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Preface
What is special about the outcome of the United Nations Conference on Envir-
onment and Development (UNCED) is that it was not an outcome at all, but the
beginning of a new process. Scholars of negotiation usually conceive of the out-
come of negotiation as an agreement, a solution, a formula that is acceptable to all
and resolves the initiating problem in some way. The outcome is a singular and con-
clusive achievement of a successful process; it is, as implied by the term, the finale
of the process of joint problem solving and decision making.
UNCED was targeted at - and, in fact, realized - a different type of conclusion.
Its outcome was a process that will continue on as a dynamic construct that frames
and governs future discussions, debates, and negotiations on the many aspects of
sustainable development, a constellation of issues recognized as critical for the
economic and environmental well-being of humanity. That process we call an inter-
national regime, and it embodies the norms, principles, rules, and procedures by
which negotiation on sustainable development will continue. The Rio Declaration
and Agenda 21, two of the major documents generated by UNCED, are testaments
to the sustained nature of the regime they help to form.
Are negotiations to build regimes different from negotiations that have a fixed
endpoint? Does this process of negotiation have special characteristics and respond
differently to internal and external stimuli? Certainly, a regime-building negotiation
can, by its very nature, operate with a significantly elevated level of ambiguity; par-
tial agreements or broad formulas without the necessary details are acceptable out-
comes because additional negotiations to iron out these deficiencies are already
programmed. As well, regime-building negotiations require the parties to be futur-
ists. They must be prepared to take some giant leaps of faith concerning how the
problem area might evolve, how the problem can be framed to account for obvious
and nonobvious policy linkages, and how the international community is likely to
want to address these issues beyond the lifetime of the personalities participating in
the current negotiations. Such negotiations require foresight, creativity, and flexibil-
ity by the participants; the formulas that are concluded must contain these same
traits. Many other attributes distinguish regime-building negotiations; they are the
subject of this book.
Outwardly, the process of UNCED did not appear that unusual. The Preparatory
Committee (PrepCom) meetings often consisted of the standard fare of general
national position statements, rhetoric addressing the pet issues of each sovereign
party to the negotiation, and a minimum of true dialogue and negotiation among the
parties. However, our observation of this process made it apparent at the same time
that something visionary was occurring: that even if this process was only partially
successful, something new and necessary would emerge. We decided to organize a
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book - starting with our own research on environmental negotiations and the
UNCED process, and then involving others who were already studying or involved
first-hand in the process - to understand and explain the negotiation process of
building international environmental regimes. Although another process exactly like
UNCED will probably not happen again for a very long time, UNCED spawned
sub-regimes - in desertification, biodiversity, forestry, and other areas - where the
lessons learned from the umbrella negotiations could be applied meaningfully. Our
goal was to incorporate an assessment of the major building blocks of the UNCED
negotiation - the structure, the process, and the participants - and produce an analy-
sis that would be useful from a conceptual perspective, as well as a practical one.
The last section of the book seeks to challenge the scholar by distinguishing this
type of negotiation from other types, and to challenge the practitioner by offering
concrete recommendations for future application.
This manuscript is a project of the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN)
Project at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in
Laxenburg, Austria. At the time we began this effort, Dr. Spector was the leader of
the Project and Drs. Sj6stedt and Zartman were members of the PIN Project Steer-
ing Committee. l We are appreciative of our many IIASA colleagues with whom we
collaborated and shared ideas on the issues and processes of UNCED, in particular
Roderick Shaw, Sture Oberg, Paul Weaver, and Gilberto Gallopin. We also thank
Peter de Janosi, the director of IIASA, for his generous support of our efforts over
the years. We were fortunate to have the dedicated and thoughtful support of Anna
KomIa, who gathered and analyzed much of the early data on the UNCED process,
and Ulli Neudeck, who cared for the administrative functions of the study and put
the manuscript into its final form.
Ultimately, we are indebted to all of the diplomats, members of the UNCED
secretariat, and representatives of nongovernmental organizations who were
extremely helpful, forthright in their views, and willing to spend much time in inter-
views to explain the process to us. Specifically, we are grateful to Maurice Strong
and Nitin Desai for granting us easy access both to the meetings and to their staff
during even the most frenetic moments of the negotiations. Our understanding of the
process would not have been possible without their openness and support.
Bertram Spector
Gunnar Sj6stedt
I. William Zartman
lOther members of the PIN Steering Committee are Guy Olivier Faure, Victor A. Kremenyuk,
Winfried Lang, and Jeffrey Z. Rubin.
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Part I
The Structure ofAnalysis

1The Dynamics of Regime-building Negotiations
Gunnar Sjostedt, Bertram I. Spector, and I. William Zartman
Cooperation among nations is taking place increasingly within the context of inter-
national regimes. These regimes codify rules, norms, and regulations; establish
expectations; and manage the governance of formal and informal agreements to
integrate cross-national action to achieve common goals on targeted issues. To vary-
ing degrees, depending on the issue area, regimes provide the necessary principles,
structures, institutions, procedures, and standards that guide national behaviors,
policy development, and coordinative strategies.}
Regimes are formulations within which international cooperation and coordina-
tion can be nurtured through mutually understood definitions of a problem and
appropriate strategies to combat it, and common perceptions of fairness and accept-
able procedures on how further disputes in the problem domain should be resolved
equitably. Regimes are not limited to governing only legally binding conventions;
they can be the organizing concepts for softer, nonbinding agreements that embody
cross-national intentions on particular issues.
Regimes are not new constructs. They exist in the areas of security (for example,
on the issue of nuclear nonproliferation), trade (for example, via the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade), human rights (for example, on the treatment of prisoners
of war), and the environment (for example, concerning acid rain in Europe). How-
ever, regimes have taken on new and important functions recently in the environ-
mental field where international diplomats have found it useful to approach these
transboundary problems in a partial and incremental fashion. International environ-
mental agreements are not generally hammered out at the negotiating table at a
single blow. Many are the product of the convention-protocol approach, in which
broad, often vaguely worded, statements of principles are established, followed by
multiple agreements that elaborate on the details. Thus, a continuous negotiation
process is established that must be implemented, managed, adjusted, and sustained
by some mechanism, which in many cases are regimes. During the formative and
operative stages of agreement implementation, regime mechanisms are needed to
foster a sense of cohesiveness, common purpose, and continuity among a set of
nations that have agreed to abide by common objectives and standards.
ISee Krasner (1983) and Young (1989) for detailed discussions of international regimes.
Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons Learned from the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (G. Sjostedt, et al., eds.; 1-85966-077-0; © IIASA; pub. Graham & Trotman, 1994;
printed in Great Britain), pp.3-19.
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4 NEGOTIATING INTERNATIONAL REGIMES
Almost every sector of international environmental concern is governed by one or
more regimes - conservation and living resources, marine environment, marine
living resources, transboundary freshwaters, land resources, hazardous and toxic
substances, nuclear safety, and the work environment. The innovation of the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) was to suggest
that all of these sectors should be subsumed under a large regime umbrella that rec-
ognizes explicitly the linkages among these environmental sectors, as well as the
linkages between these sectors and economic concerns. Of the products developed
by UNCED in this regard, the Rio Charter, which espouses agreed principles on the
environment and development, and Agenda 21, a global action plan that establishes
desired standards, goals, and targets, provide the foundation for such a regime
umbrella that takes a very broad view of the problem area. The Commission on
Sustainable Development proposed by UNCED and established by the General
Assembly is the structural entity charged with monitoring the regime.
Regimes are created and operated primarily through the mechanism of negotia-
tion. Parties that subscribe to the regime meet, monitor progress toward achieving
the assigned goals, issue warnings to free-riders, and attempt to enforce compliance
within their means. They address the binding and nonbinding agreements that serve
as the founding principles of the regime, revise them as scientific evidence, feed-
back, and political interest demand, and resolve new problems or disputes as they
arise. The balancing of demands and concessions among the subscribing nations to
arrive at a solution that is deemed fair and equitable by the parties is the typical
mode of operation and governance. Formal votes are rarely taken in such multilat-
eral fora; consensus derived from formal and informal negotiations is the chosen
mechanism for reaching joint decisions.
Regimes are not only mechanisms that encourage the use of negotiation to govern
agreements and resolve disputes that arise in their implementation, they are also
born of negotiation. To establish a regime, nations must indicate the desire to coor-
dinate action, demonstrate sustained political will, and engage in the tradeoff of
values. Although nations that seek to develop a regime in a particular area may share
the desire to cooperate, the formative negotiations can succeed or falter on many
very contentious issues: how will the problem area and solution set be defined to the
mutual satisfaction of all; what extent of monitoring will be acceptable; how should
decision making and dispute resolution within the regime be handled; are all parties
considered to be equal within the regime in terms of their rights and privileges; how
will free-riders be dealt with; will continued scientific research be sponsored; will
financial and technological support be offered to less-developed participants and to
what extent; should nongovernmental organizations playa role and, if so, what type;
how will the agreed standards, norms, rules, and procedures of the regime be
enforced; and, most importantly, how much intrusion into national sovereignty will
be tolerated? Moreover, different formulas for regime architecture must be negoti-
ated: is it to be based on a legally binding convention or a soft law understanding;
and is the regime to be institutionalized with a formal, sitting commission or secre-
tariat, or is to have only occasional meetings of the parties and experts? These are
only some of the difficult and complex questions that must be negotiated.
The outcome of regime formation negotiations must be well crafted in order to be
sustainable. Regimes must be constructed to manage relationships between signing
parties over extended periods of time. That means they must be organic and mal-
leable, capable of dynamic change in response to new scientific findings, or the
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feedback of compliant behavior. At the same time, regimes must be able to manage
international cooperation within what are often ambiguous ranges or constraints
given the nonbinding nature of the founding principles.
THE UNCED NEGOTIATIONS
The 1992 United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development repre-
sents the analytical point of departure of this study. However, the ambition of this
project goes beyond mere description of this important event and the preparatory
work preceding it. It analyzes the UNCED process as a prime example of how inter-
national regimes are negotiated. It points to conclusions drawn to facilitate the fur-
ther negotiation of environmental regimes that are likely to follow in the wake of
UNCED. UNCED succeeded in formulating an umbrella regime in the field of sus-
tainable development that will continue into the future and spawn sub-regimes in
particular environmental sectors and cross-sectoral policy areas. In many areas,
UNCED merely marked out areas in which it is vital that serious negotiations get
under way as soon as possible, such as for instance in the case of deforestation and
desertification. In several areas in which relative success was proclaimed at Rio,
continued negotiation is still regarded as a necessity by most parties. Here belong
several of the key topics of UNCED, such as climate change, biological diversity,
technological transfer, and financial assistance. These negotiations will undoubtedly
yield new sub-regimes or strengthen existing regime mechanisms.
Continuity of the process begun at Rio was by deliberate design. One purpose
of UNCED was to expand upon the goals and programs of action that originated at
the Conference on the Environment in Stockholm in 1972. Agenda 21, a very spe-
cial outcome of the UNCED process, represents a blueprint for a plan to modify,
extend, and more effectively coordinate on-going treaty-regulated processes of
cooperation in the area of environmental problems at the regional and global level.
Implementation procedures represent an important element of this process of
coordination, requiring the appropriate technological, financial, and institutional
structures to support it, especially within the UN system. Needless to say, the
future implementation process related to the ambitious plan of action represented
by Agenda 21 cannot be accomplished merely with existing approaches, organiza-
tions, and coordinative mechanisms. Complex collective decisions will have to be
taken at the international level to ensure the effective implementation of the out-
come of the Rio meeting.
Still another task of UNCED was to stimulate and support negotiations in new
areas made more complex by introducing their cross-sectoral nature, notably climate
change, deforestation, biodiversity, and economic development. The major theme of
UNCED was the conception of sustainable development. However, many of the
issues that fall under this broad heading became stalemated as a result of political
sensitivities between North and South, pressures to assign responsibility for past
environmental destruction, financial funding shortfalls, and intellectual property
rights disputes over technology transfers. Thus, the process begun at UNCED will
require continued negotiations with respect both to backlog issues and to matters
that have been dealt with relatively successfully.
If various aspects of UNCED continue to be negotiated after the 1992 Rio meet-
ing, it is a safe bet that the practitioner will find these negotiations to be a cumber-
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some process. Many of the backlog issues were warehoused because they were
politically sensitive, as well as technically complex to deal with. In some cases, for
instance the issue of deforestation, it was totally impossible to get negotiations on
matters of substance off the ground. It was even difficult to undertake discussions
about some general principles concerning forests and deforestation. In those areas
where agreements were attained, the success was often the result of the fact that
sensitive topics had been circumvented altogether or handled with the help of partial
or unsatisfactory compromises. In many cases, technical complexities related to
physical linkages across issues were avoided in the UNCED negotiations.
Given these difficulties experienced in the UNCED process, what are the useful
lessons that can be learned? It has often been pointed out that UNCED represents a
unique chain of events, a very special kind of negotiation process that is not likely to
be repeated in the near future. Certainly, any negotiation or international event can
be viewed as unique, but each shares some common characteristics as well with
other activities. Regime-building negotiations on particular sustainable development
issues will invariably encounter similar actors, positions, interests, complexities,
and sensitivities. Learning of the successes and pitfalls from the UNCED negotia-
tions can only serve to enhance the opportunities for effective negotiations in these
future regime-building situations.
Very simply, analytical conclusions drawn from studying the UNCED negotia-
tions can assist in future regime-building negotiations in at least two ways -learning
from the problems and learning from the successes. Many of the problem areas in
the UNCED negotiations were backlogged or left partially unresolved. Once can
learn in hindsight from what went wrong in the UNCED negotiations and contem-
plate ways to circumvent pitfalls and seemingly unresolvable sticking-points under
similar circumstances. One of the successes of UNCED, on the other hand, was its
regime-building process. UNCED was not itself intended to produce legally binding
treaties related to particular environmental issue areas. Such convention texts were
developed in parallel fora and only signed at UNCED. UNCED's objective was to
develop a mandate and basic set of guidelines for international governance and con-
tinued negotiations on the intersection of environmental and developmental issues.
It was to be only a way-station, but one that establishes the path, structure, and prin-
ciples - the regime - to guide subsequent agreements in a process of global integra-
tion. How this occurred, who participated and was influential, and how they
interacted to produce the negotiated outcomes of Agenda 21, the Earth Charter, and
the Commission on Sustainable Development is analyzed in the following chapters
to support more effective negotiations that formulate new regimes.
CHARACTERISTICS OF REGIME-BUILDING NEGOTIATIONS
In its heyday in the 1960s, the study of regional integration was plagued by an ambi-
guity in its very name. Integration as an outcome was continually confused with
integration as a process. The process of integrating frequently led to results short of
integration and aroused counterpressures at the same time, pushing away from an
integrated outcome; yet that process was assumed to be composed of steps toward a
goal that, in specific realities, was never reached. Regime-building, a looser reincar-
nation of integration, suffers from the same debilities, although because of the
looser nature of the subject, many regimes can be said to have been created, includ-
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ing environmental regimes. The dynamics of regime-building result from a number
of separate and often contradictory processes.
Part of the ambiguity can be brought under control by recognizing the role of
negotiation in regime-building. Specific encounters from time to time mark the for-
malization of the evolving regime, and therefore characteristics of the negotiation
process, and particularly of the process of multilateral negotiations, govern the
building of regimes. That gives some form to the amorphous notion of regime cre-
ation as integration, but it also raises further assumptions about the regime-building
process that reflect its complicated dynamics.
It must be assumed that the process of regime-building is, at least at the hands of
some of the parties, a purposive exercise heading toward the establishment of rules,
regulations, and expectations governing the given issue area (Krasner, 1983). It
should also be assumed that some parties are interested in preventing regime forma-
tion or at least limiting the attainment of the goal of others, and that, concomitantly
if not identically, progress toward regime formation arouses a counterprocess of lim-
iting regime effects. Finally, it can be assumed that any momentary process of
regime-building has its own interfactional dynamic, in which the outcome will lie
somewhere between the extreme positions, although not necessarily in the middle
(as is sometimes assumed). These three sources of dynamics need to be kept in mind
and will be referred to subsequently when necessary in the discussion, but are also
implicit and subjacent even when not directly mentioned.
PROCESSES
It will first be important to layout the characteristics of multilateral negotiations to
understand the basic process of regime-building (Zartman, 1994). Within the stand-
ard definition of negotiation as the process by which conflicting positions are com-
bined to form a common decision (Zartman and Berman, 1982: 1), there are six
characteristics that define the multilateral version of the process.2 Multilateral nego-
tiations do not have the characteristic dynamics that the two-party structure imposes
on bilateral negotiations; instead, their essential nature is one of managing complex-
ity to produce an outcome. These six defining characteristics all point to salient
ways of managing aspects of complexity.
Most obviously, multilateral means multiparty negotiations, with multifaceted
interests in each party. UNCED, in particular, was characterized by the representa-
tion of over 170 sovereign states, dozens of intergovernmental organizations, and
nearly 1500 nongovernmental organizations, each with overlapping and diverse
interests and stakes on the various issues. A second defining characteristic is the
multi-issue nature of the negotiations. Multiple issues provide the means as well as
the subject of agreement, since they allow for the tradeoffs that provide the net-
work for a single outcome. They also allow for texture in the negotiations, since not
2This list is necessarily similar to, but importantly different from, Oran Young's in "The Politics of
International Regime Formation," XXXXIII, International Organization, 3:359--66 (Summer 1989). His
"multiple actors" is of course the same. "Consensus" replaces "unanimity" as being more accurate;
"coalition" and "variable values, parties and roles" replace "transnational alliances" and "shifting
involvements" as being more specific. Young's "integrative bargaining" seems to mistake an optimal
search for a basic characteristic. Both "uncertainty" and "(selective) problems and approaches" are
interesting features, but do not appear to be defining characteristics.
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all the many parties have the same intensity of interest on any issue, any more than
they have the same substantive interest. This allows Homans's Maxim - "The more
items at stake can be divided into goods valued more by one party (or parties) than
they cost to the other(s) and goods valued more to the other party (or parties) than
they cost to the first, the greater the chances of successful outcome" (Homans,
1961: 62) - to be played out to the fullest, and Homans's Maxim is the key to any
negotiation.
The recognition of multiple cross-sectoral issue linkages was one of the unique
innovations of UNCED, as well as the source of its many inherent problems. The
General Assembly resolution establishing UNCED acknowledged not only the
physical linkages across issues, but also the policy linkages that must be addressed
by the international community if the problems of environment and development are
to be confronted effectively. At the same time, while it is useful to acknowledge the
interrelationships between issues at a high level, the scientific community is still
uncertain as to the physical linkages surrounding global warming, for instance, and
policy makers are not yet quite sure of the appropriate policy linkages - the trade-
offs that should be made - to create the balance necessary for sustainable develop-
ment (see Shaw, Gallopin, Weaver, and Oberg, 1991, for a systems approach to
answering these questions). As a result, much effort was exerted at UNCED merely
to define the network of issue clusters in an impressionistic fashion, benefiting only
from partial answers available from scientists and policy makers.
As a result of the first two characteristics, multilateral negotiations are character-
ized by coalition. Coalition among many parties is often noted to be the major ana-
lytical characteristic, but its applicability to many other issues as well, in order to
reduce their complexity and make them manageable, is not usually recognized.
Packaging, linkages and tradeoffs - the basic devices of the negotiation process -
are all ways of making coalitions among issues, interests, and positions.
Many of the institutionalized coalitions were ever-present forces on the confer-
ence floor - the EC and the Group of 77, for example. In addition, though, newly
formed, nontraditional, special-interest groupings also emerged - small island
states, mountain states, economies in transition, for example. The intensive net-
working conducted by NGOs also generated many coalitions outside of the tradi-
tional governmental form. These alignments were driven more by the motives of
common economic and ecological interests than by common geographic location, as
in the traditional Second Committee groupings of the General Assembly. These coa-
litions helped to simplify the public proceedings of the negotiation. However, much
time was devoted in coalition caucuses during the PrepCom meetings, as well as at
the Rio Conference itself, to intra-coalitional bargaining - to deal with disputes
among coalition members, iron out common positions and strategies, and respond to
alternative coalition demands and proposals.
Multilateral agreement is by consensus, a decision rule in which, essentially,
abstention is an affirmative rather than a negative vote. Multilateral agreements are
arrived at by consensus when a coalition formed by a significant but unspecified
number of parties is in favor and the rest do not oppose. Parties not in agreement can
abstain without blocking the outcome, and parties opposing can be left out as long
as their number does not become significant. Strategies of incremental participation
and agreement then become possible (Zartman, 1987, ch. 10). At the same time, the
significant number requirement means that lowest common denominator (LCD)
agreements without teeth are a residual possibility.
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No voting ever occurred at UNCED or at the PrepCom sessions. Rather, the pro-
cedure for agreement was consensus. Certainly, there were abstentions, but gener-
ally they were not allowed by the Bureau to block approval if the majority was
generally in favor of a proposal. Given the mission of UNCED to establish nonbind-
ing guidelines and mandates for future negotiations that would produce binding
agreements, obtaining consensus was not an unreasonable goal. It was commonly
understood that under a future sustainable development regime, many of the same
issues would be debated and negotiated again, so that partial disagreement was
acceptable and agreements reached by consensus at UNCED were not irrevocable.
The fifth defining characteristic is the multirole nature of the negotiations. Roles
are divided initially into leaders and followers, but then additionally into other posi-
tions such as defenders of single issues, general orchestrators, and others. Without
such role diversity, the issue and party complexities could not be combined in an
agreeable outcome. Playing on all levels of interaction, parties not only work to
shape the values attached to various issues, but also to manipulate the other parties
and their roles in order to come to an agreement. They must do so because, if they
choose to ignore these possibilities, others will make use of them, forcing the other
parties to play on these levels in response. It is again the immense complexity of
having to deal with many parties, issues, and roles that makes such multiple vari-
ability the price of winning an agreement, thus further increasing the characteristic
complexity.
Leaders on some issues at UNCED were followers on others. Individual delegates
often were asked to take on the responsibilities of leading working groups in negoti-
ating specific issues, thus neutralizing sometimes powerful personalities. Moreover,
NGO representatives were placed on the official delegations of several countries,
thus bridging the gap between official and special interest stakeholders, requiring
these agents to represent both narrow and broad constituencies.
Finally, multilateral negotiations - particularly for building regimes - are matters
of rule-making rather than the redistribution of tangible goods. Neither of the basic
characteristics of division and exchange are frequently present in multilateral nego-
tiations; instead, the main goal is to establish procedures that harmonize national
legislation or establish rules that can be applied by and to states (Winham and Kizer,
1991), and that only secondarily govern substantive outcomes. This does not mean
that tangible goods are not thereby affected, but it does mean that effect is uncertain,
long range, and universal. It does mean that the importance of the formula is
enhanced, since the adoption of a rule depends more on a convincing justification or
a notion of justice than on exchanged concessions in detail.
Rule-making has two dimensions - diachronic and synchronic - that reflect the
three simultaneous processes. The particular outcome represents the results of the
moment in a synchronic process, but it is also a stage in the battle over the evolution
of the regime. Regimes are temporary, evolving, and continuously expandable and
perfectible rather than being overarching and deductive as an optimal formula
should be in a negotiated agreement. They are often built up inductively, in an incre-
mental process, in which many parts are put together by trial and error into a
momentary, unstable resting place, preparatory to further movement. For those who
are trying to move the process forward, instability can be a creative characteristic of
negotiations; the temporary formula should be so constructed that it calls for its own
improvement and moves the process along - or, like the Sinai disengagement agree-
ments of 1974-5, so that it "falls forward" as a temporary solution that, construc-
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tively, cannot last in its momentary form. However, for opponents, that same
instability is an opportunity to renegotiate later for a looser agreement.
The diachronic process of incremental formulation for multilateral regimes takes
place over an extended period. The formulating negotiations are preceded by prep-
aratory and partial negotiations, as well as other events. Often the incremental
process begins bilaterally and even nongovernmentally, and the main round serves
to collect and coordinate these diverse efforts around a coherent formula. The initial
or salient negotiation lays out the basic formula and the subsequent negotiations fill
in and revise the details. Negotiations move from "whether" in the main round to
"when," "what," and "how" in later meetings.
This incrementalism involves both steps in regime construction and resistance.
and momentary midpoints among the parties. interests. and roles at the particular
negotiation encounter. Definitions are often avoided in favor of lists of covered
activities, which are only later joined under a definitional umbrella. Areas of atten-
tion are identified and cobbled together to form the scope of the agreement. A pack-
age is constructed out of either a core coalition of key interests or a diverse coalition
of disparate interests; then the agreement is expanded, to the extent possible, either
to extend the coverage or fill in the holes. Commitments are outlined and then
strengthened, and resistance against them weakened. Environmental negotiations
have characteristically begun with statements of intent. codes of conduct, or differ-
ential obligations. exceptions. and reservations. which are then gradually turned into
binding obligations; private watch groups monitoring behavior replace signatories'
engagements or international organizational constraints. until new norms have been
introduced far enough to constitute informal international law.
UNCED did not yield rules per se. but a framework setting the stage for continu-
ous rule-making negotiations. The global action plan. Agenda 21, for example.
inventories goals, targets, alternative strategies. and conditions that should be con-
sidered in future talks across all of the sectors and cross-sectoral issues related to
sustainable development. These elements are likely to be the components of even-
tual treaty provisions that specify rules. constraints. and procedures that must be
complied with for effective implementation.
The process of expanding the scope of the momentary agreement is a particularly
good illustration of the dual synchronic and diachronic nature of regime-building.
Procedural tradeoffs are used to construct the unstable agreement. and their ele-
ments then become the ingredients for its expansion toward a more stable regime.
Tradeoffs are the essence of formula-building and of negotiation in general; they
provide the means of creating a positive sum agreement, both by constituting ele-
ments evaluated differently by the parties and by incorporating additional side-
payments to enlarge the pie (Nash. 1950; Homans. 1961). In the regime-building
process. the potential items for tradeoffs are as ill-defined as the issues themsel ves.
and are differentiated in time as well as nature and size. Time-related payoffs are
unusually difficult to compare and equate, not only because discount rates fluctuate
wildly, but also because delayed payments can change in value or even be evaded
(Sebenius. 1991). However. by the same token. they do lend themselves well to
diachronically evolving agreements.
Three types of rule-making tradeoffs are available. One is the exception: agree-
ment to a regulatory situation is often obtained at the price of claiming exceptions at
the end of the agreement. In this way, a principle is established. but its effectiveness
is weakened. Later, the incipient regime can be consolidated by negotiating away
I
THE DYNAMICS OF REGIME-BtnLDlNG NEGOTIATIONS 11
the exceptions, presumably against other tradeoffs in new circumstances. A second
tradeoff exchanges breadth for depth in regulation. Many are the cases where a
regime began with a relatively strict coverage of a relatively small number of items,
often implemented through a small number of steep steps, and later expanded the
scope of the coverage. The opposite approach is a relatively broad coverage through
loose restrictions or gentle steps. The first can lead to incoherence and imperceptible
results, whereas the second invites generalized resistance and tends to "fall back-
ward," to less rather than more extensive effectiveness.
The third type of tradeoff is the reverse of the first, trading restrictions for induce-
ments, which are then tapered off as compliance proceeds on its own and becomes it
own inducement. Many environmental negotiations have turned to compensation as
a way of establishing tradeoffs across the North-South divide. Indeed, the entire
structure of UNCED is based on such a massive tradeoff designed to bridge the
North-South gap between environment and development. Compensation can pro-
vide an immediate transfer of resources, but has an air of bribery; it must be so
structured that individual parties are not able to enjoy its benefits as a public good
while opting out of its obligations.
ACTOR DYNAMICS
There is no prescribed model or method to this process, although there are strategies
that the parties use to play. There is a procedural sequence, which gives a certain
order to the parties' efforts at finding a formula: philosophical or plenary thoughts,
sectoral interest-related positions, horsetrading resolutions. In the process of being
more or less active in multilateral negotiations, parties select from a limited list of
roles that differ in nature. They can Drive, Conduct, Defend, Brake, or Cruise
(Sj6stedt, 1992). Drivers try to organize the participation to produce an agreement
that is consonant with their interests. Conductors also seek to produce an agreement,
but from a neutral position, with no interest axe of their own to grind. Defenders are
single-issue participants, concerned more with incorporating a particular measure or
position in the agreement than with the overall success of the negotiations. Brakers
are the opposing or modifying resistance, brought into action by the progress being
made on either the broad regime or on specific issue items. Cruisers are filler, with
no strong interests of their own and so available to act as followers. Two other mar-
ginal strategies are left, that of exit, through individual exceptions and derogations,
and that of compensation, through a trade of exceptions for inducements and side
payments. All of these roles are available, to be used by various parties at various
times, although the adoption of certain roles - driver or conductor, for example -
colors the ability to shift to another later on.
These roles aggregate into the two types of goals - the building of a partial and
eventually minimum winning (or blocking) coalition, and the building of a univer-
sal coalition or consensus. Coalitions can be based on transnational or international
cooperation. The transnational cooperation of scientists, technologists, and busi-
ness is one type of coalition that can be built as a basis for an environmental bar-
gain, but it is generally not enough. It is merely the grouping that constitutes one
side of the negotiations, and it must then use its pluralistic resources - knowledge,
skill, and money - to either raise the consciousness or strike an interest deal with
political leaders accountable to constituent groups. This strategy clearly appears to
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be the equivalent of the incrementally aggregating process already noted on the
issue side.
The other type of coalition building is international, among - rather than across -
states. In this, the political leaders are the motor, with science, technology, and busi-
ness as their advisory groups. The building blocs of such coalitions are frequently
regional identity groups, but may also be caucusing groups based on issue-related
common interests. Strategies are drawn from the three classic baskets labeled
Coalesce, Cut Up, and Confront. Groups seek either to aggregate other groups and
parties into a growing winning coalition, or to divide opposing groups into smaller
parts so as to absorb or merely to weaken them, or to work out a deal with them.
This second strategy can be termed one of leadership or orchestration for the
building of consensus. As opposed to the acephalic conglomerating strategies of
coalition, orchestration strategies depend on a designated conductor or leader who
agglomerates parties into a consensual process. Each party pursues its own interests
and is brought to play its own score in the right way to bring a harmonious result.
The conductor could be a sovereign with his own interest-related agenda, but above
all interested in obtaining a generally satisfactory agreement. However, the multilat-
eral conference nature of the negotiations weigh in favor of a disinterested leader to
provide some order to the proceedings. Thus, many environmental conferences give
a prominent role to a secretary general, conference chair, secretariat, or other organ-
izing agency. States rarely aspire to this role, for many reasons: often, no state is
powerful enough to be hegemonic, interests are usually defensive and partial rather
than global, and every potential leader is above all a regional and interest group
player and so is tainted. In this situation, the procedural conductor is actually wel-
come, since he allows the state-parties to pursue their own interests more effectively
and to facilitate agreement.
Several other dynamics are important in describing actor behavior in large multi-
lateral regime-building negotiations such as UNCED. The first dimension embraces
the wide variety of entities that participate. The traditional actors in international
negotiations are, of course, the nations themselves, who embody the interests of
governments and are usually the exclusive agents invited to the table to conduct bar-
gaining. At UNCED, and in any projected negotiations conducted under the
umbrella of sustainable development for the foreseeable future, North-South differ-
ences will likely playa prominent role. This was certainly the single most important
division characterizing interstate relations at UNCED. The industrialized states,
with their emphasis on the environment, their ownership of the technology and
resources needed to achieve environmental and developmental goals, and their dom-
ination of the UNCED agenda, were in a much more powerful position than the
developing countries. In part, through an analysis of how the relative power of these
two camps was actually exercised, we can attempt to understand the negotiation
process and outcome of UNCED. Beyond the central position of the national actors,
pivotal roles were played at UNCED and in the prenegotiation phase by two types of
nontraditional actors: intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs). The IGOs played relatively neutral, though extremely
important, information provider roles, feeding studies, analysis, and data into the
UNCED process primarily through the UNCED secretariat. The NGOs mirrored the
division between North and South and, in their own way, attempted to influence the
primary state actors. Most NGOs were advocates of a singular position, but an
important segment of NGOs represented the international and national scientific
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communities, offering scientific infonnation and analysis focused on particular tech-
nical issues.
Another characteristic relates to how actors organize themselves internally. Tradi-
tionally, delegations at international negotiations represent and are members of the
foreign ministry of their country. Given the cross-sectoral nature of so many issues
at UNCED, this approach was infeasible if truly knowledgeable delegates were to
be appointed. National delegations from countries with sufficient resources were
composed of officials from various relevant ministries and departments: foreign
affairs, finance, environment, development and trade, etc. As well, several delega-
tions included small numbers of NGO representatives as official members, repre-
senting important interests within their national populations. As a result, the internal
composition of official negotiation actors often epitomized the multifaceted interests
of a wide range of domestic stakeholders - both in and out of government. Another
important feature of internal organization is coordination between the negotiation
delegation and the home office. At UNCED, many delegations were on a "loose
string" with limited instructions and broad latitude; others were under much tighter
control. When very limited support was available from home, as was the case for
many developing countries, internal organization and activities on behalf of their
national interests were often a matter of discovery. Many of these national delegates
were themselves learning about the issues - their scientific as well as policy implica-
tions - in real time and creating fonnulations of their national interests on these
issues for the first time at the negotiation sessions. These internal opportunities and
constraints played a major role in facilitating and inhibiting the progress of the
negotiations.
PROCESS DYNAMICS
This book addresses how each of these characteristics influenced the regime-
building negotiations ofUNCED. Generating a common political willingness to first
come to the table and then continue negotiating is the additional catalytic element
that must be injected into the equation. This willingness or flexibility is a dimension
that cuts across all of these descriptive attributes and is common to most successful
negotiations. Aexibility is the attitudinal and/or behavioral shift from rigidity and
toughness toward conciliation and agreement. It is characterized by a willingness to
adjust perceptions of the problem, issues, and solutions, which in tum frees parties
to modify their behavior to achieve agreement (see Druckman, 1992, for a review of
the literature related to flexibility).
Aexibility in negotiation may be viewed as a necessary condition for the conver-
gence of widely divergent interests to occur, but conceptually we are hard pressed to
pinpoint what flexibility is, how it came about, and what its implications are. Yet
these are among the central dynamics of the process itself! There are inputs into the
negotiation process (new infonnation about the issue or new stakeholders entering
the fray or new tactics introduced by another party, for example) that can influence a
willingness to review the issues and one's interests concerning those issues. These
stimulants of cognitive adjustment can yield increased flexibility or stubbornness,
which in turn yield outputs, ultimately of agreement, partial agreement, or stale-
mate. The transfonnation process from input to output - from initial and distant
positions to modified and more closely situated converged positions - is the process
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of flexibility that is important to examine, but eludes most negotiation analysis.
Practitioners often can identify turning points in specific negotiation cases, but find
it difficult to put their finger on why formerly conflicting parties adjusted their per-
ceptions and exhibited a willingness to agree at that point in time. Researchers
(Druckman, 1986, and Druckman, Husbands and Johnston, 1991) have examined
the concept of turning points in negotiations as well, and conclude that they occur in
response to signals from other participating actors that their bargaining behavior has
changed, or is about to change. Others (Cross, 1978) hypothesize that flexibility is a
manifestation of a continual learning process in negotiation. Adaptation in attitude
and behavior is a response to persistent observation, monitoring of other parties, the
introduction of new information, and changes in the ambient surroundings of the
talks. However, these efforts still beg the question of why there was a change at a
specific point in time toward either agreement or deadlock. The stimulants of the
flexibility process remain vague and secretive, despite their clear importance in
explaining the negotiation process.
Conceptual headway can be made in understanding negotiation flexibility by
focusing on two negotiation dynamics - issue and interest development. Both are
the product of flexibility, and both experience iterative adjustment by all parties to
the negotiation based on cognitive reassessments - in successful negotiations yield-
ing consensual issue definition and coalitions based on common interests. Refram-
ing the issues that divide parties and adjusting national interests so that they better
satisfy international goals are major steps away from confrontation and toward inte-
grative, cooperative problem solving (Rothman, 1991). By mapping these dynam-
ics, we can understand and evaluate the process by which negotiators and policy
makers undergo adjustment regarding issues and interests cognitively - in terms of
their understanding of the issues; perceptually - in terms of assessments of their
own and other actors' positions, interests, and strategies; and evaluatively - in terms
of their beliefs of fair formulas for agreement.
Several factors stimulate this cognitive, perceptual, and value flexibility (see
Figure 1.1). These factors operate primarily within the context of the internal policy
making system of each national actor. As the parties to a conflict gradually adjust
their understanding of complex issues under dispute, through the interjection of new
information from other negotiators as well as from sources external to the negotia-
tion, their definitions and framing of the problem may transition to new understand-
ings. Another important stimulus of issue and interest reframing is the gradual
clarification of national policy objectives, spurred on by domestic public and
intragovernmental debate. As a nation's values and preferences concerning a par-
ticular issue mature and clarify, its changed perspectives on those issues may cause a
redefinition that rationalizes the issue in line with the newly adjusted interests. Cer-
tainly, the use of power and persuasive tactics by other parties to the negotiation can
influence the way national interests are stated and issues are framed. In the best of
circumstances, these factors can produce a consensual understanding of issues and
interests, thereby enabling a shared search for solutions to proceed among the nego-
tiating parties.
A possible outcome of this common learning experience due to the evolution of
issue and interest understanding is the development of a common sense of fairness
concerning possible solutions. (See Albin, 1992, for a review of different concep-
tions of fairness in negotiation.) Formulas perceived as fair by all parties are achiev-
able as consensual knowledge about the issues develop and interests converge.
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Figure 1.1 The Iterative Dynamics of Issue Reframing and
Interest Clarification
Issue Development
The process of prenegotiation, in large part, is the process of issue redefinition and
reframing. In UNCED, the complexity of issue linkages caused issue reframing to
extend into the negotiation phase as well. As actors redefine issues, with the input of
new information, there is the possibility that multiple conflicting definitions of these
issues will eventually converge, leading to a common understanding and consensual
knowledge. Given the emergence of consensual knowledge in an issue area, viable
and acceptable formulas for solution are more likely.
Conflict often arises over issues that are perceived and defined differently by
actors who are stakeholders on those issues - those who have something to gain or
lose in settling the dispute. Initially, the wayan issue is perceived and defined is
largely determined by broad national objectives and the state of issue knowledge by
national policy makers. As the subject of much international negotiation today
focuses on complicated and interlinked multi-issue problems involving the interac-
tion of complex social, scientific, technological, and economic factors, issue defini-
tion is becoming extremely information-dependent and difficult, especially for
developing countries who do not have the resources to expend on extensive data
gathering and analysis.
This fact has given rise to the heightened role played by several third party actors
who are not principals in the negotiation themselves; however, they have become
critical adjuncts to the process of issue definition and redefinition (Sjostedt and
16 NEGOTIATING INTERNATIONAL REGIMES
Spector, 1992). These actors include conference secretariats, who provide back-
ground papers on the scientific issues and conduct research and analysis on the
implications of alternative proposals and recommendations. A wide range of inter-
governmental and regional organizations can also play major roles in generating
information and making assessments based on objective data. Increasingly, a third
type of actor that is becoming important at an international level is the nongovern-
mental organization (NGO). These NGOs can take many forms - from objective
scientific research institutes to advocacy, business, and lobbying groups. Whatever
their form, though, one of their principal roles in the prenegotiation is to provide
information to negotiators and policy makers in the hope of influencing opinion and
shifting perceptions of the problem itself.
Interest Development
What is the process by which such issue reframing comes about? In part, it is a pro-
cess of incremental clarification of national interests and objectives (Ikle and Leites,
1962; Spector, 1983). As more is learned about an issue, domestic debate proceeds,
and national goals are better understood, policy makers may readjust their values
and preferences toward that issue, resulting in a modification of how the issue is per-
ceived, scoped, and defined. In prenegotiation and negotiation, there is typically a
continuous push-pull interaction between interest clarification and issue reframing.
Interests are fonned and modified based upon new information and a clarification of
national objectives. Issues are reframed and redefined as national interests change,
in turn refreshing the consensual knowledge about these issues.
This iterative process occurs on two levels. Internally, within pluralistic negotiation
actors, each stakeholder is continually attempting to reformulate the way issues are
represented and understood, so that their particular interests are best served. This defi-
nition and clarification process also occurs on a multilateral level among negotiating
parties that are jointly seeking a way of accommodating their mutual interests. Issue
and interest clarification and adjustment are major dynamics addressed by the various
authors in this book. We seek to track, understand, and evaluate how and why negotia-
tors and policy makers change their minds concerning their definitions and prefer-
ences on issues under debate and what the implications of such changes are.
ORGANIZATION OF TIDS BOOK
One striking feature of UNCED was its vast agenda. It covered virtually the whole
range of environmental issues and confronted complicated cross-sectoral issues,
such as financial support to developing countries, transfer of technology, and trade
and development as well. By design and out of necessity, UNCED steered clear of
dealing with any of these issues comprehensively. Rather, these substantive issues
were conceived of as an integrated part of a large system of many on-going negotia-
tions, most of which are likely to continue in the future. This important element of
the structure and system of the UNCED negotiations is described in Chapter 2.
We turn from the structure of the analysis to the process of negotiation itself in
Part II, beginning with an impartial eyewitness account of what happened in the pre-
negotiation and negotiation phases (Chapter 3). The study continues by focusing on
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two analyses of the UNCED negotiation process: one focused on issue definition
and linkages, and the other on interest adjustment. An important element of UNCED
was the nature of problem solving and collective learning about the substance of
issues that is usually associated with the prenegotiation stage of international bar-
gaining. In particular, issue definition and clarification was an important element of
the UNCED process. In several areas, a stable issue formation was not concluded
before the Rio meeting, but continues within the context of negotiations that will
proceed into the future. Several of the main problems confronting negotiators at
UNCED were not clarified sufficiently in a scientific sense or early enough in the
process. One example is the physical linkage between several of the major issues
like those between climate change and, for example, deforestation, biological diver-
sity, and oceans. These physical - or real world - couplings across issues were
largely avoided, but must reemerge in future negotiations for solutions to be devel-
oped. The reality of these physical issue linkages have to be considered in global
negotiations on environment and development because of their mutual interdepend-
ence. Therefore, useful lessons for the future may be drawn from examining issue
dynamics. linkages, and issue redefinition (see Chapter 4).
The UNCED process was in many ways a direct continuation, not only of earlier
negotiations on particular environmental problem areas, but also of the protracted
North-South struggle about the ruling regimes for international economic coopera-
tion. As seen in this perspective, the UNCED process recalls the grand debates of
the 1970s in the UN system, especially in UNCTAD, on a New International Eco-
nomic Order. This continuity from the past is due to the ambition of UNCED to link
the global problems of environment and development. Many observers feared that
this strategy would inevitably revive the North-South ideological trench war that
proved to be so destructive earlier. Therefore, it is not surprising that North-South
contentions did, indeed, have a great impact on the UNCED negotiations. Several of
the key issues on the UNCED agenda were elements in the traditional North-South
dialogue - or confrontation. Here notably belong the cross-sectoral issues of transfer
of technology and financial resources from the North to the South that increasingly
dominated negotiations over Agenda 21. However, the North-South conflict was
clearly also a typical feature of the negotiations over the pure environmental issues.
A recurrent claim of developing countries was that they should be treated preferen-
tially in comparison to industrialized countries; Third World countries should retain
the right to prioritize their own developmental needs where these conflicted with the
environmental policy measures discussed in UNCED.
Notwithstanding these highly significant differences between developed and
developing countries, the North-South confrontation was not as dysfunctional as it
had been in the 19705. One explanation is the new pattern of cooperation and coali-
tion-building involving developing countries that emerged at UNCED. The Group
of 77 certainly remained a key actor in the process. In line with General Assembly
norms, all endgame negotiations were conducted on the basis of draft texts offered
by the Group of 77. However, many of the more significant developing countries
were not satisfied to have their own national interests defended by the larger coali-
tion. These states either performed individually or became partners in smaller coali-
tions created to defend a limited set of interests. Illustrative examples are the
coalition of countries with highly fragile mountain ecosystems on their territories
and the coalition of low-lying island states. The negotiations progressed as national
and coalitional interests changed from their initial positions and drew closer
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together. This process of interest adjustment on issues and the coalition-building that
results from common-interest groupings of nations is an area in which significant
lessons can be drawn for the future (see Chapter 5).
While Chapters 4 and 5 analyze issue formation and interest adjustment in
UNCED at a macro level, Chapter 6 addresses these same process factors, but
employs a quite different approach. This is a case study representing a micro per-
spective. It traces how a particular constel1ation of linked issues were dealt with. An
objective of this chapter is to highlight negotiation problems related to the kind of
complexity typical of the UNCED process - that represented by issue linkages.
Chapter 6 offers an evaluation of the extent to which the UNCED process was able
to cope with a package of highly important physical linkages that were not a priori
acknowledged at the political level, but one that is very likely to resurface in the
future regime negotiations.
Part ill of the book reflects the Actor Perspective - how the key participants in
UNCED behaved in the process. Chapters 7 and 8 pertain to the most important type
of participant in the UNCED process: the nation state. They address the problem of
how nations function to perform effectively as unitary actors. One consequence of
issue complexity typical for the UNCED agenda is the need for extensive intragov-
ernmental negotiation. This feature of the negotiation process is by no means excep-
tional for UNCED. It is, in fact. quite normal that agendas of complex international
negotiations in issue areas like the environment or, say, economic affairs and trade,
impact on the responsibilities of two or more ministries or central agencies. Still, the
need for intragovernmental coordination was of a particular concern in the UNCED
process. One reason was the sheer number of issues that was unusually large, even
by UN standards. More importantly, new couplings across issues were made at
UNCED that had not been dealt with in earlier negotiations. This was notably the
case with themes related to the new concept of "sustainable development" and par-
ticularly the cross-sectoral issues. Accordingly, in these areas experience from ear-
lier intragovernmental consultation and negotiation was comparatively weak. The
linkage between environmental and trade issues is one case in point. Thus, intra-
governmental coordination is one area in which useful lessons for future negotia-
tions can be developed (see Chapters 7 and 8).
Chapters 9 and 10 relate to the function of negotiation leadership, which can be
performed by several types of actors at the national, intergovernmental, or interna-
tionallevels. An important negotiation problem highlighted in the UNCED process,
with ramifications for the future, is that of effective leadership. In many processes of
complex multilateral negotiations before UNCED, a successful outcome was depen-
dent on Great Power leadership. For instance, the bilateral relationship between the
United States and the EC has given clear and authoritative guidance to several
rounds of trade negotiations in GAIT. In UNCED, this sort of Great Power leader-
ship was largely lacking, particularly in the early stages of the negotiation process
when issues were framed and the agenda set. In this phase of the UNCED process,
negotiations were almost entirely dependent on the input supplied by the UNCED
secretariat and the Bureau, including the chairman of the PrepCom as well as the
chairmen of the working groups. In the preparation of future regime-building nego-
tiations on environment and development, it is an essential analytical task to evalu-
ate the opportunities and limits of leadership.
A rapidly growing literature on international regime-building highlights the deci-
sive role of the scientific community in the creation of conventions concerning the
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protection of the environment. However, the scientific community seemingly did not
make as significant a contribution to the UNCED process as required. In fact, many
scientists were frustrated by the relatively modest achievements made in UNCED.
Chapters 11 and 12 offer an assessment of the efficacy of scientific attempts to
influence UNCED and climate change negotiations that should be useful in consid-
ering enhancements to their role in future regime-building negotiations.
Opinion-building has always represented a significant element in policy making at
the national level, as well as the international level, concerning environmental mat-
ters. Sometimes, public opinion has enhanced negotiations on international envir-
onmental problems by stimulating national agencies in the various countries
concerned to take constructive decisions. However, public opinion intervention in a
negotiation process is not always helpful. For instance, the involvement of public
interest groups in environmental negotiations has sometimes prevented the quiet and
secretive diplomacy necessary for constructive solutions. One case in point was the
negotiations for the Basel Convention concerning the handling of hazardous waste.
Therefore, the role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) may become a critical
factor in future negotiations on environment and development (see Chapter 13).
From this point of view, the performance of NGOs in the UNCED process is signifi-
cant. NGOs attained greater access to the UNCED process as compared to earlier
conferences or negotiations in the UN context. This was by no means a certain out-
come given the protracted discussions during the first PrepCom sessions concerning
the status of NGOs. The roles played by NGOs in the UNCED process and the kind
of contributions made by them are elucidated and analyzed systematically to draw
insights for future negotiations.
Part IV relates to the outcome and lessons learned from the UNCED process.
Chapter 14 gives an account and an assessment of the concrete results achieved in
the UNCED process in terms of building a new environmental regime. Partial suc-
cesses and shortcomings are also evaluated and recommendations to improve future
practice are offered. Finally, Chapter 15 offers an important perspective to support
future regime-building negotiations on sustainable development issues. Lessons
learned from UNCED are deduced to improve actor strategies and negotiation pro-
cesses in upcoming negotiations. Institutionalization of techniques to manage com-
plexity and help build consensus to govern regimes effectively are described as a
new type of procedural outcome that should be addressed early in the regime-
building negotiations themselves. Ultimately, regimes evolve and adjust through a
reflexive process of sustained negotiations. This continual process of transformation
to maintain effectiveness and support of international commitments is a challenge
that existing regimes and future regime-building negotiations must face. The experi-
ence and lessons of UNCED are sure to be of assistance to practitioners and analysts
alike.

2The Negotiating System of Environment and
Development
Pamela Chasek
This chapter puts UNCED into the context of a larger system of international negoti-
ations on environment and development-related issues. Since the 1972 Stockholm
Conference on the Human Environment, there has been a growing number of inter-
national negotiations, conferences, and agencies to deal with environmental issues.
Concomitantly, as the economic conditions in many developing countries worsened,
organizations and agencies were formed and conferences were held to generate solu-
tions to development-related problems. The growing interaction among these fora is
an indicator of the formation and development of a negotiating system.
A negotiating system is composed typically of specialized intergovernmental and
transnational structures and processes, involving state and non-state actors, that are
capable of handling at least some collective tasks in an ex ante coordinated manner.
Such systems are characterized by the fact that they never become static. They
evolve continuously in response to their own inner dynamics as well as to changes
in the political, economic, and social environments (Kremenyuk, 1991; Riuberger,
1983; Young, 1989). Such systems do not represent necessarily comprehensive or
institutionalized processes that incorporate talks among countries on all disputable
and controversial issues. Nor does such a system simply consist of the sum total of
national governments and their dyadic interactions.
A multilayered system of intern.ational negotiation is characterized by: (1) an
identifiable political agenda filled with a host of issues in which a variable number
of state and non-state actors have a stake, and which they cannot, and do not want
to, handle by themselves; (2) more or less durable multiparty networks of coordina-
tion through which state - and, to some extent, non-state - actors deal collectively
with one or more of these issues; and (3) collectively chosen policies of regulation,
distribution or redistribution in an issue-area, the implementation of which is again
sustained through such networks (Riuberger, 1983). The major actors in such sys-
tems are national governments, intergovernmental organizations, agencies estab-
lished by national governments, and nongovernmental organizations. Binding the
system together is a body of agreements and arrangements ranging from unofficial
expressions of national interest to firm treaty commitments under international law
(Caldwell, 1990:95). While such negotiation systems can certainly operate within
Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons Leamed from the United Nations Conference on
Environmental and Development (G. Sjlistedt, el al., eds.; 1-85966-077-0; © IIASA; pub. Graham &
Trotman. 1994; printed in Great Britain), pp. 21-4 I.
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the context of international regimes, they do not necessarily imply that the partici-
pants share common principles and norms of behavior; they have only agreed to
continue negotiating over such issues.
In 1989, when the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 44/228 establishing
UNCED (see Appendix A), one of its goals was to evaluate the state of the system of
environmental and development negotiations. The Resolution asked the conference
to: "examine the state of the environment and changes that have occurred since the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment ... taking into account the
actions taken by al1 countries and intergovernmental organizations to protect and
enhance the environment." It also said that the conference should: "recommend
measures to be taken at the national and international levels to protect and enhance
the environment, taking into account the specific needs of developing countries...
with special emphasis on incorporating environmental concerns in the economic and
social development process..." (UNGA, 1989).
In effect, the conference was to determine the extent of cohesiveness between the
treatment of environmental and development issues in the negotiating system and
then recommend the means to strengthen this system.
This chapter examines UNCED as the focal point of a negotiating system, evalu-
ating the degree of coordination across different negotiations, conferences, and trea-
ties, and determining how these elements contributed to one of the conference's
major products: Agenda 21. Agenda 21 is a 750-page detailed blueprint for action to
be taken by governments, agencies, UN organizations, and independent sectors in
al1 major areas affecting the relationship between environment and economic devel-
opment (see Appendix C). Looking at UNCED as the core of the larger system, this
chapter describes the two essentially independent sub-systems of environment and
development negotiations at the outset of the UNCED preparatory process and how
they contributed to the PrepCom's negotiations. The next section describes the out-
put of UNCED - the recommendations within Agenda 21 for initiating new negotia-
tion processes and institutions that will have an impact on changing the system.
Final1y, both UNCED and the overall system are analyzed as to the impacts they had
on each other and the significance of this relationship for the future of the
negotiating system.
UNCED INPUTS
As part of the preparatory process, the UNCED secretariat and the PrepCom exam-
ined the components of the existing international system of environment and devel-
opment negotiations before preparing Agenda 21. To manage the complicated list of
issues set out in Resolution 44/228, the PrepCom divided environmental issues into
eight groups: atmosphere, land resources, forests, biodiversity, biotechnology,
oceans, wastes, and freshwater resources. The issues related to the underlying pat-
terns of development that cause stress on the environment - such as poverty, unsus-
tainable consumption patterns, demographic pressures, trade, and investment - were
examined separately. While this method proved to be a practical way of dealing with
such a long and complex agenda, the sectoral division of issues made it difficult to
assess the system as a whole.
The negotiations, treaties, and conferences described in the fol1owing section
and portrayed graphical1y in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 do not include every linkage in
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the systems of environment and development negotiations, but merely provide an
indication of the overall structure of the system. The components of each system's
structure are based on those cited in background documents prepared by the
UNCED secretariat during the preparatory process. Other negotiations and organi-
zations may have contributed to the system, but as they were not cited directly in
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the background documents, they are not reflected here. In addition to the contribu-
tions from ongoing negotiations. UN agencies. intergovernmental organizations,
nongovernmental organizations and conferences described below. the PrepCom
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also took into account the recommendations from the regional meetings that were
held to discuss the issues on the UNCED agenda. I
The Sub-System of Environmental Negotiations
The sub-system of environmental negotiations is characterized by a large number of
cross-sectoral linkages. Many of the components of the sub-system are legally bind-
ing conventions, some of which are supplemented by protocols and amendments,
that have been negotiated in the 20 years since the Stockholm Conference on the
Human Environment in 1972.
Atmosphere
The UNCED negotiations on atmosphere focused on three major areas: climate
change, ozone depletion, and transboundary air pollution.
Climate Change On climate change, the Intergovernmental Negotiating Commit-
tee (INC) for a Framework Convention on Climate Change had the greatest impact
on UNCED. In certain respects, the UNCED negotiations on a number of issues,
including climate change, forests, and oceans, could not move forward until these
parallel negotiations were complete. UNCED also took into account the work of the
Second World Climate Conference (OctoberlNovember 1990) and the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPcq, which published its First Assessment in
August 1990.
A number of regional and international conferences also took place that influenced
the UNCED preparatory process. On the UN level, these included: the UN Commit-
tee on New and Renewable Sources of Energy; the May 1991 Helsinki Symposium
on Electricity and the Environment, sponsored by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (lAEA), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the UN Environment
Programme (UNEP). Other international activities that contributed to the PrepCom's
discussions on climate change included the 1991 Asian Energy Institute's I I Country
Climate Costing Study, the 1991 OECD-sponsored International Conference on Coal
and the Environment, and the Sustainable Energy Development Conference in
Copenhagen (NCONF.151/PC/60).
Protection of the Ozone Layer The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer, which was initially signed in March 1985, created the framework for
international cooperation on measures to protect the ozone layer. Within this frame-
work came the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
which was signed in September 1987 and went into force in January 1989. The Pro-
tocol was amended and strengthened at the Second Meeting of the Parties (London -
June 1990). The Vienna ConventionIMontreal Protocol regime is one of the
strongest international regimes aimed at protecting the global environment. Its
I These meetings included the UN Economic Commission for Europe's Conference (Bergen, Norway-
May 1990); UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean's Conference (Mexico Gty-
March 1991); the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific's Ministerial-Level
Conference (Bangkok - October 1990) and the Meeting of Senior Officials on Environment and
Development (Bangkok - February 1991); the African Regional Preparatory Conference for UNCED
(Cairo -1uly 1991); and the West Asian Regional Preparatory Conference for UNCED (Cairo - September
1991).
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strength and acceptance within the international community enabled the PrepCom to
reach agreement on this issue with comparatively little difficulty.
Transboundary Air Pollution Two types of international instruments used to regu-
late air pollution influenced the UNCED negotiations: agreements for transboundary
air pollution control and technical standards to control emissions from different
sources. Among the regional conventions is the 1979 Convention on Long-range
Transboundary Air Pollution (in force since 1983), elaborated and administered
within the framework of the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), and geo-
graphically limited to Europe and North America. The convention has been supple-
mented by a series of protocols on joint long-tenn financing of the Cooperative
Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-range Transmission of Air
Pollutants in Europe, EMEP (in force since 1988); the reduction of sulphur emis-
sions or their transboundary fluxes by at least 30 percent (in force since 1987); and
the control of emissions of nitrogen oxides or their transboundary fluxes (in force
since 1991). During the course of the UNCED negotiations, additional protocols
were under consideration.
Other legally binding agreements for transboundary air pollution abatement have
been concluded within the sub-regional framework of the European Community and
on a bilateral basis between neighboring countries in Europe (e.g., Finland-USSR in
1989) and North America (Mexico-United States in 1987, Canada-United States in
1991). In addition, several of the UNEP-sponsored regional agreements for marine
environment protection include among their objectives the abatement of "Iand-
based" air pollution.
In tenns of sectoral regulation, international technical standards for the control of
specific emission sources have existed in the automobile sector since 1970. Aircraft
engine emissions have been monitored since 1981 by the Council of the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). For air pollution from ships, the Marine Envir-
onment Protection Committee of the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
established a working group in 1990 to determine target loads and strategies for the
reduction of ship-based air pollutants to be laid down in a new annex to the 1973/
1978 MARPOL Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships. As regards
air pollution from waste incineration at sea, the Parties to the 1972 London Conven-
tion on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter
decided in 1990 to tenninate all marine incineration of liquid noxious wastes by the
end of 1991 (AiCONF.151IPC/59).
Forests
During the last two decades, the world has witnessed a significant increase in con-
cern for and action on forests. On the international level, the International Tropical
Timber Organization (lITO) was established by the 1983 International Tropical
Timber Agreement (IITA), under the auspices of the UN Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), and was the only existing international agreement on
tropical forests prior to UNCED. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO),
together with the World Bank, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the
World Resources Institute (WRI), launched the Tropical Forestry Action Plan
(TFAP) in June 1985. The Plan provides a framework for actions at national,
regional, and global levels on tropical forestry. The FAO Committee on Forestry, at
its 10th session in September 1990, recommended to increase the efficiency of the
I
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TFAP, particularly through strengthening national capabilities. The FAO Council at
its November 1990 session endorsed the concept of an international instrument on
the conservation and development of forests, which became a major part of the
UNCED negotiations (A/CONF.151IPC/27). Other international initiatives included
the launching of the International Conference on Forests and Trees ("Silva") organ-
ized by the French government in February 1986, and the Ministerial Confer-
ence for the Protection of Forests in Europe (Strasbourg - December 1990)
(A/CONF.l51IPC/64).
Cross-sectorally, in the context of the 1990 Second World Climate Conference, the
Ministers declared that they recognized that forests and forest products playa key
social and economic role in many nations and communities. They also noted that the
conservation of the world's forests in their role as reservoirs of carbon is of consider-
able importance for global climate stability, keeping in mind the important role of
forests in the conservation of biological diversity and the protection of soil stability
and the hydrological system (A/CONF.1511PC/27). The PrepCom took into consider-
ation input from related conventions, including the 1971 Ramsar Convention on
Wetlands and the 1973 Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species
(A/CONF.151IPC/64).
Land Resources
On the subject of land resources, the UNCED negotiations covered four major
topics: integrated management of land resources, combating desertification and
drought, sustainable mountain development, and sustainable agriculture and rural
development. In spite of a general lack of international attention and the paucity of
international negotiation on these issues, several institutions and initiatives have
addressed land resources.
Desertification The major international instrument guiding efforts to combat
desertification has been the 1977 United Nations Plan of Action to Combat Deserti-
fication. Despite this plan, desertification remains unabated; more land is desertified
now than it was in 1977 and a larger population is affected. Within the UN system,
UNEP and the FAO are the lead agencies working on desertification matters. Other
organizations working on combating desertification include the International Fund
for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the United Nations Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the United Nations Sudano-Sahelian
Office (UNSO) (A/CONF.151IPC/62).
Integrated Land Management There are no international agreements that specifi-
cally address integrated land management. Organizations concerned with the man-
agement of land and natural resources for development include: the FAO, IFAD,
UNEP, UNESCO, the World Food Programme (WFP), WHO, specifically its
Environmental Health Programme, and the World Meteorological Organization
(WMO). Other agencies within the UN system, such as UNDP and the World Bank,
are concerned with various aspects of land resources management for development
purposes, focusing on agriculture, fisheries, forestry, and other related issues
(A/CONF.151IPC/24).
Sustainable Agriculture Options for action on sustainable agriculture and rural
development were contained in the proposed International Cooperative Programme
Framework for Sustainable Agriculture and Rural Development prepared by FAO.
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The program is based on the Den Bosch Declaration and Agenda for Action for
Sustainable Agriculture and Rural Development agreed at the FAOlNetherlands
Conference on Agriculture and the Environment in April 1991(AlCONF.151/P042/
Add.2).
As regards water use for sustainable agriculture, a global interagency program
framework was also developed in 1990 at the FAO Conference on Agriculture and
Environment as a follow-up of the 1977 Mar del Plata Action Plan, which deals with
the relevant aspects of controlling water-logging, salinity, and drainage in irrigated
and rain-fed agriculture. Finally, sustainable agriculture also encompasses both con-
servation and use of biological diversity for agriculture. Diverse elements regarding
this program framework have been developed and implemented by FAO in close
consultation and cooperation with other institutions concerned with biodiversity,
including UNEP, UNESCO, WRI, the International Union for the Conservation of
Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of Inter-
national Importance, and the INC for a Framework Convention on Biodiversity
(A/CONF.151/PC/26).
Mountains There are no international treaties that specifically address sustainable
development of mountain ecosystems. Although some UN agencies, including the
World Bank, IFAD, and UNESCO contributed information to the UNCED discus-
sions on this topic, the majority of the information came from NGOs such as the
IUCN, the International Mountain Society (IMS), Woodland Mountain Institutes
(WMI), and the International Center for Integrated Mountain Development
(A/CONF.151/PC/l00/Add.18).
Biodiversity
The major input to the negotiations on biological diversity from outside the UNCED
PrepCom came from the parallel negotiations in the INC for a convention on biodi-
versity. The INC resulted from UNEP's establishment of an ad hoc Working Group
of Experts on Biological Diversity in 1988 to begin discussing the need to conserve
biological resources. Following three sessions of this ad hoc working group, UNEP
convened the first meeting of the ad hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical
Experts in November 1990. After two sessions that resulted in the drafting of a con-
vention, UNEP formed the INC in 1991 to further elaborate and adopt a Convention
on Biological Diversity.
During the UNCED negotiations, there was also discussion of key scientific and
technical linkages between biodiversity, and forests, climate change, biotechnology,
and oceans (AICONF.151/PC/66). Assistance and advice were also received from
UNEP, FAO, UNESCO, UNDP, IUCN, WRI, WWF and the International Union of
Biological Science (AICONF.1511P028).
Biotechnology
In spite of the close linkages between biodiversity and biotechnology, these topics
were negotiated separately by the UNCED PrepCom, on the insistence of several
developed countries. Although there are no existing international legal instruments
on biotechnology, nor were there any international negotiations underway, there are
a number of fora in which biotechnology is being addressed. During the course of the
negotiations for the Convention on Biological Diversity, the topic of biotechnology was
Ii
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discussed. At the third session of the ad hoc Working Group of Experts on Biological
Diversity (Geneva - July 1990), the meeting decided that biotechnology elements
demanded further examination. A Sub-Working Group on Biotechnology met in
Nairobi in November 1990 and recommended a number of issues that should be
considered in the preparation of a biotechnology component in the biodiversity con-
vention. These recommendations were also examined by UNCED.
Recommendations from the UN Industrial Development OrganizationIWHO/
UNEPIFAO Informal Working Group on Safety in Biotechnology, which was estab-
lished in 1985, were also examined by the UNCED PrepCom. Other WHO projects
on biotechnology include biosafety guidelines for workers engaged in the production
of vaccines and a training program on biotechnology safety (A/CONEI51IPCI29).
Oceans
Since the late 1950s, the international community has steadily developed a system
of international institutions and legal instruments to cope with problems affecting
the oceans. At the global level, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea com-
prehensively covers all marine issues, including protection of the marine environ-
ment and its living resources. The 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London Convention) has been
progressively adapted to take account of the need to prohibit or restrict dumping of
toxic substances and wastes and to promote comprehensive waste reduction and
management policies. The 1973 International Convention on the Prevention of Pol-
lution from Ships, as modified in 1978 (MARPOL), addresses Ship-source pollution.
The 1990 Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response, and Cooperation is
the most recent agreement addressing oil pollution. The 1989 Basel Convention on
the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal
also addresses the maritime transport and disposal of wastes. Work is underway to
harmonize the Basel Convention with the London Convention, MARPOL, and other
IMO conventions and codes, and to develop a liability regime.
On the issue of land-based sources of marine pollution, the primary instrument has
been the 1985 Montreal Guidelines. In conjunction with the UNCED negotiations,
UNEP began an evaluation of these guidelines as well as an outline of strategy
options or actions to reduce the effects of land-based sources of pollution and other
activities threatening marine and coastal resources. Canada, in cooperation with the
UNCED secretariat, UNEP, the International Oceanographic Commission, and the
UN Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, hosted an Intergovernmental
Meeting of Experts on Land-based Sources of Marine Pollution (Halifax, Nova
Scotia - May 1991). This was followed by a UNEP-sponsored meeting of govern-
ment-designated experts to formulate a draft strategy for the reduction of the
degradation of the marine environment from land-based sources of pollution and
activities in coastal areas (Nairobi - December 1991).
On the issue of living marine resources, UNCED examined conventions that deal
with or otherwise encompass the protection of marine species, particularly the 1946
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling and the 1979 Bonn Conven-
tion on migratory species. The work of other organizations, such as the Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission and the Agreement on Small Cetaceans in the
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Baltic and North Sea under the Bonn Convention, in the conservation, management,
and study of cetaceans and other marine mammals was also consulted.
The UNCED PrepCom also looked at instruments covering the polar regions. In
the Arctic, there is only the 1973 Oslo Agreement on Conservation of Polar Bears.
Within the Antarctic Treaty system, a protocol was adopted in October 1991 that con-
solidates and strengthens the measures for environmental protection adopted under
the Treaty and extends them to all Antarctic activities, while also subjecting mineral
development to at least a 50-year prohibition.
At the regional level, the system of UNEP Regional Seas conventions addresses a
wide range of issues. The seven conventions cover the Mediterranean, Kuwait Action
Plan Region, Wider Caribbean, West and Central Africa, Eastern Africa, Red Sea and
Gulf of Aden, South Pacific, and South-East Pacific. They are supplemented by a
total of 19 protocols: two on ocean dumping, three on land-based sources of marine
pollution, one on offshore industrial activities, eight on emergency response to pollu-
tion incidents, one on radioactive pollution, and four on protected areas and species.
There are also five oceans conventions in the European region: the Oslo Conven-
tion on ocean dumping, the Paris Convention on land-based sources (extended by
amendment to encompass atmospheric sources), and the Bonn Agreements on the
North Sea, all of which reach into the North Atlantic; the Helsinki Convention, deal-
ing with all sources of marine pollution, which covers the Baltic Sea; and the 1991
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context
(AiCONF.151/PC/69).
Freshwater Resources
The primary input into the Agenda 21 chapter on freshwater resources was the Inter-
national Conference on Water and the Environment (Dublin, Ireland - January
1992). The conference addressed critical freshwater issues and acted as the formal
entry for those issues into UNCED. The conference was the first major UN-
sponsored water conference since the 1977 United Nations Water Conference and
the resulting Mar del Plata Action Plan.
There were several conferences and meetings that led into and contributed
toward the synthesis of opinion at the Dublin Conference. Foremost among these
were the Symposium on a Strategy for Water Resources Capacity Building (Delft
- June 1991); Water Quality Assessment and Management (Bratislava - August
1991); ESCAP Meeting on Water Resources Planning (Bangkok - October
1991); informal consultation on integrated water management for developing
countries (Copenhagen - November 1991); and ASCEND 21 (an ICSU confer-
ence on scientific aspects of environment and development, Vienna - November
1991) (AiCONF.1511PCI73).
Other international water-quality monitoring and management programs that con-
tributed to Agenda 21 were the Global Water Quality Monitoring Programme, the
UNEP Environmentally Sound Management of Inland Waters, the FAO regional
inland fishery bodies, and the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance
Especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar Convention).
The PrepCom also looked at negotiations and institutions on a number of other
issues related to freshwater resources, including the Second World Climate Confer-
ence, and the INC for a Framework Convention on Climate Change.
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Wastes
UNCED's treatment of wastes resulted in the elaboration of four chapters ofAgenda
21: hazardous wastes; radioactive wastes; solid wastes and sewage-related issues;
and toxic chemicals.
Hazardous Wastes A number of steps have been taken with the aim of reducing
transboundary movements of hazardous wastes. Some of these are the Basel Con-
vention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
their Disposal (1989); the Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa
and the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes within Africa
(1991); the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter (London Convention, 1972) and the 1989 Lome IV
Convention between the EC and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group
(ACP).
Other events that also contributed to the formulation of the Agenda 21 chapter on
hazardous wastes included the December 1991 UNEP-sponsored Ad Hoc Meeting of
Government-designated Experts in Nairobi to discuss international strategy and
develop an action program, including technical guidelines for the environmentally
sound management of hazardous wastes. The Seventh Ordinary Meeting of the Con-
tracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against
Pollution and its related protocols (Cairo - October 1991) discussed a draft protocol
for the prevention of pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by transboundary move-
ments of hazardous wastes and their disposal (AiCONEI511PC/88).
Toxic Chemicals Although no legally-binding international convention exists on
the subject of toxic chemicals, there is activity on a number of different fronts that
contributed to UNCED. The 1989 London Guidelines for the Exchange of Informa-
tion on Chemicals in International Trade was designed to assist governments in the
process of increasing chemical safety through the exchange of information on
chemicals in international trade. The FAO has maintained a substantial program on
agrochemicals, providing assistance to its member countries on their safe and effi-
cient use. Guiding principles, policies, and procedures are covered in the Inter-
national Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides that was adopted
unanimously by member governments, the pesticide industry, and international and
environmental organizations in 1985. The International Labor Organization's (ILO)
Convention (No. 170) and Recommendation (No. 177) on safety in the use of
chemicals at work adopted by the 1990 International Labour Conference, provide a
universal basis for national- and enterprise-level action. Outside the UN system,
OECD expanded its work in this field in 1978 and created a special program on the
control of chemicals under a Management Committee reporting to the Council
(AiCONF.l51IPC/35).
Radioactive Wastes A Code of Practice on the International Transboundary
Movement of Radioactive Waste was adopted at the International Atomic Energy
Agency's (IAEA) General Conference in September 1990. This code of practice, in
conjunction with relevant provisions from the Basel Convention and the London
Convention, formed the basis of the negotiations on the environmentally sound
management of radioactive wastes within UNCED (AICONF.15I/PC/I DOl
Add.4).
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Solid Wastes Although there are no international treaties on the management of
solid waste, there are a number of important initiatives that contributed information
to the PrepCom's negotiations on this chapter of Agenda 21. These include: the
UNDPlWorld Bank Water Supply and Sanitation project; the Urban Management
and Environment component of the joint UNDPlWorld BanklUNCHS Urban
Management Programme; UNICEF's Urban Basic Services Programme; and
other programs coordinated by UNEP, WHO, FAO, and UNCHS, among others
(NCONF.l511PC/76).
The Sub-System of Development Negotiations
Unlike environmental concerns, most development issues have not been the subject
of formalized international treaties and conventions reached through negotiation.
They have been discussed primarily in international or regional conferences, by the
relevant UN agencies or at national or local levels. The output of these debates typi-
cally has been reports, declarations, and nonbinding recommendations. Unlike the
sub-system of environmental negotiations, there are very few cross-sectoral struc-
tural linkages within the sub-system of development negotiations, making it less
cohesive (see Figure 2.2).
Human Settlements
The UN first dealt with the issue of human settlements in its 1976 Conference on
Human Settlements. Among other things, this conference resulted in the creation of
the UN Commission on Human Settlements (UNCHS). At its 1991 session, held in
Harare, Zimbabwe, UNCHS endorsed a report entitled, "People, Settlements, Envir-
onment and Development," which had previously been adopted at an intergovern-
mental meeting (The Hague - November 1990). The report sets out the role of
human settlements in the context of sustainable development and formed the basis
of what was to become the Agenda 21 chapter on human settlements. Other ini-
tiatives on human settlements that were examined by the PrepCom included the
UNDPlWorld Bank/UNCHS Urban Management Programme, the WHO's Healthy
Cities Programme, and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)/OECD 1986
meeting on Urban Development (NCONF.151IPC/43).
Poverty, Consumption, Population
In developing the Agenda 21 chapters on "Combating Poverty," "Changing Con-
sumption Patterns," and "Demographic Dynamics and Sustainability," the UNCED
secretariat enlisted the assistance of a number of UN agencies including the FAO,
ILO, UN Population Fund (UNFPA), IFAD, and UNDP. The PrepCom also took
into consideration declarations and statements from the report of the International
Conference on Population (Mexico City - August 1984); the report of the World
Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations
Decade for Women (Nairobi - July 1985); the International Development Strategy
for the Fourth UN Development Decade; the Declaration of the 18th Special Session
of the General Assembly; the Second UN Conference on the Least Developed Coun-
tries, and UNFPA's Expert Meeting on Population and Environment (New York -
March 1991). UNCED also co-sponsored with the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF)
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and UNFPA a symposium on "Women and Children First." Finally, in one of the
few overt linkages between environment and development within the aegis of the
conference, the PrepCom also looked at the recommendations from the 1991 FAO/
Netherlands Conference on Agriculture and the Environment on raising labor pro-
ductivity and incomes in agriculture.
Environmental Health
Although there are no legally binding international agreements on health and the
environment, there were a number of conferences that contributed to the UNCED
negotiations. For example, the Ministers of the Environment and of Health of the
member states of the European Region of WHO adopted the European Charter on
Environment and Health, which covers agreed-upon principles and strategies. The
Sundsvall Conference on Supportive Environments, held in June 1991, identified
practical ways to create physical, social, and economic environments supportive of
health and compatible with sustainable development, and to build bridges between
sectors for practical problem solutions. The major UN agency involved in the prepa-
ration of the Agenda 21 text was the WHO Commission on Health and Environment
(A/CONEI51/PC/54).
Science for Sustainable Development
Many of the recommendations on science for Agenda 21 came from the ICSU's
International Conference on an Agenda of Science for Environment and Develop-
ment (ASCEND 21) (November 1991- Vienna) (see Chapter 10). In addition, UNCED
collaborated with a number of UN and related agencies including UNESCO, the UN
Center for Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTD), the World Bank,
FAO, WHO, UNEP, WMO, and UNESCO (A/CONEI51/PC/52).
Transfer of Technology
The debate on this chapter of Agenda 21 was one of the most polarized between
North and South during the PrepCom's negotiations. Despite the fact that UNCED
sponsored a workshop on the Transfer of Environmentally Sound Technologies in
1991 aimed at easing these tensions, it was to little avail. The PrepCom did take into
account parts of the 1989 London Guidelines for the Exchange of Information on
Chemicals in International Trade that addressed intellectual property rights. Other
UN and related agencies that contributed to the secretariat's working party on this
issue were UNCTAD, the UNCSTD, the UN Centre on Transnational Corporations,
UNESCO, UNEP, UNDP, UNIDO, the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
(A/CONEI51/PC/53).
Education
The recommendations from a number of conferences on education contributed to
the negotiations on "Promoting Education, Public Awareness and Training." These
included the UNESCOIUNEP Congress on Environmental Education and Training
(Moscow - August 1987); the OECD Intergovernmental Conference on Education
and the Economy in a Changing Society (Paris - March 1988); the World Confer-
ence on Education for All, convened by UNDP, UNESCO, UNICEF, and the World
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Bank (Jomtien, Thailand - March 1990); and the UNICEF World Summit for
Children (New York - September 1990) (AiCONEI51IPC/55).
Economic and Trade Issues
The negotiations on the chapter of Agenda 21 dealing with "International Coopera-
tion to Accelerate Sustainable Development in Developing Countries and Related
Domestic Policies" dealt primarily with the issues of trade and debt. In the negotia-
tions on trade and the environment, the principal area of concern related to agricul-
tural commodities was market access, a matter that is under negotiation in the
Uruguay Round of GATT. The UNCED negotiations reflected the impact of the
GATT negotiations on such issues as agricultural protectionism in developed coun-
tries. In the broader field of commodities in general, the major difficulty faced by
developing countries has been the sharp fluctuations in prices leading to great insta-
bility in export earnings. This question has been under discussion for a long time and
an Integrated Programme for Commodities, with a focus on stabilization of earnings,
was discussed within the framework of UNCTAD. The Cartagena Commitment
signed at UNCTAD vm became a major input into the text ofAgenda 21.
Financial Resources and Mechanisms
The area of financial resources and mechanisms, which dealt with the funding of
Agenda 21 implementation, was, due to its nature, the most cross-sectoral of issues
considered by UNCED. A number of different negotiations, conferences, and meet-
ings contributed to the UNCED negotiations on this topic. The PrepCom examined
reports prepared for the UNEP Governing Council on the costs to developing coun-
tries for implementing the Montreal Protocol, a costing exercise of measures adopted
to limit possible climate changes (AiCONF. 15 IIPC/23), a study prepared for UNEP's
Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Biological Diversity on estimated costs of
conserving biodiversity, and a recent study by the World Institute for Development
Economic Research of the United Nations University that examined the issue from
the perspective of the needs of developing countries (AiCONE 15 IIPC/51 ).
Meetings held during the course of the UNCED negotiations that influenced the
outcome included: the Aspen Institute Working Group on International Environment
and Development Policy (July 1991); the Meeting of OECD Ministers of Environ-
ment and Development (Paris - December 1991); the annual High-level Meeting of
the members of the DAC, joined by the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund (IMP) and UNDP (December 1991); the "Eminent Persons" Meeting on
Financing Global Environment and Development" hosted by Former Japanese Prime
Minister Noboru Takeshita (Tokyo - April 1992); the IMF and World Bank Develop-
ment Committee meeting (April 1992); the GEF Participants' Meeting (May 1992);
and the Second Ministerial Conference of Developing Countries on Environment and
Development (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia - April 1992).
UNCED OUTPUTS
UNCED based its negotiations on an examination of these existing structures and
the effectiveness of the system, and then proposed a series of strategies and action
plans for strengthening and improving the future coherence and coordination of
THE NEGOTIATING SYSTEM OF ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 35
the system. The preparatory process and the Conference examined the pieces of the
system and discussed means of improving existing institutions and treaties and, where
there was a need, for generating new ones. The governments then negotiated specific
recommendations for action that became Agenda 21. Some of these recommendations
were aimed at strengthening and unifying the overall system; it is these recommenda-
tions that formed the output of the UNCED process.
In general, Agenda 21 proposed two important types of mechanisms: (l) the
strengthening of existing institutions and the establishment of new ones, and (2) the
negotiation of new treaties that take into account the need for integrating environ-
ment and development (see Figure 2.3). It is through these mechanisms that the
future of the system will be determined.
Institutional Arrangements
To facilitate institutional coordination, enhance international cooperation, and
examine the progress of the implementation of Agenda 21 at the national, regional,
and international levels, UNCED recommended the establishment of a high-level
Commission on Sustainable Development that would report to the UN Economic
and Social Council (ECOSOC). Chapter 38 of Agenda 21, ("International Institu-
tional Arrangements") elaborates further:
The Commission should provide for active involvement of organs, programmes and
organizations of the United Nations system, international financial institutions and other
relevant intergovernmental organizations, and encourage the participation of non-
governmental organizations, including industry and the business and scientific communities.
Among the proposed functions of the Commission on Sustainable Development
are several that are aimed at strengthening and integrating the international negotiat-
ing system. Agenda 21 specifically states that the Commission should:
monitor progress in the implementation of Agenda 21 and activities related to the inte-
gration of environmental and developmental goals throughout the United Nations system
through analysis and evaluation of reports from all relevant organs, organizations, pro-
grammes and institutions of the United Nations system dealing with various issues of
environment and development, including those related to finance.
From an institutional perspective, the major outputs from UNCED to the inter-
national system are the creation of this Commission and the pledge to work to further
integrate environment and development within the decision-making apparatus of the
UN system.
International Negotiations and Conferences
In Chapter 39 of Agenda 21 ("International Legal Instruments and Mechanisms"),
the Conference agreed that there is a need for:
(l) the further development of international law on sustainable development,
giving special attention to the delicate balance between environmental and
developmental concerns;
(2) clarification and strengthening of the relationship between existing inter-
national instruments or agreements in the field of environment and relevant social
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Figure 2.3 UNCED as Part of Negotiating System
and economic agreements or instruments, taking into account the special needs
of developing countries;
(3) the participation in and the contribution of all countries, including the develop-
ing countries, to treaty-making in the field of international law on sustainable
development.
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With this in mind, UNCED recommended the negotiation of a number of new
international or regional conventions and protocols that would further the integra-
tion of environment and development in the international system. Not all of these
proposed negotiations or conferences will result in the elaboration of legally binding
instruments, yet they should all contribute to the overall system.
Proposed Negotiations
Among the future negotiations proposed by Agenda 21 is the recommendation that
governments pursue substantive negotiations between producers and consumers
"with a view to achieving viable and more efficient international agreements that
take into account market trends, or arrangements, as well as study groups. In this
regard, particular attention should be paid to the agreements on cocoa, coffee, sugar
and tropical timber" (Chapter 2).
On the issue of transboundary air pollution, Agenda 21 encourages the "establish-
ment of new and the implementation of existing regional agreements for limiting
transboundary air pollution" (Chapter 9).
For strengthening the sub-system on combating deforestation, one of the objec-
tives is:
to consider the need for and the feasibility of all kinds of appropriate internationally
agreed arrangements to promote international cooperation on forest management, con-
servation and sustainable development of all types of forests including afforestation,
reforestation, and rehabilitation (Chapter 11).
Agenda 21 also calls for:
strengthening the coordination and improving the capacity and ability of intergovern-
mental organizations such as FAO, ITTO, UNEP and UNESCO to provide technical sup-
port for the management, conservation and sustainable development of forests, including
support for the negotiation of the International Tropical Timber Agreement of 1983, due
in 1992/93 (Chapter II).
On the issue of combating desertification, UNCED agreed to request the UN Gen-
eral Assembly to establish "an intergovernmental negotiating committee for the elab-
oration of an international convention to combat desertification, in those countries
experiencing serious drought and/or desertification, particularly in Africa, with a
view to finalizing such a convention by JuneI994." This is one of the more specific
recommendations to emerge from UNCED (Chapter 12).
To strengthen the sub-system of negotiated agreements on biotechnology, Agenda
21 calls on governments, relevant international and regional organizations, the pri-
vate sector, and nongovernmental organizations to "compile, update and develop
compatible safety procedures into a framework of internationally agreed principles as
a basis for guidelines to be applied on safety in biotechnology, including consider-
ation of the need for and feasibility of an international agreement" (Chapter 16).
On oceans, Agenda 21 recommends that states, with the support of the relevant
international organizations, should initiate and promote the development of new
regional agreements aimed at the prevention, reduction, and control of degradation
of the marine environment from land-based activities (Chapter 17). For freshwater
resources, Agenda 21 recommends the development of national and international
legal instruments that may be required to protect the quality of water resources
particularly for:
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(i) Monitoring and control of pollution and its effects in national and trans-
boundary waters;
(ii) Control of long-range atmospheric transport of pollutants;
(iii) Control of accidental and/or deliberate spills in national and/or trans-
boundary water bodies;
(iv) Environmental impact assessment (Chapter 18).
To improve the management of toxic chemicals, Chapter 19 of Agenda 21 recom-
mends that governments and relevant international organizations, with the coopera-
tion of industry, should implement the Prior Informed Consent procedures as soon
as possible and, in the light of experience gained, invite relevant international orga-
nizations, such as UNEP, GATT, FAO, WHO, and others, in their respective area of
competence, to consider working expeditiously toward the conclusion of legally-
binding instruments.
On the environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes, Chapter 20 of
Agenda 21 urges the ratification of "the Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-
boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal and the expeditious
elaboration of related protocols, such as the protocol on liability and compensation,
mechanisms and guidelines to facilitate the implementation of the Basel Conven-
tion." Similarly, the delegates urged "ratification and full implementation by the
countries concerned of the Bamako Convention on the Ban on the Import into Africa
and the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes within Africa and
the expeditious elaboration of a protocol on liability and compensation." The dele-
gates also recommended that governments "formulate, where appropriate, regional
agreements such as the Bamako Convention regulating the transboundary movement
of hazardous wastes."
Finally, on radioactive waste, UNCED called for states to
implement the Code of Practice on the Transboundary Movements of Radioactive Waste
and, under the auspices of IAEA, in cooperation with relevant international organizations
dealing with different modes of transport, keep the question of such movements under
active review, including the desirability of concluding a legally binding instrument
(Chapter 22).
Proposed Conferences
In addition to proposing these future negotiations, UNCED recommended the con-
vening of international conferences that could add to the body of soft law that con-
stitutes part of the system. One of these is the International Conference on
Population and Development to be held in 1994. UNCED recommended that "gov-
ernments formulate integrated national policies for environment and development,
taking into account demographic trends and factors" and to report on the status of
implementation to the conference (Chapter 5). Although the scheduling of this con-
ference took place prior to UNCED, it will provide one of the first post-Rio opportu-
nities to deal with the issues of population, development, and environment in a
single forum.
On the issues of energy and atmosphere, UNCED called on governments and the
private sector to "study, within the framework of the United Nations and its regional
economic commissions, the feasibility of convening regional conferences on trans-
port and the environment" (Chapter 9).
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To strengthen the sub-system of negotiations on sustainable agriculture, UNCED
did not call for any new negotiations, but recommended that the appropriate UN
agencies and regional organizations promote, for 1994, the Fourth International
Technical Conference on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Plant Genetic
Resources for Food and Sustainable Agriculture (PGRFA), which is to adopt the first
state of the world report and the first global plan of action on the conservation and
sustainable use of PGRFA (Chapter 14).
Agenda 21 contains three recommendations for conferences on oceans-related
issues. On integrated coastal zone management, delegates agreed that "States should
cooperate ... in the preparation of national guidelines for integrated coastal zone
management and development, drawing on existing experience. A global conference
to exchange experience in the field could be held before 1994."
On the issue of sustainable use and conservation of marine living resources of
the high seas, Agenda 21 states that nations should negotiate, where appropriate,
international agreements for the effective management and conservation of fishery
stocks. UNCED also recommended that "States, should convene, as soon as poss-
ible, an intergovernmental conference under United Nations auspices ... with a
view to promoting effective implementation of the provisions of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on straddling fish stocks and highly
migratory fish stocks...."
Finally, on the sustainable development of small islands, Agenda 21 recommends
that:
Small island developing States, with the support, as appropriate, of international organ-
izations ... should develop and strengthen inter-island, regional and interregional cooper-
ation and information exchange, including periodic regional and global meetings on
sustainable development of small island developing States with the first global confer-
ence on the sustainable development of small island developing States, to be held in
1993 (Chapter 17).
CONCLUSIONS
Negotiating systems consist of two basic parts: the elements of the system and the
relationships between those elements. With regard to the system of environment and
development negotiations, the elements include: on-going negotiations, treaties,
conferences, UN agencies, intergovernmental organizations, treaty secretariats, gov-
ernments, and nongovernmental organizations. The relationships between these ele-
ments include: coordination, implementation, interdependence, and delegation of
responsibilities. Focusing on these relational aspects, one can easily see the many
problems challenging UNCED followup.
There was an absence of coordination and communication within the system at the
start of the UNCED negotiating process. This lack of coordination between govern-
ments, intergovernmental organizations, UN agencies and secretariats for different
treaties had a definite impact on the results of UNCED. From the start, UNCED
accentuated the fact that there were two negotiating sub-systems (environment and
development) rather than a single integrated system (sustainable development) by
treating environment and development issues on a sectoral basis. Although the treat-
ment of cross-sectoral development issues was supposed to improve coordination
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between the two sub-systems, the structure of the PrepCom's working groups only
formalized the distance between environment and development. For example, the
Agenda 21 draft chapters on environmental issues were discussed in Working Groups
I and IT beginning at PrepCom III, whereas draft chapters on development issues
(poverty, education, health, etc. ) were not ready until PrepCom IV. Very few of these
development issues were taken into consideration during the negotiation of the
environmental chapters.
The system was also characterized by an overall lack of effective implementation
of international treaties on environmental issues. Although most treaties include
monitoring and/or reporting mechanisms, treaty signatories did not always follow
through with implementation. This makes it difficult to determine the effect that
legally-binding agreements have actually had. The UNCED process accentuated this
major shortcoming in the system, while suffering from limited feedback on treaty
effectiveness.
Although there was a significant amount of acknowledged issue interdependence
within the environment sub-system (for example, the Climate Change Convention
negotiations affected negotiations and institutions that dealt with atmospheric issues,
oceans, biodiversity, desertification, forests, and freshwater resources) and recogni-
tion of the mutual effects of economic development on environment issues and vice
versa, the system had very few institutional mechanisms set up to address this inter-
dependence. In most existing environmental treaties, not only is there little mention
of the economic development issues that are often the underlying causes of environ-
mental degradation, but there is often little attempt to relate provisions of existing
treaties.
As indicated in the earlier discussion, many agencies and secretariats have respons-
ibilities to act on behalf of environmental and developmental programs. Although
there is some overlap (for example, UNEP and WMO both working on climate
change), there is little coordination and sharing of responsibilities. Governments cer-
tainly bear the brunt of responsibility for cleaning up the environment and promoting
economic development. Yet, within the system, the majority of institutional respons-
ibility is placed on the lGOs, UN agencies, and secretariats. As well, NGOs have
served traditionally as the watchdogs to ensure that existing treaties are implemented
and that ongoing negotiations result in the strongest treaties possible.
Overall, when the UNCED preparatory process began, the system was structured
such that there were, in effect, two systems - one on environment, and another
incomplete system on development. There was little coordination and communica-
tion within or between the systems; implementation mechanisms were not well
defined or well carried out; issue interdependence existed, but was not always
reflected in other elements of the system; and responsibilities were shared between
governments and the other actors in the system, with no one taking full responsibility.
The conference and its follow-up mechanisms will likely have a major impact on
transforming this system. Although it is too soon to tell how the overal1 structure of
the system may change, some initial observations can be made.
There was unprecedented cooperation and coordination between the elements of
both sub-systems during the UNCED preparatory process. The cooperative efforts
that began with UNCED may be able to live on in the new institution created by
UNCED, the Commission on Sustainable Development, thus increasing overall
coordination between elements within the system.
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It is too soon to tell if UNCED will have any effect on improving implementation
of agreements within the system. However, it is expected that the Commission may
be able to playa role in monitoring and, possibly, improving implementation. How
effective that role will be depends on the degree of increased commitment from
governments.
UNCED may have set the stage for an overall strengthening of issue interdepen-
dence. Although UNCED was the first major conference to look seriously at both
environment and development, the issues were still treated in more of a sectoral than
a cross-sectoral manner. Furthermore, as seen by UNCED's outputs, the recommen-
dations for future conferences and negotiations are still sectoral, although issues of
particular importance to developing countries will be incorporated more explicitly.
The creation of the Commission on Sustainable Development may allow for
improved and more coordinated delegation of responsibilities within the system. The
Commission could become a new focal point for the system, so that agencies, IGOs,
NGOs, governments, and secretariats can all receive assignments and report back to
this coordinating body.
By its nature, a negotiating system is fluid. The changing nature ofthe issues under
negotiation, the regimes that have been established to address these issues, and the
interrelationship between both issues and regimes, ensures that the system will be
continually evolving. The UNCED negotiating process has cleared the path for a
stronger and more effective unified system on environment and development negoti-
ations. The structure of the system is in place. It is now up to the actors in the system
to make it work.

Part II
A Process Perspective

3The Story of the UNCED Process
Pamela Chasek
In June 1992, the largest UN conference in history took place in Rio de Janeiro. Not
only was UNCED the first global gathering of heads of state or government on envir-
onment and development, it drew delegates from over 175 countries, representatives
from numerous intergovernmental organizations and UN agencies, more than 1400
accredited nongovernmental organizations, and thousands of journalists. Although
much attention was focused on UNCED - or the "Earth Summit" as it was popularly
known - the conference was not a single event. Rather, it was the culmination of more
than two years of preparation. The negotiations of the Preparatory Committee
(PrepCom) and the Main Committee of the conference were only part of the numerous
activities that contributed to the Earth Summit. While the PrepCom negotiated the
form and content of the plan of action ("Agenda 21" - see Appendix C), the statement
of rights and duties (alternatively the "Earth Charter" or the "Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development" - see Appendix B), and the statement of principles
for the management, conservation, and sustainable development of forests, Inter-
governmental Negotiating Committees simultaneously negotiated conventions on
climate change and on conserving biological diversity for signature at UNCED.
Numerous regional and technical conferences contributed findings and recommenda-
tions to the negotiating process. Nongovernmental organizations, too, held an exten-
sive series of activities in preparation for UNCED and the Global Forum, which was
conducted in parallel with UNCED. Despite the importance of these numerous
parallel events, this chapter focuses solely on the official UNCED negotiations.
THE ORIGINS OF UNCED
The origins of UNCED can be traced back to the first global conference on the envir-
onment, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, which was
held in Stockholm in 1972. The Stockholm Conference produced a set of principles
for ecologically sound management of the planet, put environmental issues on the
world's agenda, and led to the creation of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP).
In the years that followed, however, little was done in practical terms to integrate the
Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons Learned from the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (G. Sjostedt, et al., eds.; 1-85966-077-0; © IIASA; pub. Graham &
Trotman, 1994; printed in Great Britain), pp. 45-61.
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environmental dimension or the idea of sustainability into policies and plans for
economic development (UNDPI, 1992).
In 1983 the UN called upon the Secretary-General to convene a World Commis-
sion on Environment and Development. In 1987, this Commission, chaired by
Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, produced a report, Our Com-
mon Future, that served as a guide for the structuring of a global approach to what
was called "sustainable development." The landmark report documented the need
for sustainable development in both industrialized and developing countries, called
on the UN General Assembly to "transform this report into a UN Programme of
Action on Sustainable Development," and recommended that "an international Con-
ference could be convened to review progress made and promote follow-up arrange-
ments that will be needed over time to set benchmarks and to maintain human
progress within the guidelines of human needs and natural laws" (WCED,
1987:343).
Building on the Brundtland Commission report, a number of industrialized
nations began to push for a world conference to address environmental matters on a
comprehensive and global scale. The rising interest coincided with the approach of
the 20th anniversary of the Stockholm Conference. The UN General Assembly first
considered the matter of a global environmental conference in 1988, but some coun-
tries expressed concern about the feasibility and cost of a global conference with a
broad agenda. Many developing countries were concerned that the conference
would have a strong environmental (Northern) bias and would not sufficiently
address their development concerns. It was not until 22 December 1989, after a long
and often difficult debate between industrialized and developing countries, that the
UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 44/228 (see Appendix A) calling for a
global conference that "should elaborate strategies and measures to halt and reverse
the effects of environmental degradation in the context of increased national and
international efforts to promote sustainable and environmentally sound development
in all countries" (UNGA, 1989).
The resolution was created by compromise and consensus, so its goals are
broadly enunciated and encompass the broad array of interests of the par-
ticipating countries. While it was clear that both environment and develop-
ment would be essential elements of the conference, there were protracted
negotiations over the precise terms of reference. When possible, the nego-
tiators included specific language in the resolution, but when disputes could
not be resolved, the negotiators often used ambiguous language or national
statements of interpretation to postpone the resolution of contentious issues in
the hope that the differences would be resolved by the conference's PrepCom
(Antrim and Chasek, 1992).
The breadth of these goals added to the already complicated process of
multilateral negotiation. The list of tasks assigned to the conference included
over two dozen specific items, ranging from review of past policies and actions
to the development of new strategies for national, regional, and global action
(Antrim, 1991). Thus, the multiplicity of actors, combined with the multiplicity
of issues and only two and a half years to prepare for the conference, which was
to be held in June 1992, created a difficult task for both the PrepCom and the
secretariat. Within these limits it became necessary to be creative and effective
in the preparatory negotiations to ensure that the conference would fulfill its
goals.
I
THE STORY OF THE UNCED PROCESS
THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE (PREPCOM)
Organizational Session: 5-16 March 1990, New York
47
UN Resolution 44/228 established the Preparatory Committee for UNCED, which
"shall be open to all States Members of the United Nations or members of the spe-
cialized agencies, with the participation of observers, in accordance with the estab-
lished practice of the General Assembly" (UNGA, 1989). The UNCED PrepCom
met for its organizational session in New York from 5-16 March 1990. The matters
addressed were generally procedural in nature, but the decisions had important
implications for later negotiations.
Ambassador Tommy T.B. Koh of Singapore was elected chairman of the Prep-
Com; Ahmed Djoghlaf of Algeria as rapporteur; and 39 vice chairmen were elected
to form the Bureau of the PrepCom. UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar
had appointed Maurice Strong as Secretary-General for the conference earlier in the
month. Both Koh and Strong came to UNCED with a wealth of experience: Koh
was president of the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1981 and 1982, and
Strong served as Secretary-General of the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Envi-
ronment. The unwieldy size of the bureau was due, in part, to the arithmetic
involved in maintaining appropriate geographic distribution in line with UN operat-
ing practices (Antrim and Chasek, 1992).
In preparation for this session, the secretariat for the session (drawn from the
UN secretariat, since the secretariat for the conference had not yet been estab-
lished) prepared a plan for the organization of the PrepCom. The plan called for
organizing work in three substantive committees addressing global, regional, and
national issues, with a fourth committee to be established to address cross-cutting
legal and institutional issues. The delegates at the organizational session, how-
ever, did not accept the secretariat plan, and, after extensive negotiations that
were driven largely by the positions of the developing countries, they agreed to
organize their work in two working groups that between them would take
responsibility for the specific items identified in Resolution 44/228 (Antrim,
1991). The mandate of the first group included protection of the atmosphere; pro-
tection and management of land resources; conservation of biological diversity;
and environmentally sound biotechnology. The second group's mandate included
protection of the oceans, seas, and coastal areas; protection of the quality and
supply of freshwater resources; and environmentally sound management of
wastes.
A decision on convening a group on legal and institutional issues was postponed
for later discussion. The PrepCom also decided that the basic issue of integration of
environment and development and a series of related issues that cut across each of
the individual agenda items, e.g., access to and transfer of environmentally sound
technology, financial resources requirements, economic instruments, and institu-
tional arrangements, would be considered on an issue-by-issue basis, and then more
comprehensively by the PrepCom itself.
An agenda for the first substantive session of the PrepCom structured around the
two working groups was accepted in the late hours of the session. In fact, Koh kept
the PrepCom in session all night until the delegates had reached a compromise
agreement (Antrim, 1991). This strategy of Koh's was to be repeated throughout the
preparatory process.
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A decision was also taken to establish a Voluntary Fund for the purpose
of supporting participation by developing countries, in particular the least-developed
countries, in the preparatory process. The secretariat was asked to prepare suggested
guidelines for preparation of National Reports and to recommend arrangements for
the participation of nongovernmental organizations (Assuncao, 1990).
PrepCom I: 6--31 August 1990, Nairobi
The first substantive session of the PrepCom (PrepCom I) was held in Nairobi in
August 1990. This location was selected for both political and substantive reasons.
Nairobi is the only developing country site of the headquarters of a UN organiza-
tion, the UN Environment Programme. Failure to utilize this site during the UNCED
preparations would cast doubt on the commitment to address the interests of devel-
oping countries. Substantively, it was hoped that convening a session at the site of
UNEP could increase the participation of diplomats and technical experts skilled
in international environmental diplomacy and encourage a more collaborative
atmosphere than anticipated from sessions based in New York or Geneva where
North-South divisions often dominate negotiations (Antrim and Chasek, 1992).
Early in the session, the secretariat presented a proposal for the structure of the
work to be prepared for UNCED. This structure comprised a declaration of princi-
ples for environment and development, Agenda 21 - a plan of action for the twenty-
first century, and the signing of international conventions related to UNCED. The
PrepCom accepted this general structure to guide its work. The PrepCom also
elected Ambassadors Bo Kjellen (Sweden) and Bukar Shaib (Nigeria) as chairs of
Working Groups I and n, respectively.
The first week was dominated by opening speeches by heads of delegation,
followed by a debate on NGO participation. UN Resolution 44/228 directed that
NGOs in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council (CONGOs) be
able to participate in the work of UNCED. The secretariat took this to include the
deliberations of the PrepCom and, in accordance with this understanding, prepared a
draft decision that would formally define the role of NGOs (Antrim, 1991). Unex-
pectedly, the NGO issue dominated the discussions of the PrepCom for nearly a
week. Some delegations inferred that NGOs without consultative status were delib-
erately excluded. Other delegations, specifically Tunisia and Mauritania, objected to
the participation of any NGOs. Finally, after nearly a week of unanticipated debate,
the PrepCom agreed that for PrepCom I only, any NGO could attend working group
sessions and ask for permission to speak. The decision of a policy for NGO partici-
pation in future sessions of the PrepCom was left to the General Assembly (May
1990).
The remaining two weeks of the session were devoted primarily to the two work-
ing groups, which attempted to define their interests and needs for information and
to draft requests for reports to be prepared by the secretariat. The processes by
which the working groups conducted their work combined both formal and informal
procedures. Each agenda item was introduced for discussion in a formal session of
the working group. National delegations, groups of countries, intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs), and NGOs were all invited to make statements and com-
ments. After the formal sessions, the groups convened again in informal sessions for
a more open and interactive discussion. These discussions guided the chairmen of
the two groups in the preparation of a series of conference room papers and draft
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decision documents that eventually led to a set of decisions that were adopted by
consensus of the groups (Antrim, 1992).
The creation of the working group on legal and institutional issues was again
postponed. Opposition came mostly from the Group of 77 developing countries
(G-77), who on the whole saw this as a working group focused on "northern
interests" (Schally interview, 1992). African countries, particularly Kenya, saw the
agenda item on institutional arrangements as a thinly veiled plot to move the UNEP
headquarters out of Nairobi. Finally, members of the G-77 believed that the small
size of their delegations meant that they could participate in no more than two
simultaneous working group sessions. So, as a result, Working Group Ill's establish-
ment was postponed until PrepCom II.
PrepCom II: 18 March-S April 1991, Geneva
Much of the second substantive session was devoted to the two working groups,
continuing the work of the Nairobi session in gathering information to support the
development of recommendations. During the intersessional period, the secretariat
began the process of convening working parties of experts to prepare background
reports on the various substantive issues to be addressed by the PrepCom. The work-
ing parties included representatives from UN agencies and other intergovernmental
organizations, research institutions and experts, and NGOs and interest groups. A
special effort was made to ensure that experts and institutions from developing
countries were well represented. By PrepCom II, working parties had been consti-
tuted for the following areas: atmosphere issues; land and agriculture; forestry;
biodiversity; biotechnology; oceans; toxic chemicals and hazardous wastes. In the
case of freshwater issues, the inter-secretariat group preparing for the 1992 Confer-
ence on Water and the Environment acted as the coordinating group (Desai, 1991).
According to UNCED Deputy Secretary-General Nitin Desai, the secretariat wanted
to "work consciously to ensure that what went before the countries reflected a cer-
tain consensus in the UN system" (Desai, 1992).
At PrepCom IT, the working groups were supposed to discuss the first set of back-
ground reports prepared by the secretariat. These reports, however, were not avail-
able in time to allow sufficient examination and review by many governments
before the session, so additional time had to be spent reviewing the documents and,
even then, some countries were unable to engage in substantive negotiations since
they had not received instructions from their ministries. This limited prior access to
conference documents foreshadowed a similar, but more severe, documentation
problem in the third session of the PrepCom (Antrim, 1992).
Working Group I
Among the topics considered by Working Group I, chaired by Ambassador Kjellen,
the issue that gave rise to the most protracted discussion was forests. While a num-
ber of countries felt that early action should be taken to start negotiations on an
international agreement on this subject, others considered that the various options
needed further clarification before final decisions were taken. An ad hoc sub-group
was formed to discuss the whole subject, and ultimately a request was made to the
secretariat to provide more information at PrepCom Ill, so that Working Group I
would "be in a position to examine all steps towards and options for a global
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consensus on the management, conservation and development of all types of for-
ests" (UNCED, 1991). The group also decided that UNCED would negotiate a non-
binding set of principles on forests for signature in Rio, rather than an international
forest convention, as originally suggested by the United States.
Working Group I also discussed the other items on its agenda, although much less
time was devoted to these subjects. On the subjects of atmosphere and biodiversity,
Working Group I asked the secretariat to work closely with the secretariats of the
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committees (INCs) for conventions on these topics
and to provide additional information at PrepCom III. The secretariat was also asked
to prepare additional background reports on biotechnology and soil loss.
Working Group II
Among the topics considered by Working Group II was the environmentally sound
management of wastes. Discussion on solid wastes and sewage-related issues
centered on ways of diminishing the creation of these wastes through changes in lif-
estyles and consumption patterns. Discussion on hazardous wastes focused on the
"need to help developing countries strengthen their financial and technical capa-
cities, their institutions and personnel, inter alia, through appropriate training, for
the management of their domestically produced hazardous wastes" (UNCED,
1991). Working Group II requested that the secretariat provide additional infonna-
tion on these issues, as well as on toxic chemicals.
Another key topic before Working Group II was oceans. This working group
asked the secretariat to present a comprehensive report at PrepCom Ill, and to elab-
orate the potential areas for action proposed in the present report. The main focus of
the discussion of freshwater resources was on the International Conference on Water
and the Environment to be held in Dublin in January 1992 and the UNCED input to it.
Working Group III
During the first week of the PrepCom, consultations were held to discuss and agree
upon the scope of Working Group Ill's mandate (Goree, 1991). Agreement was
finally reached that Working Group III would prepare a statement of environment
and development principles to govern the conduct of nations and people toward
each other and the Earth, which UNCED Secretary-General Maurice Strong had
started to call the "Earth Charter," evaluate existing instruments in the field of inter-
national environment law, and examine institutional arrangements required for the
effective implementation of the conclusions of the conference in the UN system
(UNCED, 1991). The PrepCom also appointed Ambassador Bedrich Moldan
(Czechoslovakia) as the chair of Working Group III. The initial meetings of Work-
ing Group III, which were held during the last week of the PrepCom, were devoted
to a general exchange of views and the adoption of the agenda for PrepCom III.
Plenary
Although the Plenary had met several times early in this session to approve the
mandate of Working Group III and to fonnulate policy for NGO accreditation and
participation in the UNCED preparatory process, the Plenary did not formally open
until the beginning of the third week. During the first week, the PrepCom approved
a process whereby the UNCED secretariat would recommend certain NGOs for
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accreditation, and then the Plenary would either authorize or deny such accreditation
within 24 hours. The accredited organizations would then be allowed to speak and
address the different sessions of the PrepCom and would be allowed to attend the
Rio Conference. Although NGOs welcomed the solution to this issue that had
plagued the PrepCom since Nairobi, many expressed frustration over the fact that
the first set of NGOs were not approved until the end of the first week, and thus
could not speak in the formal sessions until the second week. Many more NGOs
were not approved until later in the session, effectively barring them from participat-
ing in the sessions through most, if not all, of the PrepCom (Goree, 1991).
During the third week of the PrepCom, the Plenary discussed the cross-sectoral
issues under its mandate. Discussion focused on two conference documents that had
been prepared by the secretariat, "Poverty and Environmental Degradation" and
"Environment and Development." According to one NGO observer, "The Plenary
was poorly attended and fairly boring, even by PrepCom standards. The PrepCom
was in a strange transition: moving from issues to actions but no one had bold
conceptual frameworks to put on the table at this early date" (Goree, 1991). When
PrepCom II came to a close, the one thing that was clear was that the secretariat had
a lot of work to do during the short intersessional period before PrepCom III.
PrepCom III: 12 August~ September 1991, Geneva
As PrepCom III opened in Geneva, UNCED Secretary-General Maurice Strong
said that the major objective of this session was to move from discussion of com-
plex issues to looking at measures to be taken. Working Groups I and II, in fact,
were ready to commence negotiations on the substantive issues, but Working
Group III and the Plenary had barely begun to analyze and discuss the issues under
their mandate. Thus, other objectives for the session included: beginning substan-
tive discussions in Working Group III; the initiation of discussion in the Plenary on
cross-cutting issues, including human settlements, financial resources, poverty, sus-
tainability, health and education, transfer of technology, and a wide range of
economic issues; and formation of a contact group to negotiate a statement of
forest principles.
PrepCom III was initially organized so that Working Groups I and II would meet
for the first two weeks, Working Group III would meet during the second and third
weeks, and the Plenary would meet during the third and fourth weeks. After the first
week, however, it quickly became apparent that there was too much material to
cover in each of the working groups during the limited time available. As a result,
Working Groups I and II ended up meeting throughout the PrepCom and the Plenary
barely made a dent in the substantive discussions of cross-cutting issues. Though the
process was well organized at the surface, it quickly ran into problems. The enor-
mity of the agendas of each working group forced the institution of evening sessions
and, often, several informal negotiating sessions had to be held simultaneously, in
spite of the protests of small delegations from developing countries.
Each of the working groups and the Plenary followed the same procedure as in
previous PrepComs: formal discussion on each issue, followed by informal negoti-
ating sessions. For the most part, negotiations were based on the secretariat-
produced draft "Options for Agenda 21." In the informal sessions, there were no
assigned seats, often no interpreters and, at times, no NGOs or IGOs were allowed
to observe the proceedings. After the conclusion of these informal sessions, the
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working group convened once again in a formal session to approve decision docu-
ments on each topic to be forwarded to the Plenary for final approval.
More NGOs attended PrepCom III and made statements than at previous ses-
sions. At certain points, PrepCom Chair Tommy Koh and the chairs of the working
groups requested that NGOs give joint statements, since so many wanted to speak
and time was of the essence. By this session it was apparent that NGOs were partici-
pating in the UNCED process for three major reasons: to influence the official pro-
cess, to network with other NGOs, and to push their own agendas. Those NGOs that
were trying to influence the official process were not always effective because of
their lack of understanding of UN conference diplomacy, failure to make statements
that contributed concrete recommendations to the text under negotiation (most NGO
statements were general statements of principle or ideology) and, in many cases, the
inability of delegates to respond to NGO lobbying efforts and change their positions
without approval from their capitals (see Chapter 12 for more analysis of NGO
participation).
Working Group [I
The focus of the Working Group I negotiations was secretariat Document PC/42
"Options for Agenda 21." Of the issues on the agenda, progress was only made in the
negotiations on atmosphere and forests. In the discussions on atmospheric issues, the
discussions focused on energy in relation to its influence on the atmosphere. Trans-
boundary air pollution and ozone issues were largely ignored because of the prepon-
derance of energy expertise in the secretariat. The negotiators once again stressed that
UNCED should not duplicate, preempt, or prejudge the outcome of the parallel
climate change negotiations. By the end of the PrepCom, Working Group I had
succeeded in reaching consensus on less than half of the secretariat draft.
As a result of the decision at PrepCom IT to negotiate a statement on forest princi-
ples rather than a convention, a contact group was formed out of Working Group I
that worked for ten days negotiating a consolidated document under the chairman-
ship of Ambassador Charles Liburd (Guyana). By the conclusion of the session,
much of the text remained "bracketed" (still under negotiation) for further discus-
sion at PrepCom IV. Due to time constraints, discussion on the Agenda 21 options
for combating deforestation was postponed until PrepCom IV.
Owing to the amount of time spent on atmosphere and forests, little time was
available to deal with the remaining subjects on Working Group I's agenda. On the
subject of land resources, formal discussion was held on three areas of concern: pro-
tection and management of fragile ecosystems; an integrated approach to planning
and management of land resources; and sustainable agriculture and rural develop-
ment. Agreement was also reached to include a new Agenda 21 chapter on moun-
tains. Specific Agenda 21 proposals on combating desertification and drought
remained poorly developed, in part because the documents were not translated into
all six UN working languages until the second week of the PrepCom. In response to
African delegations' concerns that desertification had not been dealt with
adequately, the chair proposed that desertification be the first item on the agenda at
PrepComIV.
IThe summaries of the activities at PrepCom III are excerpted from J. Bernstein, P. Chasek, and
L. Goree, "PrepCom III: A Compilation of the Four Weekly Synopses" (document posted on Econet in
the electronic conference en.unced.news), 9 September 1991.
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Working Group I agreed not to impinge on the parallel INC negotiations on a
biodiversity convention. Thus, discussion on biodiversity focused on issues of
access to genetic resources and technology, financial resources, and the relationship
between biodiversity and biotechnology. On the related issue of biotechnology, dis-
cussions revealed two major rifts. One was between the majority of delegations,
which were concerned about the risks of genetically altered organisms, and the
United States, which considered those risks to be exaggerated. The second rift was
between developing countries who wanted to consider biotechnology and biodiver-
sity issues together and those who did not want to establish this linkage.
Working Group II
The focus of Working Group II's negotiations was also Document PC/42, "Options
for Agenda 21." Although progress was made in the negotiations on oceans and
coastal management, a number of contentious issues remained, including: protection
of whales and small cetaceans (dolphins and porpoises) and the role of the Interna-
tional Whaling Commission; the inclusion of Antarctica in the chapter; land-based
sources of marine pollution; and the relationship between UNCED and the 1982 UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea.
The discussions on wastes were divided into four groups: transboundary move-
ment of hazardous wastes; management of radioactive wastes; environmentally
sound management of toxic chemicals; and solid waste and sewage. After much
negotiation in informal sessions, a number of proposed Agenda 21 items remained
bracketed. Working Group II was unable to reach agreement on the need to include a
separate chapter in Agenda 21 on radioactive wastes, largely due to US opposition.
The key issues in the discussions on freshwater were the elaboration of imple-
mentation mechanisms, groundwater, research and development, inland fisheries
and aquaculture, and the participation of women and indigenous people. As in the
previous PrepComs, negotiation was postponed until after the Dublin Conference on
Freshwater Resources in January 1992.
Working Group III
This working group on legal and institutional issues held its first substantive ses-
sions at PrepCom m. Discussions were focused on definition of issues and the back-
ground documents prepared by the secretariat. but very little real negotiation took
place. On the subject of evaluation of environmental instruments, delegates reached
consensus on a list of existing agreements for the secretariat to review and criteria
for their evaluation. The PrepCom requested the secretariat to compile background
information on these agreements before the next session. In the general discussion
on institutional matters. issues raised included: the need for greater coordination
among existing organizations, the possibility of a strengthened UNEP or UN
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to coordinate environmental matters
throughout the UN system, and whether or not to create new institutions.
No substantive negotiations took place on the statement of general rights and
principles. Delegates spent much time arguing over the name: should the statement
on general rights and principles be called the "Earth Charter," as proposed by
Strong, or should it be called the Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-
ment, as proposed by the G-77. Another procedural dispute focused on which text
should form the basis for negotiations, as the secretariat, Peru, Canada, and the G-77
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all submitted drafts. By the end of the session it was agreed that a compilation of all
the drafts would be prepared by the secretariat.
Plenary
The Plenary held initial discussions on cross-sectoral issues, including: human settle-
ments; financial resources; poverty, sustainability, health and education; transfer of
technology; and economic issues. A discussion was also held on the structure of
Agenda 21. The formal sessions were composed essentially of comments on the sec-
retariat's background documents. No substantive textual negotiations took place,
although some of the informal discussions did make progress toward identifying
options for Agenda 21. Initial informal discussions on financial resources and tech-
nology transfer revealed serious North-5outh deadlocks on a number of fundamental
issues.
PrepCom IV: 2 March-4 April 1992, New York
As PrepCom IV began in New York, most issues had still not been negotiated. Since
insufficient time was allocated at PrepCom III for substantive negotiation, all unre-
solved matters were deferred to PrepCom IV's already overtaxed agenda. Thus, as
the session opened, delegates had before them 750 pages of text, in various stages of
negotiation, that formed Agenda 21; an "Earth Charter" compilation text ofover 136
paragraphs; a partially negotiated statement on forest principles; and impending
deadlock on financial resources and technology transfer. With five weeks of difficult
negotiations ahead of them, government delegates not only faced an enormous
agenda, but also the real possibility that little or no progress could be achieved on
the more contentious issues.
PrepCom IV was the first session devoted entirely to negotiation. Formal sessions
of the working groups and the Plenary were kept to a minimum. Although only two
informal sessions were held at any given time (keeping to the G-77 two-meeting
rule), most of the actual negotiation took place in the small contact groups that met
behind closed doors with limited interpretation and translation facilities. In the
waning days of PrepCom IV, there were often five or more different contact groups
meeting at any given time. Evening sessions also became a reality during the third
week of the session.
Another difference between PrepCom IV and the previous sessions was the dele-
gates themselves. In many cases, the technical experts who had participated in the
earlier PrepComs were supplemented or replaced by political strategists. In addition,
there was a preponderance of UN General Assembly Second Committee delegates
as the meeting took place in New York. Many of those delegates who had not
attended previous PrepComs brought with them both an absence of history of the
negotiations (which both helped and slowed down the process) as well as a knack
for Second Committee procedural and political wrangling. As a result, this session
was marked by increased politicization.
PrepCom IV was also characterized by NGG frustration. Due to the paucity of
formal sessions of the Plenary and working groups, there was little opportunity for
NGGs to make formal statements. Furthermore, since most of the informal sessions
were closed to NGGs, it was difficult to follow the negotiations, influence the
process, and lobby delegates.
I
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Thus, there was an overall change of climate as PrepCom IV progressed. Time
was running out and the procedures that had dominated the first three PrepComs -
the two-meeting rule, the deferment of difficult issues to the next session, and con-
stant procedural debates - were replaced by a more pragmatic, yet frenetic,
approach. With the possibility of failure looming in front of the delegates, round-
the-clock meetings and creative problem solving became the norm rather than the
exception.
Working Group P
Discussions in Working Group I ran the gamut from productive to acrimonious. The
negotiations were based, for the most part, on the secretariat's draft chapters for
Agenda 21. Negotiations on the chapters on integrated management of land
resources, sustainable mountain development, and promoting sustainable agriculture
development were comparatively noncontroversial and dispensed with easily. That
was not the case, however, with the remaining items on the agenda. The negotiations
on desertification stalled over an African request for the preparation and adoption of
an international convention to combat desertification. This initiative met resistance
from developed countries and could not be resolved by the end of the session.
Protection of the atmosphere was not discussed by Working Group I until the
fourth week. The debate reflected the impasses in the negotiations for a climate
change convention that were due to resume after the conclusion of PrepCom IV. The
United States refused to accept targets and timetables for reduction of carbon diox-
ide emissions and the Arab Group refused to accept text on energy efficiency and
conservation. Similarly, the discussions on biodiversity were also held hostage to
the incomplete negotiations for a convention on biodiversity. On the related issue of
biotechnology, progress was impeded by a dispute between the EC and the United
States on the need for international regulation of biotechnology.
Negotiations on the chapter of Agenda 21 on deforestation began rather inauspi-
ciously when Malaysia, on behalf of the G-77, introduced five new program areas
and tabled 256 textual changes. Despite a difficult beginning, the final text was not
only agreed upon, but was considered to be quite comprehensive. Unfortunately, the
negotiations on the statement of forest principles were not so easy. Despite the high
expectations that negotiations on the forest principles document would move
quickly, the debate turned into one of the most contentious series of negotiations in
New York. Negotiations on many of the principles were linked to the outcomes of
other ongoing UNCED negotiations (i.e., trade, Earth Charter, biodiversity,
climate). So, in many cases, progress could not be made until those issues had been
resolved. Many delegates were frustrated at the end of the session. Even though they
were negotiating until 2:00 or 3:00 in the morning, they could not make any
progress (Zentilli, 1992).
Working Group II
The Agenda 21 chapter on oceans was the longest and one of the most complex. The
secretariat draft, which formed the basis for negotiations, had 152 paragraphs and
2The summaries of the activities at PrepCom IV are excerpted from J. Bernstein, P. Chasek, and L.
Goree, "A Summary of the Proceedings of the Fourth Session of the UNCED Preparatory Committee,"
Earth Summit Bulletin, Vol. I, No. 27, 20 April 1992.
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did not even include text for two of the seven program areas. Six contact groups
were established on oceans alone. The most contentious issues were in the program
areas on marine living resources, including overfishing of straddling and highly
migratory fish stocks, and conservation of marine mammals, especially whales. The
contact group on marine environmental protection spent a great deal of time inte-
grating into the document the recommendations made by the intergovernmental
meeting of experts on land-based sources of marine pollution, held in Nairobi in
December, 1991. By the end of PrepCom IV, much to the amazement of observers,
there was agreement in all areas except straddling fish stocks.
Issues of concern in the chapter on freshwater resources initially included poten-
tial environmental problems caused by construction of dams and water channeliza-
tion; transboundary rivers and freshwater resources; impacts of climate change; and
the incorporation of the recommendations of the Dublin Conference on Water and
the Environment. The contact group was able to resolve most issues, although nego-
tiations on the introduction, including reference to the Dublin Conference, never
took place because of lack of time.
As much progress was made in the negotiations on waste at PrepCom III, discus-
sion on the four chapters on waste and toxic chemicals focused on the bracketed
text. Agreement was finally reached on inclusion of the chapter on radioactive
waste, and by the end of the session only two major issues were left unresolved: mil-
itary disposal of hazardous wastes and disposal of radioactive wastes in or near the
marine environment.
Working Group III
Most of the time allotted to Working Group ill was spent on the Earth CharterlRio
Declaration. The often tortuous process got off to a poor start when Working Group
TIl rejected the chair's proposed working method. After a week of debate over pro-
cedure and the choice of negotiating text, PrepCom Chair Tommy Koh stepped in
and mediated a compromise allowing negotiation to begin on the G-77 draft text,
without prejudice to other submissions. General discussion on the proposed princi-
ples and concepts lasted for over two weeks, before a contact group was established
to actually begin drafting the final text. Negotiations broke down when an attempt
was made by the co-chairs of the contact group to streamline the text. With only two
days to go in the session, Koh took over, established a new drafting committee con-
sisting of eight G-77 delegates and eight OECD delegates, and worked for two days
until agreement was reached on a final text of the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development. The draft contained 27 norms for state and interstate behavior,
many of which have never been universally accepted before. Much to the surprise of
the entire PrepCom, the Declaration was the only totally unbracketed text to go to
Rio, largely because Koh borrowed heavily on his great reservoir of personal and
political capital. Many delegates were not pleased with either the final text or the
manner in which it had been negotiated (that is, limited number of participants and
consensus forced by time pressure and the chair). Had it not been for Koh's
insistence, the late hour, and a very fast gavel, debate would have been pro-
tracted during the final session of the PrepCom and the fragile consensus would
have been lost.
Owing to the amount of time spent on the Rio Declaration, negotiation on the
other issues in Working Group ill got off to a late start. The main focus of debate in
I
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the institutions chapter of Agenda 21 was the creation of a new institution, the Com-
mission on Sustainable Development to monitor implementation of Agenda 21.
Other unresolved issues related to the actual role of NGOs within the UN system
generally, and within UNCED implementation specifically, dispute settlement and
national reporting.
Conflict arose in the negotiations on the chapter on international agreements and
instruments. Most of the divisions were on North-South lines, with the G-77
opposed to inclusion of language saying that states should ensure compliance with
international agreements, the need for new regulatory regimes to deal with areas
where adequate measures are lacking, such as nuclear safety, and further study of
alternative dispute prevention and settlement techniques. The paragraph calling for
the prevention of deliberate large-scale environmental destruction was heavily
debated. The G-77 insisted that the paragraph should only apply in times of war,
whereas the Northern countries insisted that it apply in both war and peacetime.
What was originally expected to be a relatively noncontroversial debate, evolved
into one of the more heated and acrimonious exchanges.
Plennry
PrepCom IV was the first time that negotiations took place on the large number of
cross-sectoral issues under the Plenary's mandate. In some cases, such as in the
chapters on the integration of environment and development in decision making,
human settlements, information for decision making, science for sustainable devel-
opment, capacity-building, and education, negotiations progressed smoothly. In
other areas, debate was more protracted.
The negotiations on international economic issues were plagued with many of the
same problems that characterized the Uruguay Round of the GAIT and the eighth
round of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD VIII). The con-
tentious issues included agricultural protectionism, the use of subsidies, and the
need for mutually supportive environmental and trade policies.
The chapters on poverty, consumption patterns, and demographic dynamics were
not as difficult as expected, although the United States objected to any text that
explicitly called for changing consumption patterns. The negotiations on the health
chapter led to a heated debate on contraception and family planning, which was not
resolved until the final hours of the session.
The negotiations on the chapters addressing the need to involve all social groups
in the effective implementation of all program areas of Agenda 21 were among
those most closely watched by NGOs. The secretariat draft was divided into nine
parts to include the role of women; youth; indigenous peoples; nongovernmental
organizations; local authorities; trade unions; business and industry; the scientific
and technological community; and farmers. Before this document was even
addressed by the Plenary, the coordinator held consultations between representatives
of the major groups and key government delegates to exchange ideas and proposals
and help governments understand the positions of these major groups and possibly
to propose text on their behalf.
The most difficult negotiations were those held on technology transfer and
finance. Discussions on technology transfer began on the second day of PrepCom
IV, and lasted until the last Plenary session. The contact group finally emerged with
a comparatively clean document. There was no agreement on the terminology "tech-
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nology cooperation" as opposed to "technology transfer." A number of paragraphs,
including amendments requested by Saudi Arabia on "environmentally [safe and]
sound technology," remained bracketed - as did paragraphs on the terms of transfer
and protection of intellectual property rights.
Financial resources was given top priority at PrepCom N and negotiations lasted
throughout the session. Disagreement quickly emerged over the use of a G-77 draft
text as the negotiating text; the need for new and additional resources to finance
Agenda 21 implementation; and the use of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) as
a mechanism for funding Agenda 21. After several weeks of discussion the negotia-
tions stalled. When the coordinator, Ambassador John Bell (Canada), was unable to
make further progress, PrepCom Chair Tommy Koh stepped in and asked Mexican
Ambassador Andres Rozental to coordinate a new round of talks. This was conducted
at the Mexican mission and was limited to a select number of representatives from
industrialized and developing countries. When it finally appeared as if progress was
being made, another impasse was reached between the EC proposals and the G-77
expectations (especially on the GEF), and talks again broke down on the eve of the
last day of the PrepCom.
Although PrepCom IV was neither an unmitigated disaster nor an overwhelming
success, in actual fact progress was indeed achieved - close to 85 percent of Agenda
21 was in some state of agreement. It was, however, the remaining 15 percent that
was deeply problematic, as the most difficult issues remained to be resolved at Rio.
And so, what was expected to be a two-week massive photo opportunity in Rio was
quickly transformed into a critical negotiating session (Bernstein, Chasek, and
Goree, 1992a).
THE CONFERENCE: 3-14 JUNE 1992, RIO DE JANEIRO
Although the PrepCom had finished its work in April, the final two months leading
up to Rio were filled with numerous meetings that contributed to the UNCED nego-
tiating process. The INC for a Framework Convention on Climate Change reached
agreement at the end of its fifth session in New York on 9 May, although many coun-
tries and NGOs expressed dissatisfaction with the outcome. The INC for a Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity also completed its negotiations during its final session
in Nairobi, which concluded on 19 May.
On the issue of financial resources, numerous meetings were held, allowing the dia-
logue on finance to continue despite the deadlock at the end of PrepCom Iv. Former
Japanese Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita hosted the "Eminent Persons' Meeting on
Financing Global Environment and Development" in Tokyo in mid-April. The IMF
and World Bank Development Committee met in late April, providing a forum for
finance ministers to discuss the "interaction between environment and development
policies and the preparations for UNCED" (Bernstein, Chasek, and Goree, 1992e).
The GEF participants meeting took place in early May to discuss the future of the GEF
and UNCED participants' concerns with it. Finance was also discussed at the OECD
Ministers' meeting and the EC Environment and Development Ministers' Meeting,
both held in May. Finally, financing Agenda 21 was the center of discussion as minis-
ters from 55 developing countries met in late April in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, for the
Second Ministerial Conference of Developing Countries on Environment and Devel-
opment (UNDPI, 1992). Then, as May drew to a close, all eyes turned to Rio.
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UNCED fonnally opened on 3 June after two days of pre-conference consulta-
tions, during which the conference officers were elected, the rules of procedure
approved, and the agenda agreed upon. The conference itself was divided into two
main bodies: the Plenary and its subsidiary body, the Main Committee. The Plenary,
under President Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil, was the forum for the general
debate, which consisted of country statements delivered at the Ministerial level. The
series of 204 statements lasted from 3-11 June. On 12 June, the Summit portion of
the conference began, and for two days heads of state and government addressed the
world for seven minutes each.
By contrast, the Main Committee was the site of the actual political negotiations -
in essence, a PrepCom V. Not only were many of the negotiators the same as in the
PrepCom, but the conference elected Ambassador Tommy Koh to chair the Commit-
tee. The mandate of the Main Committee was to finalize the products of UNCED:
Agenda 21, the Statement on Forest Principles, and the Rio Declaration on Environ-
ment and Development. Those areas in need of substantive negotiations were for-
warded to contact groups established by Koh and his Bureau. The eight contact
groups were: atmosphere, biodiversity/biotechnology, institutions, legal instru-
ments, finance, technology transfer, freshwater resources, and forests (including
both the Statement on Forest Principles and the Agenda 21 chapter on forests).
Other outstanding or bracketed text was negotiated by the Committee. In most
cases, Koh asked the PrepCom coordinator for the specific issue to hold infonnal
consultations. On some issues, like the proposed desertification convention, Koh
conducted the consultations himself. During seven days of intense negotiation, the
mood oscillated dramatically from issue to issue and day to day. The entrance of
ministers and other high-ranking politicians into the negotiations alternatively
improved the pace, as they were able to make the necessary decisions, and impaired
the process, as they were often unaware of the history of the issue within the
UNCED context. When the Main Committee ran out of its allotted time at 6:00 a.m.
on Thursday, II June, three issues still had not been resolved: forests, finance, and
atmosphere. These issues were forwarded to the Plenary for further negotiations at
the Ministerial level where, at the eleventh hour, agreement was finally reached
(Bernstein, Chasek, and Goree, 1992d).
The Ministerial consultations on forests, coordinated by Klaus Topfer, Gennan
Minister for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety, were able
to make progress where the Main Committee could not. The Main Committee's con-
tact group on forests had grown too large. At the Ministerial level, the participants
had the possibility of getting involved and making decisions on issues that could not
be dealt with at the Ambassadorial level. There was no other level to which the
Ministers could refer the discussions to (interview with B. Zentilli, UNCED Secre-
tariat, July 1992). After a marathon five-hour session that concluded at 3:00 a.m. on
12 June, 18 countries, represented by no less than II ministers, finally agreed to a
package proposed by Topfer (Bernstein, Chasek, and Goree, 1992d). This package,
which included compromise language for all outstanding issues in the forest princi-
ples statement, was approved unanimously when presented to the Plenary, although
many believed the Statement to be weak or ineffectual. Regardless, these principles
constitute "the first global consensus on forests," and affinn the importance of forest
management and conservation for sustainable development.
Final discussions on financial resources lasted until 13 June. The issues that could
not be resolved by the Main Committee included: conditionality and the GEF, IDA
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replenishment levels, debt relief, and the UN target of 0.7 percent of GNP for aDA
by the year 2000. This last issue proved to be the most divisive, as the G-77 insisted
that the provision of new and additional resources from the developed countries was
necessary to ensure the G-77's support for the rest of Agenda 21. The developed
countries were quite split on the issue: some countries, such as France and the Nor-
dics, had already reached the target; other countries (such as Great Britain and Ger-
many) that had pledged to meet the target did not think they were able to; and still
others, like the United States, had never committed to anything. The failure of the
EC to reach a unified position on this issue only served to prolong the debate. A final
compromise that accommodated these disparate positions stated that countries
would reaffirm their commitments to reach the UN target of 0.7 percent of GNP for
aDA and augment their aid programs in order to reach that target as soon as poss-
ible. This compromise did not have the targets nor the timetable that the G-77 had
wanted, but was the most the industrialized countries were willing to agree to.
Next to discussions on finance, the atmosphere negotiations proved to be the most
difficult and protracted at UNCED. an the insistence of the Arab Group, PrepCom
IV was forced to transmit a completely bracketed chapter to Rio. The Arab Group
maintained that the chapter was not only duplicative of the work of the climate
change negotiations, but that it placed an over-emphasis on energy efficiency and
conservation. In contact group discussions, many Northern countries fought hard for
the retention of the reference to new and renewable energy sources throughout the
text and called into question Saudi Arabia's true motives for wanting to delete these
references.
Another contentious matter pertained to the phrase "safe and" in the context of
energy sources. Most countries had requested the deletion of that phrase on the basis
that it connoted an anti-nuclear bias. By contrast, Saudi Arabia insisted adamantly
that the phrase be retained. The chair of the contact group, Ambassador Kjellen,
with the assistance of the Brazilians, was able to resolve both outstanding matters
late on 13 June. Although the Saudis accepted the compromise text at the final
Plenary on 14 June, they fonnally placed on record their government's reservations
with the atmosphere chapter. Since Agenda 21 is not a legally binding instrument,
but instead a statement of policy, the Saudis' fonnal reservations to the chapter had
no substantive implications (Bernstein, Chasek, and Goree, I 992e).
CONCLUSIONS
As UNCED came to a close on Sunday morning, 14 June, the common theme of the
closing statements was that Rio was only a beginning and that much more work
needed to be done. The high expectations that had marked the early stages of the
UNCED negotiating process was replaced by a realization that two and a half years
of negotiation alone was not sufficient. What did emerge was a sense of satisfaction
that agreement was reached. For two weeks in June, the world was focused on Rio
and the issues of environment and development, making it the most publicized and
the largest conference in UN history.
Was UNCED a success? This question will most likely be debated long into the
future, but the answer depends on what one's goal and expectations were for the
conference. For the most part, the success of UNCED can only be evaluated in
the future, when the results of this negotiation and educational process will be seen.
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Negotiators worked hard and long on reaching consensus on several new instru-
ments of international law - both hard law, such as the Conventions on Climate
Change and Biological Diversity, which were opened for signature in Rio, and soft
law, such as the nonlegally-binding Agenda 21, Rio Declaration, and the statement
on forest principles. Although consensus diplomacy often results in a great deal of
frustration as well as "lowest common denominator" agreements that lack the teeth
advocates want, it did offer a forum in which governments could discuss the interre-
lated issues of environment and development for the first time.
The conference also resulted in the creation of new institutional mechanisms to
allocate costs and benefits of resource use and conservation more fairly. A new insti-
tution, the Commission on Sustainable Development, was created to act as a coordi-
nating body within the UN system to monitor the implementation of Agenda 21. UN
procedures were opened so that NGOs could actively participate - both in the for-
mulation of policy and in its future implementation. Although many would argue
that the Commission on Sustainable Development will be another moribund UN
institution and that NGO participation was too limited, it is still a step in the right
direction.
There are, however, some immediate lessons that can be learned from the
UNCED negotiating process. For example, perhaps the biggest problem in the
UNCED negotiations was the size of the agenda and the limited amount of negotiat-
ing time available. UN Resolution 44/228 opened a Pandora's box of environment
and development issues to be dealt with by the UNCED PrepCom. With just over
two years to prepare, less than two years of substantive sessions, and, in some cases,
less than five weeks of serious negotiation, it was a difficult task from the start. The
fact that any agreement came out of this process is quite an accomplishment.
What precedents UNCED will set remain to be seen. UNCED marks the begin-
ning of a new era of international cooperation on environmental protection and
environmentally sound development. UNCED has created a new global agenda on
sustainable development. What its legacy will be is largely in the hands of the gov-
ernments, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and
individuals from all areas of society who must continue to ensure that the future is
an environmentally sound one. As Maurice Strong said in his closing statement:
There has been, of course, some weakening of [Agenda 21] in the process, but it still
stands as the most comprehensive, the most far-reaching and, if implemented, the most
effective programme of intemational action ever sanctioned by the intemational com-
munity. It is not a final and complete action programme, and was not intended to be, but
one which must continue to evolve.

4Issue Clarification and the Role of Consensual
Knowledge in the UNCED Process
Gunnar Sjostedt
INTRODUCTION
The overall aim of this chapter is to assess how issues were introduced into
UNCED, and particularly how they were framed and developed during the negoti-
ations. Lessons learned in this regard will become useful to consider in future
negotiations extending the work concluded at the Rio Conference. Such a continu-
ation will, no doubt, become necessary. The UNCED process represented but a
moderate success. The objectives established for UNCED at the outset were only
partly attained, although the accomplishments of UNCED were by no means neg-
ligible (see Chapter 13). Two important treaties, on climate change and biological
diversity, were opened for signature at the Meeting of Heads of State or Govern-
ment in Rio de Janeiro. Although the Rio Declaration did not attain the formal
status of an "Earth Charter," it does contain a number of fundamental principles
and guidelines for future international cooperation on the environment and devel-
opment. One hundred and seventy nations formally participating in the UNCED
process accepted specific understandings - for instance, the formal acknowledg-
ment of the fundamental principle that "the polluter pays." The idea was also
endorsed that in the future, environmental considerations should be more fully
integrated into governmental decision making (Financial Times, 29 July 1992).
However, in spite of its undeniable accomplishments, the Rio Conference was
in some respects more of a beginning than the termination of a process of interna-
tional decision making. Several of the agreements attained in the process, for
instance that concerning climate change, are likely to be of only an intermediate
duration. In order to become effective, commitments incorporated in these treaties
(for example, promised reductions of industrial emissions) will have to be consid-
erably strengthened to have a real impact on the environmental problem to which
they pertain. Negotiations on a number of highly salient environmental problem
areas - for instance, deforestation and desertification - hardly got off the ground
in UNCED. Some of the ideas discussed in UNCED will have to be considerably
specified to become negotiable from a political point of view. One example is the
Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons Learned from the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (G. Sjostedt, eral., eds.; 1-85966-077-0; © IIASA; pub. Graham &
Trotman, 1994; printed in Great Britain). pp. 63-86.
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notion that changed lifestyles in industrialized countries represent one of the most
effective strategies to cope with serious environmental problems. Many formal
and informal stipulations of the UNCED agreements must become clarified and
further developed before they can become transformed into meaningful policy
action.
There are good reasons to search for improved methods to facilitate continued
environmental negotiations emerging from the UNCED process. One important
task is, for instance, to look for constructive ways of dealing with sticking points
and conflicts of interest that could not be properly solved in the UNCED process
(see Chapter 5). However, issue clarification and the creation of consensual
knowledge in the UNCED process are the key concepts addressed in this chapter.
These notions refer to how the UNCED agenda was created, established, and
developed to make issues negotiable. This was partly a conventional diplomatic
exercise at the negotiation table, and partly a collective learning process. The
exchange of concessions and the recurrent drama of the endgame have tended to
attract the attention of analysts more than agenda-setting and issue clarification.
However, these elements of the negotiation have a strategic significance, particu-
larly for the parties able to significantly influence these stages of the process.
These conditions can be expected to further enhance the importance of prenegoti-
ation and agenda-setting.
The way issues are defined and understood does not only influence the process
- that is, the political struggle in the negotiation. Ultimately, issue definitions also
condition the effectiveness of agreements reached in the negotiations - to what
extent a treaty contributes to solving the problem to which it pertains (Underdal,
1992). Sometimes a tradeoff has to be made between an easy agreement and an
effective agreement. In order to become acceptable on the negotiation table, solu-
tions may have to be deliberately simplified. In other cases, some aspects of the
problem area will have to become emphasized out of proportion to new import-
ance in order to attract the interest of a sufficient number of negotiation parties.
This kind of simplification, or even manipulation, of issues may have a negative
effect on the problem solving that the agreement in question is meant to produce.
For example, key elements of the problem may have been "defined away." Still,
issue simplification may under some conditions not only be acceptable, but also
desirable, as it may be a sine qua non for an agreement in a situation where non-
agreement is prohibitively costly. For instance, non-agreement may sometimes
endanger achievements made in earlier negotiations. A major premise of the
present chapter is that while alternative understandings of issues may be diffuse or
difficult to identify, they may have important consequences for negotiation out-
comes. Understanding the methods and processes of issue clarification may thus
facilitate negotiation and regime effectiveness in the future.
The more complex the issues are, the more important agenda-setting and issue
clarification are likely to be compared to other elements of the negotiation pro-
cess. A focus on agenda-setting and issue clarification in the UNCED setting is
particularly warranted. The agenda confronting negotiating parties in the UNCED
process was extraordinarily large. Many issues were highly complex from a tech-
nical point of view - for instance, climate change or the relationships between bio-
logical diversity, biotechnology, and intellectual property rights. Existing
knowledge on many of the issues was comparatively scarce and undeveloped.
While agenda-setting and issue clarification represented crucial stages of the
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UNCED process, it had a number of significant characteristics. These particular
attributes may indicate useful lessons for the future, things that should either be
avoided or repeated.
ISSUE FORMATION AND CLARIFICATION: THE ROLE OF
CONSENSUAL KNOWLEDGE
A Key Concept: Consensual Knowledge
In theoretical analyses focusing on negotiations per se, the issues on the agenda are
in reality often considered to be "given," especially in works inspired by game the-
ory (Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Rapoport, 1964). Note that game theory is no excep-
tional case; most process-oriented analyses of negotiations take the disputed issues
for granted (Cross, 1983). It is usually only studies with a descriptive orientation
that are concerned with the substance of issues (Winham, 1986). However, as high-
lighted by a growing literature on prenegotiation, agenda-setting often represents a
critical stage (Stein, 1989). However, descriptions of agenda-setting do not usually
focus on the dynamics of the issues as such.
The conventional understanding of "agenda-setting" conveys the image of a
selection process in which parties jointly agree on the topics they are willing to
negotiate on, such as climate change, oceans, or forestry, to mention but a few
examples from the UNCED process (Druckman, 1977). In the standard analysis,
these topics are assumed to exist and have a clear meaning before the negotiation
begins. Once the agenda has been established, the analyst may conceive of the
issues included in it as a set of given conditions for the negotiation. Often this per-
spective on the issues may be fully warranted. In many cases the stakes of a certain
negotiation issue are obvious and do not need to be clarified and explained to nego-
tiators. 1 An example of such recurrent negotiations are talks concerning fish catches
in a certain sea area. However, even in such straightforward cases, the issues "on the
table" may require some clarification. For example, determination of the quotas of
fish catches may require a common understanding between parties of conservation
needs. Such analytical requirements, however, are comparatively easy to satisfy
when, as in the example of fish catches, issues and stakes are simple and have been
dealt with in earlier rounds of negotiations.
However, issues often need to be further developed and clarified after the formal
establishment of the agenda. This is likely to happen when, as in the case of the
UNCED process, the agenda contains a multitude of relatively new and technically
complex issues. When parties meet at the negotiation table to deal with such com-
plex issues, they are likely to need more and better information about them than they
initially possess. For this purpose, a general description of the problem area con-
cerned is not sufficient. The problem dimensions that will be moved to the forefront
at the negotiation table will have to be highlighted in the information gathered. Issue
definitions, and related negotiation problems, will have to be expressed in terms that
help make them negotiable. For instance, the concepts used should integrate, or
IThe stake is the dimension, or set of dimensions, of an issue that represents the main bone of
contention dealt with in the negotiation or in any other form of conflict resolution (Mansbach and
Vasquez, 1981).
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connect, the language of problem assessment with that of problem solving. The base
of information and knowledge built up collectively to service and support negotia-
tions will have to be consensual. To negotiate on a certain issue the parties involved
will have to share a common understanding about it. In multilateral negotiations on
complex issues, this objective is usually difficult to attain. Knowledge and informa-
tion is likely to be asymmetrically distributed. Information requirements are likely
to differ among nations as well. Industrialized nations are generally much better
informed about environmental problems than the average developing country. How-
ever, in order to begin to negotiate in earnest, parties will have to share a common
understanding with respect to the issues on the agenda. The more complex the issues
are from a technical point of view, the more elaborate methods are needed to create
and establish such a consensual knowledge.
Consensual knowledge is an aggregate of cognitions that reflects what relevant
actors know about the problem(s) concerned, rather than their interests or attitudes
towards them.2 Knowledge is considered to be consensual when it reflects what the
quasi-totality of the actors involved in a negotiation acknowledge as valid cogni-
tions. There is likely to be a significant correspondence between the consensual
knowledge developed in a negotiation system and the mainstream scientific,
"objective" discernment of the same matters. One reason is that as a main supplier
of critical information, the scientific community is in a good position to influence
issue clarification. Another explanation is that in order to function effectively in a
negotiation, the cognitive understanding of the problem area needs to be anchored in
a scientifically recognized or authorized body of knowledge and interpretation.
Consensual knowledge is not a static body of cognitive elements. It may change
during the negotiation, hopefully in such a way that the issues on the agenda become
increasingly clarified and specified. It cannot, however, be taken for granted that the
efforts to create a consensual knowledge will be successful. Consensual knowledge
may be at different stages of development at any given point of time. It represents a
kind of political agreement between parties concerned. Like other accords, this
agreement may be the result of a political struggle. There may be a confrontation
between two or more bodies of knowledge competing for supremacy. Recall, for
example, the struggle between the North and the South concerning a New Inter-
national Economic Order (NIEO) during the 1970s in UNCTAD and other UN
institutions. The demands of the Group of 77 were linked to the thinking of the
"dependency" school, looking at the world economy from a new perspective that
was partly inspired by Marxism (Bhagwati, 1977). The case ofNIEO illustrates that
the creation of consensual knowledge may become a heavily politicized process and
develop into an ideological struggle. In this encounter, one of the contending bodies
of knowledge may become a winner and prevail. The other possibility is that con-
sensus is not achieved, and no common understanding of the issues on the agenda is
attained. In this case, the probability for an agreement is low.
A number of critical attributes of consensual knowledge are discernible.3 One is
the extent ofacceptance of consensual knowledge above a certain critical threshold.
In order to function in the negotiations, the body of cognitions representing an
2The concept of "consensual knowledge" is closely related to the theoretical analysis of "epistemic
communities" (Haas. 1991).
3In principle, it should be possible to estimate most of these attributes fairly precisely with quantitative
measures. For the present analytical purposes. it is however satisfactory to make a fairly general
assessment.
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emerging consensual knowledge cannot be too strongly opposed. For analytical
purposes, it is sufficient to establish the rule of thumb that a body of knowledge is
consensual if it is not outspokenly opposed by any significant party or coalition.
A second attribute of consensual knowledge is its contents identity, which is
related to the academic discipline or disciplines from which it originates. For
instance, trade theory gives a clear contents identity to the well-established consen-
sual knowledge pertaining to the GAlT system.
The language code reflects the kind of vocabulary that is used when the consen-
sual knowledge is formulated. For instance, the language code may have been
offered by lawyers and thus have a legal dressing, or the vocabulary may have a
scientific tone.
A fourth attribute is the degree of coherence characterizing consensual knowl-
edge. A body of consensual knowledge consists of a number of factual propositions.
The more individual propositions are linked together by acknowledged causal rela-
tionships, the higher the degree of coherence of the consensual knowledge. With an
increasing degree of coherence, the correspondence between the consensual and the
related scientific knowledge is also likely to grow.
Especially when consensual knowledge has little coherence, it is likely not to
have any particular goal-orientation. With an rising degree of inherent coherence,
the likelihood increases that consensual knowledge develops a consistent goal-
orientation in either of two directions. Either the knowledge built up will be oriented
toward problem analysis or toward problem solving.
A sixth variable describing the character of consensual knowledge may be
referred to as degree offormalization. The consensual knowledge may develop as an
informal understanding of a problem area, which is not codified in any kind of for-
mal texts. For instance, international lawyers may be in perfect agreement about
what legal requirements an agreement will have to meet without having this spelled
out in any formal document produced as part of the negotiation process. However,
consensual knowledge may also be expressed in documents produced in the negoti-
ation process. As demonstrated by GAlT, consensual knowledge may even become
incorporated into the basic treaty of the organization servicing the negotiation.4
Consensual knowledge may fulfill several functions in the negotiation process.
Basically, it serves as a general frame of reference for negotiators. It offers a taxon-
omy and elaborate concepts that may be helpful to facilitate communication
between negotiating parties. Consensual knowledge may also supply a code ofinter-
pretation of crucial causal relationships pertaining to the substance of issues under
negotiation. Such acknowledged causation may represent important premises for
problem solving as well as for the attribution of responsibility or values to negotiat-
ing parties.5 In this regard, when computer models provided a commonly accepted
way to specify the traffic patterns of transboundary air pollution flows, the attain-
ment of an agreement was facilitated (Alcamo, Hordijk, and Shaw, 1990). Finally,
consensual knowledge may also indicate, or even recommend, a certain solution to
the problem dealt with in the negotiation. It may, for instance, contain an analysis of
the causes of the problems negotiated, the logic of which implies a certain solution.
41n the case of GAIT, the essence of the free trade theory is built into the Preamble of the General
Agreement.
sOne example is the establishment of the transboundary spread of certain pollutants as a prerequisite
for the finalizing of the UN-ECE Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (1979).
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The process through which consensual knowledge is created or modified is referred
to as issue clarification, which in turn may be broken up into two kinds of sub-
processes. One of these is collective learning; parties to the negotiation are "educated"
about the issues on the agenda by having access to the same background information,
analysis, and assessments that are produced and circulated within the context of the
negotiation process. The other sub-process is editing diplomacy; parties typically sit
"at the table" to process a text into an agreement. This typically pertains to the final
documents to be produced in the negotiation - the outcome. In a multilateral context,
editing diplomacy often characterizes bargaining over details at the end of the process.
However, editing diplomacy may also pertain to the definition of the issues in the con-
text of issue clarification. For instance, it is not uncommon that key concepts to be
used in the negotiations will have to be established by means of careful bargaining -
editing diplomacy. Collective learning and editing diplomacy may develop independ-
ently in the negotiation process or they may interact.
The Research Strategy
The objective of this chapter is to clarify what roles issue clarification and the emer-
gence of a consensual knowledge played in the UNCED process. The questions
addressed in the chapter are framed in terms of the conceptual framework summa-
rized in Table 4.1. The first research task is to characterize the processes of issue
clarification at a fairly high level of generalization. The second research task is to
describe the character and functions of consensual knowledge. The third, and last,
research task is to draw lessons regarding issue clarification and consensual knowl-
edge for future environmental negotiations.
Table 4.1 A conceptual framework: The process of ''Issue Clarification"
and the Attributes and Functions of "Consensual Knowledge"
Consensual knowledge
FUNCTIONS
ATrRlBUTES
Frame of reference
Extent of acceptance
Formalization
Code of
interpretation
Language code
Contents identity
Indication of solution
Coherence
Goal orientation
Issue Clarification
SUB·PROCESSES Collective learning Editing diplomacy
PROCESSES OF ISSUE CLARIFICATION IN UNCED: A GENERAL
CHARACTERIZATION
The Delimitation of the Issue Clarification Stage
Issue clarification may occur, in principle, any time during a negotiation. even in
connection with the endgame. Redefinition of controversial concepts may show, for
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instance, a way out of an impasse. Still, issue clarification is likely to be most
closely associated with agenda-setting, the organization of the negotiation, and the
search for formulas to permit nuanced exchanges of concessions. In the case of
UNCED, "the distribution game" definitely prevailed at the fourth meeting of the
UNCED PrepCom IV in New York, February 1992. During the first part of Prep-
Com IV, negotiations had no clear direction (see Chapter 3). However, from the
beginning of the third week, parties showed a new determination to work out
agreements in the many areas in which negotiations had become bogged down.6 The
changed atmosphere in the negotiations manifested itself in the abolishment of a
number of procedural rules that had so far guided the negotiations. These changes
represented the discontinuation of the UN code of procedure, which had been relied
upon before PrepCom IV. For example, the norm that editing diplomacy should be
based on papers prepared by the Group of 77 (G-77) was revoked'? Likewise, the
rule that only two different committee meetings could be conducted at the same
time, because most Third World countries did not have sufficient manpower
resources in their delegations to negotiate at more than two places at once, was
abandoned. These, and a few other, procedural rules were exchanged because they
were believed to obstruct effective bargaining.
The change of atmosphere and direction during PrepCom IV was seemingly a
reaction to the prospect of a total failure at the Rio Conference in June. The leading
nations in the UNCED process were not willing to accept the visible costs of a
default, or canceled, "Earth Summit." Therefore, it was necessary to inject a new
spirit into the negotiation with the purpose of finding viable agreements regarding
the various issues on the UNCED agenda. As time was running out, it became man-
datory to use more flexible "rules of the game" than the formal UN procedures. For
example, it was indispensable to let particularly resourceful, or especially interested,
countries playa leading role when this could be expected to facilitate negotiations,
or otherwise move them forward even if the formal prerogatives of G-77 would
become compromised. It was also necessary to permit the creation of small,
restricted contact groups of "especially interested parties" to handle outstanding,
unresolved negotiation problems even if this meant a proliferation of negotiation
bodies.
Thus, from PrepCom IV onwards, the UNCED negotiations had the character of
editing diplomacy focusing on a given number of texts that should be finalized, pref-
erably before the Rio Conference. Issue clarification and the creation of consensual
knowledge was seemingly insignificant from PrepCom IV onwards. Therefore, the
premise for the present analysis is that issue clarification in UNCED was essentially
terminated during PrepCom ill in August 1991.
The General Development of Issue Clarification Activities
The idea for UNCED harkens back to a Swedish proposal from 1986 that a stock-
taking UN conference should take place in 1992 to commemorate the 1972 Stock-
holm Conference on the Human Environment (palme, 1992). This idea gained the
&rhis assessment is shared by key participants in the UNCED process (interview with Ambassador
80 Kjell~n.who chaired Working Group I).
7The rationale for this procedural rule. which had been respected in UNCED before PrepCom IV. was
that G-77 controlled the majority of the votes in the UN context.
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support of a small group of like-minded countries: Canada, the Netherlands, and
Norway.S Together with Sweden, this constellation of small and middle powers for-
mally introduced the proposal for UNCED in the General Assembly of the UN. This
initiative was further underpinned by the Brundtland Report, Our Common Future
(WCED, 1987:343). The aims of UNCED, as well as the general structure of its
agenda, were formally established in a General Assembly resolution (UNGA, 1989,
Resolution 44/228).
Resolution 44/228 was the outcome of an inter-state political struggle in which a
North-South dimension was clearly discernible (see Appendix A). Negotiation in
the General Assembly concerning UNCED was difficult and protracted; it started in
1988, but was not concluded until December the following year. The aim of the pre-
paratory work - prenegotiation - related to UNCED in the General Assembly was to
include a detailed agenda and a precise plan of work in the text of the Resolution
(see Chapter 3). These efforts were, however, only partly rewarded. Certainly, the
General Assembly mandate for UNCED identified the full range of issues of sub-
stance that were to be dealt with in the negotiation. It also contained some general
guidelines and objectives for the UNCED process leading to the Rio meeting. Fur-
thermore, it acknowledged a few crucial elements of the emerging consensual
knowledge related to the upcoming negotiation - for instance, the coupling between
environmental problems through the conception of sustainable development
(UNGA, 1989). In this respect, the UNCED agenda was clearly inspired by the
Brundtland Report.
Still, the UNCED agenda ordained by the General Assembly lacked direction in
certain respects. Essentially, it represented an inventory of themes to be negotiated
on. The General Assembly had not been able to formulate a concrete plan of action
or general strategy for the UNCED process. It remained unclear exactly how many
issues were to be understood and approached in the negotiation.
PrepCom's Organizational Session in spring 1990, formally opening the UNCED
process, was to some extent concerned with agenda-setting and issue clarification.
The contributions made in this respect were, however, mostly of an indirect nature
(see Chapter 3). They largely resulted from the completion of the main practical task
of the Organizational Session, which was to set up an institutional machinery for the
conduct of the UNCED negotiations. Initially, it consisted of a Plenary Meeting and
two working groups. A decision was made to set up a negotiation body for legal and
institutional matters, but its implementation was deferred to a later stage in the pro-
cess (A/44/48, para. 56). The election of chairs, vice chairs, rapporteur, and a
"Bureau" was also postponed to PrepCom I (A/CONE151IPCI13, p. 4).
The terms of reference given by the UN General Assembly for the formal negoti-
ation bodies of UNCED implied a certain strategic perspective on the issues put on
the agenda. The General Assembly expressed the opinion that the UNCED agenda
should be looked upon in a holistic perspective, and that physical issue linkages
should be taken into consideration in the negotiations. These aspirations were later
repeated during the UNCED process (A/CONF.l51IPCI20). However, the General
Assembly had not worked out any concrete strategy to attain these objectives.
Neither was the Organizational Session devoted to this type of strategic discussion,
although some concrete measures were undertaken to plan negotiation work. Some
8At this time. the EC had not yet developed a common policy in the area of environmental problems.
Hence, the Netherlands cannot be regarded as an agent of the EC for these purposes.
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consideration was given to physical linkages between issues when the distribution
of work was organized between the Plenary Committee and Working Groups I and
IT. Working Group I was given responsibility for environmental problems pertaining
primarily to the atmosphere and the land surface. Working Group II was allocated
water pollution and hazardous waste. The Plenary Committee was given two main
functions, the first of which was to supervise the negotiation as a whole and serve as
the main decision-making body during the preparatory work. The other function of
the Plenary Committee was to process some of the issues that were allocated to
neither Working Group I nor II, particularly all the so-called cross-sectoral issues.9
It was not until PrepCom I in August 1990 that negotiating parties in the UNCED
process became directly concerned with the substance of the issues on the agenda. 10
These talks did not, however, contribute to clarify the issues immediately. At Prep-
Com I, deliberations at the table were still steered by the frame of reference set up
for UNCED by the UN General Assembly (UNGA, 1989). The next step in the pro-
cess of issue clarification was represented by instructions given by PrepCom to the
secretariat to produce documentation on virtually all the issues identified by the
General Assembly (AICONF.15 I/PC. 13). The results of this secretariat work began
to be reported to PrepCom IT. This documentation was meant to serve three broad
purposes. The first was to offer a synoptic background on the problems of substance
on the UNCED agenda. The second objective was to describe the work that was
going on with respect to particular issues of substance. The third aim was to indicate
suitable areas for action on the issue areas concerned (AICONF.151/PC/14).
According to the official opinion of the Secretary General of UNCED, these secre-
tariat documents provided "the basis for the essential transition from the overview
of the UN system-wide activities relevant to General Assembly resolution 44/228
and the preliminary discussion of the issues concerned at the first session of the Pre-
paratory Committee to the concrete action proposals which the Preparatory Com-
mittee is expected to produce for consideration by the Conference" (Ibid., p. II).
At PrepCom I, the PrepCom instructed the secretariat to prepare reports concern-
ing the relationship between the environment and development (UNCED, decision
1/25; 1/28). Related studies were also requested concerning the cross-sectoral issues
- for instance, technology transfer and financial resources (UNCED, decision 1/29).
Also, the notion of Agenda 21 was first introduced at PrepCom I (AICONF.151/ PC!
14, PI5). The themes introduced at PrepCom I were pursued at PrepCom IT in com-
pilations of infonnation and analytical papers that had been prepared by the
UNCED secretariat. These secretariat documents served as a basis for discussions
between delegations at both PrepComs IT and III. In this process, essentially retain-
ing the character of issue clarification, the secretariat continued to produce more
infonnation concerning the issues of substance, as well as ordering concepts. For
instance, the notion of Agenda 21 grew steadily clearer and was increasingly filled
with substance (AICONF. 15 I/PC/lOO). Governments and international organiza-
tions also provided input infonnation supporting issue clarification. Notably, coun-
tries participating in the UNCED process had agreed to develop national reports
related to the issues under negotiation. Eventually, most nations produced such
9Recall that Working Party III, dealing with institutional and legal maners, did not start functioning
until PrepCom II (AlCONF.1511PClI3, p. 5).
IORecali that PrepComs I-IV, which followed after the Organizational Session, were the four formal
sessions focusing on matters of substance. Hence, PrepCom I was the second formal session of the
UNCED PrepCom.
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national reports, although the bulk of them were sent in at a relatively late stage of
the process of issue clarification (UNCED, AlCONF.lSIIPC/98). Furthermore, the
secretariat sent out questionnaires to sound out the views of governments on most of
the main environmental issues dealt with in the UNCED process (UNCED,
A/CONF.l 5 IIPC/ 104-110).11 These questions and responses were, however, more
related to the bargaining stage of "exchange of concessions" that began to influence
the character of the UNCED process during PrepComs ill and IV.
This overview indicates that issue clarification and related negotiation activities
dominated a relatively large portion of the UNCED process. The formal existence of
UNCED extended from the beginning of 1990 until late June 1992. Only one-fifth
of this time was characterized by a clearcut "distribution game" - the exchange of
concessions. These circumstances raise the intriguing question of whether issue
clarification in UNCED was unusually protracted or if the distribution game was
unproportionally brief or if the first replaced a part of the second.
Typical Properties of Issue Clarification Processes in UNCED
Issue clarification activities in UNCED retain a number of typical attributes, some
of which may also be special for UNCED. The special characteristics distinguish
UNCED from other multilateral negotiations. In order to identify and assess typical
and special attributes of UNCED, conceived of as a process of negotiation, a stand-
ard of comparison is needed. Therefore, cross-references will be made to another
process of multilateral negotiation that unfolded more or less parallel to the UNCED
process: the Uruguay Round of GAIT negotiations. This is an interesting reference
case, as issue clarification activities developed quite differently than in UNCED,
although the Uruguay Round and the UNCED process had significant similarities
too, as seen from a negotiation point of view. Both the Uruguay Round and the
UNCED process were multilateral, and involved at least one hundred nations. The
same states that participated in UNCED also negotiated in the Uruguay Round.
The two processes were concerned with an agenda that was extremely broad, as
well as unusually complex. Several issues in UNCED, as well as in GAIT, were
comparatively unknown to most parties when negotiation began. Both processes
were serviced by an international secretariat and were characterized by conference
diplomacy. In each case, the negotiation unfolded within the context of an institu-
tional structure and was influenced by a particular organizational culture, that of the
UN and GAIT respectively. The two negotiations took place at about the same time.
When UNCED started, the Uruguay Round was approaching its midterm review,
and was still going on when the Rio Conference was concluded.
The comparison with GAIT focuses particularly on the treatment of the so-called
new trade issues in the Uruguay Round: trade in services, trade-related intellectual
rights, and trade-related investments. Like many of the main issues in the UNCED
process, these new trade problems required sophisticated analysis and extensive
information-gathering to become negotiable.
Recall that the Uruguay Round was initiated in 1983-4 by one of the leading
actors - indeed, the strongest nation - in the GAIT system, the United States
lIThe issues were protection of the oceans; land resources; forests; protection of the atmosphere;
biological diversity; biotechnology; desertification and drought.
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(Sj6stedt, 1994).12 The American proposal for a new GAIT Round was initially
opposed by many countries, especially by a large coalition of developing countries,
including regional powers like Brazil and India. This opposition to another GAIT
Round especially contested the introduction of the so-called new trade issues on the
agenda. These circumslances strongly conditioned how processes of issue clarifica-
tion unfolded in the Uruguay Round. Earlier, the new trade issues had fallen outside
the scope of the GAIT regime; they were not even considered to represent trade.
Therefore, they required a considerable amount of qualified analysis and informa-
tion gathering. The creation of the needed consensual knowledge regarding the new
trade issues started during the lengthy prenegotiation preceding the Ministerial
Meeting in Punta del Este that formally opened the Uruguay Round in 1986. The
analytical work of the prenegotiations was to a great extent carried out by national
delegations. Leading trading nations like the United States and the EC were particu-
larly active in this respect. The nations initially opposing the negotiation on trade in
services and the other new trade issues in the GAIT context tried to promote or
defend their interests by means of analytical arguments supporting the contention
that the new issues were not of a genuine trade character and, hence, fell outside the
competence of GAIT. The GAIT secretariat supplied important information into the
process of issue clarification, particularly after the formal opening of the Uruguay
Round. However, these contributions of the secretariat had been commissioned by
the member slates and its work was carefully supervised and closely guided by
them. Typical of issue clarification in the GAIT negotiations was the strong political
struggle, with the help of scarce information and analytical arguments, between
leading trading nations.
The present analysis particularly concerns the differences between UNCED and
GAIT with respect to how the processes of issue clarification were generally organ-
ized and functioned. The comparison focuses on a small number of themes, one of
which is the organizational structure set up to support issue clarification and other
negotiation functions. A second topic relates to the relationship between member
governments and the international secretariat servicing the process. Communica-
tion with other international organizations (IGOs) was handled somewhat differ-
ently in the GAIT and UNCED contexts, with likely ramifications for issue
clarification. This included governmental as well as nongovernmental organizations.
The Organizational Structure
The organizational machinery set up in the Uruguay Round and UNCED respect-
ively was significantly dissimilar and, consequently, developed differently during
the negotiation process. These institutional differences reflect distinct and signifi-
cant dissimilarities with respect to issue clarification strategies and methods.
One of the first formal decisions taken during the Uruguay Round concerned the
negotiation machinery. With respect to trade in goods, a main body was set up, a
Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) (Sj6stedt, 1994). Its tasks were to guide and
supervise the unfolding negotiations in all areas, and to take necessary operational
decisions at appropriate points of time during the process. Below the Trade Negotia-
tions Committee, 14 different working groups were instituted. For political reasons,
12The information about the Uruguay Round needed for a comparison with UNCED has been
gathered within the context of a project concerning the transformation of the GAIT system at the time of
the Uruguay Round.
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a separate Negotiations Committee dealing with trade in services was also esta-
blished. 13 Each of these negotiation groups was given responsibility for a certain
delimited problem area, for instance, trade-related intellectual rights, government
procurement, or trade in agricultural goods. The negotiation work in the groups was
conducted quite autonomously, particularly regarding the analysis and information
collection typical for issue clarification. The principal task of the Trade Negotiations
Committee was stock-taking and supervision rather than coordination and manage-
ment of linkages across areas of responsibility. The "issue packages" allocated to
each negotiation group in the Uruguay Round were quite broad. For example, one
group was responsible for the whole tariff question, which had represented virtually
the whole agenda in earlier GATT Rounds.
However, the average issue space given to the individual Negotiation Group was
conspicuously narrower in the Uruguay Round than in the UNCED process. Recall,
that until PrepCom IV, the UNCED agenda was distributed between only four for-
mal negotiating bodies, the Plenary Committee and Working Groups I-III (of which
the last mentioned did not begin operation until PrepCom II). Still, the UNCED pro-
cess was obliged to deal with an overall agenda that may be considered to have been
broader than that of the Uruguay Round. It covered not only the whole range of
environmental problems, but also a number of broad cross-sectoral issues linking
environmental problems and development concerns.
Occasionally, informal negotiation groups, usually called contact groups, were set
up in the UNCED process. Typically, such groups gathered the "most interested"
countries in a given issue area to work out an agreement that other, less interested
parties could "take or leave." For example, one such grouping was instituted during
PrepCom III to deal with the politically complicated issue of additional financial
support to enable countries with scarce resources to be able to implement Agenda 21
and other results of the UNCED process. However, in the UNCED process, contact
groups and other informal negotiating bodies did not proliferate before PrepCom IV,
when issue clarification had ceased to dominate negotiations (see Chapter 3). For
instance, at the Rio Conference, remaining negotiation work was distributed
between the Plenary, the Main Committee, and eight coordinating groups, each of
which was responsible for a certain "package" of issues: the atmosphere, water,
forests, biological diversity and biotechnology, environmental law, institutions, the
financial issue, and transfer of environmentally sound technology (Swedish UNCED
Delegation, 6 August 1992). Thus, in the UNCED process, the expansion of the
number of negotiation bodies occurred in the accelerating "distribution game" at
PrepCom IV rather than in the earlier stages of the negotiation characterized by
issue clarification. It was seemingly bargaining for final agreements rather than
information gathering and problem solving related to issue clarification that needed
an extensive and flexible network of negotiation bodies. Interestingly, the negotia-
tion process in the Uruguay Round moved in the opposite direction; when the
c1earcut "distribution game" substituted for issue clarification as the dominant pro-
cess dimension, the number of negotiation bodies decreased. At the Ministerial
Meeting in Brussels in December 1990, which was meant to conclude the Uruguay
Round, several of the negotiating groups were fused with one another, with the
13Services had to be treated in a special way because one group of developing countries, including
Brazil and India, only accepted to negotiate on this issue area if it was kept formally outside the GAlT
context.
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effect that the number of committees diminished considerably. When, in spring
1991, an attempt was made to relaunch the Uruguay Round, negotiations were con-
centrated on "four tracks" only (Sjostedt, 1994).
Thus, the layout of organizational structures indicates that the negotiation work in
the Uruguay Round was more focused than in the UNCED process during the stage
of issue clarification. In each of the four formal negotiation groups operating in the
UNCED process before PrepCom IV, the same delegation would deal with a wide
range of different issues. As a consequence, the "negotiation vocabulary" that was
developed in the negotiation tended to pertain to relatively general aspects of the
issues "on the table." In contrast, in the various negotiation groups operating in the
Uruguay Round, concepts, as well as the analysis generally, were more penetrating
into the substance of issues. Several of the negotiation groups in GAIT established a
quasi-autonomous consensual knowledge of its own that "outsiders" could not auto-
matically interpret in detail. In UNCED, concepts and consensual knowledge gener-
ally were more universally accessible.
The Role a/Governments and the UNCED Secretariat
The contribution of the GAIT secretariat to the Uruguay Round was, no doubt,
important. The secretariat had two main tasks in this respect. First, the secretariat
supplied background information deemed to be useful and relevant in the negotia-
tions. Secondly, the secretariat recurrently summarized, and occasionally synthe-
sized, discussions in the various formal negotiation bodies. The assistance of the
GAIT secretariat was, no doubt, a sine qua non for the step-wise successful devel-
opment of the Uruguay negotiations. Also, the UNCED secretariat made an import-
ant contribution to the negotiation process it served. This role was, however, in
certain crucial respects different from that performed by the GAIT secretariat in the
Uruguay Round, as well as in earlier multilateral trade negotiations. The work of the
GAIT secretariat was consistently and closely monitored by national governments
through their delegations. The contributions made by the GAIT secretariat repre-
sented responses to requests made by national delegates in committees and working
groups (Sjostedt, 1994). In contrast, the UNCED secretariat performed an independ-
ent and "driving" role in the PrepCom negotiations to such a high degree that it
exercised an effective leadership role.
As in the Uruguay Round, or any other international negotiation, decisions taken
by national governments gave direction to agenda-setting and issue clarification in
UNCED. The UN General Assembly established a frame of reference for these nego-
tiations, identified the topics that UNCED was going to deal with, and set up a goal
structure for UNCED. It is fair to say that neither the UNCED process nor its out-
come exceeded the limits of this frame of reference. The guiding decisions taken by
national governments in the General Assembly were confirmed at the first sitting of
the PrepCom, the Organizational Session (UNCED, A/CONF.15IfPC.13). When, at
this very first meeting with the UNCED PrepCom, Maurice Strong was appointed
Secretary General and the UNCED secretariat was, hence, created, this act became an
agreement among governments. Thus, the initial stages of the UNCED process and
the Uruguay Round had in common that, first, they were closely directed by govern-
ments and, secondly, that they anticipated a tightly state-controlled secretariat ser-
vice. However, in spite of this correspondence, the stage of issue clarification in
reality unfolded quite differently in the UNCED and the GAIT process, respectively.
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One noteworthy difference from UNCED is that in the GAIT context, govern-
ments continued successfully to influence issue clarification through the process. In
the Uruguay Round, issue clarification stood out as a strategically crucial stage of the
negotiation process that developed into a political struggle dominated and steered by
the interaction between the great powers in this particular issue area, international
trade. Key players were the United States, the EC, Japan, and a number of other
states with the capacity to have an impact on the development of multilateral trade
negotiations. The GAIT secretariat was one of the key players in this game, but was
not free to take any decisive initiatives. Its mission was entirely to gather or aggre-
gate information in line with government instructions. Thus, in the Uruguay Round,
the servicing and subordinate role of the secretariat was unambiguous.
As compared to the Uruguay Round, the roles of national governments and the
international secretariat were virtually reversed in the UNCED process. In UNCED,
national delegations did not make any grand moves to frame the issues on the
emerging agenda in the stage of issue clarification before PrepCom IV. Instead, it
was the Secretary General and the UNCED secretariat that took the necessary and
decisive initiatives. As compared to the situation in the Uruguay Round, leading
governments remained strangely passive. It is interesting to note that the secretariat
initiatives were not limited to individual issue areas, but related to the UNCED
agenda as a whole. Closely interlinked elements of the secretariat initiatives were
the notions of Agenda 21 and the Earth Charter. The latter was meant to set up a list
of principles and goals for dealing with various global environmental problems. The
function of Agenda 21 was to serve as a long-term plan of action coordination on
international environmental cooperation, and problem solving in line with the Earth
Charter after the termination of the UNCED process. Thus, the Earth Charter as well
as Agenda 21 was meant to be part of the outcome of UNCED; an idea that the gov-
ernments-participants in the UNCED process accepted from the outset. However,
Agenda 21 was also given important functions in the UNCED process, and espe-
cially with respect to issue clarification. Agenda 21 was from the start conceived of
as a three-layer, long-term plan of action with essentially the following anatomy:
First layer: Basis for action: (1) state of environment/state of development; (2) prin-
ciples of sustainable development; sustainable development goals.
Second layer: Action agenda: (I) programmatic approaches; (2) program of action.
Third layer: Instruments for action: (I) Tools for analysis, management, and action;
(2) supporting structures and enabling mechanisms (A1CONF.l511PC.14, Figure I)
Conceived of in these fundamental terms, Agenda 21 evolved into an operational
frame of reference for the negotiations containing objectives as well as a goal-
oriented conceptual framework. Consequently, Agenda 21 considerably specified
the relatively loose terms of reference that the General Assembly had formulated for
UNCED, and gradually made it more concrete as negotiation moved from one Prep-
Com session to the next. Its most important contribution was that the parameters
negotiated on in the many disparate issue areas could generally be expressed in
terms of elements of Agenda 21. For instance, the operational objectives in the envir-
onmental problem area regarding deforestation were defined in terms of "options for
Agenda 21" (UNCED, A1CONF.l511PC.1OO/Add.16). Thus, the gradual specifi-
cation and clarification of the structure and elements of Agenda 21 through Prep-
Coms I, II, and ill conditioned a more or less parallel clarification of the issues of
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substance. During the same period, governments consistently abstained from taking
significant initiatives with respect to issue clarification. The debate between national
delegations at the PrepCom sessions recurrently pertained to issue clarification. The
point is, however, that national delegations were content to debate the definition and
meaning of issues in terms of the ideas and concepts proposed by the UNCED
secretariat.
Recall that formal measures were undertaken to cumulate information systematic-
ally about how governments looked at the issues. However, the questionnaires sent
out to governments primarily sought to elucidate their interests and positions with
regard to a number of selected issues (UNCED, NCONF.1511PC. I04-110). Like-
wise, for several reasons the national reports submitted to the UNCED process had
little to contribute to issue clarification (UNCED, NCONF.1511PC.98). First of all,
country reports were as a rule not available until PrepCom III in August 1991. Sec-
ondly, most reports did not elaborate on the issues on the UNCED agenda, but rather
described the domestic situation of the country concerned with respect to environ-
mental problems and policy choices.
Although country reports generally did not contribute to issue clarification, in
many cases they still had an important role to play when the country concerned
determined its national position in the UNCED negotiations. For example, in Chap-
ter 7, Schally explains that the preparation of the Austrian national report facilitated
coordination between different Ministries and Central Agencies when Vienna deter-
mined its UNCED policy. Furthermore, Schally reports that the preparation of the
national report helped the Austrian authorities to become aware of the meaning and
significance of the linkages between environment and development. Accordingly,
national reports did not serve to supply input into the UNCED processes of collec-
tive learning. Rather, they had the opposite function: to disseminate information
about the emerging consensual knowledge from the UNCED process to national
ministries and central agencies.
Communication Between UNCED and Other International Organizations
GAIT has always been very restrictive in letting other international organizations
take part in its own work, including in the multilateral trade negotiations. However,
in the early stages of the Uruguay Round, a number of international governmental
organizations were, in fact, invited to participate in the negotiation work. Usually,
the invited organization also had responsibilities in an issue area with which the
Uruguay Round was concerned, and was therefore asked to inform negotiating
parties about its current work. For instance, the negotiation group dealing with
trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs) had reason to invite the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to several meetings.
Similarly, a number of international organizations were invited to report to
UNCED about their responsibilities and current activities in the areas of environ-
mental or development problems. However, it is striking that the supply of informa-
tion by international organizations was much broader in UNCED than in GAIT. Its
impact on the negotiation process was also seemingly more far-reaching, particu-
larly with regard to issue clarification. In fact, the extensive links of communication
to UNCED from a great number of international organizations contributes to explain
the leadership role that the UNCED secretariat was able to perform during the first
sessions of PrepCom when issues were essentially clarified.
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At an early stage in the UNCED process, it was decided that a holistic per-
spective should be retained on the substantial number of environmental and
development issues on the agenda (UNCED, AlCONF.151/PC.13). This meant,
first, that issues should be addressed simultaneously rather than sequentially;
secondly, that issue linkages should be taken into account; thirdly, that cross-
sectoral means, related to finance, technology, institutions, or education, should
be established in order to link environmental problems to development consider-
ations in terms of concrete political action (UNCED Newsletter, II March
1991). This outlook directed the strategy that the UNCED secretariat developed
to gather information to consolidate the agenda and to achieve a satisfactory
degree of issue clarification. The UNCED secretariat is considered to have had a
competent staff and an effective, charismatic leader in Maurice Strong (see
Chapter 9). These qualities enabled the UNCED secretariat to produce analytical
papers that affected how issues became collectively understood. However, the
UNCED secretariat was not resourceful enough to carry out independent studies
concerning all critical topics on the agenda. The number of issues was far too
large, the substance of issues too complex, and the time available too limited.
The staff of the secretariat was quite small. Furthermore, it took some time
before the secretariat was working to full capacity, which affected the initial
phase of issue clarification. The recruitment of staff was relatively protracted
because the Secretary General was careful to find people that he personally
found competent and loyal. Because of these circumstances. the UNCED secre-
tariat had to draw extensively on external sources when it gathered and assessed
information that could help to clarify the issues on the UNCED agenda and to
build up the necessary consensual knowledge for the negotiations.
To receive external contributions, a suitable communication system was needed
to find, retrieve, and process the necessary input information and knowledge. For
this purpose, a network system of working parties was set up by the UNCED secre-
tariat (UNCED, Newsletter, II March 1991). The character of these bodies can be
described by the term "issue-specific contact groups." They were issue-specific in
the sense that they were given responsibility for a particular package of issues. The
dimensions of these aggregates were comparable to the agenda confided to individ-
ual negotiation groups in the Uruguay Round; the focus was set on a particular
theme. Thus, related to the activities of Working Group I, working parties were set
up at an early stage of the negotiations for the following topics: atmosphere issues,
land and agriculture, forestry, biodiversity, and biotechnology. Under Working
Group n, two new working parties were created to deal with oceans and toxic chem-
icals and hazardous wastes. Working Group n activities could, furthermore, also be
linked to bodies that already existed and functioned parallel to UNCED. One nota-
ble example was the inter-secretariat group preparing for the 1992 Conference on
Water and the Environment that was linked to the UNCED issue of "freshwater."
Another example was the working relations established between the UNCED secre-
tariat and the Dublin Conference on Water and Environment. In this connection, it
may be added that Working Group I activities were linked to institutions external to
UNCED. Prominent examples were the couplings to the FAOlNetherlands Confer-
ence on Sustainable Agriculture, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
and the Ad Hoc Group on Biodiversity.
These working parties - or contact groups - included a mixture of people from
the UNCED secretariat as well as from international organizations, primarily UN
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institutions or, in a few cases, representatives of on-going negotiation processes
(notably on climate change and biological diversity). Spokesmen of nongovernmen-
tal organizations and research institutions were also part of these networks. For
instance, the International Council of Scientific Unions was selected to represent the
scientific community. Working parties did not merely function as fora for discus-
sion. Most of them became closely involved in the UNCED process, especially dur-
ing the stage of issue clarification. The task of the working parties was to take part
directly in the preparation of the secretariat papers that represented the basic input
into processes of consultation and negotiation that finalized agenda-setting in
UNCED. That is, they specified objectives and issues as well as the terms of refer-
ence for the UNCED process (UNCED, Newsletter, 11 March 1991; UNCED,
A/CONF. 15 l/PC. 14).
Most of the working parties were concerned with problems under the respon-
sibility of Working Groups I and II - to a large extent, "pure" environmental
matters. Needs of issue clarification were met in a similar way with regard to the
over-arching and cross-sectoral issues allocated to the Plenary Committee in its
capacity as a specialized working group. Such a strategy was manifested in the
creation of working parties on, for instance, environmental education and tech-
nology transfer (UNCED, Newsletter, 11 March 1991). However, the cross-sec-
toral issues had certain inherent qualities that prevented them from being treated
in the same way as the "pure" environmental questions. The latter were usually
already on the agenda of some other organization than UNCED when this pro-
cess started. In these cases, the assignment of the working party concerned was
essentially stock-taking and synthesis. The working party reported how the
problem area, for example forestry, was understood within the context of inter-
national cooperation, what results had already been attained in this work, and
what was currently going on in parallel processes of negotiation.
The analytical work concerning the cross-sectoral domain was in many ways
more demanding. Regular stock-taking was usually not sufficient owing to the
simple fact that the linkages constituting the backbone of the cross-sectoral
issues had hitherto not been particularly analyzed. Targeted, and partly innova-
tive, analysis was necessary to clarify the meaning and significance of the many
cross-sectoral issues - for instance, the linkages between poverty and environ-
ment; economic growth patterns, consumption standards, demographic pres-
sures and environment; and debt, terms of trade, "reverse resource flows," and
environmental degradation (UNCED, A/CONF. l5l/PC. 16). These analytical
needs required new methods, and ultimately new institutions, to be handled
effectively. One approach chosen by the UNCED secretariat to meet these
requirements was to set up study groups to analyze the meaning of the various
cross-sectoral issues and their significance in different respects. Like the work-
ing parties, these study groups assembled representatives from organizations
considered to possess the necessary and relevant information. In order to refine
the integrative conceptual framework for these studies, the UNCED secretariat
organized a project en-titled "Sustainable Development: From Concept to
Action." The method typical for this approach was to ask experts, often in their
individual capacity, to prepare analytical papers on specific themes. The papers
were discussed at a seminar at the UNCED secretariat in order to become syn-
thesized into a concluding report that was eventually assessed at a conference
organized in the Netherlands at the end of 1991, at the time when issue clarifica-
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tion processes were being phased down (UNCED, Newsletter, 11 March 1991).
This is not the only example of an academic approach to problem solving. Prom-
inent research organizations were engaged to analyze certain problems where
the UNCED secretariat did not have all the necessary knowledge. For example,
the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (lIASA) was commis-
sioned to analyze the physical linkages between, on the one hand, the problem
of climate change and, on the other, forestry, food production, and water
resources (Shaw, Gallopin, Weaver, and Oberg, 1992). The International Confer-
ence on an Agenda of Science for Environment and Development into the 21 st
Century (ASCEND 21) seemingly made an important contribution to the chapter
in Agenda 21 concerning science for sustainable development.
The UNCED secretariat reserved for itself the study of the means to be
employed for the implementation of the results of the UNCED process, and
especially Agenda 21; institutions, technology, and finance (UNCED, AI
CONF.151IPC.15). These issues were of strategic significance as they deter-
mined whether Agenda 21 would only be of symbolic significance, or whether it
would become an operational program of action. To some extent, cross-sectoral
issues like finance or technology transfer were dependent on direct political sup-
port rather than on scientific analysis. However, political support was only a
necessary condition, and not a sufficient condition, for effective processing of
the cross-sectoral issues in UNCED. The cross-sectoral issues had hitherto been
dealt with rather superficially in international organizations, including in the UN
family. In some of these areas, the UNCED secretariat was obliged to undertake
something akin to an academic assessment of the theoretically oriented litera-
ture in order to create a viable basis of consensual knowledge. The issue of
"costing" is a good example.
"Costing" represented a key element of the studies concerning the implemen-
tation of the outcome of UNCED. The idea was that the essential costs required
by implementation of a certain program of action should be determined a priori
so that the necessary financial resources could be secured. It was particularly
important to calculate the need for "additional" financial resources that certain
nations, notably the developing countries, needed in order to be able to carry out
the recommendations stipulated in the Final Acts of the Rio Meeting. However,
costing calculations presupposed penetrating analyses that, as a rule, had not
been carried out prior to UNCED. Consequently, costing was an extremely
demanding task for the UNCED secretariat, which needed external assistance. A
revealing case is the report concerning costing with respect to climate change
(UNCED, AlCONF.1511PC.23). The terms of reference for the work in this area
were derived from the objective of adopting measures to limit possible climate
change and mitigate its reverse effects. The approach required a thorough inven-
tory of relevant academic ideas and notions. It was necessary to begin with the
choice of a suitable definition of "cost." This concept had been given quite dif-
ferent meanings in recent discussions of the economic consequences of climate
change. A rational choice of a definition presupposed a competent assessment of
competing theoretical approaches which, in turn, needed a thorough stock-
taking and analysis of the literature. In this work, the UNCED secretariat
cooperated with seven regional or intergovernmental organizations, 16
nongovernmental organizations, as well as 25 national governments (UNCED,
AlCONF.151/PC.23, p. 9). The organizations, as well as the governments
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concerned, were all logical and competent actors in the area of climate
change. 14
The participation of nongovernmental organizations (NGGs) in the UNCED pro-
cess was in many ways exceptional. At the time of the Rio Conference, approx-
imately 1400 NGOs were formally associated with the UNCED process (see Chapter
12). Most of these organizations rarely made a contribution to issue clarification in
UNCED. Instead, many organizations tried to pursue their own agenda in the
UNCED process. For instance, some organizations wanted to come to the Rio Meet-
ing only to get publicity at home or attention in the media. However, a considerable
number of NGGs made a contribution to UNCED without being invited to any of
the study groups set up by the UNCED secretariat. Such NGGs primarily carried out
two types of activities that were somehow related to issue clarification. First, several
NGGs were invited to deliver speeches to PrepCom (in the Plenary Committee) on
selected themes. Many of these presentations communicated new expertise on par-
ticular issues. Secondly, NGGs were also able to give direct support to certain dele-
gations with a limited capability to follow developments in UNCED. Gne example
is a newsletter produced by a small consortium of NGGs, which followed PrepCom
proceedings from day to day. The original objective of the newsletter had been to
help the community of NGGs keep track of the negotiations, but as time went on it
became increasingly used also by national delegations, particularly from the Third
World. Thus, it seems that some NGGs contributed to the creation of consensual
knowledge by disseminating information and knowledge among the participants of
the UNCED process.
THE CHARACTER OF CONSENSUAL KNOWLEDGE
It is a difficult task to make a detailed characterization of a body of consensual knowl-
edge related to a negotiation agenda that is as wide and complex as that of UNCED.
The requirements for issue clarification did not only pertain to the contents of individ-
ual issues, but also to the overall agenda. Consensual knowledge was needed to under-
stand, and conceptualize, the agenda in a uniform language and to aggregate its
various issues into one, single whole. Considering the technical complexity of many
issues in combination with the multitude of problems to which they pertained, one
might have expected an absence of consensual knowledge in the UNCED context.
However, the body of consensual knowledge "conditioning" the UNCED process was
quite different. It was highly integrated and expressed in concepts that were under-
standable and applicable in all negotiation groups. Finally, consensual knowledge was,
no doubt, an important prerequisite for the relative ease with which the "distribution
14Governmental organizations: Commission of the EC, United Nations Economic Commission,
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the World Bank, Asian Development Bank:, OECD, International
Energy Agency, United Nations Environment Program.
Nongovernmental organizations: Asian Energy Institute (New Delhi), Stockholm Environment
Institute, Alliance to Save Energy, Natural Resources Defence Council (Washington DC), Lega Par
L'ambiente (Italy), Greenpeace, World Wildlife Fund (Washington DC), Institute for European
Environmental Politics, Center for Global Change (Washington DC), Batelle NW Labs (Washington
DC), Royallnstitute for International Affairs (London), Bariloche Institute (Argentina), Africa Center for
Technical Studies (Kenya), Bangladesh Institute for Advanced Studies (UNCED, A1CONE15 11PC.23, p.
9).
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game" of the UNCED process could be conducted from PrepCom IV onwards. It is
interesting to note that the typical, and partly special, attributes of the UNCED consen-
sual knowledge differed significantly from the consensual knowledge of GAIT, which
has played an important role in multilateral trade negotiations. 15
Recall the conceptual framework, summarized in Table 4.1 (p. 68), declaring that
one of the basic criteria for the characterization of a body of knowledge, be it con-
sensual or not, is its contents identity. This property essentially reflects the academic
discipline or disciplines on which consensual knowledge leans directly or indirectly
- for instance, physics, biology, or economics. The contents identity of consensual
knowledge may represent an important influencing factor in the process of bargain-
ing. For instance, the strength of the GAIT regime as a guiding principle for the
multilateral trade negotiations is partly conditioned by the close and recognized
relationship between the GAIT rules and mainstream trade theory.16 The GAIT
regime contains norms and principles that give guidance to problem solving as well
as decision making in the negotiation process. Thus, the consensual knowledge of a
GAIT Round contains criteria for what solutions and decisions are "correct" as seen
from a rational and knowledge-based perspective.
The character of the consensual knowledge developed in the UNCED process had
different qualities. The GAIT regime is supported by a single, strong academic the-
ory pertaining to an authoritative discipline: economics. In contrast, the UNCED
consensual knowledge was connected to a multitude of academic disciplines, a vari-
ety of natural and social sciences explaining the many aspects of the environmental
problems on the agenda. The objective to promote economic instruments required a
supply of knowledge from several sub-disciplines of economics. The work in Work-
ing Group III on institutions and legal matters was dependent on contributions from
the profession of international law. The links between consensual and scientific
knowledge was considerably weaker in UNCED than in GAIT. 17 In UNCED, the
scientific component of consensual knowledge was essentially a background factor.
The flows of information into the UNCED process concerning the substance of the
agenda were, as a rule, not coming from scientific communities directly. The main
sources of information were institutions that were part of, or closely associated with,
the UN system. These UN bodies share a similar culture that is bureaucratic-
organizational rather than scientific- professional.
The characteristics of the UN bureaucratic-organizational culture have colored
the UNCED consensual knowledge significantly, notably with regard to goal-
orientation. Thus, consensual knowledge retains what may be called a program
perspective on the agenda of UNCED. The frame of reference is not related to
problem solving in a scientific sense, but rather represents a program of action. In
the case of the UNCED process, this orientation was an important explanation for
the functional significance of consensual knowledge. Information accumulation and
ISRecall that the GAlT negotiations, and especially the Uruguay Round, is here used as a reference
case, a standard of comparison, when the UNCED process is assessed. However, both the Kennedy
Round (1964-7) and the Tokyo Round (1973-9) were guided by essentially the same consensual
knowledge as the Uruguay Round.
16By mainstream trade theory, I refer to the neo-c1assical theory of free trade ba~ed on the principle of
comf,arative advantage.
I Recall that in the multilateral trade negotiations the general principles of free trade were formal Iy
codified in the GAlT treaty. These principles have been explicitly referred to when the objectives for the
GAlT Rounds have been established.
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analysis regarding "poverty and environmental degradation" has been selected as a
case illustrating the significance of the program perspective of the UNCED consen-
sual knowledge.
Regarding the poverty/environment problem, UNCED was ordained by the UN
General Assembly to address the issue of "improvement of the living and working
environment of the poor in urban slums and rural areas, through the eradication of
poverty by, inter alia implementing integrated rural and development programs, as
well as taking other appropriate measures at all levels necessary to stem the degra-
dation of the environment" (UNGA, Res. 44/228). In order to clarify this cross-
sectoral issue, the secretariat organized an analytical work process outside the
UNCED negotiation machinery, the results of which were duly reported to the Prep-
Com in a series of documents. The basic problem of substance evoked in this analy-
sis was clearly relevant for the academic agenda: the causal relationship between
poverty and environmental degradation. In the UNCED process, this meant a focus
on three sets of "independent variables": (I) "the macro-economic context within
which development is taking place, (2) demographic developments, and (3) access
to means of livelihood and sustenance" (A1CONF. 151/PC115). This outlook was
strongly conditioned by the Fourth United Nations Development Decade, a kind of
super, multi-agency program within the UN system. Thus, for clarification of the
key concept of poverty, UNCED relied on reports prepared by the World Bank
(World Development Report, 1990) and the UN Development Program (Human
Development Report, 1990). Other suppliers of information at this stage were, for
instance, the International Fund for Agricultural Development and the Swedish
International Development Agency, which offered the preliminary results of a study
on poverty, environment, and development. As the UNCED study unfolded, a num-
ber of themes were increasingly incorporated. Many of these new sub-issues were
clarified by an international institution that had on-going activities in the area con-
cerned: (I) Anti-poverty programs related to resource/management issues - World
Bank; (2) the relationship between agricultural productivity and environment -
FAO; (3) employment and sustainable development - ILO; (4) health, poverty, and
environment - WHO; (5) demographic developments, poverty, and environment -
UNDEP; and (6) the impact of environmental stress on children - UNICEF
(A/CONF.151/PC/.15, p.13).
All these assessments, concerning highly dissimilar subjects, were expressed in a
program language that was basically the same for the various UN agencies contrib-
uting to the assessment. The same program language was easily understood at the
receiving end - among national delegations. These were dominated by diplomats-
generalists, many of whom were professionally familiar with the UN system. Under
these conditions, the program format of the unfolding consensual knowledge con-
tributed to strengthening its coherence for at least two reasons (see Table 4.1 on
p. 68). First, the program approach as such helped negotiating parties to have the
same focus on the problems concerned. Secondly, the program format in its UN
linguistic dressing represented a familiar, common frame of reference for the
UNCED negotiators.
The integrating impact on the agenda achieved by the general program orientation
of the UNCED consensual knowledge was strongly reinforced by Agenda 21. Par-
ticularly, it significantly facilitated issue clarification in the UNCED process.
Agenda 21 constituted a central, elaborate, as well as formalized, core element of
the UNCED consensual knowledge. It served as a frame of reference as well as a
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code of interpretation in the negotiation process, a set of criteria that could serve
effectively to coordinate negotiation efforts in different issue areas. The basis for
this correlation was the inherent logic of the program character and the operational
goal-orientation of Agenda 21. Thus, when the idea of Agenda 21 was acknowl-
edged at an early stage of the UNCED process, this corresponded to the acceptance
of a set of elaborate criteria for the guidance of the UNCED negotiations. These
guidelines functioned well within the context of individual environmental or devel-
opment issue areas where negotiations concerned commitments with regard to par-
ticular chapters of Agenda 21. Also, most of the cross-sectoral issues, representing
different types of political linkages between environment and development, mani-
fested themselves as chapters of Agenda 21 - for example, additional financial
resources, technology transfer, etc. IS
What may be called physical or real world issue linkages were also nominally on
the UNCED agenda according to the mandate given by the UN General Assembly.
However, in reality, physical linkages across several environmental issue areas were
not seriously evoked in the negotiations. Some studies were carried out to elucidate
issue linkages (see Shaw, Gallopin, Weaver, and Oberg, 1992). The results of these
analyses were communicated to the UNCED process, although not really considered
by delegations. One reason was that physical linkages were not part of Agenda 21
explicitly and, hence, was not expressed in a language that made these issues
negotiable.
CONCLUSIONS: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
Our assessment leads to the conclusion that both issue clarification and consensual
knowledge in the UNCED negotiations were comparatively instrumental and effect-
ive. A comparison with the reference case, the Uruguay Round in GAIT, is sugges-
tive. Although the agenda of UNCED was even more extensive and complex than
that of the Uruguay Round, the time needed for agenda-setting and issue clarifica-
tion was considerably shorter. Thus, as compared to the Uruguay Round, UNCED
was clearly a success story rather than a failure. 19 It seems that one positive driver
of this outcome was the consensual knowledge that was established in the UNCED
process before the bargaining about final agreements began in earnest at PrepCom
IV. Therefore, the UNCED process offers a number of useful lessons for future en-
vironmental negotiations with respect to the methods of issue clarification as well as
to the functions of consensual knowledge, once it has been established.
Positive Attributes of Consensual Knowledge
The consensual knowledge established for the purposes of the UNCED negotiations
had a number of positive critical qualities as seen from the point of view of the practi-
18Agenda 21 contained chapters concerning groups of environmental problems relating the
atmosphere, the land, forests, mountains, agriculture, and biological diversity. Cross-sectoral issues
represented a second category of issues that, in addition to technology transfer and financial resources,
included economic relations, poverty, consumption patterns (lifestyles), population, health, living
conditions, and environmental and development considerations in decision making.
19At the time of writing, the Uruguay Round had not yet been completed. However, the conclusion of
the Uruguay Round at the end of 1993 was (Sjostedt 1994) more than two years overdue, and hence
represents a failure in this sense.
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cal negotiator. The most important attribute of the consensual knowledge was evi-
dently its capacity to give operative guidance to negotiators, to indicate feasible
solutions to negotiation problems (see Table 4.1 on p. 68). These operative objectives
began to be established at an early stage of the negotiation thanks to the acceptance of
the notion of Agenda 21, already at PrepCom I. Agenda 21 also represented a useful
code of interpretation, functioning as a criterion for the selection of infonnation ser-
vicing as input into the processes building consensual knowledge. The discriminatory
edge of this criterion of selection evidently contributed to limit the volume of docu-
ments containing the UNCED consensual knowledge. This mass of infonnation was
by no means insignificant. Many developing countries complained that they had great
difficulties in taking part, and of assessing all the official infonnation provided for the
various sessions of the PrepCom. Praise was duly given to the secretariat for its com-
petence and its impressive capacity to produce substantive documents quickly. How-
ever, considering the great number of issues, and their complexity, the quantity of
documents delegates had to deal with to be active in the process was comparatively
small and manageable. Furthennore, conceived of as a frame of reference for negotia-
tors, consensual knowledge was relatively easily accessible and understandable.
Although a large element of the consensual knowledge, particularly related to the
environmental problems on the UNCED agenda, had a scientific contents identity, it
still retained a language code that was quite familiar to the average negotiator "at the
table." Thus, the UNCED consensual knowledge was not expressed in a scientific lan-
guage, but rather an administrative-organizational language typical for the UN
system. Recall that most of the delegates to the UNCED meetings had experience with
the UN in Geneva or New York, or some specialized agency elsewhere. Also, note that
this proportion further increased from PrepCom ill to IV when UNCED moved to the
UN Headquarters in New York.
Positive Attributes ofIssue Clarification
The positive attributes of the UNCED consensual knowledge was to a great extent
deliberately designed by the processes of issue clarification. Therefore, an important
lesson of UNCED relates to the properties of the process of issue clarification that
conditioned this favorable outcome.
One explanation of the limited time required for issue clarification in UNCED
was its predominant character of stock-taking within the system of UN agencies.
Little new original infonnation was generated within the context of the UNCED
process. This is a significant difference from the Uruguay Round, in which new
knowledge had to be created concerning the so-called new trade issues, especially
trade in services. At the same time, it has to be stressed that the UNCED consensual
knowledge conceived of as an encompassing cognitive platfonn did not exist before
the UNCED negotiations got under way.
Thus, one significant lesson for future negotiations on the environment and devel-
opment concerns the conditions under which separate bodies of knowledge and
infonnation pertaining to different international organizations are to be combined
into an effectively functioning consensual knowledge. It is doubtful that this integra-
tion could have been achieved by means of the regular, permanent mechanisms and
procedures for coordination of organizational activities within the UN system. The
coordination of infonnation-gathering and analysis was directed and administered
by a competent organization, the UNCED secretariat, using an effective ad hoc and
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partly informal organization for this purpose: the system of multi-agency study
groups. Coordination work was subordinated to a widely visible plan of action
particularly manifested in Agenda 21. Finally, the suppliers of information (UN
agencies), the coordinators (the UNCED secretariat), as well as the final users of the
consensual knowledge, were familiar with the administrative--<lrganizational UN
language in which it was essentially expressed.
Negative Lessons Regarding Issue Clarification and Consensual Knowledge
In many ways the experience gained in the UNCED process with regard to issue
clarification methods and procedures is so positive that one might want to repeat
them in a possible future comprehensive overview of the outcome of the 1992 Rio
Conference. One strategy might, for instance, be to transform the Rio Declaration
into a stronger Earth Charter, to review and update Agenda 21 and to establish a new
temporary UNCED structure with an ad hoc secretariat to administer this process.
However, before the prospect of a repeated UNCED process is contemplated, its
weaknesses have also to be spelled out and considered.
With special regard to issue clarification, the flaws of the UNCED process largely
correspond to factors that condition its positive attributes. Negotiations in UNCED
were largely conducted in tenns of Agenda 21, which was evidently a condition for
the relative success of this process as it actually evolved during the meetings of
PrepCom and at the Rio Conference. This meant that negotiations in UNCED itself
did not concern concrete policy measures, and state obligations in particular envir-
onmental issue areas like climate change or biological diversity. Although the results
of the negotiations over these issues were integrated into the UNCED process at the
Rio meeting, the bargaining as such took place elsewhere. There are indications that
these external negotiations were disturbed rather than supported by the discussions
over the same topics in UNCED. The general character of the consensual knowledge
seemingly did not permit a sufficiently strong focus on either the matters of
substance or on the legal dressing of the various clauses of an agreement.
At the same time, consensual knowledge was also insufficient to attain the desired
holistic perspective on the ecological and development problems on the agenda. The
trick ofAgenda 21 was that it advocated a comprehensive global outlook at the same
time as it compartmentalized the working schedule into smaller pieces - the various
chapters of Agenda 21 - that were manageable at the negotiation table. Key cross-
sectoral issues like finance or technology transfer were in reality delimited single
topics with which negotiators working in the UN system were quite familiar. These
issues had been covered by various UN agencies and conferences for many decades.
In contrast, the UNCED process proved quite incapable of handling new issue link-
ages, because of the existing anatomy of consensual knowledge. If in future negotia-
tions it will be necessary to address the physical linkages between problem areas
like climate change, ozone depletion, deforestation, desertification, and biological
diversity, another kind of approach to issue clarification than that represented by
Agenda 21 will have to be designed.
I
5The Search for Flexibility on Financial Issues at
UNCED: An Analysis of Preference Adjustment
Bertram I. Spector
The negotiations that preceded the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development (UNCED) focused on a complex set of multi-sectoral issues
that cross-cut national and coalitional interests and objectives. For agreements to
emerge, it was necessary to search for and achieve compromises on highly conten-
tious subjects at the nexus of these issue linkages. There were many successes or
partial successes, as attested to by the leaders of the process (see Ambassador Koh's
account in Chapter 10) and the mutually acceptable texts that were cobbled
together using a tedious "editing diplomacy" process. The search sometimes
yielded stalemates because the sheer number and complexity of issues overpowered
the ability of national delegations to traverse the bargaining space. Moreover, dele-
gations did not always have the authority to truly negotiate from initial positions and
effectively explore that space for compromise options.
At various stages in the prenegotiation and negotiation processes, impasses mate-
rialized on probably the most pugnacious of all issues, that of financial resources.
Essentially, the deadlock revolved around the questions of "how much?" and "how
distributed?" Besides the generally pervasive rift in interests and objectives between
North and South, the debate was concerned with the propensity of industrialized
nations to pledge large economic and technological assistance packages and commit
themselves to confronting global and regional environmental problems. Conducted
in the midst of these UNCED negotiations, the analysis presented in this chapter
seeks to understand where the opportunities for compromise lay on these difficult
issues, what concessions were needed, and the extent of concessions required to
reach successful agreement. Analytically, the chapter explores the flexibility of
negotiating actors in difficult situations - their willingness to modify their positions
to reach an accord.
Conducting a systematic analysis of negotiations while they are still in progress is
a tenuous exercise. First, critical information to conduct the analysis may not be
available or may be difficult to access while negotiations are still under way. Issues
may not be fully defined, and interests and positions may not be established; even if
they are, actors in the process may not view it as advantageous to disclose their
Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons Learned from the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (G. Sjostedt, et al., eds.; 1-85966-077-0; © llASA; pub. Graham & Trotman, 1994;
printed in Great Britain), pp. 87-103.
87
88 NEGOTIATING INTERNATIONAL REGIMES
preferences prematurely or through third parties. Secondly, negotiations are
dynamic processes; an analysis conducted in midstream cannot, by definition, pro-
vide a complete understanding of the effectiveness of persuasive strategies or tactics
in reaching agreement, for example. Overall, a process that is still active is difficult
to treat analytically until it has reached a stable resting state.
At the same time, one way for negotiation research to have real utility for practice
is to apply its conceptual and analytical frameworks to processes that are still in
progress. I Because of the problems identified above in obtaining information for
systematic analyses, a contingency approach for negotiations-in-progress is pro-
posed. The results of such an approach will be of interest to researchers, and likely
to be usable by practitioners in a realistic way. In a contingency analysis, users can
ask "what if' questions that relate to future circumstances and the conclusions can
be stated in an "if then" format. The analysis of ten is based on historically meaning-
ful or hypothesized scenarios and explicitly stated assumptions. While complete
information about the negotiation is obviously not available, such an analysis uses
what is known to date about the structure of the issues, positions, interests, and so
on. Practitioners can employ the results to test their own assumptions about the
effectiveness of a possible strategy, the reactions of other parties to the use of a new
tactic, or the likely negotiated outcome of a new proposal. Contingency analyses can
provide practitioners with a common information structure and approach to diagnos-
ing the negotiation situation and planning new strategies in the prenegotiation
period. Such analyses can also identify and examine opportunities for compromise
on contentious issues.2
This chapter has several objectives. First, and most generally, we want to under-
stand more about the dynamics of cognitive interest adjustment that lead to com-
promise in negotiation. Can it be characterized as a mechanistic tit-for-tat
concession-making process? Or is it primarily a learning process in which prefer-
ences are modified as new information and arguments persuade of the need for
change? Secondly, we are interested in assessing the role of interest adjustment
within the process of negotiating new environmental regimes. Are particular inter-
ests especially prominent in the development of new regimes? Are these at the cen-
ter of controversy in the negotiation, or on the sidelines? We focus here on rule-
making concerning the design of financial resource mechanisms and processes.
Finally, we seek to demonstrate the practical utility of a certain analytical methodol-
ogy to support negotiations while still in progress. Related research was performed
during the prenegotiation phase to support planning and diagnosis activities of the
secretariat and the conference leadership of UNCED (Spector, 1991). The current
study was conducted with these same end users in mind.
INTERESTS, PREFERENCES, AND LEARNING
Chapter 1 referred to the interactive relationship between issue and interest clarifica-
tion during the course of the prenegotiation and negotiation periods. Adjustment in
I Another is to apply lessons learned from past cases and analyses to current negotiations. See Sjostedt
(1993), for example, in the area of international environmental negotiations.
2See Spector (1993c) for a survey of analytic techniques that can be of use to negotiation practitioners.
primarily in the prenegotiation phase.
I
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one is intertwined with change in the other, and is stimulated by the behavioral
inputs of domestic and international negotiation, the introduction of new informa-
tion, and the clarification of national goals and objectives. As issues and interests
change, opportunities for tradeoffs become possible and convergence on a mutually
acceptable formula is feasible. On the other hand, issue and interest modification
can lead to a hardening of positions or, worse still, a radical divergence of the parties
away from any possible joint solution. The factors responsible for pushing the nego-
tiation process one way or the other are not well understood, but this is the subject of
much continuing research (see Kremenyuk, 1991).
The process of interest modification is not a mechanistic tit-for-tat interplay, but
rather a learning experience in which negotiators frame and reframe issues and
interests based on domestic and international influences. It is a learning experience
within a joint problem-solving context, one in which the parties have agreed on the
common objective of seeking an agreement together.
Interests and Preferences
Interests and preferences, the key concepts in our framework, are used here inter-
changeably. These terms identify the desires, concerns, and aspirations of a negotiat-
ing party in the context of the particular negotiation in question (Fisher, Ury, and
Patton, 1991; Burton, 1990). They constitute the attitudes that motivate behavior in
the negotiating environment toward agreement or stalemate. Burton refers to the
concept of values to specify the longstanding, stable, and relatively invariant goals
and objectives of a nation or society. Interests and preferences, on the other hand,
refer to the more transient attitudes that are at the basis of decision making in par-
ticular negotiations. Considered policy decisions are often made in relation to a set
of hierarchically ordered criteria that represent the interests and preferences of the
decision makers in that particular situation. These criteria, in effect, operationalize
the values of society in relation to the issues being negotiated. In many cases, these
values can be operationalized in different ways, and that is where the idea of interest
and preference modification comes into play. Interests and preferences also can refer
to the more specific desires or concerns of a negotiating party toward various pro-
posals and fonnulae. Adjustment and tuning of negotiator attraction to alternate sets
of decision criteria or specific fonnulae is the phenomenon we are particularly inter-
ested in understanding and explaining.
Essentially, interests and preferences are negotiable (Burton, 1990). They can be
influenced by infonnation, power, and persuasion, the essential media of negotia-
tion. When commitments to initial positions become unstuck, it is usually because
the initial preferences of the negotiating parties have been influenced, resulting in a
reprioritization of the negotiator's affection for alternative solutions. If interests and
preferences can be adjusted, they can serve as the stimulus or pretext for parties to
engage in logrolling to generate mutually acceptable fonnulae.
Issue-Interest Cycle
Adjustment of interests and preferences is intimately intertwined with the process of
issue definition and clarification (see Chapter 4). Issues are defined, framed, and
reframed in tenns of national interests. Negotiators and policy makers think of
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issues in tenns of their concerns, desires, and goals. Many negotiation problems
relate to multiple interests; especially conflicting interests must be considered in
combination to facilitate a coherent understanding and fonnulation of the issues at
hand. If these interests change over time, issue definition may undergo a transfonna-
tion as well.
What causes interests and preferences to change? Internal factors within a negoti-
ation actor, as well as external factors, play important roles. Internally, a national
government may change, revamping the broad principles and values by which
national goals and objectives are established. Certain catalytic events may occur,
such as the Chernobyl accident or a natural disaster, that serve to drastically reorient
national interests on an issue. As well, domestic negotiations among stakeholders -
in government bureaucracy, business, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and
the public - can influence the motives of international negotiators and policy mak-
ers. External factors that influence national interests and preferences are primarily
focused on the international negotiation process itself. Other negotiation actors,
international organizations, and NGOs can present effective arguments, use per-
suasive tactics, and offer attracting or repelling incentives and tradeoffs to reorient
preferences on an issue. New information, especially in scientific and techno-
logical areas, can be a potent force in changing preferences toward an issue. Obtain-
ing such data is a particular problem for developing countries, which are often
highly dependent for information on industrialized nations.
This issue-interest cycle can be viewed as a learning process. Actors adapt their
attitudes and behavior in reaction to new situations and inputs from others. In a mul-
tilateral negotiation environment, the potential for both positive and negative
stimuli, urging and discouraging change, are likely to be great. The actors' re-
sponse to these stimuli, through adjustments to preferences and reframing of issues,
will detennine whether or not logrolling will become a productive activity in the
negotiation situation.
APPROACH
Methodology
A decision analytic model can be employed as a simplifying vehicle to represent and
structure national interests, preferences toward possible negotiated solutions, and
opportunities for interest adjustment. In particular, a Multi-Attribute Value (MAV)
analysis model is applied in this study to operationalize the analysis of interest
dynamics in the prenegotiation process (Spector, 1993b). This modeling approach is
capable of tracking change in the values and preferences of national policy makers
toward particular issues and sub-issues under debate in negotiations, providing an
explanation as to why interests have changed and highlighting compromise options
that may represent achievable outcomes due to the adjustment of actor interests.
Decision analysis is a nonnative technique that seeks to prescribe appropriate
courses of action that coincide with decision maker values and preferences. Central
to all decision analysis models are personal preferences or interests. MAV models,
in particular, provide an analytical structure to trade off decision objectives across
alternate decision options given these preferences or interests, resulting in a priori-
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tization of options. It requires the modeling of a decision maker's preference struc-
ture by specifying evaluation criteria that are weighted in terms of their relative
importance in making the decision. The range of decision options are then rated
against each criterion, and calculations are performed that yield a prioritization of
options.
This modeling approach has been employed by several negotiation researchers to
provide both practical advice for negotiation teams involved in on-going talks, and
an explanation of historical negotiations for research and analytical purposes. Spec-
tor (l993a) demonstrated the use of MAV models to understand and explain the
adjustment of national and coalition preferences in two multilateral negotiations, the
Uruguay Round of GAIT and the Single European Act of the EC. MAV models also
have been applied prescriptively to assist in prenegotiation strategy development
concerning US military bases in the Philippines (1978), the Panama Canal (1974),
and international oil tanker standards (1978) (Raiffa, 1982; Ulvila and Snider, 1980;
Ulvila, 1990). MAV models typically evaluate the decision calculus of each negoti-
ating party independently. In this study, however, models of each key nation or
coalition are compared directly to facilitate a multiparty analysis that features
the interdependence of negotiator preferences.
The development and exercise of a MAV model to evaluate prenegotiation interest
dynamics is conducted in several steps (Spector, 1993a and 1993b). A separate model
must be structured for each actor and each issue being analyzed. A criterion structure
is developed that models the range of national interests for all interested parties con-
cerning the issue under debate. The range of possible negotiated outcomes is specified
and arrayed in an outcome structure. Data is gathered to estimate the extent to which
each possible outcome satisfies each of the interests in the criterion structure (the out-
come ratings). For each national or coalition entity, the relative importance of each cri-
terion is assessed (the criterion weighting). The model is then exercised by performing
calculations for each national or coalition entity, yielding a prioritization of alternative
negotiated outcomes for each entity. Comparisons across entities can be assessed to
evaluate the extent of convergence or divergence on the various possible outcomes.
Most importantly, the dynamics of preference adjustment are analyzed through sen-
sitivity analysis. Prominent outcomes that are identified in the model's exercise -that
is, those outcomes that are most preferred by the key national or coalition entities - are
used as the basis for the analysis. The objective is to evaluate the extent to which each
principal actor must adjust its interests and preferences to be able to accept these
prominent outcomes. To do this analytically, the initial weighted preferences on each
prominent outcome, interest-by-interest, are compared to the maximum possible pref-
erence each actor can have (that is, equal to a weighted preference score of 100). The
difference between these two values is defined as the weighted deficiency, the distance
between the actor's initial preference for the outcome and its undisputed acceptance of
that solution. This score represents the degree to which the actor's preferences must
change from its going-in position to reach total endorsement of the outcome option.
Because this sensitivity analysis is calculated on an interest-by-interest basis, it is pos-
sible to specify which interests must be adjusted more than others by each actor in
order for a prominent outcome to be acceptable.
The application of this type of analytical approach to a prenegotiation that is still
in progress introduces many risks. Issues and interests are not fully defined. Coali-
tions among national entities may be only in a formative stage. Strategies and tactics
used by negotiators to influence other actors may not be formulated yet; certainly,
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their effectiveness is not detenninable. Only some proposals envisioning potential
outcomes or formulas for agreement have been generated. The researcher's ability
to collect useful objective or subjective data within this context is difficult, to say the
least.
However, if it is possible to identify the emerging issues and sub-issues, recog-
nize the going-in positions, uncover the national interests, and array the existing
proposals during the prenegotiation phase of an international debate, the researcher
may be able to provide the practical negotiator with valuable insights. In the case of
the UNCED prenegotiation, it was possible at the end of the last PrepCom meeting
in April 1992 to specify the issues and sub-issues that were being debated, and the
ways in which these issues were understood and framed by the negotiators at that
time. It was also possible to define the preliminary range of alternative proposals for
each of these issues and sub-issues. It is certainly much more difficult to specify
national interests or preferences concerning these issues. However, through the
debates that were conducted, public statements made, interviews performed, and
national reports submitted to the conference, estimates of the initial going-in inter-
ests and preferences of nations and coalitions could be interpolated. As a result,
interest profiles were developed for prominent nations or coalitions, estimating their
internal decision-making priorities. Using these profiles, the MAV model could be
applied and sensitivity analyses conducted to test various contingencies: What if
actors stand firm on certain issues? Is a convergence of interests possible that results
in integrative win-win solutions? How much must each party give up of its key
demands?
Simulating negotiator interest profiles with MAV models offers practical end-
users with a decision support system that can diagnose prenegotiation opportunities
and pitfalls. Practitioners can assess how much flexibility is required to achieve rea-
sonable compromise agreements, and if agreement can be reached at all. Different
paths toward bridging the gaps between contending parties can be explored ahead of
time to facilitate the ones likely to be most effective.
Context
An innovative feature of UNCED was its recognition of linkages among environmen-
tal issues (for example, between deforestation and climate change), and between envi-
ronmental and other issues (for example, with development and international trade).
Ideally, these linkages would figure significantly in the search for solutions: to solve a
multidimensional problem requires that the entire system of issue relationships be
accounted for in prior planning. Linkages between issues offer negotiators potentially
novel tradeoffs with which to construct deals: balancing environmental constraints
with development benefits, for example.
UNCED addressed issue linkages in two negotiated documents: the Rio Declara-
tion, which states global principles and objectives, and Agenda 21, an action plan
identifying specific goals, targets, and implementation programs. It is within Agenda
21 that several cross-sectoral issues, most prominently, financial resources and tech-
nology transfer, are featured. These cross-sectoral issues, as their name implies, are
jointly linked to both environmental and developmental issues; for example, extens-
ive financial resources must be mobilized to implement anti-pollution technologies,
as well as to foster new industrialization programs.
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In this chapter, two critical issues within the financial resources area are examined
- developing a viable funding mechanism and agreeing on acceptable funding levels
- in which tradeoffs were required to bridge gaps between the positions of the key
coalitions. The first issue concerns the mechanism to fund future sustainable develop-
ment projects that fall under the Agenda 21 umbrel1a. The debate focused primarily on
the appropriateness of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) proposed by the indus-
trialized countries and the Green Fund proposed by the developing countries. The
GEF is currently a jointly managed pilot program of the UN Environment Programme,
the UN Development Programme, and the World Bank to provide grants for invest-
ment and technical assistance to developing nations for environmentally sound devel-
opment projects that benefit global environmental problems. It has come under
extensive criticism from developing countries because of its structure, scope, and gov-
ernance rules, which tend to limit the voice of these nations in how funds are distrib-
uted, and place limiting conditions on the use of funds that are granted. From their
perspective, developing countries are treated as second-class citizens. The aim of the
Green Fund and other similar conceptions put forth by several developing countries -
China, Argentina, and Brazil, in particular - is to address technology transfer issues,
national capacity building, and environment-development problems not already cov-
ered by specific international agreements. The goal is to deal explicitly with issues of
specific concern to developing countries. Thus, contributions are compulsory, prefer-
ential conditions are provided to the recipient nations, and parity in the governance of
the fund is provided to both donors and recipients.
The second issue deals with the target levels of funding that should be established
to yield meaningful progress on sustainable development programs. Currently, the
mean level of funding for al1 overseas development assistance from the OECD
countries amounts to 0.35 percent of the GNP. The UN has established 0.7 percent
as the goal by the end of the century. Given the economic downturn currently being
experienced by most countries, this doubling of assistance is viewed by many as
unlikely in the near term. At the same time, the UNCED secretariat has estimated
that the average annual cost for implementing al1 of the Agenda 21 programs is US$
125 billion from 1993 to 2000. The principal question being debated is how industri-
alized countries should realIocate savings in defense spending and current expendi-
tures devoted to implementing environmental programs at home to benefit global
environmental problems.
At the end of PrepCom IV, in April 1992, several proposals were on the table for
each of these two issues. They are presented in Table 5.1.
The principal criteria upon which policy decisions were made by the key UNCED
participants (nations and coalitions) on these issues were identified based upon a
reading of national statements made at the PrepComs. These represent the critical
factors that are considered in the domestic policy-making process. Table 5.2 lists the
criteria and their ranges of values that were used in the analysis. As shown below,
each negotiation actor prioritizes these criteria differently, but each one takes these
criteria into account to some degree. (See Appendix 5.1 on p. 103 for the importance
of the weights accorded to each criterion for the actors analyzed in this study,)
Three of the key actors in the UNCED talks have been modeled - the United
States (US), the European Community (EC), and the Group of 77 (G-77). They
represent the range of interests and preferences across the two financial issues under
analysis, the US and G-77 often being at either extreme and the EC often
somewhere in the middle.
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Table 5.1 Proposals for Funding Mechanism and Funding Level
Issue: Developing a viable funding mechanism
• Existing GEF Alone: Establish the Global Environment Facility as the sole mechanism for
granting and coordinating financial support
• Modified GEF: Use a modified Global Environment Facility that incorporates greater
participation by developing countries and adjusts the governance rules by which financial
support is granted
• GEF plus Other Funds: Use the Global Environment Facility as one of several available
and accepted funding mechanisms
• Green Fund Alone: Establish the Green Fund as the sole mechanism for granting and
coordinating fi nancial support
Issue: Agreeing on acceptable funding levels
• Existing Levels: Employ existing levels of overseas development assistance (ODA) with
no additional funding
• Additional Funding, but Unspecified: Agree to additional funding above current ODA
levels, but leave the target level ambiguous
• Additional Funding, but Conditional: Agree to additional funding above current ODA
levels, but indicate that such funding will be subject to certain, mainly economic,
conditions
• Additional Funding, but Variable: Agree to an overall target for additional funding above
current ODA levels, but each nation is allowed to specify its own targeted level
• Additional Funding Set at 0.5% of GNP: Agree to an overall target for additional funding
of 0.5% of GNP by the year 2000
• Additional Funding Set at 0.7% of GNP: Agree to an overall target for additional funding
of 0.7% of GNP by the year 2000
Estimates of actor preferences for each criterion (the actors' prioritized interest
profiles), as well as proposal ratings against the criteria (how well each proposal sat-
isfies each criterion), were generated in this study by expert coding of statements
and proposals made by the actors. In particular, the compilation of nationaU
coalitional perspectives on these issues prepared by the UNCED secretariat in Docu-
ment A1CONF.151IPC/102, "Institutional Proposals," proved to be very helpful.
While the MAV model requires precise integer values to perform calculations, such
precision is not appropriate in measuring such preferences and ratings. As a result,
these items were coded into a simple five-point scale, from very high to very low,
and then transformed into numerical values.3
3The numerical scale (D-l()() was divided into equal quintiles. Verbal ratings were assigned the mean
value within each quintile. An intercoder reliability test was performed to assess the reliability of data
coding. Employing Spearman correlations to compare coding similarity, two independent coders using
the same source materials had a .52 and .67 correlation with the author's coding over a total of 145
different value judgments.
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Table 5.2 Criteria for National/Coalitional Policy Decisions
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Locus ofPower: Where does control over the agreement reside?
RANGE: National sovereignty
International control
Responsibility: Where does responsibility liefor resolving the issues?
RANGE: Main responsibility (primary responsibility for past environmental
degradation rests with industrialized countries who must bear the
burdens of resolving the problem now)
Partnership (resolution of current and future environmental problems
must be considered a mutual responsibility of all nations acting in
partnership and cooperation, without recourse to blame)
Scientific Basis for Action: What are the scientific triggers compelling action?
RANGE: Precaution (anticipation of possible future environmental degradation
motivates preventative action now)
Await certainty (act only when scientific findings of future
environmental degradation are more certain)
Funding Conditions: What are the conditions under which developing countries can receive
additional funding to deal with environment-development problems?
RANGE: Conditionality (conditions must be placed on granting additional
financial resources)
Preferential treatment (concessions are made in granting additional
financial resources to facilitate the resolution of the problems)
Amount ofFunding Required: Are additional financial resources required to deal effectively
with environment-development problems?
RANGE: Additionality (additional financial resources - beyond current levels -
are required)
Existing efficiencies (current levels of development aid should be used
more efficiently before additional resources are considered)
RESULTS
The results of the MAV analysis and sensitivity tests are presented in this section in
graphical fonnat to facilitate comfarisons. The quantitative model results are
presented in Appendix 5.1 on p.103.
Developing a Viable Funding Mechanism
Figure 5.1 presents the results of the MAV analysis comparing actor preferences on
funding mechanism proposals. As one might suspect, the two extreme proposals - to
establish only a GEF or only a Green Fund - are favored in the extreme by the US
and the G-77, respectively. The compromise path to agreement falls somewhere in
between. Of the two compromise options in our analysis, the "GEF plus other
'1be MAV models developed in this study were structured and analyzed utilizing a PC-based decision
analysis software package developed by James Huttinger of Booz, Allen, and Hamilton Inc., Bethesda.
Maryland.
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Figure 5.1 Preferences for Funding Mechanism Proposals
(US, EC, and G77)
funds" proposal more closely approximates the preferences of both the US and G-77
than the "Modified GEF' proposal.
What will it take to achieve the former compromise solution? As discussed earlier
in the chapter, compromise will take place when there are significant preference
changes from initial (and often rigid) positions, and these preference adjustments
must be such that the preference space between conflicting parties is narrowed. The
extent of adjustment required of each actor, as one might expect, is not equally dis-
tributed; the demand for preference modification may be highly asymmetrical. The
model provides results on the relative degree of change needed by each actor to
facilitate each compromise proposal. The results for the "GEF plus other funds" pro-
posal indicate that the largest burden for change rests with the US (38 percent), with
the EC and G-77 together bearing a somewhat lower, but equal, burden (3 I percent
to each) to modify their preferences.
Figure 5.2 describes which preferences must indeed be adjusted to achieve the
"GEF plus other funds" compromise based on a sensitivity analysis. The clearest
conclusion that can be drawn from this figure is that each actor has a very different
preference profile that influences its ability to compromise. Each actor must be
motivated to modify different preferences to different degrees. Looking at the US,
by far the biggest adjustment needs to be made in its demand for scientific certainty.
The US and the GEF have pursued a relatively conservative approach to environ-
mental action - to resist preventative action and await greater scientific certainty
before committing to action. The high priority placed by the US on awaiting
certainty must be deflated, along with demands for greater efficiency in the use of
current funds and the placing of restrictive conditions on granting funds.
The G-77 must modify a very different set of preferences in order to reach a com-
promise stance. It must concede somewhat on its demands for preferential treatment
and its strong stance on national sovereignty. The G-77 must also back down to a
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Figure 5.2 Preference Adjustment Required to Achieve
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degree on its demands for additional funds, and the placing of blame and respons-
ibility for current global environmental problems on the industrialized countries.
The EC, for its part, must modify a different mix of preferences to reach compro-
mise. Moving toward the G-77 perspective, the EC must back down a bit on press-
ing for financial efficiencies before new funds are allocated, and must constrain its
demands for placing conditions on granting new funds for environmental solutions.
At the same time, the EC's preferences must move a little toward the US perspective
by reducing its demands for preventative, anticipatory action and for preferential
treatment for developing countries.
Agreeing on Acceptable Funding Levels
Figure 5.3 presents actor preferences for the six proposals on acceptable funding
levels. Preferences across all proposals are extremely diverse, save one, "Additional
Funding but Unspecified Target." All three actors share a common preference for
this proposal. But, as with the funding mechanism issue area, underlying this com-
monality are very different reasons and criteria. The data suggest that this proposal
appears to be a true compromise, requiring almost equivalent preference adjust-
ments by each of the three actors.
Based on a sensitivity analysis, such a compromise requires that the US modify
its preferences to await certainty, seek international partnership, and press for con-
ditionality (see Figure 5.4). The G-77, on the other hand, must be more flexible in its
demands for preferential treatment, additionality of funds, national sovereignty, and
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main responsibility blame. The EC must reduce its stance on precaution, while at the
same time reducing its demands for international partnership and conditionality.
In contrast with this "Additional but Unspecified" proposal, the "Additional but
Variable Target" proposal yielded a greater divergence of interests by the three
actors, as indicated in Figure 5.3, being much more favored by the G-77 than by the
US. To achieve this alternative compromise, much more movement is required by
the US than the G-77, as their overall interests would imply. To make this alternative
proposal a realistic compromise, the degree of change in preferences demanded of
the US would have to be double that required of the G-77 (44 percent versus 22 per-
cent)! The nature of those changes for the G-77 mirror the changes indicated above
for the "Additional but Unspecified" proposal. The changes required of the US are
somewhat different though, with the extra demand for changing its firm stance on
financial efficiency.
DISCUSSION
Contingency Analysis and the UNCED Outcome
This analysis examined several potential scenarios, comparing assumed preferences
with salient compromise formulas. How far were these postulated scenarios and
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their implied conclusions from the real outcomes achieved at UNCED? The ultimate
compromise at UNCED concerning funding mechanisms was a modified GEF, one
that allows for greater developing country participation and reduced conditionality
constraints. According to our analysis, this proposal was much more preferred by
the US and EC than by the G-77. However, the G-77 apparently was willing to
reorder its preferences and trade many of its demands to secure the highly desired
nonconditionality clause (Earth Summit Bulletin, 11 June 1992).
Concerning funding levels, the final compromise at UNCED was an affirmation
of developed country commitments to the target of 0.7 percent of GNP by the year
2000, the most preferred G-77 option. An important feature of this compromise, and
what made it indeed a compromise, was the looseness of the commitment: devel-
oped countries only pledged their intent to reach this target by 2000 if possible, or
beyond that time if necessary. Thus, the negotiated result is a direct merger of the
"Additional funding at 0.7% of GNP" and the "Additional funding, but unspecified"
proposals. This formula cleverly reduced the need for the key parties to modify
their preferences: the G-77 could certainly accept the 0.7 percent goal, while the
"unspecified" time limit was highly attractive to the US and EC.
Overall, had the UNCED negotiators exercised the hypothesized scenario
described in this analysis during the planning stages of the conference, they might
not have guessed the ultimate agreement; they would not have been far off, though.
Certainly, they could have used the analytical technique in the "what if' mode to
examine alternative scenarios and compromise outcomes.
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Implications for Preference Adjustment
Do these results suggest that compromises are possible on these contentious issues?
How much modification in preference is needed by each negotiating party to reach
possible compromises? Which preferences must change to make convergence poss-
ible? The exercise of the MAV model reveals several interesting insights that could
have provided meaningful and practical information to the UNCED conference
leadership during the final phases of the negotiation process.
Degree ofModification
The results suggest that the US position required the most modification if a compro-
mise formula were to become a reality on either issue. On resolving the funding
mechanism issue, the US required more adjustment to its position, compared with
similar but lesser adjustments required of the EC and the G-77. On the funding level
issue, to achieve the "Additional, but Variable" proposal, the amount of change
required in the US position is double that of the G-77, with the EC somewhere in
between. The analysis suggests that on these compromise formulas, movement
toward the middle of the bargaining space should be more stressful for the US and
less stressful for the G-77.
Only for the "Additional but Unspecified" compromise is the amount of change
required by all three parties relatively equivalent. Using an equality measure of jus-
tice in negotiation, perhaps this last proposal can be considered the most fair, since
the degree of change needed from each is about the same. But is this a reasonable
conclusion? The initial stance taken by the US on many financial sub-issues in the
UNCED process was extreme. The US could be seen as practicing an endgame strat-
egy of stating extreme positions and remaining firm until the final stage of the nego-
tiation in Rio, thereby trying to convince others that the only way to reach
compromise solutions was to modify their positions toward that of the US. The
widespread outlook on the US position of intransigence at the Rio Conference con-
cerning financial as well as biodiversity issues led to an increasing ostracism and
isolation of the US, even from its usual allies.
Type ofModification
The results also point to the significant national interests in which flexibility is
required for the compromise formulas to be viable. Sensitivity analyses of the model
indicate the particular interests on which preference adjustment is needed by each
party for each compromise. These results offer insight into the convergence process
that must ensue. The set of preference adjustments required of all parties, when
viewed all together, suggest the precarious balance of tradeoffs needed to achieve
the compromise outcomes.
The US must give way on some of its key interests and demands in the negotia-
tion - in particular, the demand to wait for increased scientific certainty before nego-
tiating further on key issues such as climate change, the demand for increased
efficiency in the use of current development aid, and the rejection of direct blame for
past environmental degradation. For its part, the G-77 must give way on some of its
principal demands, that of obtaining preferential treatment and concessions on
future financial and technological assistance, and seeking additional financial
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resources for new sustainable development projects beyond current development aid
levels. The EC, a coalition in the middle, must move increasingly away from the US
camp, principally giving way on its demands for increased efficiencies in the use of
existing aid packages and demands for conditionality in the provision of new finan-
cial aid. At the same time, the EC must also back off from its demands for pre-
cautionary action on environmental issues, moving it away from an importantly held
G-77 interest. Flexibility on these interests, according to the analysis, will yield the
circumstances within which compromise formulas can be successfully achieved.
CONCLUSIONS
What insights can the practical negotiator participating in future environmental
regime-building talks draw from this analysis? First, it is important for practitioners
to assess the size of the bargaining space and the distance that must be bridged
among the parties to solve the problem. This evaluation involves reviewing the
range of proposals on the table and the degree to which each negotiating party indi-
cates a preference for these proposals. The purpose of this review is to determine
where there are possibilities for finding compromise outcomes. Secondly, prac-
titioners can go a step further in their review of proposals and preferences by assess-
ing their own and the others' national interests. In so doing, negotiators and their
staffs can evaluate opportunities that yield possible tradeoffs. Practitioners need to
evaluate possibilities for change in their own interests with regard to the negotiation
issues, and anticipate possible changes that other parties might be willing to make.
This will result in a comparative assessment of firm commitments to certain bar-
gaining positions and the degree of flexibility available in the negotiation environ-
ment. Ultimately, such an assessment will identify where there is a willingness to
generate compromise, and how far each party must modify their position to achieve
compromise outcomes.
The UNCED test case demonstrated in this chapter suggests that this methodo-
logical approach can be meaningful in a post hoc analysis to understand and
explain flexibility and compromise in historical negotiations. Equally important, the
technique can also provide important insight to support planning and analysis by
negotiators and their staffs prior to and during the course of negotiations - as a
practical decision support tool. It can help to structure the bargaining space and com-
pare the preferences of the various parties toward the proposals on the table. The
technique can be viewed as an accounting device that simplifies and structures
several important aspects of complex negotiation situations.
The analytical results clearly highlighted which of the competing proposals
matched closest to a multidimensional framework of actor preferences. Then, by
focusing on the most likely compromise proposals - where the gaps in preference
were not that great - the analysis offered a picture of the extent of mutual movement
- or flexibility - required of all parties to achieve the compromise; the amount of
flexibility required of each party was not always allocated equitably. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, the analysis provided insight into the "makings" of com-
promise solutions - the often implicit changes to interests and preferences that must
be made to bridge the initial gap between actors. By decomposing the preferences
that must change for a compromise to be struck, the catalysts of negotiating
flexibility are at least partially revealed.
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This analytical technique may be especially useful for practitioners in deadlocked
negotiations. The detailed analysis of alternate proposals by means of assessing
interests, contrasting priorities, and disaggregating preferences can help to identify
opportunities that can overcome impasses. The methodology provides a vehicle for
understanding the spread between preferences that can result in impasse and the
dynamics of bridging some of those gaps between parties. Case analyses of stale-
mated negotiations using this technique would provide guidance for researchers
interested in designing such a practical decision support tool. Applications to other
negotiations already under way - such as in the area of forestry, climate change, and
the sulfur dioxide protocol renegotiation in Europe - could also be instructive in
refining such a practical support method.
Conceptually, additional related research would be useful to understand what
causes preferences to change - what stimulates preference adjustment. The MAV
methodology indicates how much change is required and the types of modifica-
tions needed to reach compromise agreements, but not how such intentions to be
flexible are initiated or can be incited. Analytically, the MAV model, as we have
used it, provides two snapshots in time, comparing the going-in position to a
potential compromise position. With so few data points, it is difficult to assess the
actual learning and adaptation accomplished by the negotiating parties in achiev-
ing agreements. Further study of these concepts is needed to provide researchers
and practitioners alike with a clearer idea of how the process of convergence in
negotiation operates.
Finally, how does an assessment of preference adjustment help us to better under-
stand the process of negotiating regimes? The analysis of financial resource issues is
a classic case of negotiations over rule-making, a necessary and central feature of
regime-building discussed in Chapter 1. The issues of establishing funding targets
and structures within which parties can comfortably operate are straightforward
examples of the need to set general principles and norms for a new regime. As such,
though, the UNCED negotiations over financial issues do not appear atypical. The
dynamics of preference transformation that facilitate the ultimate achievement of
compromise does not seem much different in concept or practice from the dynamics
one might observe in other complex multilateral negotiations not dealing with
regime-building.
What does appear unique to these rule-making negotiations, especially
through the special lens of our multi-attribute analysis, is the formulaic structure
that frames the effective compromises. Regime-building that is multi-partied
and multi-issued is also multi-interested, implying that the outcome must appeal
in a multi-faceted way. The package that is acceptable must satisfy the unique
combination of prioritized preferences that characterize each actor's interest
profile. And while malleable in many cases, these interest profiles most always
stabilize around a multidimensional set of preferences that each actor, in his or
her own way, identifies as reflecting a "fair" solution. After all, the negotiations
concerning rule-making ultimately spell out the proposed process and structure
for sustained interaction within a regime after the initiating negotiations are
completed. Finding the acceptable balance among these multi-interest profiles
across actors is the difficult task of learning and problem solving with which
professional negotiators are faced.
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APPENDIX 5.1: MODELING DATA AND RESULTS
The following tables present the quantitative input and results of the MAV models.
Normalized Criterion Weights for Both Issues
United European Group of 77
Criteria States Community
Locus of power 9 8 21
Historical responsibility 18 16 21
Scientific basis for
action 27 29 7
Funding conditions 18 24 26
Amount of funding 27 24 26
Funding Mechanism Issue: Aggregate Preferences Calculated by the model
Aggregate preferences: GEF as is
model results only
United States 64.0
European Community 49.9
Group of 77 30.7
Modified
GEF
64.3
62.5
42.7
GEFplus
otherfunds
51.2
62.0
62.3
Green Fund
only
27.7
52.3
79.7
Funding Level Issue: Aggregate Preferences Calculated by the model
Aggregate No Additional Additional Additional Target of Target of
preferences: change funding/ funding/ funding/ 0.5% 0.7%
model results in uncertain conditions variable GNPfor GNP for
existing levels applied levels per ODAby ODAby
levels of country 2000 2000
aid
United States 60.1 50.2 63.7 40.0 38.2 36.0
European
Community 39.4 50.9 51.2 53.2 52.1 58.8
Group of 77 12.7 50.1 32.2 71.1 75.1 83.9

6Food Security, Environment, and Development:
A Case Analysis of Process Dynamics
Amanda Wolf
The UNCED negotiations addressed separate issues, such as desertification and
toxic wastes, even though the overall mandate was to forge a consensus on interna-
tional policy to address environmental problems at the interface between human
development and physical realities. Some cross-sectoral issues that arose, notably
technology transfer and financial assistance, tended to reinforce traditional ways of
thinking in UN agencies, rather than paving the way for a new and possibly more
productive packaging of the issues. This structural characteristic, together with the
structure set up by the PrepComs, the process of clarifying issues on the agenda (see
Chapter 4), and the process of preference adjustment (see Chapter 5), created the
parameters for new international environmental regimes. Throughout the process of
developing these new regimes, negotiators were ultimately concerned with creating
and preserving the well-being of present and future generations.
The interface between environment and development is really the main subject of
concern in the emerging regimes. Concrete human interactions with the physical
environment gave the negotiations their motivating force. For instance, in the short
to medium term, the pollution of inland water resources, desertification, or toxic
pollution may have dramatic consequences for food production in poverty-stricken
regions. In the longer term, climate change may have severe effects, undermining
the conditions for stable and productive agriculture in the same or other regions.
Similar examples could be sketched out to show how the issue areas on UNCED's
agenda relate to the provision ofenergy, of effective transportation of goods and ser-
vices, and even the provision of a modest level of aesthetic or cultural services. In
short, food security, energy security, mobility, and nonutility services are some of
the prime reasons why people care about the condition of the environment.
Before the issue agendas were finalized, the secretariat commissioned some
analyses of the environment-development linkages (see, for example, Shaw et aL,
1991). However, the sheer complexity and insufficient knowledge of causal relation-
ships worked against broader attention to feasible tradeoffs across issue areas. Rather,
negotiators focused on narrower and simpler issues, through which they nevertheless
kept a focus on the implications for the well-being of their constituencies.
Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons Learned from the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (G. Sjostedt, et aI., eds.; 1-85966-077-0; © IlASA; pub. Graham & Trotman, 1994;
printed in Great Britain), pp. 105-119.
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It will be years before any plausible assessment can be made of the new UNCED
regimes in terms of addressing the basic mandate and meeting countries' interests.
As the post-UNCED regimes are further fleshed out, evaluative approaches will be
useful to consider periodically the validity of interlinked rules and institutional sys-
tems. Such approaches would seek to understand the multidimensional character of
each problem area managed by the regimes.
This chapter is designed as an initial attempt at that broader assessment. Of all the
underlying concerns at the interface of environment and development, one of the
most basic is an assured access to food. Food security epitomizes the collective
objective of UNCED. UNCED did not expand upon exactly what specific duties and
requirements this underlying objective establishes. Yet, by examining food security,
it is possible to illustrate the general nature of linkages in the negotiation setting.
FOOD SECURITY AND UNCED
The interconnection of environmental deterioration and development needs with
food security is evident across the entire spectrum of the negotiating "compart-
ments" of UNCED. Table 6.1 makes clear how the treatment of any of UNCED's
issue areas was bound to have implications for food security. The remainder of the
chapter examines the various ways in which food security was implicitly linked into
the negotiation process.
ISSUE CLARIFICATION: LEVELS OF LINKAGES
Figure 6.1 presents schematically the overall linkage context. In developing plans of
action to effectively address the linkages of issues with other issues (lateral links),
negotiators take account of relevant political and ethical principles, including, for
example, compensation for past damage and equitable access to financial and tech-
nical assistance. Ideally, these plans of action, as set out in Agenda 21, will be trans-
lated into very precise policies, largely expressed in economic and technical terms,
and implemented in thousands of different contexts. The consequences of such poli-
cies, against the background of the "natural" environment, will in turn be translated
into the concrete effects on people's well-being.
Figure 6.1 makes the distinction between the existence of an environmental prob-
lem and its policy implications. For instance, it is a simple matter to state that there
are relationships between CO2 emissions, climate change, and shifting agricultural
productivity (at the bottom level). But what do these relationships imply for India or
for Finland? That will depend in part on policy decisions (at the second level) that
affect trade and technology transfer. What policies or negotiated decisions will be
favored? That may well depend on how one issue area links to another (at the top
level). Many more questions could be raised. Importantly, although scientific studies
have greatly advanced understanding of many linkages, a number of important link-
ages are not "scientific" or "technical" at all. For example, there are ethical linkages
that will shape regime decisions. A typical case involves the linkages drawn
between past emissions of greenhouse gases and responsibility for future climate
change mitigation efforts. Another type of linkage is drawn explicitly by individuals
or organizations to encourage the joint consideration of the linked elements -
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Table 6.1 Linkages between UNCED Environmental Areas and Food
Security
Atmosphere
Land, Agriculture
Forests
Oceans
Freshwater
Biodiversity
Biotechnology
Toxics and wastes
Food Security
Climate change leading to drought; poleward advance of the monsoon
rainfall; other precipitation and temperature impacts on crops and
biota production; air-borne pollutants; UV radiation; reduced soil
moisture; acid deposition on perennials; climate change leading to sea
flooding impact on productive wetlands and decrease in agricultural
land; species loss due to climate effects; change in habitat; ozone
effects on biota.
Changing energy and other input requirements due to degradation;
desertification; population and activity distribution pressures on land;
clearing forests for crops; coastal erosion and siltation; destruction of
nesting grounds; agrichemical pollution of productive resources;
competition for water use; biota as a source of germplasm for genetic
engineering; increased demand pressures; migration and labor
considerations.
Degradation of productivity after deforestation; land-use conflicts;
decreased protection and habitat conditions for wildlife; decreased
availability of fuel for food preparation; decreased soil protection
(leading to decreased fertility as well as increased runoff into rivers);
changes in the hydrological balance of the drainage basin.
Source of food.
Limiting factor in agricultural food production; contamination effects
on crops; salinity; stability; possible increase in water-borne infectious
diseases to livestock and humans; decreased quality or quantity of
drinking or cooking water; habitat for fish.
Loss of species; loss of soil organisms.
Food production with specialized species; new varieties; release of
modified organisms; increased forest production; maintenance of gene
pool; substitution for traditional species.
Land and water contamination of food chain; accidents; pollution in
coastal zones; effects on biodiversity; persistent effects on health;
elimination of land for alternative uses; eutrophication from sewage.
Note: Some factors may have both positive and negative consequences. For example,
biotechnology can improve food production intensity, but may increase the risk of a local
disaster, such as an entire crop failing simultaneously through a pest explosion.
Sources: UNCED PrepCom (1991), various documents, and Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (1990).
UNCED's agenda-setting is the best example. All of these different types of linkages
influence policy decisions and the course of negotiations.
With the rise into predominance at UNCED of the sustainable development para-
digm, a separate approach to each environmental and developmental component of
food security is no longer tenable.
Food security is mentioned in various places in UNCED documents. Most
notably, it is one of the principles of sustainable development (UNCED Prep-
Com, A/CONF.151/42 para. 11, vi). Food security is an "issue constellation,"
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... Lateral Links with Other Issues ..
PoliticaVEthical
Cross-Sectoral
Knowledge/Strategic .. Negotiati on Focus
DECISION
Economic/Political
TechnicaVPolitical
Policy/Functional .. Pol icy
IMPLEMENTATION
Food Security and
Environment
PhysicaVFunctional .. Human Effect
CONCRETE EFFECT
Figure 6.1 Levels of Linkage
bringing in many of the interlinkages implicit in the "sociopolitical" and "bio-
geochemical" spheres. Ideally, then, the negotiators might have treated food
security (and energy security, etc.) explicitly in this broad frame. However, the
sheer technical complexity of coping with the issue linkages under such an inte-
grating notion as food security was a serious impediment. Knowledge about the
causal relationships was only beginning to be sketched in. Just as importantly,
explicit attention to food security would have made it impossible to avoid treat-
ing many sensitive issues, notably population and agricultural policies. The
result could well have been a complete stalemate in Rio. Instead, serious prob-
lem solving seemed to imply breaking the problems into smaller pieces. This is
exactly what was done at UNCED. In the process, the larger context got pushed
out of view, but presumably not out of mind.
I
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Food security is a tenn that has been widely used since the early 1970s, but has
typically meant different things to different people. 1 The FAD definition has been
generally accepted since the mid-1980s: "Ensure that all people at all times have
both physical and economic access to the basic food they need. Ensure production of
adequate food supplies; maximize stability in the flow of supplies; secure access to
the supplies on the part of those who need them" (FAD, 1987).
This general definition actually accommodates a number of interpretations. In a
negotiation context (in which different interpretations can emerge as different inter-
ests and policy stances), five separable elements of the definition may be discerned.
These are: (1) the composition and nutritional adequacy offood to sustain an active
life; (2) "who" is secure in tenns of food availability - a country, a household, a per-
son, particularly the poor; (3) "security" - the assurance of access to food as needed,
which is really the heart of the concept - expressed as physical supply-based
assurance, effective real income demand-based assurance, or both; (4) intertemporal
elements - whether food insecurity is transitory or chronic and whether con-
sumption levels are sustainable as population expands; and (5) linkages with the
developmental and political needs of the country (that is, with "national" security
more broadly), and of the individual, such as guarantees of the right to work for
reasonable wages.2
Food security problems may arise in a number of ways. First, supply may fall
short. Variations in production and world price, both of which can cause domestic
shortages, have been substantial and are increasing. Weather is by far the largest
source of variability, but civil strife, shortages of critical inputs, and misguided pol-
icy may all playa part. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change concluded
in its well-respected report that food production at the global level could be sus-
tained at levels sufficient to meet world demand under the test case conditions of a
CO2 doubling scenario, but that the cost of achieving this remained unclear (IPCC,
1990).
Supply is also affected by price. Price variability is much higher in the world mar-
kets than in the domestic markets of most countries. Agriculture and trade policies,
especially in the developed countries, and price policies that protect consumers,
especially in the developing countries, insulate producers and consumers from sup-
ply shocks. The insulation forces adjustment on to a thin world market, magnifying
the price effect of small global production shocks, and further reduces the ability of
poor countries to rely on world markets for food security. Sensitivity to price thus
becomes a crucial component of food security adjustments. Secondly, the demand
component adds to the food security problem. Populations are expanding faster than
agricultural productivity in many countries. One study, for example, examined 104
I Much of the material in this section is drawn from Wolf (1990).
2 The various issues have been highlighted in the following works defining food security: (I): Valdes
and Konandreas (198\), pp. 28-9; Garcia (198\), p. 127; Bread for the World (1989), p. 2; Huddleston
et al. (1984), p. 3; FAa (1987). (2): Adams (1983), p. 550; Koester and Valdes (1984). p. 431; Lappe and
Collins (1978), p. 154; von Braun (1988), p. 1083; and FAa (1987). (3): Hathaway (1981); Brown et al.
(\984), p. 185; World Bank (1986); Advisory Panel (1987), p. 3. (4): FAa (1987); Adams (1983), p. 550;
von Braun (1988), p. 1083; Valdes and Konandreas (198\), p. 38; (5): Huddleston etal. (1984), p. 3;
Koester and Valdes (1984), p. 431; Lap¢ and Collins (1978), p. 154; Lele and Chandler (1981), p. 102;
Bread for the World (1987).
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developing countries for 1961-83 and found that although only 16 of these countries
had negative food production growth rates, 65 had negative per capita pro-
duction growth rates (Ezekiel, 1989). If per capita income is also increasing, food
demand will grow even faster. Fluctuations in non-food production and prices
can lead to decreased real incomes, and thus decrease the ability to purchase ade-
quate food.
Although all of the components of food security are important to the concept of
sustainable development, it is likely that the national level is most relevant for the
UNCED regimes. Countries may be particularly concerned about the decisions of
other countries and of the international community.
Finally, economic efficiency is inadequate as the sole criterion of sustainable food
security. The ultimate objective must also include reliability. This translates into the
right of all people to be free from hunger.3
DEFINITION OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
SUSTAINABILITY
Despite the difficult, and perhaps intractable, philosophical concerns raised by a dis-
cussion of rights, as in the right to be free from hunger, the notion is central to the
concept of economic development. Development, in contrast with growth, carries
much more of an individualistic sense. No longer is growth alone taken auto-
matically to be a good thing, nor only in economic terms. According to the most
widely used definition, sustainable development "meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their own needs"
(WCED, 1987:43). This definition was echoed throughout UNCED.
The notion of needs in the WCEDIUNCED definition of sustainable development
is, of course, an expandable concept. Many commentators have recognized that
human needs are more than just subsistence requirements. The UNDP, for example,
has addressed this in its Human Development Report (UNDP, 1991). Here human
development is again framed in terms of rights; it is defined as the "process of
enlarging people's choices." It incorporates basic needs (health, nutrition) with
social needs (education, participation, and opportunities).
Exactly how "needs" may evolve as development progresses is not well under-
stood. Two points seem evident, however. First, all the characteristics of needs apply
to individuals, but are aggregated into a national frame. The way this happens is not
necessarily directly related to individual needs, or even predictable. Secondly,
changes in needs, as politically defined, may occur over a different time frame than
do changes in the causes of those needs. Nevertheless, it is such needs, however
defined, that national representatives purport to represent at the international negoti-
ating table. When the issues are environmental, the social and economic aspects of
development needs must be integrated into the new dimension of interest.
3See• for example. the Food and Agriculture Organization Den Bosch Declaration (1991 l. as reported
in UNCED PrepCom A1CONF.151/PC/61.
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FOOD SECURITY LINKAGES
III
One way of organizing linkages is to classify them as physical (the biogeochemical
sphere), functional (causal relationships that include human behaviors, usually
expressed in political or economic terms), or strategic (linkages "forced" intention-
ally, principally by agenda-setting in negotiation) (Sj6stedt, 1991). Because this
analysis takes an illustrative "slice" of an overall environment-development rela-
tionship through various levels of linkages, it is useful to distinguish the linkages
according to: (I) concrete physicaVjunctional, in which food security at the most
basic level is examined as an environmentallhuman interface; (2) policYlfunctional,
which may be subdivided into (a) economic-technical linkages and (b) economic-
political linkages; and (3) negotiation knowledge/strategic - that is, broadly actor-
mediated ways of creating meaningfullinkages.4 There are two subdivisions here:
(a) ethicallpoliticallinkages and (b) the UNCED cross-sectoral linkages. 5
Concrete PhysicallFunctional Linkages
The basic food security identity says that production plus imports, plus any food still
in storage from the previous period, must equal consumption plus food put in
storage for later use. Combining the storage terms (net carryover), gives:
Production + Net Imports + Net Carryover == Consumption
To judge whether or not a food-secure condition exists, the frame of consideration
must first be specified. Is it food security for the individual, household, region,
nation, or world? Or is it food security throughout the year, across the years, for
future generations? Then each term in the identity may be assessed. Factors
affecting each term include:
Production
Production has two basic components, yield and land area (or water area) har-
vested.6 Changes in either can affect the production of food. Environmental factors
and macroeconomic policy relating to factor costs, terms of trade, availability of
credit, etc., can also influence the choice of crops and levels of production. For food
security, it is helpful to look at the micro levels of particular crops, regions, or
seasons, since significant differences can be noticed at these levels of dis-
aggregation.
"This category clearly has an overlap with the functional categories, but the knowledge dimension as
it interacts with the "world out there" is extremely important in negotiation. In the UNCED PrepCom
process, information collection, management, and dissemination were strongly higWighted.
5Refer back to Figure 6.1 on p. 108 for an overview diagram of these levels of linkages.
6A secondary component of production is the processing of food. Further refining of raw produce
before it is marketed or consumed, or the production of livestock, add another layer to the considerations
delineated here, but do not substantially affect the analysis.
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Net Imports
This tenn concerns debt and the economics of the trade situation, credit possibilities,
foreign exchange earnings, managerial capacity for appropriate decision making,
environmental impacts in other countries, laws in other countries, and the political
considerations of trade.
Net Carryovers
This term considers the stocks of food supplies that are held between periods,
by households, governments, and traders. Factors that can affect storage are
related to management and infrastructure finance and infonnation and
forecasting.
Consumption
Access to food, either because the consumer has produced the food or has adequate
exchange entitlement, detennines consumption (Sen, 1990). Other important factors
are: macroeconomic policies that influence access; consumer infonnation regarding
health and nutrition practices; degree of health (lack of weakness and illness); tech-
nology and finance to get food to people under nonnal and emergency circum-
stances; labor, migration, or other conditions that influence the distribution of people
relative to where the food is; population growth rates relative to the rates of change
in food availability; and cultural factors and taste that relate to the ability to adjust
consumption under changing conditions.
The food security identity is expanded in Figure 6.2. Many, but not all, of the influ-
ential factors are shown. Different countries will place differing emphasis on the vari-
ous food security factors. For example, a country that has an important fishery may put
more emphasis on conservation policies, and be more concerned about legal and insti-
tutional factors regulating the use of the common ocean resources. Another country
may agree that oceans are of important common concern, but if it does not itself sup-
port an ocean fishery, the country may maintain that oceans are of very low priority for
international negotiated action. To take a final example, a country that is very poor will
tend to place lesser value on problems that may arise in the future than will a rich
country. This has implications, for instance, on food storage policies, which in turn
may be affected by external economic or environmental shocks.
Similarly, infonnation and perceptions differ. Parties will view different sections
of the figure as more or less important regardless of how well the linkages seem to
be factually known, and will make different judgments regarding the relative
importance of what is known, and the implications for policy. For example, one
country may believe that stability of import supplies requires commodity agree-
ments, whereas another might believe that food security may be best assured only in
a free-market regime. In raising these sorts of issues, the linkages are extending to
the next higher level - that of policy detennination.
EconomicJPolitical and Economicffechnical Linkages
The linkages at the next level are embedded in the physical/functional linkages
noted in Figure 6.2. However, the lens is focused on policy decision making. This is
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Net Imports
Net Carryover
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Climate change
Biotechnology
Biodiversity
Stable water
Sedimentation
Toxification
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Erosion, etc.
Figure 6.2 Food Security, Environment and Development
Source: IIASAIEDP (1991), modified by author.
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the level at which the physical concerns for production and adequate food supply are
translated into proposals for the coordinated implementation of activities aimed
toward the objective of sustainable development.
Referring to Figure 6.2, the economic/political linkages are most prominent in the
consumption, trade, and storage segments, while the economic/technical factors
dominate the production linkages. Second-level linkages show the interactions
between decisions and outcomes, given certain external conditions. For a given
country, the "world out there" consists not only of the physical environment beyond
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Figure 6.3 Economicffechnical Linkages
Source: Internal frame; Goodwin (1991), p. 94.
its control (e.g., weather), but also the consequences of decisions made by others. A
country sets policies to try to affect change in the manner in which the "out there" is
internalized. Thus, it makes trade policy in the light of what others' influence -
products and volume - is on the market; it may set agricultural subsidies according
to the way it values competing goals of, say, agricultural-industrial terms of trade
and degree of food self-sufficiency.
The first of the two figures that follow is the simpler, but helps show the
importance ofthe interrelationship oftechnology transfer, institutional mechanisms,
and financial and economic resources. Flows and kinds of technologies available to
a country influence a country's prospects in the world - that is, its opportunities for
growth and development. Moreover, technology transfer, economic instruments and
financial aspects, and institutional considerations are the three most important of the
cross-sectoral issues as defined by the UNCED PrepCom. They are all elements of
technical policy coordination. The model shows the move from classical economics
(a landllabor tradeoff) through the neoclassical period (the addition of technology)
to the "modem" emphasis on immaterial technologies that are informationlhuman
capital intensive.
The economic/political linkages that are important for food security concern the
relative degrees of interaction of government policies with the components of the
food security identity that are mediated by economic considerations. These policies
encompass those that influence trade, pricing, the structure of the economy, labor
and migration conditions, perceived and actual inequities in the distribution of
economic goods, policies influencing the relative desirability of factor combinations
I
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Figure 6.4 EconomicIPolitical Linkages
Source: Adapted from Parikh (1990), p. 116.
in production, and many others of a similar type. Figure 6.4 shows the linkages of
one country in a world context. Environmental conditions and political stability are
shown as contextual factors. The bottom portion of the figure shows the external
effects of other governments on the focal country. Environment and political stabil-
ity both affect the intemallinkages by setting limits on actions that can feasibly or
effectively be undertaken.
EthicallPolitical and UNCED Cross-Sectoral Linkages
At the third level of linkages, perceptions of problems have important foundations
in cultural and social structures, and in the institutions, laws, and norms that have
evolved within these structures. This "knowledge history" shapes more than percep-
tions, however. It influences motivations to act or in specific ways. The cultural/
social structures that have preconditioned perceptions are also evolving, and
giving rise to new notions of justice and fairness, needs and desires, which can
influence problem and solution boundaries. In the process of negotiation, knowledge
116
Ethical Frame
NEGOTIATING INTERNATIONAL REGIMES
International Responsibility -
National Responsibility
Individual Responsibility _
Human Dignity
t !
FOOD
for ·survival'
t !
Other basic
needs
Relative Poverty
Absolute Poverty
I
Figure 6.5 EthicallPolitical Linkages
and principles provide referents for the construction of a "formula" for the negoti-
ated outcome (Zartman and Berman, 1982).
There are a number of ethical considerations in the field of food security and it is
not intended to do more than simply suggest the nature of these considerations.
Figure 6.5 is therefore simply a rough and impressionistic sketch of the ethicaV
political domain. The surrounding environment is an "ethical frame," perhaps a
dominant theory, such as the United States' emphasis on individual human rights or
perhaps a tradition-bound pattern of responsibilities that is religiously, not legally,
grounded. This frame implies what should be the division of responsibility for
ensuring food to the hungry. Depending upon the allocation of responsibility, certain
supporting policies are required. For this reason, the figure is labeled "ethicall
political." The negotiation formula provides the thematic overview of respons-
ibilities, which are then built into the specific policies. Finally, the specific policies
lead to concrete impacts on people.
The last set of linkages are the cross-sectoral linkages among UNCED problem
areas. These linkages were purposefully made in the agenda-setting process.
UNCED has specified these as: (1) economic/financial resources; (2) technology
transfer; (3) legal instruments; (4) institutional considerations; (5) poverty and urban
settlements; (6) supporting measures (education); and (7) science. Cross-sectoral
implies both that the issues are common to more than one sector and that they con-
nect sectors. From this it follows that consideration of these issues needs to be cross-
disciplinary and multiple-resource oriented. For example, economic and financial
aspects link with all the others in terms of resources to carry out the scientific and
educational tasks, or to undertake technological research, or to institute an anti-
poverty plan that reduces environmentally stressful impacts. The resources them-
selves are a combination of differently trained personnel and different sources and
types of financial resources. The sectoral concerns of agriculture link with other
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sectors, such as energy, transport, and industry through government policies and
resultant human decisions. Each of the cross-sectoral issues contains relevant food
security linkages within its own domain and between it and the others.
For example, economic/financial instruments are linked with institutional con-
siderations such as providing or facilitating loans and grants for food imports, mak-
ing financial policy, and economic data gathering and the use of economic
instruments. Educational support is linked with institutions, science and technology
in the support of indigenous knowledge and decentralized activities, agricultural
outreach efforts, access to technology, and research and development.
LINKAGES AND INTERESTS
Together, the set of linkages described above (as well as those linkages that have not
been listed) give definition and detail to the "conceptual space" for food security in
UNCED. Within this space are the concerns and interests of parties attempting to
incorporate both global goals and substantive action responses into an acceptable
plan. These interests have two levels. First, "country goals" of a fundamental ideo-
logical/normative sort underlie issue definitions for each country. Secondly, there
are the particular preferences of each country for various proposed outcomes. For
example, some countries maintain that the right to a healthy environment exists and
is a basic human right; a particular preference might be that a per capita criterion be
used in allocative decisions.
In UNCED negotiations, as already noted, the focus was on the particulars. The
UNCED secretariat summarized the task facing delegates to the conference as one
of discovering a detailed and particularized solution to a multiple challenge:
[How] to achieve the appropriate mixture of regulatory and market mechanisms, how to
free social creativity, how to satisfy the need for economic development while protect-
ing the resource base, and how to balance the requirements for social equity with both
individual and communal needs (UNCED PrepCom NCONF. 15 IIP063 , paragraph 14).
Negotiations, which are joint problem-solving exercises, tackle exactly such chal-
lenges of finding balances among a number of objectives. Parties arrive on the scene
with different definitions of the problems and the work to be done. As the work gets
under way, negotiators assess the quality of proposed outcome "packages" accord-
ing to the interests that they appear to satisfy. Over time, there may be several types
of movement: parties change their definitions of the problems (along any number of
dimensions); new solutions may emerge that better match the definitions of parties;
and aspects of the negotiations themselves may enhance the process of convergence.
Throughout the process, the parties are comparing the developments against a back-
ground of interests.
UN regional economic councils submitted public reports as part of the prepara-
tion process for UNCED. These reports stated how environment and development
problems and their interfaces were viewed from these regions. The highlights are
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discussed briefly below. These statements of objectives provided an initial way to
infer interests about food security in UNCED.
The Bergen Declaration (ECE, 1990) emphasized the precautionary principle, the
need to "integrate environmental considerations with economic and sectoral plan-
ning policies," and the importance of balancing the use of economic instruments
with regulatory measures. There was also an emphasis on costlbenefit analysis to
determine the merits of "anticipatory and adaptive strategies." Among the important
environmental needs, pollution control was labeled the single most important need
in a synthesis paper prepared from a number of national reports (ECE, 1991).
The Final Declaration of the Ministerial Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP, 1990) emphasized an integrated approach,
together with the precautionary principle. The statements further revealed that this
group saw the major cause of environmental degradation as the "unsustainable pat-
tern of production and consumption," but also cited the importance of both popula-
tion growth and distribution and of poverty. They further stated that environmentally
sound and sustainable development was primarily an economic issue, and that states
have sovereign rights to exploit their resources, provided they do not cause damage
(ESCAP, 1991).
The T1atelolco Platform, and supporting information from the Economic and
Social Council for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, 1991), highlighted
the principle of equity in changing production patterns and called for a dynamic bal-
ance in the use of all forms of capital: human and cultural, natural, financial, and
institutional. International competition and increasing trade, greater integration
across sectors and levels of the economy, and intraregional cooperation were essen-
tial ingredients. Similar to ESCAP, ECLAC called for principles of environment-
development integration and the "harmonious occupation of national territory."
Development depends on exploitation and marketing of natural resources, according
to this view, and thus the developing countries must be able to realize the benefits of
natural resources. This view implies the necessity for conservation efforts, but also
the need for trade and other practices to ensure that the value these resources repre-
sent is not siphoned off by other (perhaps wealthier) countries.
Some indications of African concerns were found in a report of the 1989 meeting
of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).? Four such issues brought out were:
(1) the need to prevent and reverse desertification; (2) the need to manage demo-
graphic change and pressure; (3) the requirement of self-sufficiency and food
security; and (4) the need to maintain species and ecosystems.
Much of the information in the regional reports expressed "preferences" as well
as "facts." Clearly, though, interests diverged. The five ranges shown below are the
dimensions along which specific proposals were arrayed:
(1) the degree of market freedom (in contrast with regulation/protectionism) in
called-for actions;
(2) the degree of international control (in contrast with national control or the
primacy of national sovereignty) in determining actions;
(3) the degree to which legal measures would be binding laws (in contrast to "soft"
laws);
7As reported in the Brundt/and Bulletin (1990), Issue 9/10.
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(4) the degree to which scientific uncertainty would be tolerated and how flexible
policies would be to accommodate change; and
(5) the degree to which development would be emphasized (in contrast with
environment).
Agenda 21 is the result of interest-based bargaining applied to each of the
UNCED issue areas. The food security impacts will flow from the implementation
of Agenda 21 and further evolution of the UNCED regime.
CONCLUSION
Food security issue/interest interactions motivated a joint and dynamic process of
defining the salience of an issue and formulating judgments about possible policy
responses to address the problems. These judgments were grounded in the traditions
of ethics and political philosophy, but manifested themselves as preferences along a
continuum of policies. Over the course of the negotiation, a number of changes
occurred. Among them were changes in "objective" knowledge about the problem;
in judgments about the importance of this change in knowledge; in the relative
importance of the change within a given knowledge base, because of changes in
preference determination; and in the formation and actions of coalitions in the day-
to-day play of the negotiations. Over the course of implementation, further changes
will occur.
Using the issue of food security, a number of interrelated linkages were illustrated
in this chapter. As negotiators went about the particular efforts to draft the Rio De-
claration and Agenda 21, among the most critical factors influencing the process
were the perceptions of these linkages against a background of fundamental inter-
ests: perceptions and knowledge of the problem and its scientific characteristics;
degree of risk aversity; preconditions, precedents, and history; political factors and
tradeoffs outside the immediate decision context; competing objectives and counter-
productive feedback effects; financial and managerial capacity; and finally, aspira-
tions, values, and beliefs. As the figures make clear, these factors were underlying
the direct environmental discussions that were the particular negotiation focus.

Part III
An Actor Perspective

7Problems and Opportunities in
Intragovernmental Coordination: A Northern
Perspective
Hugo Maria Schally
Now that UNCED and other related international negotiating fora, like the Inter-
governmental Negotiating Committees for Climate Change and the Protection of
Biological Diversity, are over, one can say that the task was one of managing
unprecedented complexity. The characteristics of the negotiating process leading up
to the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 are all the more
evident in UNCED. There it was said that what had happened at the negotiating
table was just the visible tip of the iceberg; a whole mountain of arduous preparatory
labor was the necessary prerequisite for final success (Sohn, 1973 ). At UNCED, the
number of actors involved at international, regional, and national levels far outpaced
the earlier conference and brings into sharp relief the question of how actor
dynamics fashioned the process and outcome of UNCED. A book that was pub-
lished by the Center for our Common Future to review the national responses to the
Brundtland Report underlines that in building regimes, all actors "must forge new
partnerships among groups that do not nonnally listen to each other, forcing a dia-
logue on the changes needed" (Starke, 1990). This small sentence points to the gov-
ernmental actors, as well as the nongovernmental ones, in the process. The lessons
learned from analyzing their interaction during UNCED can certainly be applied in
the domestic area for improvements in legislation, implementation, integration of
policies, and the involvement of the public.
This chapter focuses on the intragovernmental negotiating process in industrial-
ized countries from the perspective of a participant. The subject will be treated
mainly in the light of the national preparatory process for UNCED and the actual
conduct of negotiations from Austria's experience, but with a view to finding simi-
larities to such processes in other industrialized countries. Most of the documenta-
tion on intragovernmental coordination and on domestic bargaining and
negotiations is not declassified and not freely available. Thus, this analysis is based
on first-hand experience. It is also a investigation into the way industrialized coun-
tries approached the process. Developing countries' approaches to the negotiating
process were doubtless similar in many ways, but given differences in available
Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons Learned from the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (G. Sjostedt, et a/., eds.; 1-85966-077-0; © IIASA; pub. Graharn & Trotman, 1994;
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resources and administrative and political structures, one would expect that
intragovernmental coordination would vary widely.
For most industrialized countries, the actors involved are the same: government
ministries and agencies at national, regional, and local (federal provinces or states)
levels, business, organizations representing special interest groups such as trade
unions, chambers of industries, and other NGOs. Western European countries had
one additional layer of coordination - the quasi-intragovernmental coordination pro-
cess within the EC. The Commission of the EC participated in all the negotiations,
and even negotiated as an independent actor in areas where authorized (mainly
trade-related issues).
Three underlying questions guide the description and analysis of the preparation
and coordination processes:
(1) Did the responses from different layers of government diverge significantly
during the preparation?
(2) Was there a growing awareness of the needs and opportunities of regime-
building throughout the process?
(3) Was there a redefinition of the concept of "national interest" or "national
position"?
The process leading up to Rio was unparalleled both in its complexity and the
short time allotted to it. The UN-GA Resolution 44/228 of 21 December 1989,
which gave the mandate for the beginning of the preparatory process, left only 2
years for it to be completed. Given the sheer number of topics that were to be dealt
with during the conference, the time would have been short even if there had been
only one set of negotiations to be conducted. As it turned out, there were a number
of other parallel negotiations in the environmental field that were conducted simul-
taneously, with an increasing intensity toward the end. There were, for example,
regional preparation meetings (EC-regional meeting on sustainable development,
Bergen, Norway, May 1990), negotiations for Conventions on Climate Change and
for the Protection of Biological Diversity, and participants' meetings for the Global
Environment Facility. AlI this added up to a frenetic pace of meetings that went on
almost continuously until the very end of the UNCED preparatory period. It stressed
the capacity of many national administrations to cope with such a heavy schedule. A
growing number of actors from various national agencies and government institu-
tions had to participate in several of these fora. Two main difficulties emerged.
Either they had to follow all negotiations almost continuously without having time
to consult and co-ordinate at home, or the job was distributed to different groups of
negotiators who ran the risk of losing touch with each other. In either case, the pro-
cess led to a considerable concentration of personnel resources, placing great strain
on the capability of smaller states to participate effectively.
THE AUSTRIAN EXAMPLE
The Austrian response to the UNCED challenge has to be understood against the
backdrop of historic and geographic facts. As the introduction of the Austrian
National Report for UNCED (1992) points out, "Austria is part of the central Euro-
pean interior" and its foreign policy and interests are targeted accordingly. In line
with its neighbors, Austria was under the impression at the beginning of the
I
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UNCED process, influenced by the media and political discussions, that UNCED
was going to be a pure Stockholm II, a misconception that was to be proved wrong
as economic development issues insisted upon by the South became more and more
prominent in relation to environmental issues during the preparatory negotiations.
Organization and Participation
Due to historical and logistical reasons, two ministries plus the Federal Chancellory were
involved in the UNCED preparations from the very beginning. The Ministry for
Foreign Affairs was the traditional government organization concerned with inter-
national cooperation and it played a key role in the whole preparatory process. The
Ministry for the Environment, Youth, and Family Affairs, on the other hand, which came
into being as a direct result of the Stockholm conference and is the ministry that
deals directly with the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), was also highly interested
in the follow-up conference to Stockholm. The third main player was the Federal
Chancellory, partly because it retains the national competence for bilateral development
cooperation, but also because the Federal Chancellor commissioned an independent
contribution to the process: "International Environment Charter, The Austrian Con-
tribution to the International Environment Charter" (1990). Initially, the preparatory
process for UNCED was conducted in a number of fora where different but inter-
related topics were discussed. The industrialized countries participated, for example,
in the meeting resulting in the Declaration of The Hague, March 1989; DECD Min-
isterials of May 1989; the UN-ECE Conference in Bergen, May 1990; the UN-ECE
Espoo Ministerial Declaration, February 1991; and the World Bank meetings to set
up the Global Environment Facility, November 1990. Many of these sessions were
attended by ministers and/or representatives of different ministries. This obviously
did not help to focus the national response to the upcoming UNCED conference, as
different ministries had separate interests, and different priorities and approaches.
As the institutionalized preparatory process within the UN system followed the
traditional path of setting up a conference structure (that is, installation of working
groups, election of officers, setting up of a secretariat) without going into substance
until later, it was primarily the representatives of the environment and foreign affairs
ministries that were involved at the initial phase. A national response to the sub-
stantive matters was rather slow in being formulated. Neither the public nor the
administration and interest groups really grasped the complexity of the matter at this
early stage. It was not until after the first session of the PrepCom was held in
Nairobi from 6 to 31 August 1990 that the scene was set for intensified work on
national coordination and national responses to the challenge now presented.
By the end of 1990, elaboration of national reports began to gain some urgency.
Focusing and structuring the response to the UNCED process and the preparation
of concrete answers to key questions on a national level was largely influenced by
the need to develop a national report. The report served as a useful early reminder
to several national institutions that it was necessary to deal with a stunning variety
of interconnected issues in the preparation of UNCED. In the preparation for the
second PrepCom in Geneva (April 1991), when the breadth of the agenda became
apparent, various segments of the administration became distinctly aware that
UNCED would touch their designated area of competence. As the issues and
objectives of the conference began to be spelled out more clearly, it dawned upon
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more and more of the participants involved that it was necessary to formulate a
coherent response and to integrate approaches in order to present a single national
position in the negotiating process. Thus, at the beginning of 1991, a national
coordinating structure was established, the so-called "Nationale UNCED Kom-
mission zur Koordinierung der osterreichischen Vorbereitung" ("National Com-
mission for the Coordination of the Austrian Preparations for UNCED"). Looking
at the topics listed in Resolution 44/228, a list that was still to change and grow in
the course of the negotiations, one quickly becomes aware that virtually all
aspects of human activities as they relate to the environment are covered, from
climate change to human health, from human shelter to international trade, from
desertification to the development of international environmental law. During the
PrepCom negotiations, an attempt was made to draw up an organization chart
relating specific tasks to responsible organizations of the UN system. The results
show clearly that a comprehensive approach on the international level would have
to involve all sectors of the UN family, as well as other international organ-
izations. Accordingly, a sound national preparation had to involve the totality of
national administrative agencies.
The Commission met for the first time in February 1991. Focal points in each
ministry were designated to collect and distribute information relating to the
UNCED process, hoping that horizontal communication within ministries would
thereby be improved. The initial idea for Austria's national report was to base it on
the Austrian contribution to the World Commission on Environment and Develop-
ment (Brundtland Report); a first concept was presented in spring 199I. That con-
cept gave a fairly good indication of the priority interest and action areas from the
Austrian perspective. It was, however, too narrowly focused, and some important
issues contained in the proposed agenda were not adequately covered. It was also
evident that effective coordination required the establishment of a smaller group to
guide the work of the report. A steering group was designated to coordinate the
coordinators. It was composed of representatives of the Federal Chancellory, and the
Federal Ministries for Foreign Affairs; Environment, Youth, and Family Affairs;
Science and Research; Finance; and Economic Affairs. In the course of the prepara-
tory process, it appeared that even that structure was too large and cumbersome to
coordinate the process efficiently. A yet more informal group, composed of repre-
sentatives of three ministries, prepared and implemented most of the substantial
work. These included representatives from the Ministries for Foreign Affairs, and
Environment, Youth, and Family Affairs, and the Federal Chancellory, the units that
contributed financially to the process. The final packaging and editing of the texts
supplied by the various parts of the administration were entrusted to consultants in
the end. Thus, the national process of managing complexity involved an ever-wider
range of consultations coordinated by a nested series of smaller groups.
The National Commission met 88 times before UNCED, roughly every two
months. Information was received both through the Permanent Missions at the UN
in New York and Geneva, and through the institutional channels of other ministries,
and circulated through the Steering Committee to all the participants. The sheer
mass of documentation and the fact that most people concerned had little or no
multilateral experience presented the coordinators with a considerable problem.
UN documents were difficult to tackle in any case, and it was not always possible
for the concerned ministries to evaluate the contents of all documents. Some par-
ticipants also encountered language problems.
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Patterns of behavior and contribution were influenced based on personal involve-
ment, the interest of certain members of negotiating groups, and influences from the
political scene, which made themselves felt more strongly as the conference drew
nearer. Some ministries, which logically should have been more closely involved in
the negotiations on certain issues, took a deliberate decision to abstain. These deci-
sions were often explainable in the context of domestic political considerations,
though they may have had little to do with the UNCED process itself.
The Commission included wide participation, involving not only an federal min-
istries, but the Bundeslander (the federal provinces) and the independent sectors
(environmental and development NGOs, the Trade Union Federation, the Federal
Chamber of Commerce, the Industrialists Assembly, the Austrian Agriculture Cham-
bers, and the Chamber of Austrian Workers Assembly). This participation was
chosen to extract the distinct contributions of all groups to the National Report. The
deliberations of the National Commission were such that in the end several par-
ticipating groups from the independent sector actually won the right to be repre-
sented in the report with a separate and distinct contribution. The integration of
NGOs into the Commission was a delicate process, involving partners that were
very suspicious ofeach other at the beginning. Differing from the traditional special
interest groups, such as the Trade Union Federation or the Federal Chamber for
Commerce, which are very much integrated into the normal national decision-
making process, the NGOs, both environmental and developmental, were very
suspicious of their involvement at first, and at times felt excluded from the real pro-
cess. It is important to explain this difference clearly in order to understand the
dynamics of the coordination process in Austria. The Austrian concept of Social
Partnership until recently allowed special interest groups to participate in the
elaboration of national positions, but not NGOs in the narrow sense of the word -
that is, grassroot organizations like Greenpeace. These NGOs were confronted for
the first time with the chance to make positive contributions to the elaboration of
national positions and were faced with the same dilemma as others: how to deal with
and process large amounts of information. Their critical appraisal was voiced in the
National Report:
The financing of economic interest groups (social partnership) is particularly safe-
guarded as a special feature ofAustrian society by legal regulations. Although their tasks
have changed greatly since the war, the make up of the social partnership has remained
untouched. Nature conservancy and environmental protection as a counterbalance to
socio -economic interests is not supported even though this is doubtless among the most
important tasks today (p. 1(0).
NGOs felt partly excluded from the UNCED preparation process, but, as with
other participants, they were handicapped by the fact that they did not participate in
the negotiating process throughout the preparatory phase, and therefore did not evalu-
ate the negotiating progress appropriately at times. Contributions by NGOs came
late and were not always well coordinated, although they did from the very begin-
ning receive an the official documentation. There was certainly a lack of clear
understanding from their side concerning the dynamics of the negotiating process.
As was to be seen at the conference itself, the potential contribution of NGOs could
have been greater in particular fields where they possessed special expertise, such as
for example on youth, indigenous people, primary producers, human health, deci-
sion making, or science for sustainable development. Their overall impact on the
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work of the delegation in Rio, however, was positive and valuable, and they con-
tributed very constructively.
Selection of NGOs for participation in the preparatory process was based on their
competence in the field and relevance of action. The three NGO representatives
chosen for the Austrian delegation at Rio represented three distinct aspects of the
NGO spectrum, one coming from an environmental, one from a developmental, and
one from a special interest group (Global 2000, Austrian Information Service for
Development Cooperation, and the Society for Endangered People, respectively). It
was left to the NGO community to decide on the individual representatives; the
national administration accepted the decision of the NGOs. This involvement led to
an important mutual learning process, where the proponents of open diplomacy -
the NGOs - and the more traditional negotiators from the bureaucratic structures
began to learn from each other. Their strengths - public diplomacy on the NGO side
and traditional international bargaining on the government side - were largely
complementary; mutual respect and understanding emerged as the conference
proceeded.
Position Taking
UNCED dealt with issues that transcend narrow definitions of national interest and
that clash with strong tendencies to defend national sovereignty. Issues such as
desertification, forests, and freshwater, for example, cannot be solved without a
view toward mutual cooperation and interdependence. Initially, Austria's prep-
arations and position taking were based on national interests that were closely
defined in terms of Austria's political and economic positions. However, when it
came to some of the key environmental issues that dominated the conference, a vital
Austrian national interest could not be defined; in fact, being a small, landlocked
country made a global interdependent view of issues, such as climate change,
forests, and nuclear waste, most prominent.
The criteria to develop a national position was simple, providing a sharp edge to
cut through the complexity of issues. The question asked was, "Will a certain devel-
opment or decision of the conference have financial or economic repercussions?" If
certain proposals involved financial consequences, different ministries jockeyed for
control of the issue. Typical were differences between the Ministries of Finance,
Technical Cooperation, and Environment about possible financial mechanisms,
where supporters of the Bretton Woods institutions would oppose those favoring a
solution more directly within the UN system. Many issues were brought to the atten-
tion of the coordinating committee by the public at large, NGOs, and public political
debate. One significant example was the debate over tropical rainforests that kept
growing in importance throughout the preparatory phase, and influenced national
positions on the forest issue as well as trade, climate change, and agriculture. Many
diverging forces (NGOs, special interest groups, different ministries) engaged in
heavy political infighting over the issue. Ultimately, a resolution and new legislation
on tropical timber were passed by the Austrian parliament just before UNCED,
prompting an UNCED initiative by the Austrian government: the "Fonds fUr die
Forderung der aufrechterhaltbaren Nutzung des tropischen Regenwaldes" (Tropical
Forest Initiative), which provides 200 million Austrian schillings for projects that
contribute to the sustainable use of tropical forests. This unusual approach to posi-
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tion taking was a direct consequence of strong public interest and political action in
connection with the particular issue of tropical forests.
In the beginning, the conference raised little public interest. The ideas put forward
were initially met with little or no resistance. This changed, however, as the external
political and economic framework altered over the period of the preparatory pro-
cess. Early, the economic situation was widely perceived to be stable and on the
upswing; there was a high propensity for change. By the time concrete action plans
were developed, the economic indicators had turned downward and the readiness for
radical change dwindled among many sectors both in the government and the
private sector.
The Negotiation
Intragovernmental coordination was further complicated by the complex structure
of the proposed conference itself. On the one hand, the high level Earth Summit
called for participation by heads of state and governments. On the other hand, the
ministers of environment were to playa substantial role during the conference. At
the same time, substantial political preparation was to be done by the traditional
apparatus of the foreign ministries. This was a clear recipe for misunderstandings
among ministries, as there is a very practical, and political, difference between
involvement in internal coordination, outward representation, and designated com-
petence. There were several Austrian ministries that chose not to be represented in
the negotiation process, although concerned with some of the sensitive issues. This
led to changing leadership patterns during the negotiation process causing some loss
of clarity over time. The strength of leadership emanating externally from the For-
eign Ministry, and internally from the Ministry of Environment and Federal Chan-
cellory, varied over the course of negotiations, yielding some coordination and
coherence problems in the delegation.
The reasons for and consequences of stronger or weaker involvement by minis-
tries varied from case to case. It usually stemmed from a combination of factors
such as different priorities, availability of qualified personnel to attend the meetings,
tactical considerations, and a perceived lack of importance of the issues on the polit-
ical agenda. Three important ministries were particularly underrepresented, namely
the Ministries for Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Forestry, and Finance (at least
in the initial stages).
The composition of the delegations at the various PrepComs, and finally at the
conference, indicates both the interest and influence on the process of various minis-
tries, as well as changing interest over time (see Table 7.1).
Table 7.1 shows that it was mainly a few ministries that were involved from the
very beginning and that carried the brunt of the actual negotiating work. Their dom-
inating role was further amplified as the preparatory process continued. As the sub-
ject of negotiation became more complex, the issues were not only discussed on the
basis of existing documentation, but with a view to merging the collective institu-
tional memory into a coherent and permanent negotiating team. This proved diffi-
cult, since only one delegate participated in all rounds of negotiation, three
participated from PrepCom I (Nairobi) to UNCED, four from PrepCom II (in
Geneva) to UNCED, seven from PrepCom III (Geneva) to UNCED, and eight from
PrepCom IV to UNCED. The composition of the delegations at the third and fourth
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Table 7.1 The Composition of the Austrian delegation
Organization Meeting (New York)
PrepCom I (Nairobi)
PrepCom II (Geneva)
PrepCom III (Geneva)
PrepCom IV (New York)
UNCED (Rio de Janeiro)
Foreign Affairs
Environment
Foreign Affairs
Environment
Foreign Affairs
Environment
Foreign Affairs
Environment
Federal Chancellory
Finance
Foreign Affairs
Environment
Federal Chancellory
Finance
Economic Affairs
Head of Delegation: Bundeskanzler
(Federal Chancellor) and, in his
absence, the Minister for
Environment, Youth and Family
Foreign Affairs
Environment
Federal Chancellory
Finance
Health and Consumer Protection
NGOs
Federal Provinces
Special Interest Groups
2
I
4
2
5
3
4
4
I
I
4
4
2
I
I
6
4
5
2
I
3
2
6
PrepComs clearly showed that there are limits to a small country coping fully with a
major negotiating process like UNCED. Out of a delegation of 39 at UNCED
(including clerical staff and security), less than half (13) were actual negotiators.
This was not sufficient to cover the work of conferences and meetings that split up
in many simultaneous working groups.
The peculiarities and characteristics of the Austrian preparatory process and its
specific intragovernmental problems and challenges have, of course, to be seen in
the light of it being a smaller industrialized country. Participants in the domestic
coordination and the negotiation proper were largely identical, thereby increasing
coherence on the one side, but also creating a big risk by spreading everything too
thinly; one person dropping out at a particular point would have jeopardized the
whole preparation. This was simply because of a lack of people available within the
public service capable of actively participating in such a multilateral negotiating
exercise. The language problem was only one stumbling block. The Austrian delega-
tion had to rely on the people available to cover those negotiating groups that where
considered to be of special importance. Unlike some other countries, Austria could
not fall back for support on any regional or political group - like, for instance, the
EC and Nordic group could. It could not rely on an automatic flow of information,
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institutional support, or even representation in negotiating groups that come with
membership in a group. Substitutes like the "Central European Initiative" did not
offer a workable alternative. Its membership (Austria, Hungary, Italy, Poland, and
Yugoslavia) at the time was only loosely cooperative, and because of the rapidly
emerging conflict in Yugoslavia, it could not generate a coherent approach.
The development of the Austrian negotiating position on several issues that were
high on its agenda emerged along different lines. These processes of position devel-
opment and coalition formation demonstrate the various ways in which agencies and
ministries became involved in the larger negotiation process.
International Legal Instruments
Austria traditionally has had a strong commitment to the legalization of inter-
national relations. At UNCED, the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs launched
the idea of developing enhanced mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of
environmental disputes. In the preparatory phase of the conference, Austria worked
through the Central European Initiative to introduce specific text on dispute resolu-
tion into Agenda 21 as well as the Rio Declaration. This was undertaken and nego-
tiated primarily by delegates representing the Office of the Legal Counsel of the
Foreign Affairs ministry. However, as indicated above, the Central European Ini-
tiative did not prove to be a practical instrument for joint efforts. In general, the
former socialist countries did not have very experienced negotiators on their delega-
tions and they each were pursuing other goals and priorities independently. Italy, for
its part, was often hindered in working congruently with the other partners in the
Initiative because of its strong participation in EC position taking.
The environmental dispute resolution text ran into some opposition from develop-
ing countries and was regarded suspiciously by some industrialized nations as well.
At several points in the preparatory process, it appeared as if the initiative was in
danger of being rejected entirely. It required a considerable amount of negotiating
skill and effort on the part of the Austrian delegation to finally get the support of
most OECD countries for a compromise version that preserved the essential ideas.
The negotiators were able to forge an alliance that allowed them to overcome the
initial resistance and have the compromise text included in both Agenda 21 and the
Rio Declaration.
Protection of the Atmosphere
The Austrian positions at UNCED on atmospheric issues were strongly influenced
by the simultaneous negotiations to develop a framework convention on climate
change. Austria played a very active but controversial role on these issues; the envir-
onmental ministry took the lead in defining the national position. Austria was among
the countries that maintained a rather radical approach to targets and timetables for
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and a change in the patterns of energy
consumption and production. These were among the most controversial details
debated and negotiated at Rio. Austria remained rather isolated in its position, even
among the OECD countries that favored more moderate approaches or, like the
United States, were completely opposed to any strict control measures. Given this
situation, Austrian delegates could only influence the outcome by intensive lobbying
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and participation in the drafting of specific points. The fact that many details of
concern to Austria can be found in the final text of the Agenda 21 chapter on the pro-
tection of the atmosphere is due in large part to the hard work of these negotiators.
Forests
Austria has one of the largest forest covers in Europe, combined with a high degree
of dependence on forests for economic and ecological benefits. The forestry issue
was doubly of interest because of its linkage to the climate change issue. At an early
stage, there were attempts to define a clear and broadly based national position
involving several ministries, notably the ministries of environment, and agriculture
and forestry. The OECD countries were less divided on the forestry issue than on
many other issues, which contributed to Austria's constructive role in helping to
build a coalition that included such countries as Germany, France, Finland, Canada,
and the United States. As part of the mainstream, Austria was able to include several
points that it found of major importance into the final text of the Forest Declaration.
It is interesting to note how Austrian positions on these issues were pursued
through different negotiation means and different negotiation roles. In the first case,
Austria pursued its own initiative and tried to involve other countries. In the second
case, Austria's position led to its isolation. In the third case, it played along with the
mainstream. In all cases, the way negotiations were conducted, positions defined,
and alliances developed, were strongly influenced by the fact that Austria was not a
member of some natural and standing coalition. Instead, Austria was forced to
search for and persuade possible allies to take common cause with it on an issue-by-
issue basis.
COMPARISON WITH OTHER OECD COUNTRIES
How generalizable are these experiences of the Austrian preparatory process to
other industrialized countries? There are likely to be many similarities, but some
important differences too. The structure of most delegations of industrialized coun-
tries, as well as the structure of their national reports, suggest that their national
preparations and intragovernmental coordination followed a logistical pattern simi-
lar to the Austrian example. Environment ministries dominated the process in the
beginning, but at the end, political forces and foreign offices tended to gain more
control over the process. The most important difference is likely to be in the scale of
involvement, rather than in its content. Obviously, there are differences in national
approach given different traditions and governmental structures. The level of par-
ticipation at the Rio Conference itself (at head of state level or lower) and national
priorities (strong involvement in development aid or environmental concern) tends
to shape the response. The manpower capacities of national administrations also
play an obvious major role. Another major influence on the level of national prep-
aration is the language factor. Those countries who use one of the UN languages as
their mother tongue or working language have a much easier time in analyzing and
formulating responses to texts.
One of the most important differences, however, is the fact that most industrialized
countries are already integrated into the framework of a supranational coordination
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process, an important step in managing the complexity of both many parties and many
issues. The obvious example is the EC countries, but also the "CANZ group" (Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand), and the Nordic Group (Iceland, Finland, Norway,
Sweden, and, to some extent, Denmark), which coordinated their positions substan-
tially. Such integration allows smaller countries to make their views and positions
known and to have greater influence on certain issues. Existing resources could there-
fore be allocated more efficiently. Supranational coordination influences greatly the
structure of intragovernmental negotiations, because it adds another layer of decision
making to be integrated. Coordination among the countries that are members of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) did not really take
place in the UNCED process, although it was active. However, even there, coordina-
tion concerned only very specific issues, particularly those on which there were strong
differences of opinions among the industrialized countries. For most countries, the
involvement in such a supranational coordinating structure offers a decisive dif-
ference, enhancing their political weight. For Austria, not belonging to any regional
grouping was a real disadvantage as there was no automatic forum for her initiatives.
CONCLUSIONS
The negotiating process stretched the manpower, even of larger nations, to its limits,
as the necessity for coordination and integration of responses grew. Future issues
dealing with the implementation of Agenda 21 and other results of the Rio Confer-
ence will necessitate further intragovernmental coordination, as the process of
regime-building continues. The coordinating structures that were created by
UNCED should be used for the preparation of that work also, but they need to be
enhanced.
Governmental structures were ill equipped to cope with the increased interest of
the public, the fragmented negotiation process, the need to coordinate across minis-
tries and agencies dealing in different disciplines, and the dichotomy between pro-
claimed open "parliamentary" diplomacy and negotiations conducted behind closed
doors. Throughout the preparatory process, the odds were heavily in favor of total
failure as the talks nearly collapsed several times. Considering the complexity of the
negotiation issues, special interest groups and NGOs can play important roles in
helping governments coordinate their positions. The impact of NGOs on the style
and structure of the talks, not directly on the negotiating results, was considerable.
They shaped the responses of the different layers of government involved, as public
reaction was intense and had to be taken into account.
In the light of public pressure and increased public interest, the negotiation pro-
cess that began at UNCED appears to be generating a certain realignment in the def-
inition of "national interest," from self-interest and sovereignty to cooperative
interdependence among nations. The big challenge will be how to bridge the divide
between the concepts of national resources and global heritage. At UNCED, the tra-
ditional nationalist concept largely prevailed in the end despite the more global
approach taken by some negotiators. However, the seeds for change have been
sown; and the mechanisms for intragovernmental coordination required to produce
the change in future negotiations have been given a trial run.
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8The Decision-making Process from a Developing
Country Perspective!
Oscar A. Avalle
The UNCED negotiation process posed major political challenges to Argentine
policy makers. In its substantive aspects, what was at stake was the inclusion of
environmental concerns as an independent variable in the design of public policies
in Argentina. The inclusion of environmental concerns would allow for a more
effective formulation and implementation of the concept of "sustainable develop-
ment" in the country's growth process. In its formal aspects, UNCED confronted
Argentine policy makers with a very complex process of regime-building
negotiations to define Agenda 21 and other UNCED-related instruments.
This chapter identifies the key domestic actors in charge of the design and imple-
mentation of environmental policies in Argentina, describes the country's policy goals
during the UNCED multilateral negotiation process, and analyzes the positions adopted
by the Argentine delegation during the negotiations, and the extent to which the coun-
try's policy goals made their way into UNCED resolutions. Special attention will be
devoted to the major role played by key intergovernmental actors in the articulation of
Argentina's position at the negotiation table. The objective is to understand the influence
of intragovernmental coordination, as well as supranational coordination within the
0-77, on Argentina's capacity to perform effectively in the negotiations.
KEY DOMESTIC ACTORS
UN Resolution 44/228 called for the convening of UNCED to discuss the inclusion
of environmental criteria in the design and implementation of economic develop-
ment policies. For the Argentine government, the process thus initiated entailed the
need to define the country's policy goals in terms of the concept of "sustainable
development" as well as to identify the relevant domestic actors who would be
charged with negotiating Argentina's position at the negotiation table.
1Although the author is an official of the Argentine government, the opinions expressed in this chapter
are strictly personal. and should not be taken as a reflection of the official Argentine opinion or position in
this matter.
Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons Learned from the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (G. Sjostedt, et al., eds.; 1-85966-077-0; © llASA; pub. Graham & Trotman, 1994;
printed in Great Britain), pp. 135-147.
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Over the years prior to UNCED, the activities of a complex network of national
and international NGOs and the impact of environmental problems on the day-to-
day life of Argentine society had fueled rising concern over environmental priorities
within the definition of growth policies in Argentina. As a result, it was expected
that the country's official position at the UNCED meeting should reflect the diver-
sity and aspirations of a pluralist democratic society. Thus, the need arose to define
and implement the appropriate ways to identify and represent those domestic
conditions as faithfully as possible.
Both the selection of the official representatives to the conference and the nego-
tiation process were a reflection of the country's political and institutional arrange-
ment, especially the level of development of its legal and institutional structure.2
In accordance with Argentina's federal constitution, the central government shares a
host of responsibilities with the provincial authorities. Since environmental issues
were not of primary importance at the time the constitution was enacted, they were
not treated with either the comprehensiveness or the inter-sectorial approach that
they are dealt with at present. Only a few environmental questions were specifically
reserved for the central government under the power-sharing arrangement estab-
lished by the constitution.3 However, the latter also vested the central government
with broad scope to provide for the country's general welfare. As a result of this
vaguely defined authority, the central government became entitled, in principle, to
address and regulate environmental issues as it deemed necessary.4
Although a vast body of legislation has followed since, especially in relation to
the usage and exploitation of the country's natural resources, the regulatory frame-
work governing environmental questions in Argentina has suffered, and still suffers,
from several shortcomings. Typical of these shortcomings are the existence of
numerous regulatory loopholes, overlapping functions at the national and provincial
level, and little overall policy coherence. This has resulted in frequent jurisdictional
conflicts, weak enforcement, and a generalized lack of efficacy. At least until the
1970s, Argentina lacked a systematic environmental policy. At the institutional
level, there was no agency charged with the responsibility of formulating a
comprehensive environmental policy at the national, provincial, or municipal levels.
Faced with the need to set u an administrative structure and a cadre of experts for
the formulation of environmental policy, the Undersecretary of the Environment
was created in 1985. The new agency was given an advisory role in the design of
policies relating to environmental conservation. It would report directly to the exec-
utive branch, under whose competence the Undersecretary was established. Intense
bureaucratic struggles followed the creation of the Undersecretary position, motiv-
ated by a poor definition of its areas of competence and extensive functional overla
with the Ministry of Economy. As an intrabureaucratic compromise, a new National
Commission on Environmental Policy (CONAPA), established in 1988, was given
not only an advisory role in policy design (as the former Undersecretary had
enjoyed), but also a more comprehensive authority to coordinate the implementation
of policies by different agencies within the central bureaucracy.
2See the Informe Nacional sobre Problemas Ambientales, Republica Argentina. 1992. for more
details.
3See Constitucion de la Nacion Argentina, Articulo 26 and Articulo 67 inc. II and 16, Buenos Aires,
Victor Zavalia.
4See Pedro Frias. Derecho Publico Provincial, Depalma, Buenos Aires.
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Seeking to fill the legal loopholes and solve intrabureaucratic conflicts, the gov-
ernment created a secretariat of Natural Resources and Human Environment within
the competence of the Executive Branch by decree in March 1992. For the first time,
a government agency in charge of environmental policies was vested with cabinet-
level status as a way to enhance its leverage within the central bureaucracy.
The main role assigned to the new agency involved the provision of all necessary
technical assistance to the Executive Branch in the pursuit ofactivities geared toward the
promotion, protection, recovery, and control of the environment and the preservation of
renewable natural resources within the Argentine territory. To undertake these activities,
the secretariat was entitled to consult other provincial and municipal authorities, national
and foreign government agencies, and NGOs in order to promote an optimal interaction
and balance of man with the physical and biological milieu.5
The granting of so broad a mandate for the new environmental agency was bound
to give rise to new jurisdictional conflicts within the central bureaucracy. This time
the secretariat's authority was resisted, on the one hand, by a host of agencies within
the Ministry of Economy (i.e., the Secretaries of Energy, Mining, and Agriculture,
Livestock and Fisheries) and, on the other, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which
is solely responsible for conducting, on behalf of the national government, all
negotiations taking place in multilateral fora.
Therefore, the authority given to the secretariat of Natural Resources and
Human Environment to negotiate on behalf of the national government in multi-
lateral economic fora opened a potential source of jurisdictional conflict with the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This friction was enhanced by the fact that the
officers of the secretariat had never headed an Argentine delegation, nor had the
secretariat fully participated in the preliminary stages leading up to UNCED.
Lacking sufficient experience and negotiation skills at the outset of the multi-
lateral negotiations, the secretariat was forced to rely on the greater expertise of
the diplomatic corps.
THE PROCESS OF DETERMINING ARGENTINA'S POSITION
Experience shows that, in cases where more than one agency has jurisdiction over a
certain policy issue, the responsibilities of each participating agency must be clearly
defined by the political authority in advance for policy coordination to be effective.
Such functional division of labor must be made explicit and translated into a formal
power structure, so as to allow each agency to be aware of its respective jurisdiction
and role during the subsequent process of negotiation with other parties. This fa-
cilitates the coordination of the technical and political staff of the participating
agencies to achieve a single policy stance at the negotiation table.
In the case of the UNCED process, early informal meetings were held
between the technical staff in charge of environmental policy (i.e., the CONAPA
initially, and the secretariat of Natural Resources and Human Environment
thereafter), and officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which would be
involved in negotiating the country's position in international fora. Yet, such
5Decree No. 534/92,27 March 1992.
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meetings failed to yield a clear definition of functional responsibilities between
the agencies involved. Instead, such definition would emerge ad hoc on the basis
of the participating agencies' areas of expertise: the secretariat of Natural
Resources would provide substantive inputs concerning the technical aspects of
the issues under discussion, while Foreign Affairs would be in charge of the
political negotiation at the diplomatic level. It was further expected that, in
response to changing circumstances, policy coordination through tactical read-
justments of the country's position would be facilitated by daily meetings
between the upper echelon of Foreign Affairs and of the secretariat, both of
whom would be present during the Rio Summit.
In practice, the lack of definition of a formal hierarchical structure, as well as the
political responsibilities of the Argentine delegates to the Summit, resulted in a
puzzling situation: the ranking of Argentina's senior diplomat in the conference was
substantially lower than that of the chief of the technical mission. As will be dis-
cussed below, this situation led to frequent misunderstandings, ineffective
coordination, and leadership problems within the delegation. In an effort to over-
come these deficiencies, the highest-ranking Argentine officials strove to maintain
the stability of the country's position throughout the negotiations opted for the con-
tinuity of the negotiating team during the whole negotiation process, in spite of the
hierarchical problems6 in order.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs played a central role in the process of negotiation
of Argentina's position during the PrepComs, in which the bulk of the substantive
discussions was carried out.7 The Ministry'S influence, which was largely reflected
in the composition of the various delegations to the PrepComs, was partly the result
of the fact that, unlike other public-sector agencies, the diplomatic corps in most
6La Nadon, 4 June 1992, Buenos Aires, p. 2.
7The Argentine delegation to the PrepComs and UNCED was composed as follows:
PREPCOM I (New York)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 4
PREPCOM JJ (Nairobi)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 4
PREPCOM JJ (Geneva)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 6
PREPCOM III (Geneva)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 6
PREPCOM IV (New York)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 7
CONAPA 3
UNCED (Rio de Janeiro)
Technical Mission:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs )2
secretariat of Natural Resources
and Human Environment 12
Advisers:
Legislative branch (federal and provincial),
provincial and municipal authorities and NGOs 60
Executive branch:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 9
Secretariat of Natural Resources
and Human Environment 4
Ministry of Economy: I
Other executive agencies: 4
Legislative branch: 2
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developing countries is composed of a professional core of career personnel,8 with
extensive expertise gained through successive rounds of international negotiations.
As a result of this cumulative pool of knowledge, the diplomatic corps usually
enjoys a significant comparative advantage vis-a-vis other public agencies with for-
mal responsibility over a policy issue. This fact proved to be of particular relevance
at the very outset of the negotiation process. Moreover, the presence of diplomatic
personnel from the Permanent Missions of Argentina in Geneva and New York
made it easier to coordinate a common position with other delegations, both at the
bilateral level and within the Group of 77,9 during the PrepComs as well as in the
negotiations.
Foreign Affairs was heavily represented throughout UNCED. An Environment
Unit, headed by a senior officer, was set up within the Bureau. It played a
coordinating role in the determination of Argentina's negotiation stance, and would
become the main spokesman of the Argentine government during the UNCED pro-
cess. It was specifically in charge of the negotiations involving the Rio Declaration,
the financial arrangements of Agenda 21 and the Protection of the Atmosphere,
especially the protection of the ozone layer, where the Argentine delegate held the
post of vice-president of the International Negotiation Committee on Climatic
Change. At the same time, this office within the secretariat of Environment was in
charge of contact and communication with the NGOs. The Legal Department of the
Foreign Ministry dealt primarily with legal issues, especially those related to
fisheries and the oceans, as well as the Rio Declaration.
The Permanent Mission ofArgentina to the International Organizations in Geneva
participated through a middle-level diplomat, who was mostly involved in the nego-
tiations on waste disposal, but also served as a liaison person within the Argentine
delegation. Three officials from the Permanent Mission of Argentina to the United
Nations were involved, and two from the economic section (a senior and a junior)
and one from the legal section (a senior). They were in charge of the negotiations
with the G-77, on economic and trade aspects of Agenda 21 and on the terms of
reference for the Commission on Sustainable Development.
IDENTIFICATION OF THE RELEVANT ISSUES10
The paucity of human and financial resources made it difficult for the Argentine del-
egation to follow through on all the relevant issues under discussion in Agenda 21.
To overcome this constraint, which affected most developing countries alike, the
Argentine delegation opted for a selective approach. Thus, only those policy issues
of central concern to the country's interests would be the object of ongoing monitor-
ing and direct participation in the negotiation by one or more Argentine delegates or
through other negotiation groups, like the G-77.
8See the relevant work on administrative practices in developing countries by Waldino Suarez, Some
Notes on Governmental Rearrangements in Argentina since 1930, ECR Paper, Freiburg, Germany, 1982.
9The G-77 constitutes by far the largest functional negotiation bloc within the UN system. From its
inception during the 1964 UNCTAD, the G-77 has served as the main vehicle for the demands of the
developing world. It currently represents some 130 developing countries, including Argentina.
[<>Por a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Estrada Oyuela, RaUl. Conjerencia de las Naciones
Unidas sobre Medio Ambience y Desarrollo: Apuntes para su evaluaciiin, in Revista del Ministerio de
Relaciones Exteriores y Culto. ISEN, MREC. Ano 1no. 2. 1992.
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The participation in questions deemed of secondary importance was marginal.
Negotiation of such questions was left to either the G-77 representative or, where
there was no established G-77 position, by another delegation sharing Argentina's
policy stance on the issue. This approach prevented the delegation from using up its
scarce human resources on questions of marginal importance maximized available
manpower.
Most of the developed countries, in particular the United States, Japan, and the
European countries, which were represented through the UK as the chairman of the
EC, were very well endowed in human and material resources. The huge disparity in
resources between developed and developing countries' delegations weakened the
latter's negotiation power as a bloc considerably, since the complex technical issues
dealt with required that at least one delegate had to be fully dedicated to follow-up
and negotiating. This was beyond the means of many delegations from developing
countries. II
To overcome these constraints and arrive at agreements required the conclusion
of alliances among like-minded countries, coalitions, and negotiation groups (like
the G-77). Examples of such negotiating blocs are presented below. Several strate-
gic alliances were also formed between developing and developed countries on spe-
cific policy issues - for example, on the effects of ozone depletion on agricultural
production.
The absence of a clear functional division of roles within the Argentine nego-
tiating team, coupled with the lack of expertise of some delegates in complex multi-
lateral negotiation processes, contributed to the emergence of disparate opinions
within the Argentine delegation on certain key issues. Some of these disagreements
found their way into the press, as was the case with a request, expressed in a Latin
American and Caribbean Group of States (GRULAC) meeting, to mobilize regional
support to introduce some changes in the wording of the Rio Declaration. The
changes should not have come as a surprise, however, since they had already been
announced during the final session of PrepCom IV, as well as at a G-77 meeting in
New York in March and April 1992 respectively. 12 At both occasions, Argentina had
expressed its disagreement with the final draft of the Rio Declaration, especially its
explicit reference to the concept of "equity" contained in Principle 3. This ran
counter to a position dear to Argentina, which has traditionally considered that
"equality" rather than "equity" should be the main principle governing a country's
right to economic development.
Furthermore, the Argentine delegation also resisted, from a philosophic position,
the inclusion of a reference to reduce, and ultimately eliminate, unsustainable pat-
terns of consumption linked to the promotion of appropriate demographic policies,
contained in Principle 8 of the draft. Such reference would have established a causal
link between economic growth and a country's demographic policies, with the risk
II Another important weakness common to most developing countries was the lack of logistic support
during the Conference itself. For example, while every delegation of developed countries could count on
adequate communication and secretariat support, the Argentine delegation, for instance, had at its
disposal only a personallapto computer and two cellular phones at the Rio Center. This lack of means
created additional coordination difficulties for the delegation, as well as problems in maintaining a
continuous flow of information with the decision makers in Buenos Aires.
12See Ambito Financiero, 4 June 1992, Buenos Aires, p. 22. Also, Pagina /2,4 June 1992, Buenos
Aires, p. 4, and Cronista Comercial, 4 June 1992, Buenos Aires, p. 16.
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of rendering economic assistance to developing countries contingent upon extra-
economic criteria.
Argentina's breaking role toward the wording of Principles 3 and 8 of the Rio
Declaration was amplified by the press, which portrayed the country's objections
not as an observation to a document under negotiation, but rather as a deliberate
attempt to blackmail the whole negotiation process. If successful, Argentina's posi-
tion would have contributed to improving the substance of the document. At no time
was it Argentina's intention to blackmail or break the consensus over the Rio
Declaration. 13
A further element, which was largely neglected at the time, involved the possibil-
ity of using Argentina's opposition to the wording of the draft as a bargaining chi to
increase the country's leverage on other issues. By threatening to brake the con-
sensus, issue-linkage seemed an appropriate tactical move to enable the delegation
to bring more pressure to bear on other points in Agenda 21 (for example, on
agriculture).
Nevertheless, this situation forced the secretariat of Natural Resources and the
Minister of Foreign Affairs to issue new instructions to the delegates. 14 The strong
reaction to the country's position also led to a direct intervention by Maurice Strong,
the UNCED Secretary General, and the withdrawal of the objections by the highest-
ranking Argentine delegate, under direct instructions of both the secretariat of
Natural Resources and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Trade and Agricultural Protectionism
Through the G-77, Argentina participated in the negotiations and drafting of the Rio
Declaration during PrepCom IV, where it shared the consensus prevailing in the
G-77 in all but a few items. Along with other Latin American countries, Argentina
pushed for the inclusion in the draft of a strong condemnation of agricultural sub-
sidies and protectionist policies as detrimental to the environment. Another central
tenet of the Argentine position was inclusion of a clause foreclosing the imposition
of trade restrictions on the basis of environmental arguments.
Both positions were included in the first G-77 draft, despite strong opposition
both within and outside the G-77. In the subsequent negotiation process, however,
strong resistance from net food-importing countries combined with EC pressure was
able to dilute any explicit reference to the unsuitability of agricultural subsidies. As
a result, a compromise solution was achieved. It became embodied in Principle 12
of the Rio Declaration, which was intended to cover some of the concerns expressed
by Argentina and other exporters of foodstuffs. 15
As a net exporter of foodstuffs, Argentina is seriously harmed by the agricultural
subsidies and protective tariffs imposed by a number of developed countries to shel-
ter inefficient domestic producers. It is widely acknowledged that, from a strictly
economic point of view, the preservation of such activities by artificial means is
irrational. Argentina has consistently condemned these practices in every inter-
national meeting in which the subject has come to the fore. Its goal has been to
13Buenos Aires Herald, 4 June 1992, Buenos Aires, p. 3, and Cronista Comercial. 4 June 1992,
Buenos Aires, p. 16.
14Ambito Financiero, 4 June 1992, Buenos Aires, p.22; Pagina 12, 4 June 1992, Buenos Aires, p. 4.
15 Ing. Maria Julia Alsogaray. in her press comments to La Nacion, 9 June 1992, Buenos Aires, p. 3.
142 NEGOTIATING INTERNATIONAL REGIMES
mobilize international support to force protectionist countries into adopting more
flexible policies.
The adoption of the principle of "sustainable development" afforded Argentina
the opportunity to broaden the scope of its opposition to agricultural protectionism,
since the artificial protection of agriculture through subsidization threatens to have a
deleterious impact on the environment. On the basis of this premise, as reflected in
the UN draft resolution NC.2/46fL.74 on "Protectionism and Sustainable Agri-
cultural Policies," a heated debate took place during the 46th General Assembly. The
debate was centered upon the inclusion in the UNCED agenda of the principle of the
economic and environmental irrationality of agricultural subsidies, as well as the
need to foster an open, predictable, fair, and non-discriminatory multilateral trade
system. The main purpose of the Argentine effort was to resist the attempts of some
developed countries to manipulate Agenda 21 to allow for the imposition of addi-
tional trade restrictions on the basis of environmental criteria. To further its position,
the Argentine delegation sought to mobilize the support of other members of the
Cairns Group,I6 countries, both developing and developed, that are efficient pro-
duers and net exporters of foodstuff.
Two separate blocs, each with clearly defined interests, emerged early in what
was to become a lengthy and complicated negotiation process: the EC and the
Cairns Group. The EC delegates were strongly committed to delinking environmen-
tal and economic questions as two separate sets of issues. Therefore, they adamantly
opposed the Cairns Group's proposal to deal with them together, which might open
up the possibility of establishing a direct link between protectionism and subsidies
on the one hand and environmental damage on the other.
Despite wide differences, the negotiating parties managed to achieve a sub-
stantive agreement, during PrepCom IV, not to impose trade restrictions on the basis
of environmental considerations. 17 The attempt of EC members to leave economic
and trade issues out of Agenda 21, which they wanted to redefine as merely an
instrument of environmental policy, was partially neutralized through the ample use
of cross-references, particularly in chapters 2 ("International Cooperation to
Accelerate Sustainable Development in Developing Countries and Related Domes-
tic Policies"); 14 ("Promoting Sustainable Agricultural and Rural Development");
and 32 ("Strengthening the Role of Farmers").
Protection of the Atmosphere
The progressive depletion of the ozone layer over Antarctica and Argentina's main-
land gave Argentine authorities a strong incentive to adopt a defensive role in the
agreements leading to the Montreal Protocol and the negotiations of the Convention
on Climatic Change. This involvement was mostly carried out by the official in
charge of the environmental section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was
appointed vice chairman of the Intergovernmental Negotiation Committee on
Climatic Change.
16Por a more detailed analysis of the Argentine position in the Cairns Group, see Tussie. Diana y
Simone,Cristina; El Grupo Cairns: Un nuevo tipo de concertaci6n; en America LatinalInternacional,
FLACSO, Buenos Aires, vol. 9, no. 33, July-September 1992.
17A/CONF.l51126, Vol. I, especially ch. 2, para. 2.22.
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Argentina's concern with this subject was conspicuous in the process of negotiat-
ing Agenda 21. The depletion of the ozone layer has a strong negative impact on a
food-producing country like Argentina. Besides obvious risks to human health, the
core economic activities in the country are harmed as well. 18 Along with other
affected countries such as Chile and Uruguay, Argentina introduced a particular pro-
gram area into this document on preventing stratospheric ozone depletion. The
Argentine delegation advocated the introduction of mechanisms aimed at com-
pensating those countries directly affected by ozone depletion. The motion was
defeated largely because of the concerted opposition of developed countries and the
paucity of hard data on the extent of the damage resulting from ozone depletion.
Despite this setback, governments were urged to consider taking appropriate reme-
dial measures in the fields of human health, agriculture, and marine environment,
based on the results of research on the effects of additional ultraviolet radiation
reaching the Earth's surface. This motion passed with the support of the UN, the
NGOs, and the private sector. Along with other delegations, Argentina also took the
lead in introducing an explicit reference in Agenda 21 on the need for research
to assess the impact of ozone depletion on both the environment and the econ-
omic activities of affected countries. 19
It was further agreed that a concerted effort should be made to monitor the evolu-
tion of the ozone layer in the Southern Cone on a permanent basis, to supplement a
monitoring program which, with UN Development Program (UNDP) support, is
currently being conducted by the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay
and Uruguay.
The introduction of these elements required the negotiating parties to overcome
dissensus in the G-n, stemming from opposition from the Organization of Oil
Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC) to any development policy aimed at
limiting hydrocarbon exploitation or otherwise fostering the use of alternative
sources of energy.
Oceans, Fisheries and Rivers
Because its extensive coastline, Argentina played a key role in the negotiations
on the Law of the Sea. During the UNCED process, the Argentine delegates
were also actively involved in discussions centered on chapter 17 of Agenda 21,
on the "Protection of the Oceans, All Kinds of Seas, Including Enclosed and
Semi-Enclosed Seas, and Coastal Areas, and the Protection, Rational Use and
Development of their Living Resources." Argentina's main goal involved the
preservation of the country's sovereign rights over a 2oo-mile exclusive econ-
omic zone EEZ from outside interference, especially regarding fishing. In addi-
tion, the Argentine delegation played a salient role in the negotiations leading to
the decision, announced during the 47th UN General Assembly, to hold an
International Conference on Fisheries in 1993.
I 8NCONF.l 5 1126. Vol. n. ch. 9: Protection of Atmosphere. para. 9.5.
19NCONF.15 1126, Vol. II. ch. 14: Program Area (I). and ch. 17: Program Area (e).
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Financial Arrangements and Transfer of Technology
The Argentine delegates participated actively in the discussions on financial
arrangements and transfer of technology within the G-77. Once a common nego-
tiation position had been determined, Argentina left the substantive negotiations that
were carried out by the G-77 itself, then presided over by the Pakistani delegate.
Argentina opted for a moderate and realistic approach throughout the negotiations.
Although it recognized the disparate responsibility of developing and developed
countries in the areas of technology transfer and international finance within the
framework of a "new partnershi for development," Argentina sought to avoid the
radicalization of demands and the adoption of a confrontational stance by the G-77,
which might have endangered the conclusion of a substantive agreement in these
two crucial issues.20 Argentina and Brazil put forth a set of proposals at PrepCom
m. This document contained a number of alternative funding proposals to finance
Agenda 21.
In the area of technology transfer, Argentina strongly advocated the adoption of
new mechanisms of association whereby host countries would benefit from the
transfer of environmentally sound technologies while preserving the property rights
of patent holders. This position stemmed from an increasing awareness that the bulk
of technology transfer in the future is likely to take place through private channels.
This requires a basic regulatory framework aimed at safeguarding the intellectual
property rights of technology suppliers.
Institutional Arrangements
Through the G-77, Argentina actively participated in the ongoing discussions on the
restructuring of the UN's social and economic system.21 From the outset, Argentine
delegates were opposed to the creation of new agencies wherever possible, and the
duplication of activities among UN agencies and programs in an effort to enhance
overall effectiveness. This position was maintained in the discussions on institu-
tional arrangements in the UNCED process.
A working proposal was initially discussed before PrepCom IV, in a number of
meetings between the permanent missions of G-77 countries in New York. The aim
of these meetings was to build a consensus on a single negotiating position within
the G-77. They resulted in a preliminary agreement to let the ECOSOC coordinate
the activities during UNCED, while reserving the substantive negotiation for the
General Assembly. If adopted, this arrangement would have made it unnecessary to
create a new agency to handle the discussions on behalf of the G-77.
Yet this preliminary agreement forged through lengthy negotiations between the
Permanent Missions to the UN was later changed by several G-77 members, follow-
ing the arrival of new delegations to PrepCom IV. A number of delegations that had
previously subscribed to the original G-77 proposal changed their position dramatic-
ally, and began to urge the creation of an autonomous organization to follow up the
UNCED process. Had this proposal been approved, the mandates of the ECOSOC
and the General Assembly would have been subsumed under the terms of reference
2Opor an in-depth analysis of this question, see Carlos, Escude, Realismo Periferica, Planeta PoHtica y
Sociedad, Buenos Aires, 1992.
21UN General Assembly Resolutions 45/264 and 46/235.
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of this new organization. During PrepCom IV, moreover, the intense lobbying
efforts of NGOs based in developed countries succeeded in persuading a number of
developed countries of the need to set up a new organization vested with a specific
mandate to follow up the implementation of Agenda 21.
As a result, the previous consensus broke down, stripping the G-77 of a common
negotiation stance at both PrepCom IV and the Rio Summit. Faced with this situ-
ation, Argentina and other countries tried to mobilize support behind an alternative
proposal to place the question of "sustainable development" under the responsibility
of a Third Seasonal Committee of the ECOSOC. After lengthy negotiations, it was
finally decided that the follow-up of the Rio Conference would be entrusted to an
ECOSOC functional committee, called the Commission on Sustainable Develop-
ment.22 This arrangement, which retained the ECOSOC's paramount role in dealing
with economic issues, blocked the efforts of developed countries to have the econ-
omic growth and development agenda subsumed under the environmental agenda
within the UN system. The specification of the terms of reference of the Com-
mission on Sustainable Development was left to be determined at the 47th UN
General Assembly.
NEGOTIATION BLOCS
In the joint decision-making processes of international negotiation, countries nor-
mally seek to enter into tactical alliances to enhance their negotiation power so as to
further their own agenda. With the exception of Japan, the United States23 and the
Eastern European nations,24 the bulk of countries at UNCED expected to increase
their leverage at the negotiation table by parking in broad negotiation blocs, rather
than articulating their positions independently, Argentina's main negotiation blocs in
the UNCED process were the G-77 and smaller regional groups.
The Group of 77 is one of the main negotiation blocs operating within the UN
system. A typical feature of the G-77 decision-making process is that every policy
issue brought to the Group is decided by consensus after long and cumbersome
negotiations among its members. Only those issues on which a substantive agree-
ment is achieved are then expressed formally as the position of the G-77 as a whole.
This mechanism, known as the "rule of consensus," is conducive to moderate
demands, since the most extreme positions usually lose their edge during the
consensus-building process prior to actual negotiations.
However, decision making by consensus represents both a strength and a major
weakness of the G-77, since the opposition of a single member suffices to bring the
whole decision-making process into disarray and prevents the adoption of a com-
mon position in multilateral negotiations. Bereft of consensus, the G-77 abstains
from articulating an official position. In such cases, member countries normally
22A/CONF.lSII26, Vol. III, ch. 38.
23Although both the United States and Japan belong to the OECD and other intergovernmental
organizations, the latter did not function as a single bargaining bloc within the UN system.
24So far, the Eastern European countries have not established any mechanism, whether regional or
functional, to articulate their position in international fora. Being "economies in transition," they are
faced with a stark dilemma: they are neither "developing" economies, nor do their structural problems
allow them to be considered as "developed" countries.
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search for alternative alliances to articulate and support their position at the negotia-
tion table.
These constraints notwithstanding, the G-77 played a crucial role during the Rio
negotiations. In the first place, the chairman of the G-77 coordinated the positions of
key actors during the internal decision-making process prior to the Rio Summit and
provided leadership to build a consensus around a common negotiation position.
Pakistan's capable leadership during PrepCom IV and UNCED enabled the G-77 to
playa central role in key negotiations, such as those involving technology transfer
and financial issues.
Secondly, the existence of widespread consensus allowed the G-77 to adopt a
common position in most issues under consideration. As a result, the G-77 could
mitigate the dearth of human and material resources in numerous developing coun-
try delegations. A G-77 member could informally tum over its representation to the
Pakistani delegate or a designated spokesman to negotiate on its behalf, whenever
there was consensus on an issue or when a direct presence in the negotiations was
out of reach. This simple mechanism contributed to a heightened presence of the
developing world in the definition of the substance of Agenda 21.
On the other hand, the lack of consensus in the G-77 on a few key issues forced
the Argentine delegates to search for alternative channels to articulate the country's
position at the negotiation table. Other interest blocs, such as the Cairns Group,
offered Argentina a more effective conduit to press for concrete demands in the
multilateral negotiations on trade and rural subsidies than was the case with either
the G-77 or through direct negotiations.
The GRULAC, the Rio Group,25 and MERCOSUR26 were Argentina's three
main reference groups at the regional level. Each of them was instrumental at vari-
ous stages of the negotiations, as the Argentine delegates sought their active support
to articulate their position more forcefully, whether within the G-77 or in direct
negotiations with developed countries. However, time and resource constraints mili-
tated against a strong presence of these groups at the final and decisive stages of the
Rio Conference, depriving them of the chance to playa more effective role on
behalf of the Latin American countries.
THE ROLE OF NGOS
From the outset of the UNCED process, the Argentine government displayed a
genuine commitment to fostering the broadest possible debate on environmental
questions in Argentine society. All relevant sectors were strongly encouraged to
participate in discussions with public officials of the CONAPA, the secretariat of
Natural Resources and Human Environment, as well as the Environment Unit of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Active participation of NGOs in the Argentine delegation was encouraged as
well. In fact, numerous NGO spokespersons were invited to serve as advisers in the
Argentine official delegation to the UNCED negotiations. As much as 70 per cent of
25The Rio Group is a regional policy coordination body among Latin American countries. Its members
are: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay, and
Venezuela. Peru's membershi is suspended.
26Regional economic integration process formed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay
(Mercado Comun del Sur (Common Market of the South).
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the Argentine delegation of roughly 200 members was thus accounted for by NGO
representatives.
Daily meetings, in which the NGO representatives were briefed by the official
delegates about the course of the negotiations, were held every morning during the
Rio Conference. These meetings also provided an effective conduit for the exchange
of information and suggestions between the official delegation and the NGOs. These
initiatives were so successful that several Argentine NGOs would later praise the
whole UNCED process as exemplary for the absolute transparency displayed by the
Argentine authorities.
CONCLUSION
The Rio Conference opened up a process of multilateral negotIatIOn on a new
agenda for development. Following the Rio Summit, the discussions were followed
through at the 47th UN General Assembly, the ECOSOC, and the Commission on
Sustainable Development.
From the point of view of a developing country, the UNCED process highlighted
the willingness of the international community to hold a serious political dialogue
on a new development agenda, which takes environmental criteria into account.
Rather than limiting the growth prospects of the developing world, the adoption
of the concept of "sustainability" offers the potential for a more rational utilization
of available resources worldwide. The realization of this potential along the process
of sustainable development will translate itself into a higher standard of living for
this and future generations.
UNCED and its aftermath point to the consequences of a domestic decision-
making process lacking in a clear administrative and political definition of respons-
ibilities within the negotiating team. Such definition must be clearly spelled out in
advance, so as to avoid the ambiguities, jurisdictional conflict, and bureaucratic
struggles that prevented the Argentine delegation from playing as effective a role as
it might have played otherwise. In spite of these problems, the Argentine delegation
succeeded in having most of the country's positions included in the UNCED
agenda.
Another important lesson of the UNCED process refers to the central role played
by intergovernmental and supranational actors in a complex process of international
negotiation. For the developing countries as a whole, the G-77 proved to be an
efficient vehicle for articulating their demands at the negotiation table. Under
Pakistan's capable leadership, the G-77 was able to perform a brilliant task through-
out the negotiations, both by coordinating the positions of key member countries
and by making u for the paucity of resources in numerous country delegations.
Finally, by opening up new channels of communication between the government
and society at large, the UNCED process may have set an important precedent for
the future conduct of Argentina's foreign policy, whose consequences may extend
well beyond the specific outcomes of UNCED itself.

9Dynamics of Leadership in UNCED
Lance N. Antrim
In diplomatic tenns, UNCED was a substantial success, producing agreement on
the principles guiding the balance between environment and development, a
700-page program of global, regional, and national action, a start on a global con-
vention on forests, and the signing of conventions on the global climate and on the
conservation of biological diversity. This success grew out of many contributions
- substantive contributions from expert groups, support from countries, public
pressure, and contributions by diplomats to the text of compromise agreements.
Together, however, all of these elements only contributed to the complicity of the
process, and each of these was not enough individually to yield success. The com-
plexity had to be managed and the individual components had to be harnessed to
work together in a common effort for a common goal; leadership was the linchpin
for this success. At UNCED, this leadership was found in three areas: inspiration,
substance, and process. Leaders in these three areas, working together in the com-
plex dynamics of conference diplomacy, were instrumental in achieving positive
negotiation outcomes.
UNCED was a dynamic activity that progressed through phases in which the
focus of the negotiators changed from the definition of issues under debate, through
the structuring of agreements, to the negotiation of the details of the final docu-
ments. The negotiators constantly evolved their strategies and tactics in response to
new events and to infonnation and actions of other parties. Progress through the
phases of negotiation was not inevitable, nor was the pace of progress necessarily
sufficient to achieve a timely agreement. Good leadership at critical moments served
to overcome major obstacles.
The role of leadership in UNCED's success can best be examined in com-
parison with the conventional role of leadership in diplomatic conferences. This
role is illustrated below in the procedures and practices applied in conferences in
general, and in the first UN Conference on the Environment and the UN Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea in particular. Within that framework, the adaptation
and innovation of leadership roles in UNCED becomes clear, leading to con-
clusions that may improve the chances of success in other large and complex
multilateral negotiations.
Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons Learned from the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (G. Sjostedt, et al., eds.; 1-85966-077-0; © llASA; pub. Graham & Trotman, 1994;
printed in Great Britain), pp. 149-163.
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CONFERENCE LEADERSHIP IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
Modem multilateral negotiations have been convened since the Congress of Vienna,
and over time processes and procedures have been developed to support leaders in
these activities. Leadership may be exercised by many parties in a conference: con-
ference officers in both formal and informal settings; conference secretariats in sup-
port of the work of the conference; and by governments in explaining positions,
putting forward proposals, and making compromises that lead to mutually accept-
able agreements. Leadership by officers and by the secretariat can contribute to suc-
cess, but the commitment of the participating countries is essential. Without a
political will on the part of countries, efforts by officers and secretariats cannot suc-
ceed. The focus of this chapter, and the following chapter by Ambassador Koh, con-
cerns primarily the leadership of particular key personalities: the Conference
chairman, the Secretary General, the working group chairpersons. The leadership of
nations and coalitions, the principal actors in negotiation, is referred to here, but is
discussed at length in Chapters 5, 7, 8, and 12.
General Nature of Conference Leadership
Leadership in different forms may be exercised by different individuals and groups.
There is considerable flexibility in roles, so that strengths in one area may offset
weaknesses in another. Key leadership positions include presiding officers, secretar-
iats, heads of national delegations, and representatives of regional and interest
groups.
Presiding Officers
Presiding officers are responsible for managing the negotiating processes of a con-
ference. An experienced conference chair, Ambassador W. Lang of Austria, has pro-
vided some guidelines for effective leadership by presiding officers of conferences
and negotiating groups (Lang, 1989:37-8). The chair of a conference or negotiating
group is responsible for the management of the formal procedures: opening the
meeting, recognizing speakers and maintaining the speakers list, interpreting the
rules, etc. Lang also notes that a chair has an orchestrating role beyond that of man-
aging the formal processes. As the senior officer responsible for the negotiating pro-
cess, the chair must also manage the informal processes, in order to push the
negotiations toward agreement. To this end, a chair should have the following
attributes:
(1) creativity and innovativeness, provided that the ideas do not go too far beyond
what has been called the permissive consensus of the participants;
(2) constant awareness of the mood prevailing among key actors, seeking the
advice of key delegations, particularly with regard to significant procedural and
substantive decisions;
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(3) exercise of "preventive guidance," that is, be aware of delegations that may
impede progress and, if appropriate, include them in the formal or informal
circles of decision making;
(4) availability to participants in the negotiations, both in public and private;
(5) capability to separate issues into separate channels, oversee their debate, and
recombine the results into a single process;
(6) recognition of critical moments of the negotiations, particularly in terms of
submission of chairman's drafts, and in the imposition of time limits and target
dates for the group's work.
Secretariat
Secretariats have important roles in multilateral conferences. One role is in pro-
viding support to the elected leadership by handling all the details of conference
management, such as providing translation services, arranging rooms for meetings,
and disseminating documents. In some cases, a secretariat may take on a substantive
leadership role by conducting research and preparing conference documents that
discuss issues facing the negotiators, and summarizing the current state of under-
standing and the history of national and international actions on those issues. Some-
times, a secretariat may even be asked to prepare recommendations for debate by
national delegations.
Group and National Leaders
Countries, individually and organized in regional and interest groups, are the prin-
cipal parties in a diplomatic conference. A conference is convened by countries, and
it is they that must accept or reject the results of the negotiation. Generally, as the
conveners of a conference, a country, or group of countries, is expected to provide
the inspiration for a conference that goes beyond national interests to a compromise
that reflects the interests of all.
Countries may exert substantive leadership by determining the goals of a
negotiation, submitting proposals for debate, accepting or rejecting proposals of the
presiding officers and secretariat, and, finally, adopting or rejecting agreements.
Countries may lead by clearly defining issues, interests, and proposals for response
by other countries.
A country or group may also take on leadership in procedural roles by acting as a
mediator, attempting to bridge differences among parties, or supporting the confer-
ence leadership in decisions that pressure the recalcitrant parties to move toward
agreement.
Forms ofLeadership Leadership in diplomatic conferences comes in three forms:
inspirational, procedural, and substantive. Inspirational leadership can be expressed
as support for the goals of the conference and a commitment to the overall process.
Procedural leadership is expressed in the management of the negotiating process.
Substantive leadership is expressed in the identification and promotion ofresponses
to the substantive issues assigned to the conference.
All three forms of leadership are found in the UNCED negotiations. The balance
among the forms changed over the two and a half years between the passage of
the founding resolution and the completion of the conference, reflecting the
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relationship between the phases of negotiation and the readiness of the countries, the
elected leaders, and the secretariat to contribute to the negotiations.
Stockholm, 1972
The 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment began as an initiative of
developed countries: Sweden made a proposal for the conference in the UN General
Assembly; and the United States gave strong support, with other countries providing
additional support or at least acquiescing to it. The support of the United States and
of Sweden provided inspirational leadership and maintained a political will, at least
among the industrialized countries, for agreement. The secretariat provided addi-
tional inspirational leadership by encouraging the involvement of respected non-
governmental organizations and individuals. These NGOs worked directly with
governments, and indirectly through the media, to promote the importance of the
conference at high levels of national government, contributing to the national polit-
ical will to reach agreement.
With the political commitment of major industrialized countries, and the
behind-the-scenes work of the secretariat to encourage the participation by devel-
oping countries and avoid disruptions due to East-West disputes that threatened
the conference, the role of the conference officers diminished in importance.
Presiding officers maintained the procedural aspects of the negotiation, but
governmental proposals and secretariat-sponsored (or secretariat-encouraged)
inter-sessional activities provided the substantive leadership that led to the final
agreement.
Law of the Sea
In contrast to the Stockholm Conference, the conference officers in the Law of the
Sea Conference provided leadership critical to the success of the conference. The
Bureau of the Conference (the president of the conference, the vice presidents, and
the chairs of the negotiating groups) were responsible for all major procedural deci-
sions, and national delegations (individually and in groups) provided the major sub-
stantive leadership through the submission of proposals and contributions of
technical experts. The importance of the issues facing the conference ensured a
strong political will to reach agreement, at least until the final months when political
changes in the United States diminished its commitment to completing the agree-
ment. National political will, assisted by strong procedural leadership by conference
officers and substantive leadership by governments, maintained progress over the
ten years of negotiation and achieved a final agreement that is largely accepted by
all countries as a statement of current customary international law even before it has
officially entered into force.
LEADERSIDP IN UNCED
UNCED was the most complex diplomatic conference the UN has yet attempted.
With its large participation, multiplicity of issues, numerous interrelationships, and
diversity of national interests, there was concern that the negotiators would be able
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to achieve little beyond rhetoric and photo opportunities. The most significant
impediments facing the UNCED negotiations were:
(I) Too many issues and too little time. In-depth negotIation of substantive
agreements was impossible. There were only 16 weeks formally set aside for
negotiation of these issues.
(2) Political agendas beyond the issues contained in the founding resolution.
Issues of technology transfer and financing of development had long histories
of negotiation in other fora of the UN system.
(3) Competition for attention and resources from other negotiations. Parallel nego-
tiations on binding conventions on climate change and biological diversity
required commitments of skilled diplomats and technical experts, drawing
down the personnel resources available to UNCED, particularly in smaller
developing countries.
(4) Limited commitment by major governments. As laudable as were the goals
expressed in Resolution 441228, national governments were not particularly
supportive of UNCED. During the preparations, UNCED was over-
shadowed by other world events (e.g., the invasion of Kuwait, the coup,
and breakup of the Soviet Union, and economic stagnation) that competed
for attention in national governments, particularly among the industrialized
countries.
There were several points that favored the UNCED negotiations:
(I) Visibility. As the 20th anniversary celebration of the Stockholm Confer-
ence, UNCED would attract some public attention. The potential for a large
number of heads of state and government meant that the negotiations could
not be delayed or gutted without adverse public attention on the national
leaders.
(2) Skilled procedural leadership. Ambassador Koh, with long experience in the
UN, had proven his ability to manage a large, complex, multi-issue conference
as president of the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea.
(3) Skilled substantive leadership. Maurice Strong had demonstrated the capability
to organize a global conference and to coordinate substantive contributions
from governments, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental groups,
and individual experts.
In spite of the obvious importance of the issues that were to be discussed,
UNCED is notable for a lower national commitment to the negotiations than was the
case in either the Stockholm Conference or the Law of the Sea Conference. This
limited national commitment can be shown by the decision of the conference to
avoid any intersessional sessions and the reliance upon the secretariat for the prep-
aration of most substantive documentation for the conference, particularly in the
first half of the preparatory process. The limited national political commitment to
the conference required that national leadership be supplemented by procedural
leadership from the conference officers and substantive leadership from the secre-
tariat. Most important, however, was the combined efforts of many groups to pro-
vide inspirational leadership to promote the development of political will to reach a
meaningful agreement.
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The guiding inspiration for UNCED was provided by the World Commission on
Environment and Development (known as the "Brundtland Commission"), which
promoted the concept of sustainable development as the philosophy for the manage-
ment of the world's resources. However, the commission, having submitted its
report to the UN in 1987, was not available to provide continuing inspirational
leadership during the preparations for UNCED. In its place, the Secretary General of
UNCED, Maurice Strong, attempted to fill this role. Strong, a former member of the
Brundtland Commission, presented the concept of sustainable development to the
PrepCom and emphasized the importance of having UNCED implement it in an
effective program of action both to the members of the PrepCom and to leaders
throughout the world. Strong's role as the principal advocate of UNCED continued
through most of the preparatory process. It was only after the fourth and final
session of the PrepCom in the spring of 1992 that the role of conference advocate
was taken up by many heads of state and by important members of the world media.
Even then, Strong remained an important leader in publicly supporting of the
success of UNCED.
In the final stage of UNCED, the inspirational role was indeed taken by the heads
of state in the summit segment of the conference. Limited to speeches of five min-
utes, their leadership was not only conveyed in statements, but also through their
delegations, which became more determined to gain a substantive rather than a
superficial success. Thus, the inspirational leadership of the heads of state added
pressure that increased opportunities for the leaders of the negotiation process.
Inspirational leadership may be provided from many sources: the 'champion'
among the sponsoring countries, the head of the secretariat or of the conference
leadership, the head of a sponsoring agency, or even parties outside the process.
While such a leadership role cannot be forced upon any party, it is an important con-
tributor to any negotiation that hopes to go beyond the current state of affairs and
create a new order, be it for environment, security, economics, health, or any other
area that must be addressed in the international arena.
Procedural Leadership
The UN secretariat provided the initial leadership on the procedural aspects of
UNCED. The organizational session of the PrepCom was scheduled for March of
1990. In preparation for this session, the secretariat staff prepared recommendations
for the procedural matters that would guide the work of the PrepCom. Among the
proposals was one for the structure of the committee, which specified three working
groups divided among global, regional, and national issues, plus a group to address
legal and institutional matters. The UN Secretary General appointed Maurice Strong
as the Secretary General for the conference.
At the opening of the session, the committee elected Ambassador Tommy T.B.
Koh as its chairman. Koh and Strong shared the responsibility for procedural leader-
ship during the organizational session, a sharing that was sometimes smooth and
sometimes rough. One particular case demonstrated that the responsibility for pro-
cedural leadership would be exercised ultimately by the conference officers. As the
organizational session came to its final scheduled day, Chairman Koh directed that
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the committee would work on until it completed its work on the last scheduled day
of the meeting. Strong, anticipating that the committee would break and continue its
work on the next day, did not arrange for extended hours for interpreters and sched-
uled meeting facilities and interpretation for the following day. In accordance with
his plans, however, Koh kept the committee in session, even after the departure of
the interpreters.
Conference Officers and Group Leaders
The principal responsibility for procedural leadership in a diplomatic conference
generally rests with the Bureau, which consists of the elected officers of the confer-
ence. However, at the organizational session, the PrepCom decided to elect a total of
39 vice chairmen, which would make an extremely unwieldy decision-making body.
In order to obtain more effective advice, Koh established his own smaller leadership
group. This group, which consisted of the chairmen of the working groups and the
leaders of the major regional and interest groups, met frequently to advise Koh on
the management of the committee, including such matters as the scheduling of
meetings and decisions, creation of special groups, and other procedural matters. In
turn, these leaders were responsible for building support within their groups for the
decisions made as a result of their advice in the leadership group.
Leadership Structure and Dynamics
As agreed during the organizational session, two working groups were established at
the first substantive session in Nairobi. Seven environmental topics were divided
among the groups as shown below:
Working Group I Working Group II
Protection of the Oceans
Hazardous Wastes
Protection of Freshwater Resources
Atmosphere and climate
Desertification, Deforestation and Soil Loss
Biodiversity
Biotechnology
The PrepCom elected Ambassador Bo Kjellen (Sweden) to chair Working Group
I and Ambassador Bukar Shaib (Nigeria) as chair of Working Group II.
The activity of the working groups dominated the middle portion of the Nairobi
session. The work of each group was structured to begin with a formal session to
review the individual issues. After the issues were aired in the formal sessions, the
chairmen would draft decisions on each topic for consideration by the group. The
groups would then convene in informal session to review the draft decisions. After
the decisions were revised and appeared to have consensus support, the groups
would convene in formal session to approve the decisions and forward them to the
Plenary for adoption.
In practice, there were marked differences between the two working groups.
While some of the differences resulted from the subject matter, some important
differences resulted directly from the working styles of the chairmen.
Related to the subject matter, the issues assigned to Working Group I were, for the
most part, the subjects of years of work in other fora. As a result, many participants
were knowledgeable regarding the topics and could deal with them with some
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substantive competence and relate the work of the group to the work of other negoti-
ations on environment and development. However, due to the national positions
taken in those other fora, the delegates were limited in their ability to explore alter-
native approaches or to compromise on their opening positions. By contrast, the
issues in Working Group II were collections of national, regional, and global topics
that had not been addressed before in a comprehensive fashion. This gave the Work-
ing Group II negotiators more flexibility, but it also meant that there was a less solid
substantive base for the negotiations. As a result, the Working Group II debates
tended to include more political and ideological overtones than did those of Working
Group I.
The stylistic differences of the working groups were readily apparent. Ambassa-
dor Kjellen (Working Group 1) adopted the style of a mediator, while Ambassador
Shaib (Working Group II) was a moderator. During the initial formal sessions,
Kjellen was more interactive, often questioning a speaker to better understand the
stated position. Shaib ran his group more as a sequence of national presentations for
which he maintained order and a schedule, but where he kept a low personal profile.
This difference in style was a major factor that allowed Working Group II to
complete the formal session a day in advance of Working Group I.
After the formal sessions of the working groups were complete, the PrepCom
convened in Plenary for a mid-session progress report, while the working group
chairs retired to draft decisions based on the results of the formal sessions. The
working groups then reconvened in informal session for consultations on the draft
decisions. The effects of the stylistic differences of the chairmen became more
apparent during this process. Kjellen's drafts drew more specific comments and
criticism than did Shaib's, focusing the disagreements more clearly. Kjellen
addressed the disagreements through a series of chairman's drafts that combined
comments of the working group with his own contributions. The debate during
the consultations took the form of delegates attempting to explain their positions to
the chairman in order to convince him that their views should be incorporated into
the revised text.
In Working Group II, Shaib would listen to opposing views and, if a compromise
were not apparent, would incorporate the different positions into the text as alterna-
tive bracketed language. Stating a position forcefully and without a move to com-
promise was sufficient to have a position recorded in a subsequent draft, so that
there was little incentive to compromise until late in the session. As the closing date
of the Nairobi session loomed, pressure from conference leaders increased, and the
working group sessions lasted into the early morning as they worked to complete
action on all of its agenda items.
Leadership and the Dynamics ofNegotiation
Leaders in negotiation must be aware of the dynamics of a conference and use them
to advantage. Two aspects of a case from UNCED illustrate the relationship between
conference dynamics and leadership actions.
At the conclusion of the third PrepCom session, Working Group ill had con-
ducted serious debate over the content of the Declaration on Environment and
Development. The negotiations were making the transition from diagnosis to for-
mula, but many were not prepared to compromise on the details of the declaration.
When the PrepCom reconvened in New York, the chairman of Working Group ill,
Ii
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Bedrich Moldan, decided to push the group forward. He prepared a chairman's draft
proposal that he viewed as a possible compromise, and that he believed could serve
as the basis for negotiation and the development of an agreed text. Unfortunately,
neither North nor South were prepared to abandon their positions. Worse, each side,
and particularly the South, viewed the proposed draft as leaning too much to the
opposing side. In making the proposal, Moldan lost the confidence of some of the
parties in his neutrality. As a result, not only did the countries fail to move ahead,
but they expressed their discomfort with continuing the negotiations under Moldan's
leadership. As a result, Chairman Koh established an informal group to continue the
discussions.
The informal group continued debate throughout the session. Although little sub-
stantive progress was made, the parties became more aware of each other's interests
and concerns. Over the session, it became clear that no party had a chance of win-
ning the others over to its position and that a compromise was needed. In the final
week of the session, the co-chairmen of the informal group came to Chairman Koh
and asked that he take over the negotiation for the declaration.
Koh recognized that the time was ripe for reaching agreement, but that the con-
cessions that were needed from all parties could not be discussed in an open forum.
Nor did he believe that the negotiations could be concluded in the remaining time
unless the group was limited in size. With the agreement of the informal group, Koh
took on the task of chairing the negotiation of a compromise text. Before starting, he
obtained agreement on several points. First, the group would be limited to 16 coun-
tries, which would be selected as representatives of regional and interest groups and
would be expected to represent the groups' interests and to explain and defend the
compromises reached in the negotiations within their groups. Koh began the nego-
tiations based on a negotiating text prepared by the co-chairmen on the evening of
1 April. After meeting until midnight, and reconvening the next morning, Koh was
able to produce an agreed text by 6:15 p.m. this same day.
Koh's work was not over with the agreement of the small group. Koh and
members of the group had to convince all of the delegations to accept the agree-
ment. At 3 a.m. during the final session, Koh introduced the proposed text of the
Declaration on Environment and Development to the Plenary, emphasizing that the
text was a package deal that represented the best that could be obtained and that any
party that opposed it or tried to modify it would cause it to unravel and would be
responsible for the failure of the PrepCom to achieve agreement on this key docu-
ment. After apologizing to all countries excluded from the small group, and par-
ticularly to four countries not part of any of the regional and interest groups
represented in it, Koh asked for permission to adopt the Declaration. In spite of a
threat of opposition from Israel, Koh ruled the text as adopted and sent it forward to
Rio, where it was adopted by UNCED.
The lesson of this case is the importance of timing and trust. Moldan's effort to
prepare a compromise text failed, not because of the substance of his proposal, but
because the parties did not yet believe that they could not achieve more of their
objectives by continuing the negotiations. In contrast, as the deadline loomed in
the final week of PrepCom IV, the delegations were unwilling to bear the onus of
failing to reach agreement, and to avoid this they were willing to grant Koh
unusual authority and trust him to produce an agreement that would equitably
share the burden of concessions while satisfying the essential interests of all
parties.
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There were many sources of substantive information relevant to UNCED. Standing
intergovernmental organizations (e.g., UN Environment Programme, the Food and
Agriculture Organization, and the World Meteorological Organization) conducted
research and printed reports on aspects of the UNCED agenda. Preparations for
regional meetings of governments brought UNCED to the attention of national
bureaucracies and leaders. The first such meeting, convened by the Economic Com-
mission for Europe, brought UNCED's issues to the attention of the leaders of the
industrialized world. However, as the UNCED PrepCom got underway, there was
little organization to the complex mass of available information. In response, the
conference secretariat moved in to provide leadership in this area.
Governments had little investment in or commitment to the UNCED preparations
during the early PrepCom process. The first substantive session (Nairobi, 1990) was
devoted almost exclusively to the definition of tasks for the secretariat. These tasks
were largely investigatory, and the secretariat was expected to report back to the
PrepCom in March 1991, the second session.
The secretariat established a process for responding to the directions of the com-
mittee on matters of substance. A number of working parties were convened, each
comprised of experts from UN agencies and other organizations. Contributions by
the experts were funneled through the working parties before being redrafted by the
secretariat for distribution to the PrepCom. Following a process similar to the Stock-
holm Conference, all reports were submitted through the conference secretariat for
distribution as official documents rather than distributed directly by UN agencies.
At the conclusion of the second PrepCom, the secretariat was asked to continue
its work in preparing background material. It was also asked to prepare its recom-
mendations for elements of Agenda 21 for consideration at PrepCom m. This
marked the high point of secretariat leadership in the substance of the negotiations.
The changes in leadership roles through the course of the preparatory negotiations
were, in part, a reflection of the progress made during and between negotiating ses-
sions, as the negotiations progressed from diagnosis, through formula development,
and on to the details of the agreement. Although the PrepCom negotiations were
restricted to the four substantive sessions, the work of supporting the PrepCom
continued between the sessions. The preparations were undertaken in several ways:
secretariat information, regional consultation, expert meetings, and national reports.
Secretariat Information
As a result of requests for information that emerged from the first and second sub-
stantive sessions of the PrepCom, the UNCED secretariat was charged with the
preparation of many reports on a variety of topics. To prepare these reports, the sec-
retariat convened working parties that drew upon the expertise of UN agencies, sup-
plemented by other experts. Drafts were often prepared by the parties, but the
secretariat retained the final authority to modify the reports as necessary to meet
their interpretation of the PrepCom requests.
The preparation of reports through an interagency committee structure was a
time-consuming process. This was exacerbated by the need to provide translation of
the reports - almost exclusively in English - into the other five official UN lan-
guages. These factors combined to delay the distribution of documents until just
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before the opening of the second and third sessions of the PrepCom (and, in some
cases, documents in the other languages were not available until late in the session -
if they were available at all). The effect of these delays on delegations was uneven
since the reports were sometimes available to countries that were well connected to
the agencies and experts who contributed to their preparation. Thus, while some del-
egations were able to review the secretariat reports with their governments in
advance of PrepComs II and III, others did not even have copies of the translated
reports in their hands until late in the sessions. This had a direct impact on the slow
pace of the negotiations.
Regional Consultations
Regional meetings on UNCED were organized by the UN regional economic com-
missions. The first such consultation, conducted by the Economic Commission for
Europe (including East and West Europe as well as North America), provided a
model for further meetings. Subsequent consultations were held by the Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, the Economic Commission for
Africa, and the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. The
results of the meetings were reported to the PrepCom.
Expert Meetings
Meetings of groups of experts on topics related to UNCED were convened under the
authority of UN agencies, national governments, and some nongovernmental
groups, in coordination with the UNCED secretariat. Meetings of topics included:
forest management, protection of freshwater supplies, reduction of land-based
sources of pollution, energy and the environment, science and development, sustain-
able agriculture, and other topics related to the UNCED agenda. The results of these
sessions were presented either in official reports of the PrepCom (such as the report
on the Halifax meeting on land-based sources of pollution) or in statements and
reports provided by the hosts of the meetings.
Other meetings sponsored in coordination with the UNCED secretariat included a
symposium on the relationship between the environment and the health and welfare
of women and children and the Second World Industry Conference on Environment
Management. Secretariat members participated in meetings such as this, both to
help direct the conferences toward the issues facing UNCED and to gather informa-
tion to be incorporated into the secretariat reports and proposals for the PrepCom. In
addition, some of the papers presented at these meetings, and at similar meetings on
other topics, were reproduced by the secretariat and distributed to delegations as
unofficial documents.
National Reports
Following the precedent established by the Stockholm Conference, UNCED's
founding resolution invited all states to submit national reports on environment to
the PrepCom. The secretariat prepared guidelines for the reports and encouraged
governments to submit them before the third session of the committee. A number of
reports were submitted at that session, more arrived at the fourth session, and
several were submitted at the conference itself.
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The national reports had two purposes. First, they were to provide a catalog of
national policies and programs related to the environment. Second, the preparation
of the reports required internal bureaucratic structures to prepare and approve the
reports, which had to be created if they did not already exist. The contribution of the
national reports to the PrepCom process varied considerably from country to coun-
try. Small countries in particular may have offset the costs of preparing national
reports through the allocation of limited personnel and financial resources away
from other activities.
Other Sources ofSupport
Support for the UNCED process also came from other sources that were independ-
ent of national governments and international organizations. High-level advisers to
the Secretary General, such as the leaders of the Business Council for Sustainable
Development, provided advice and contributed information to the secretariat.
Among the most effective supporters in the nongovernmental community were the
private foundations that donated substantial sums to support the UNCED process.
Some funding was funneled to a foundation established specifically to support par-
ticipation by developing countries. Other funds were given directly to organizations
seeking to influence specific environmental and developmental issues. The total sum
of funds provided by private foundations is difficult to measure, but it was sub-
stantial, and could not help but influence the negotiation process.
National Role in Substantive Leadership
PrepCom 1lI marked the beginning of the shift of leadership from the secretariat to
the national delegations. In some areas, such as ocean issues, the leadership role
shifted completely, while in others the secretariat remained a principal contributor.
By PrepCom IV, however, the government delegations were firmly in control of the
substance of the negotiations. During this session the countries took charge and
addressed the entire 700-page draft of Agenda 21 paragraph by paragraph,
resolving, by one estimate, 85 percent of the content.
ANALYSIS OF LEADERSHIP DYNAMICS
Leadership roles and forms evolved throughout the UNCED process. These changes
were related to the progress of the negotiations through the phases of diagnosis,
formula, and detail. They were also related to the efforts of the core of the con-
ference leadership to advance the negotiations through the phases in time for the
conference in Rio.
Inspirational Leadership
UNCED initially suffered from a lack of inspirational leadership. Most countries did
not see the conference as critical to their national interests and did not promote the
conference. In some cases, this resulted in assignment of negotiators responsible for
general international relations rather than environment and development issues or
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negotiators with limited experience in conference diplomacy. In lieu of inspirational
leadership, the conference Secretary General sought to develop situations that would
pressure governments into making serious efforts to reach agreement. One effort
was to ensure that the conference would have a high profile. This was accomplished
through the promotion of a conference for nongovernmental organizations that
would occur in parallel with UNCED, mirroring a similar arrangement in the Stock-
holm Conference. It was combined with efforts to build interest in the conference by
major media outlets. The second effort was to obtain the commitments of heads of
state and government to attend UNCED. Both efforts began to show signs of success
by the third session of the PrepCom, during which the number of governmental
leaders planning on attending began to grow, plans for the parallel conference and
participation by NGOs showed significant advances, and the media began to
observe and report on the work of the PrepCom.
A special feature of the UNCED negotiations was the anticipation that the full
conference would include a segment attended by heads of state and government.
This decision was stated in the founding resolution and confirmed in a resolution of
the PrepCom at its first substantive session. Anticipation that the senior officials of
the participating countries would take part in at least a segment of the conference
pressured the participants to engage their senior officials in the preparations for the
conference. Engagement of senior officials could slow the preparatory process by
complicating domestic preparatory processes for the conference, but it could also
raise the level of national commitment to the final outcome of the conference.
Inspirational leadership also had a dynamic nature, but remained throughout less
apparent than the substantive and procedural aspects. After the General Assembly
convened the PrepCom, there was little attention given to UNCED. Most non-
governmental organizations were focused on the negotiation of binding conventions
on climate change and biological diversity. Governments viewed UNCED with cau-
tion, considering it likely to get overwhelmed by the North-South differences
related to development issues. Intergovernmental leaders had little or no stake in
UNCED, other than to be seen as supportive of the process. It fell to the UNCED
Secretary General to attempt to provide inspirational leadership in the beginning
stages of UNCED. Following the first preparatory session, Mr. Strong traveled
around the world, contacting senior governmental officials and leaders of major pri-
vate and public organizations to build a broad base of support for UNCED. By the
third session of the PrepCom, public involvement in the process took on a greater
role in inspirational leadership. Major environmental organizations had a substantial
presence, and developing country NGOs began to attend in increasing numbers. The
effect of these groups, however, was limited because they focused much of their
effort on preparations for the activities to be held at the parallel NGO conference
rather than the intergovernmental negotiations. Finally, with the preparations com-
plete and the conference underway, the impending attendance of over 100 heads of
state provided the inspiration to complete negotiations in time for the summit
segment of the conference.
Substantive Leadership
The UN General Assembly adopted the resolution to convene UNCED almost two
and a half years before the conference was due to open. It was difficult for national
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governments to focus their attention on an event that far in the future, so leadership
on substantive matters began as the responsibility of the conference secretariat.
Acceptance of this charge was confirmed in the first preparatory session, when the
countries assigned the responsibility of preparing background reports to the secre-
tariat. It grew in the second session with the request that the secretariat prepare draft
recommendations for governments to consider. By the third session, though, the bal-
ance began to change as national experts took a greater role in the negotiations and
the secretariat was pushed more into a supportive capacity. By the fourth prep-
aratory session, the substantive leadership was clearly in the hands of government
delegations.
Procedural Leadership
The dynamics of procedural leadership were somewhat different. In early sessions,
leadership was mainly the responsibility of the chairman of the PrepCom, the heads
of the two (later three) main working groups, and the leaders of the principal
regional and interest groups who acted as friends of the chair, providing advice and
helping to implement the decisions of the leadership within their own groups. As the
negotiations proceeded to greater degrees of detail, the burden of managing the
negotiating process also grew. Leadership was shared as issues were assigned to
subsidiary bodies (e.g., contact groups and informal negotiating groups) in order to
identify potential compromises for debate and adoption in the full sessions of the
working groups and the Plenary.
For the most part, there was little activity between sessions, other than ad hoc per-
sonal contacts among delegates. A model that might have provided more continuous
involvement is the structure of a major corporation into a board of directors and a
chief executive. The board provides the policy leadership to guide the work of the
executive. In tum, the executive assesses the resources, goals, and options, provides
information to the board, and makes recommendations to the board. The executive
provides continuous leadership while the board meets at intervals to provide mid-
course corrections. In the conference context, this model would be most relevant
when there are long intervals between conference sessions.
RECOMMENDATIONS
UNCED is concluded, but its effects will be felt for decades to come through the
agenda set in Agenda 21, through the information gathered and disseminated, and
through the awareness created about the interrelationship of environment and devel-
opment. In its most direct form, the UNCED regime is seen and felt in the institu-
tions established in response to Agenda 21.
The new institutions that take on the task of implementing Agenda 21 will need to
continue the intergovernmental processes started in UNCED. The Commission for
Sustainable Development, the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a
Framework Convention on Drought and Desertification, and other bodies will
inherit a negotiating history, procedures, and expectations that will guide their work.
An examination of the importance of leadership in UNCED helps identify char-
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acteristics needed for strong and effective leadership within these bodies and
required for constructive evolution of reform:
(I) Foster inspirational leaders who can maintain commitment to the success of the
overall negotiation by keeping common goals in sight of all parties.
(2) Be creative in developing resources for negotiation support by tapping outside
sources of funds, fostering technical expertise to serve regional and interest
groups, and working with nongovernmental organizations (both profit and non-
profit) to expand the information available to the negotiators.
(3) Promote the commitment of national governments to the negotiations. Secre-
tariats may fill leadership gaps, but cannot replace government representatives
as conference leaders.
(4) Involve skilled diplomats, particularly from smaller states with limited interests
at stake, who can serve as mediators, problem solvers, and chairs of groups.
Multilateral negotiation is a special skill that should be respected and nurtured
by national governments.
(5) Involve states early on substantive matters, particularly developing countries.
Promote leadership by experts in early substantive discussions. Move states
into leadership roles early in the negotiation process.
(6) Finally, increase involvement of elected leadership in managing the process
between sessions and improve the linkage between elected and appointed
officers. The leaders of a diplomatic conference must have leadership them-
selves. The bureau and friends of the chair provided this type of leadership for
UNCED.

10
UNCED Leadership: A Personal Perspective
Tommy Thong-Bee Koh
In 1989, the UN General Assembly decided to convene the Earth Summit in 1992,
20 years after the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. The decision
to convene the Earth Summit was contained in Resolution 44/228. The text
contained in that resolution soon came to be regarded as sacred.
In order to prepare for the Earth Summit, the UN decided to set up a Preparatory
Committee (PrepCom). Because of the great interest in the conference, the PrepCom
was enormous in size; itconsisted of all the member states of the UN as well as non-
member states such as Switzerland. The size of the PrepCom made negotiation diffi-
cult, and one of my challenges was how to reduce the size of negotiating groups. I
will return to this later.
The PrepCom was mandated to hold an organizational session in New York and
four substantive sessions in Nairobi, Geneva, Geneva again, and New York in 1991
and 1992. You may wonder why the four substantive sessions were held in three dif-
ferent cities in three continents. Was this an example of the UN diplomats awarding
themselves junkets at the expense of their taxpayers? It wasn't. It was an example of
the kind of compromises that had to be struck in order to achieve consensus. The
New York-based diplomats, who were the most politicized, wanted all the sessions
to be held in New York. The Geneva-based diplomats argued that they should be
held in Geneva, the home of the UNCED secretariat. The supporters of UNEP,
which is based in Nairobi, argued that they should be held in Nairobi.
The organizational session of the PrepCom was two weeks long. It was held in
New York from 5-6 March 1990 and had five objectives: to elect its chairman; to
decide on the size of the Bureau and the distribution of the number agreed upon
among the five regional groups; to decide how many working groups to establish
and which regional groups would provide candidates for their chairmanship; to
adopt a provisional agenda for the Earth Summit; to adopt its rules of procedure.
Any reasonable person would think that you would need only one or two days,
not two weeks, to agree on five such seemingly simple tasks. However, this was not
the case, and the two weeks were barely enough to complete our tasks. Of the five
tasks, the only simple one was electing me. All the other candidates wisely withdrew
when they realized the pain and suffering that the chairman would have to endure
for the next two years and three months! The first thing I did on assuming the chair
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was to propose that we should refrain from polluting the air in our meeting rooms by
prohibiting smoking at all our meetings. Before the nicotine addicts could rally their
forces, I asked if there was any objection. Seeing none, I banged the gavel and pro-
nounced that there was a consensus in favor of my proposal. The former Secretary
General of the UN, Javier Perez de Cuellar, watched in surprise because no UN
chairman had succeeded in defeating the tobacco lobby at the UN before.
The speed with which I used the gavel would give rise later to some unhappiness
- and later, I would count to five before banging my gavel. On one occasion, the
chairman of the Group of 77, a wonderful man from Pakistan, Ambassador Jamshid
Marker, remarked that my counting of I to 5 became faster and faster, the longer the
meeting lasted!
I failed, however, to persuade my colleagues to accept a relatively small Bureau.
For a Bureau to be efficient, it has to be representative but small. Many delegations
wanted to be in the Bureau because they thought that it might become a negotiating
forum. In the end, I had to accept a Bureau of 42 members, which, in my view, is too
large to be useful.
The PrepCom agreed to establish two working groups that would be chaired
respectively by a West European and an African. There was, however, no agreement
to establish a third working group to deal with questions relating to law and insti-
tutions. The third working group was ultimately established at the beginning of the
second substantive session in Geneva. The most difficult task was drafting the
agenda. Why? Because delegations feared that the wording of an agenda item could
tilt the balance in favor of their adversaries.
On the last day of the organizational session, there was still no agreement on the
agenda, and I was determined to get one. I instructed the secretariat to arrange for
interpreters to be available so that I could work through the night until 6:00 a.m. the
next morning. The secretariat did not believe that I meant this, and subsequently I
had no interpreters after midnight. Thus I had to persuade the non-Anglophones to
work in English. This was by no means an easy task, especially with the Franco-
phone group.
My strategy was to maintain the pressure on the delegates until they agreed to
compromise. By 4:30 a.m., the delegates were so exhausted that they asked me to
draft a compromise. I called for a short recess and, with the help of about a dozen
colleagues representing the various interest groups, succeeded in drafting a compro-
mise. I got my agenda. The meeting adjourned at 6:00 a.m. on St. Patrick's Day. I
felt exhausted, but vindicated in my determination not to adjourn the meeting until I
secured an agreement. If I had adjourned the meeting, the pressure would have
eased and delegations would again dig their heels in. I also wanted to make the point
to delegates and the secretariat that when I set a deadline, I meant to keep it. The
secretariat never doubted my resolve again. At all subsequent sessions of the Prep-
Com and the Main Committee, teams of interpreters were ready to serve the meeting
through the night and into the morning of the next day on the final day of each
session. On two subsequent occasions, we worked through the night: until 4:30 a.m.
on the last day of the 4th substantive session in New York, and 6:00 a.m. on the last
day of the Main Committee at the Earth Summit in Rio.
Managing a complex negotiating process requires both leadership and team work.
I worked closely with the Secretary General of the conference, Maurice Strong, and
the various members of the secretariat. Twenty years earlier, he was the Secretary
General of the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, and I had
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worked closely with him in preparing for the Stockholm Conference. The fact that
our friendship went back 20 years helped us to forge a good working partnership. I
kept no secrets from him or his deputy, Mr. Nitin Desai.
I expanded the collective leadership or collegium to include the chairman of
Working Group I, Ambassador Bo Kjellen of Sweden; the chairman of Working
Group II, Dr. Bukar Shaib of Nigeria; the chairman of Working Group III, Dr.
Bedrich Moldan of Czechoslovakia; and the Rapporteur, Mr. Ahmad Djoghlaf of
Algeria. I institutionalized the collective management of the negotiating process by
holding meetings every morning at 9:00 a.m. with this group and the senior
members of the UNCED secretariat. This would be followed by a daily meeting at
9:30 a.m. with the representatives of all the UN agencies. The purpose of the second
meeting was to bring all the members of the UN family together and to prevent turf
fights and misunderstandings. It was also to tap the expertise and inputs of the
various agencies.
The work of the PrepCom was carried out in four principal forums: the Plenary of
the PrepCom and the three working groups. The agenda of the Plenary was long and
complex. It included the difficult questions of financing sustainable development
and the transfer of technology from developed to developing countries. It also
included such questions as the relationship between the environment, on the one
hand, and, poverty, population, the international economic order, and human
settlements, on the other.
A good chairman must avoid the temptation of keeping everything under his
wings, and must learn to delegate. He must also be capable of choosing able men
and women to whom to delegate responsibility. When it becomes clear that a dele-
gatee is unable to deliver, a chairman must do the very unpleasant job of replacing
him with someone else.
At the second substantive session held in Geneva in the spring of 1991, I estab-
lished a number of open-ended negotiating groups in the Plenary. I appointed
Ambassador John Bell of Canada to chair the one on finance; Ambassador Bjorner
Utheim of Norway to chair the one on technology; Deputy Foreign Minister John
Muliro of Kenya to chair the one on the poverty-population-health cluster; Ambas-
sador Enrique Penalosa of Colombia to chair the one on human settlements; and Mr.
Ahmad Djoghlaf of Algeria to chair the one on the international economic order. I
coopted the chairmen of the negotiating groups into the collegium.
At the fourth substantive session I replaced Ambassador John Bell with Deputy
Foreign Minister Andres Rozental of Mexico, and at the Summit I replaced
Rozental with Ambassador Ricupero of Brazil. Also at the Summit, I replaced
Utheim with the Dutch Minister of the Environment, Mr. J.G.M. Alders. As one
who attaches great value to loyalty and friendship, I have always found it very dif-
ficult to abandon a colleague. However, I felt duty-bound to put the best interests
of the conference before friendship and loyalty. The fact that both Ricupero and
Alders succeeded in their work showed that I was right to make the personnel
changes.
The Bureau of a committee or conference is supposed to act as its steering com-
mittee, but the Bureau of the PrepCom and the Earth Summit was unable to play this
role effectively because of its size: 42 members. It was almost as difficult to reach a
consensus among the 42 members of the Bureau as among the ISO-plus members of
the PrepCom and the 170-plus members of the Summit. I had to invent another body
to act as the steering committee.
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I convened twice weekly meetings of a group consisting of the chainnen of the
five regional groups: the chainnan of the Group of 77 (representing the developing
countries); the chainnan of the EC; the chainnan of the Nordic Group; the chainnan
of CANZ (representing Canada, Australia, and New Zealand); and the three coun-
tries that did not belong to any interest group: China, Japan, and the United States.
This group of 12 countries and the collegium functioned as the steering committee
of the PrepCom and Summit, and it proved to be a very effective body. During crit-
ical periods of the PrepCom and Summit, I would convene daily meetings of this
group. In order to pacify the members of the Bureau, who quite rightly felt
bypassed, I would from time to time convene meetings of the Bureau.
In negotiation, timing is very important. A chainnan who acts prematurely risks
being rebuffed. A chainnan who acts too slowly loses the opportunity to clinch a
deal. I have observed that multilateral negotiations often pass through three phases:
confrontation, crisis; and resolution. A good chainnan must not be unnerved by the
phase of confrontation, and must wait for the period of crisis that often follows con-
frontation. It is at this hour of maximum danger and opportunity that he must strike
and bring about a resolution.
Let me illustrate these general observations with the following concrete example.
Working Group ill, on law and institutions, was established at the beginning of the
second substantive session in Geneva. It elected Dr. Bedrich Moldan of Czecho-
slovakia as its chainnan. One of the items on its agenda was the drafting of the Rio
Declaration on the Environment and Development, popularly referred to as the
Earth Charter. At the beginning of the fourth substantive session, Dr. Moldan offered
a compromise draft consisting of ten principles and three prerequisites. However, he
moved too soon. Also, his draft was viewed, rightly or wrongly, by the developing
countries as favoring the viewpoint of the developed countries. Because of this, the
developing countries refused to continue to negotiate under his chainnanship.
Instead, an infonnal contact group was established under the co-chainnanship of
Mr. Mukul Sanwal of India and Mr. Ole Holthe of Norway.
On the morning of 31 March 1992, three days before the end of that session, Mr.
Sanwal and Mr. Holthe asked for pennission to speak to our daily meeting at 9:00
a.m. They reported that they had gone as far as they could and were unable to make
any further progress, and requested me to take over the negotiations. The meeting
supported their request. I then convened a meeting of the de facto steering commit-
tee. I said I would be prepared to chair the negotiation provided they agreed to
establish a small, closed, representative group of 16: eight to represent the North and
eight to represent the South. The meeting agreed to this. The North was represented
by the United States; Portugal, the Netherlands, and Gennany (EC); Australia
(CANZ); Norway (alternating with Sweden); Japan and Russia. The South was
represented by Pakistan, India, Iran, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Tanzania, and China.
I then made another request. I requested that Mr. Sanwal and Mr. Holthe produce
a negotiating text by 6:30 p.m. on 1 April 1992. They did so, and the group of 16
began its work that same evening; it adjourned before midnight and continued the
next morning. A clean text, containing 27 principles, was agreed upon, ad refer-
endum, at 6:15 p.m. on 2 April (AICONE15 IIPClWGIIIIL33/Rev.l). This text
would eventually be adopted by the Earth Summit as the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development.
Apart from the clean text of the Rio Declaration, the other documents submitted
to Rio contained 350 bracketed statements or instances of disputed words. We had
I
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only one week in the Main Committee to remove these brackets and to find
acceptable language, and I was not at all sure that the job could be done.
I persuaded the Committee to adopt a number of procedural decisions. First, that
the negotiation would focus entirely on the bracketed language - I ruled out of order
any delegate who tried to reopen discussion on unbracketed or agreed language. I
also rebuffed the attempts by several delegations to insert new brackets on the
ground that they had been inadvertently omitted by the secretariat. Fortunately, we
had brought along the authoritative documents of the PrepCom. Upon verification,
we found no merit in any of the requests. Second, I refused to allow any delegation
to make a new proposal if it met with a single objection. The reason for this is that
any new proposal must advance the prospect of achieving consensus. Third, I asked
the Committee to allow me to establish nine open-ended negotiating groups on the
understanding that not more than three would meet concurrently. Fourth, I per-
suaded the Committee to work from Monday to Saturday and to meet morning,
afternoon, and evening. Fifth, I imposed a strict time-limit on the length of state-
ments. Sixth, whenever the negotiation got stuck on a point, I would set up an ad
hoc open-ended negotiating group to deal with it and appoint an able colleague to
chair the group. In this way, I was able to keep the negotiation moving at a steady
pace.
The final meeting of the Main Committee began at 8:00 p.m. on 10 June 1992. It
continued through the night and ended at 6:00 a.m. the next morning. I did take one
short break, though. At 4:00 a.m., after eight hours in the chair, I was desperate to go
to the toilet - I also sensed that there was a lot of tension in the room. I announced
that we would recess the meeting for five minutes in order to enable me to make a
discharge of non-toxic waste, and I promised to do it in an environmentally safe and
sound manner. The delegates broke into laughter and the meeting resumed in a bet-
ter mood. All bracketed language, excepting those words or statements relating to
finance and forests, was resolved. Those two issues were referred to ministerial-
level negotiations chaired by Brazil and Germany respectively and consensus was
achieved on 12 June. The Summit was therefore able to adopt, on 14 June, the Rio
Declaration, Agenda 21, and the Statement of Principles on Forests, by consensus.
Thus ended the largest conference the UN has ever held. It was attended by 116
heads of state or government, 172 states, 8000 delegates, 9000 members of the
press, and 3000 accredited representatives of nongovernmental organizations.
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The Role of the Scientific Community in the
Preparation of and Follow-Up to UNCED
Julia Marton-Lefevre
Many of the issues on UNCED's agenda required scientific knowledge and expert-
ise; and, not surprisingly, scientists perfonned important roles within the system of
negotiations that comprised the UNCED process. Scientific organizations, for exam-
ple, were called upon to provide crucial background infonnation that helped the
UNCED secretariat develop the conference's agenda and define the linkages
between environmental and developmental issues. However, the UNCED nego-
tiations were very traditional and firmly in the UN's mold: thus it was dominated
more by the professional culture of UN administrators and diplomats than by the
scientific community. In fact, Agenda 21 can be viewed as an instrument through
which scientific knowledge was transfonned into a uniquely UN frame of reference.
On the other hand, the parallel negotiations to develop a framework agreement on
climate change, as embodied in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), were dominated by scientists and a scientific professional culture.
This chapter and the following one portray the differing roles that scientists
played, and their relative influence on the UNCED process depending on their direct
or indirect levels of participation. In this chapter, the fonnal role bestowed on the
scientific community within the context of UNCED is described. Chapter 12
analyzes the impact of scientists on the climate change negotiations.
PREPARATIONS FOR UNCED
In September 1990, the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) was
invited by the Secretary General of UNCED to become the principal scientific
adviser to the conference. ICSU immediately took up this challenge and infonned
its national members of the UNCED process, encouraging them to be involved in
the national preparations for the Rio Conference and to ensure the inclusion of a
scientific perspective in the national submissions to the conference. While the direct
results of this are difficult to measure, it is clear that a number of national papers
were prepared that drew upon national scientific expertise, and several delegations
Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons Learned from the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (G. Sjiistedt, et al., eds.; 1-85966-077-0; © IIASA; pub. Graham & Trotman, 1994;
printed in Great Britain), pp. 171-180.
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to the Rio Conference itself included scientists. ICSU also provided the UNCED
secretariat with the names of independent experts, who either participated in the
preparations of key UNCED documents, notably of the chapters in Section II of
Agenda 21 on the "Conservation and Management of Resources for Development:'
or provided comments on the drafts of texts being prepared for Agenda 21.
ICSU was created in 1931 for the principal objective of promoting scientific coopera-
tion for the benefit of humanity. ICSU is international and nongovernmental, and con-
sists of two types of members: 23 disciplinary international Scientific Unions in fields
ranging from astronomy to immunology, and bodies from 92 nations that are academies
of science or national scientific bodies representing a wide range of scientific disci-
plines in a given territory. In addition, ICSU has 29 Scientific Associates in fields
that are not primarily within the scope of a single union, such as the information sci-
ences, cartography, cell and brain research, and applied systems analysis. Several Asso-
ciates represent regional bodies, such as the Third World Academy of Sciences
(TWAS), and similar organizations in Latin America, Asia, and the Pacific region.
ICSU members set up interdisciplinary bodies on problem areas that none of them
can address alone, and presently over 20 of these are in operation. Some of these on
oceanic, Antarctic, and space research date from the mid-1950s, while others - in
the areas of natural disasters, genetics, and biotechnology - are more recent. Of par-
ticular relevance to matters of environment and development are the Scientific Com-
mittee on Problems of the Environment, set up in 1969 to assemble, review, and
assess the information available on man-made environmental changes and the
effects of these on human beings. The International Geosphere-Biosphere Pro-
gramme: A Study of Global Change (lGBP) was established by ICSU in 1986 to
improve our knowledge of the dynamics of the biosphere influencing (and influ-
enced by) global environmental change. An important mission of IGBP is the
setting up of a System for Analysis, Research, and Training (START) that will
provide for the structure of networks, centers, and sites to address the regional
origins and impacts of global change. Other ICSU interdisciplinary bodies deal with
training and capacity building in science, and a special Committee deals with the
more general questions of Science and Technology in Developing Countries. This
Committee (COSTED) has a secretariat in Madras, and was established by ICSU in
1966 to act as an advisory body to ICSU on the range of ICSU activities in
developing countries.
ICSU also has numerous joint undertakings with other organizations. The Lecture-
ship Programme in Science and Sustainable Development is in cooperation with
TWAS, UNESCO, and the Commonwealth Science Council; the program for a coop-
erative network for the distribution of scientific literature (lNASP) is carried out with
TWAS and UNESCO. The International Biosciences Networks, with regional nodes
in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Arab region, is a joint ICSU - UNESCO under-
taking set up over 10 years ago, and the World Climate Research Programme is jointly
sponsored by ICSU, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), and the Inter-
governmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) of UNESCO. The recently estab-
lished Global Climate Observing System (GCOS) is jointly sponsored by ICSU,
WMO, IOC, and UNEP, and the complementary Global Ocean Observing System and
Global Terrestrial Observing System are sponsored by ICSU and several UN bodies. A
program devoted to the scientific aspects of biologycal diversity, DIVERSITAS, is
sposored by the ICSU Union on Biological Sciences (lUBS), the Scientific Committee
on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE), and UNESCO.
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In May 1990, a conference was held in Bergen, Norway, on "Sustainable Devel-
opment, Science and Policy." This conference, organized by the Norwegian
Research Council for Science and the Humanities and the European Science
Foundation, concluded that:
In order to ensure that the science community is actively and broadly involved in the
process leading up to the Brazil Conference, it is strongly recommended that a major
science conference be held 6 months in advance. This Conference should take the form
of a Global Science Summit. It should underscore the need for a comprehensive, yet
focussed scientific approach which is required to face up to the challenges put to the UN
Conference in 1992. Beyond Rio '92, the aim is to produce an enduring global research
and action agenda in the field of sustainable development.
Following this recommendation and other events bringing the scientific com-
munity closer to policy debates and decisions (notably the Second World Climate
Conference, held in Geneva in October 1990), the need to bring together the scien-
tific community's position regarding sustainable development became clear and
ICSU decided to organize the International Conference on An Agenda of Science for
Environment and Development into the 21st Century (ASCEND 21). The confer-
ence was held in Vienna in November 1991 with the co-sponsorship of other interna-
tional nongovernmental bodies (the Third World Academy of Sciences, the International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), the European Science Foundation,
the Norwegian Research Council for Science and the Humanities, the Norwegian
Academy of Science and Letters, the Stockholm Environment Institute, and the
International Social Sciences Council). The purpose of the ASCEND 21 conference
was to bring together the understanding and judgment of the world scientific com-
munity (encompassing natural, social, engineering, and health scientists) on the
issues of highest priority for the future of the environment and development so as to
define the agenda of science in these areas for the next to to 20 years. The outcome
was to provide both a consolidated contribution to the Rio Conference and a per-
spective for the future of international science in these and other related areas.
The ASCEND conference was attended by nearly 300 people from over 70 coun-
tries. Half of the participants came from developing countries, but each person
attended strictly on a personal basis. Conference papers were prepared in advance
on 16 themes addressing the problems of environment and development, the scien-
tific understanding of the Earth System, and the contribution of science to environ-
ment and development strategies. Teams of authors with complementary expertise
and experience (in most cases one from a developed country and another from a
developing country) prepared the papers, which were thoroughly discussed by
working groups in the conference and revised as a result of this review in order to be
a part of the final publication of the proceedings by Cambridge University Press
which was ready by May 1992, in time for the UN conference.
The themes of the ASCEND conference and the chapters in the publication are:
Problems ofEnvironment and Development:
Population and Natural Resource Use
Agriculture, Land Use and Degradation
Industry and Waste
Energy
Health
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Scientific Understanding ofthe Earth System:
Global Cycles
Atmosphere and Climate
Marine and Coastal Systems
Terrestrial Systems
Freshwater Resources
Biodiversity
Responses and Strategies:
Quality of Life
Public Awareness, Science, and the Environment
Capacity Building
Policies for Technology
Institutional Arrangements
RESULTS OF THE ASCEND 21 CONFERENCE
The ASCEND 21 conference provided a unique platform for the scientific com-
munity to reflect on the issues of environment and development and on the role of
science in finding solutions to these problems. The conference stressed a new com-
mitment on the part of the international scientific community as a whole to work
together so that improved and expanded scientific research, and the systematic
assessment of scientific results, combined with a prediction of impacts, would
enable policy options in environment and development to be evaluated on the basis
of sound scientific facts. It underlined the classical responsibility of all scholars to
undertake research, to publish the results, and to explain the implications for society.
It asserted that it is especially important to draw attention to the implications of what
is not known: indeed, the precautionary principle advocates that complex,
inadequately understood systems should be protected against disturbances until
further investigation has provided a scientific understanding of their vulnerability.
The conference also provided a model for a future modus operandi in which assess-
ment of scientific results serves as a basis for predicting impacts and formulating
policy options, leading to authoritative advice on the basis of international
consensus among scientists.
The ASCEND conference participants agreed on the nature of the major problems
that affect the environment and hinder sustainable development, and identified a
number of specific areas through which the scientific community could begin to
tackle those problems considered by ASCEND as being of the highest scientific
priority: population and per capita resource consumption; depletion of agricultural/
land resources; inequity and poverty, climate change; loss of biological diversity;
industrialization and waste; water scarcity; and energy consumption.
While each of the 16 scientific papers prepared for the ASCEND 21 conference
recommended specific action, the overall recommendations of the conference called
for:
(1) intensified research into natural and anthropogenic forces and their inter-
relationships, including the carrying capacity of the Earth and ways to slow
population growth and reduce over-consumption;
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(2) strengthened support for international global environmental research and
observations of the total Earth system;
(3) research and studies at the local and regional scale on: the hydrological cycle;
impacts of climate change; coastal zones; loss of biodiversity; vulnerability of
fragile ecosystems; impacts of changing land use, of waste, and of human
attitudes and behavior;
(4) research on transition to a more efficient energy supply and use of materials
and natural resources;
(5) special efforts in education and in building up of scientific institutions as well
as the involvement of a wide segment of the population in environment and
development problem solving;
(6) regular appraisals of the most urgent problems of environment and develop-
ment and communication with policy makers, the media, and the public;
(7) establishment of a forum to link scientists and development agencies, along
with a strengthened partnership with organizations charged with addressing
problems of environment and development;
(8) a wider review of environmental ethics.
Immediately after the ASCEND conference was concluded, the draft Chapter 35
of Agenda 21, entitled "Science for Sustainable Development," was revised and
subsequently adopted by UNCED. This chapter, which is in complete harmony with
the outcome of the ASCEND conference, has among its objectives the vigorous
implementation of the major on-going Earth System Research and Observation pro-
grams, as well as the strengthening of interdisciplinary cooperation among the natu-
ral, social, engineering, and health sciences. It further calls for periodic objective
scientific assessments of global issues and for clearly explaining scientific findings
to the general public and to policy makers. Throughout the text of this chapter and
the ASCEND proceedings, the total involvement of the scientific communities in the
North and the South is stressed.
INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER SCIENTIFIC BODIES IN UNCED
A large number of activities involving a variety of other scientific actors took place
before the Rio Conference, and these have been followed up since the conference.
No effort has yet been made to account for all of these, but some highlights will
suggest their pervasiveness. The joint program involving the World Federation of
Engineering Organization (WFEO), the International Federation of Independent
Consulting Engineers (FIDIC), and the Consortium for International Earth Science
Information Network (CIESIN), entitled "World Partnership for Sustainable Devel-
opment," was formally launched in Rio during UNCED. This program aims to
address the engineers' role in sustainable development through an interdisciplinary
partnership to engage in decision-making processes at all levels. The Third World
Academy of Sciences (TWAS) and the Third World Network of Scientific Organ-
izations (TWNSO) also began its Program for Sustainable Development, consisting
of a network of 20 international centers for science, technology, and the envir-
onment to provide a focus for international cooperation based in developing-
country institutes. The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)
and the Stockholm Environment Institute supported the secretariat and many
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working groups preparing UNCED. The World Conservation Union (mCN)
published Caring for the Earth: A Strategy for Sustainable Living just before
UNCED, and has been particularly active in the biodiversity-related follow-up activities.
The scientific agencies of the UN system also focused on sustainable
development during the preparatory years and continue to sharpen their
programs in this area. The Intergovernmental Meeting on the World Climate
Programme is a follow-up measure, as are the global observing systems that
have already been put in place.
OTHER PREPARATORY STEPS TOUNCED
ICSU was selected to represent the scientific community on the International Facili-
tating Committee for the Independent Sectors input to UNCED. This committee
facilitated discussion among nongovernmental organizations in preparation to the
UN conference. and organized the Global Forum of NGOs that took place in Rio de
Janeiro at the time of the conference. Although science did not have a particular role
to play at the Forum, there were a number of science-related symposia organized at
the Forum and several of the exhibitors were scientific bodies.
The group of accredited NGOs to the PrepComs, to the Global Forum, and to
UNCED was too heterogeneous for most practical purposes, as it included both
organizations having objective study as their aim, so as to present a rational basis for
policy decisions, as well as those that are pressure groups, and religious organ-
izations that aim to influence decisions in the direction they see as the best one. All
have their legitimacy, but scientific organizations lose their credibility if they are
seen in the same category as action groups. ICSU, as also numerous other non-
governmental organizations, was present at each of the PrepCom meetings for
UNCED and was able to address two of these sessions. In Rio, the president of
ICSU, Professor M.G.K. Menon, gave a speech to the UNCED Plenary on behalf of
the scientific community, sharing this privilege with 12 out of the 1420 accredited
NGOs.
In opening his speech, Professor Menon spoke of the catalytic role of science in
the UNCED process and in the future sustainable development regime:
It is important to stress that it is the scientific community working over several decades
on these questions which has brought these aspects to the notice of society. It is this
which has led to the increase in public awareness so that people and governments, for
the first time in history, are devoting a large part of their time to the global environment
and the impact of human activities on it. It is this which has been the basis for the Cli-
mate and Biodiversity Conventions which have been placed before the nations of the
world to adhere to, as also for the Montreal Protocol on Ozone.... In the light of this, the
scientific community has a responsibility, which it is fulfilling, to provide more precise
information on the current status of planet Earth, particularly in respect of the key
aspects which define its well-being, and to monitor the changes that are being brought
through increased human activities. For all of this we now have available powerful tools
of earth observation satellites, oceanographic capabilities, computers for storing access-
ing and handling vast amounts of data, sophisticated instrumentation and the like. It's
not enough only to monitor changes. It is further necessary to model the nature of the
change, reduce uncertainties and provide an analysis which will tell humanity where it is
going. For all of this scientific work will need to be supported - for only it can provide
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an understanding of where we are, in which direction we are going, what are the likely
consequences and how we might avoid pathways that can be dangerous.
THE OUTCOME OF UNCED AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY
Rio Declaration
While this declaration does not contain a specific reference to the essential role of
scientific research of the Earth System in providing a basis for policies for sus-
tainable development, this may be remedied in an Earth Charter based on the Rio
Declaration, to be prepared during the coming years.
Agenda 21
Many of its sectoral chapters (9-22), such as those on the atmosphere, land resources,
oceans, freshwater resources, biodiversity, biotechnology, and toxic chemicals, are
specifically relevant to the scientific community, which would be well advised to
take note of these so as to establish its role in the execution of Agenda 21.
Several other chapters are of substantial importance:
Chapter 35 on "Science for Sustainable Development," in harmony with the
ASCEND results, encourages the strengthening of partnerships with other NGOs,
intergovernmental organizations, and with industry. The need for capacity building
in science receives strong emphasis, and of special importance is the proposal for
increased interaction between science and decision making: "Strengthen and design
appropriate institutional mechanisms at the highest appropriate local, national, sub-
regional and regional levels and within the UN system for developing a stronger sci-
entific basis for the improvement on environmental and developmental policy
formulation consistent with long term goals of sustainable development" (quoted
from para 35.7.C). The total annual cost for implementing chapter 35 was earlier
estimated at $1.8 billion; at UNCED, this estimate was increased to $2.9 billion.
Chapter 31 on the "Scientific and Technology Community" further elaborates the
desired collaboration between science, policy making, and public information; it
also calls for an examination of the ethical basis for conducting science and tech-
nology and the development of codes of practice, where appropriate, in addition to
those already in existence.
Chapter 36 on "Promoting Education, Public Awareness and Training" and Chapter
37 on "National Mechanisms and International Cooperation for Capacity Building
in Developing Countries" both call for a major strengthening of on-going bilateral
as well as multilateral efforts so as to make achievement of sustainable development
possible. In this regard, UNDP's recent report on "Human Development" prepared
as an input to UNCED is also highly relevant to the scientific community's plans in
capacity building.
Chapter 38 on "International Institutional Arrangements," in general, advocates the
use of existing mechanisms to ensure implementation of Agenda 21, but there are
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some significant exceptions: the setting up of a high-level commission on
sustainable development to monitor and guide progress on Agenda 21 's imple-
mentation; strengthening of the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC)
of the UN organizations and extension of its mandate; a strengthened role of UNEP
with respect to scientific research; development of procedures to expand the co-
operation between the UN system and NGOs. In addition, the possibility is being
opened for setting up a high-level advisory board to advise the Secretary General of
the UN on matters of environment and development.
Conventions on Climate Change and on Biodiversity
These each contain clauses that call for appropriate scientific advisory support to the
"Conferences of the Parties." It is hoped that, as much as possible, existing mechan-
isms will be relied upon. An indication to this effect was the recent proposal to the
Executive Council of the WMO to involve the IPCC as support to the Framework
Convention on Climate Change. Plans for future action on forests and desertification
also require adequate scientific support for their further elaboration into conventions
or other legal instruments.
In general it can be said that both UNCED and ASCEND call for a stronger role
of science in policy making, and better interaction with policy makers and the
general public. Of particular significance is the clear demand for independent,
nongovernmental scientific advice on global issues and capacity building.
WHAT HAS BEEN LEARNED AND WHAT ARE THE
CHALLENGES AHEAD?
For the first time, through the UNCED process, the best available knowledge about
the status of the Earth System, its carrying capacity, the changes occurring in it, and
its responses to human action has been recognized as an essential ingredient for the
design of international policies and strategies for achieving sustainable develop-
ment. Policy makers need scientists to give them the best available knowledge, and
scientists have to carry out systematic world-wide investigations to respond ad-
equately and in a timely manner. Thus, science has received a new mandate and is no
longer driven solely by curiosity and the benefits of application in industry, agri-
culture, defense, and health care. Science is now also looked upon as the provider of
policy frameworks, set by the limits and opportunities of the Earth System, for the
development and survival of humankind.
Over the past ten years, through the Montreal Protocol (1987), the IPCC (1988),
and UNCED (1992), this demand structure for best available scientific knowledge has
been given shape. The IPCC serves as the "sensor" for the latest scientific information
as a basis for decision making in climate change issues, while the international agree-
ments on the ozone layer, on biodiversity, and others that follow each have their own
scientific advisory groups to the relevant "Conference of the Parties." The Com-
mission on Sustainable Development of the UN and indeed, the Secretary General
himself, will have scientific advisory mechanisms. The Earth Council, a new
independent authoritative body, will provide scientific information and assessment in
addition to its tasks of following and facilitating the implementation of Agenda 21.
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On the supply side, the scientific community has the responsibility to generate the
required scientific information. Several countries have already stimulated global
change research programs and these have been woven together into a coherent inter-
national framework. Thus, several major international research programs are now in
place that together comprehensively investigate the most urgent global issues. These
are the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme, the World Climate Research
Programme, and the Human Dimensions of Environmental Change Programme,
along with the two supporting observing systems: the Global Climate Observing
System and the Global Ocean Observing System, with a Global Terrestrial Observ-
ing System being planned. In order for the Earth System Research Programme to
succeed, the participation of scientists from all countries is required. This is not only
because reliable measurements, data collection, and field experiments from all parts
of the globe are needed, but, especially as called for by UNCED, because every
country must be able to rely on its own corps of scientists in taking action on the
basis of Earth System Research results, nationally or internationally. This is only
possible if an adequate proportion of these scientists have participated in the
research in question.
Thus, both on the demand and on the supply side, regrouping is taking place of
existing structures that merge with newly set-up bodies so as to arrive at the desired
outcome as prescribed by UNCED. It seems clear that UNCED, however govern-
mental a conference it was, would have been very different had it not had such
active participation from the various sectors in the independent arena. However, the
success was only moderate, and could have been improved with additional time and
effort spent - in this case, by the scientific community - on the preparations.
The most important lessons for the scientific community (as for the others) is that
it should have started its interactions with the UNCED process even earlier than it
did, and it should have thoroughly familiarized itself with the rules of the game so
that its interactions with the preparatory machinery would have been easier. While
scientists still have some way to go toward achieving a smoother communication
with the general public and decision makers, if they want to influence the intergov-
ernmental process, they will also need to learn to communicate in the particular
mode of the UN. Learning this language is not always viewed as a pleasant or rel-
evant task, but it is a prerequisite for even moderate success. In addition to learning
the language, a constant presence would have been required in the preparatory pro-
cess, and very few of the large NGOs were willing to devote so much time (or
funds) to what they saw as an uncertain investment. It was important to keep the
concern of science constantly in front of the governmental participants in the Prep-
Coms, and this was probably not done as systematically as it should have been.
Thus, the individual interventions by representatives of scientific bodies were not
always heard and, even if the message got through, by the time a document was
produced, the message was watered down to an unrecognizable entity.
In order to achieve a more influential role in the UNCED process, the scientific
community might have tried to achieve short-term coordination by joining forces
with bodies such as ICSU, together with existing partners such as IUCN and IIASA,
and with new partners representing engineers and social scientists. This might have
given a higher profile to the cause of science, but it is not certain whether the end
result would have been so different. The basic problem is that the scientific com-
munity is an independent, nongovernmental effort, while UNCED was organized by
the UN for governments. Communication and coordination between these very
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different types of bodies is not easy. Given these basic differences of approach,
however, the inputs by scientists can be said to have been moderately successful.
It is probably more important to take the road from Rio and to not lose sight of the
commitments made in the preparation to Rio. ICSU, as well as the other bodies
referred to earlier, is translating the agenda set by ASCEND 21 in Vienna and by
UNCED at Rio into specific actions to be undertaken either by ICSU alone or with
its partners. In this, there is a special commitment to work with the scientific
communities in developing countries to ensure that sustainable development pro-
grams at the national level are based both on sound science and on local needs, and
can therefore become a part of larger international programs.
,
I
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Scientific Uncertainty and Power Politics: The
Framework Convention on Climate Change and
the Role of Scientific Advice!
Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen
Although the negotiations concerning global climate change transpired in a different
forum, albeit concurrently with the UNCED negotiations, many of the issues, con-
troversies, and debates were common to both. In a sense, the climate change nego-
tiations could be considered the first to fall within the context of the sustainable
development regime created by UNCED. After all, the framework convention was
signed at Rio and was deemed to be a central outcome of the overall UNCED pro-
cess. While the impact of the international scientific community at UNCED proper
was somewhat vague and problematic (see Chapter II), its influence on the climate
change negotiations was not only catalytic in terms of initially identifying to policy
makers the problems, but pivotal in relation to framing the issues, defining likely
solutions, and actively encouraging the negotiations themselves. This chapter
analyzes the role of scientists and scientific organizations as principal actors in the
climate change negotiations.
There is a new scientific universalism in the sense that:
(l) Scientific research is broadening its disciplinary base and interconnectedness
as it attempts to understand and model the earth as a unified system; this now
includes man as an agent of physical change. The natural science community
has long been globally organized and influential. It is strengthening and
expanding this influence by both identifying and challenging powerful
environmental threat perceptions, especially those of climate change.
(2) Research institutions are making claims that they are able to predict the future
"scientifically." While these claims remain suspect - recognized but not always
IThis chapter is ba~ed on a two-year project: "The Formulation and Impact of Scientific Advice on
Global Climate Change. " Ref. No. Y320 25 3030, funded by the UK Economic and Social Research
Council. The author wishes to thank the UK Department of the Environment and the Hadley Centre for
Climate Research at the UK Met Office. and the secretariat of the IPCC Working Group I for their
cooperation, as well as many scientists and policy makers in several countries who granted interviews.
Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons Learned from the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (G. Sjostedt. et 01., eds.; J -85966-077-0; © IlASA; pub. Graharn & Trotman. 1994;
printed in Great Britain), pp. 181-198.
181
182 NEGOTIATING INTERNATIONAL REGIMES
admitted by the scientific community itself - such claims become independent
international and national actors over which science soon loses control.
(3) Threat perceptions and images of the future, once released into the world of polit-
ics and commerce, take on a life of their own and it is how they fare there, rather
than scientific knowledge as such, that determines policy responses. Scientific
knowledge alone is unable to initiate more than further research agendas.
I hope to support this argument by relating the climate treaty (the outcome) with
the activities of the scientific community, explored through the origin, activities, and
research networks associated with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC). This panel is responsible for making major contributions to the debate that
led to the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC).
THE CLIMATE CONVENTION
The FCCC is described as one of the major achievements of UNCED. The primary
purpose of this gathering of people and governments was political: governments that
considered themselves "poor" wanted to obtain some commitment to a transfer of
resources from the "rich" in the name of sustainable development, a vague concept
that everybody had previously accepted as a global "norm." Those considered to be
rich tried to weaken this demand or satisfy it within strict limits and on stated con-
ditions. By proving useful to both sides, the institutions of science (having organ-
ized themselves around the IPCC) had the opportunity to raise their profile and
expand their influence.
The FCCC was agreed upon after only two years of negotiation by an Inter-
governmental Negotiating Committee (INC), set up in 1990 and instructed to take
into account the scientific consensus developed by the IPCe. The Convention consists
of 26 articles and is now open for signature. It will come into force when 50 countries
have ratified. The UK, the EC, Japan, and the United States have all ratified - the United
States only agreed to comply after the language of the treaty was significantly
weakened. It came into force when 50 countries had ratified in March 1994.
The Convention is what it claims to be, a framework agreement that allows com-
mon future action if the parties to the Convention desire it, and recommends com-
mon but differentiated national action. It does not impose a World Meteorological
Order on the community of states. There is no agreement to reduce carbon dioxide
emissions by a certain percentage at a certain date, as had been desired by a rather
unholy alliance of lobbies and interests during the late 1980s.
Environmentalists and their supporters in the scientific community were disappointed
by this outcome and angry with the Bush administration, a reaction that reflects both
political naivety and an excessive faith in the power of scientific evidence to compel
action. Also disappointed, but for different reasons, were many European countries,
including the nuclear industry and the promoters of renewable energy sources. They had
hoped for a tougher treaty for reasons of energy and trade policy.
During the negotiations, the United States acted as a defender of Third World
interests, a fitting role to the extent that fossil fuel and especially oil price increases
would have had a disastrous impact on these economies. The European attempt to
have a carbon tax seriously discussed failed, even inside IPCC, as did the attempt to
have a protocol on forests linked to the Climate Treaty.
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The origin of the FCCC is not straightforward. After initial calIs from "independ-
ent" scientists in 1985, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) had calIed for the prep-
aration of a framework convention in 1988 containing appropriate commitments for
actions to combat climate change, taking into account the most up-to-date sound
scientific knowledge and any existing uncertainties (Churchill and Freestone, 1992:
240-9). The UN Environment Programme (UNEP), headed by Dr. Mostafa Tolba,
had hoped that the FCCC, like the Montreal Protocol on ozone depletion, would
remain the responsibility of UNEP and the World Meteorological Organizations
(WMO).
However, in late 1990 UNGA made the issue its own (Resolution 451212 on
protection of global climate for present and future generations of mankind) by estab-
lishing the INC under the auspices of the General Assembly, supported by UNEP
and the WMO, and by "taking into account (inter alia) the work of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change." The ad hoc secretariat of the INC was: "to
cooperate closely [with the wcq to ensure that the panel can respond to the needs
and requests for objective scientific and technical advice made during the nego-
tiating process." No such requests were made.
This removed the climate negotiations from UNEP and WMO, probably to the
relief of WMO but not UNEP. The influence of UNEP's important nongovernmental
allies (globalIy organized environmental lobbies and research institutes), as well as
the impact of the scientific consensus it had helped to negotiate informalIy inside
WCC, were weakened. Instead, the climate issue was negotiated as part of the wider
UNCED bargain, which in turn led to new tactics being adopted by science
organizations.
The FCCC was subsequently negotiated. Rather than becoming an agenda for
global action, it primarily codified and legitimated the global change research efforts
organized by the natural sciences community, with minor inputs from the social
sciences.2 This was surely a major achievement for Global Science, especially the
diagnostic disciplines (natural, economic, and demographic).
This global research agenda is now in able hands, although serious funding prob-
lems remain. 3 These problems would increase were the climate threat to become too
weak to be of concern to politics. While not arguing against the implementation of
this agenda, it is arguable (on the basis of previous analyses of international envir-
onmental policy responses) that perfection in diagnostics does not lead directly, or
easily, to regulation and remedial action (Boehmer-Christiansen, I 992a).
Effective policy responses require a far better understanding of society than is
assumed in the linear thinking that underlies international (UNEP/WMO) thinking
on environmental policy making. This proceeds from an understanding of the physi-
cal problems, to the prediction and economic evaluation of effects, and hence to the
2For details, see ICSUIIGBP, Reducing Uncertainties. Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences,
Stockholm, 1992, which outlines one part of this research program, and WMOIICSU, Global Climate
ChLlnge: A scientific review presented by the World Climate Research Programme. Geneva, 1990.1. Jager
and H.L. Fergusan, Climate ChLlnge: Science. Impacts and Policy: Proceedings of the Second World
Climate Conference. contains an overview of the WCRP by P. Morel: 163-9. Concerning the partial
failure of the social sciences to join this effort, and a split in the social sciences over the linkage with the
natural sciences, see M.F. Price, "The Evolution of Global Environmental Change: Issues, Research,
Pror.arnmes,' Impact of Science on Society. no. 166, UNESCO, 1992.
As reported in recent issues of The Globe (UK newsletter from the Research Councils' Global
Change Office), the Global ChLlnge Newsletter from the IGBP secretariat in Stockholm, and the German
newsletter Global Change Prism.
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technocratic definition of responses options. Actions taken in response are imple-
mented at the national level and below, consequently remaining poorly linked to the
global agenda, which has indeed little to offer but the transfer of ever more know-
ledge and, hopefully, technology.4
The above arguments will be supported with evidence from the FCCC itself, and
then by a closer analysis of the "IPCC process."
THE IPCC AND ITS ORIGIN: INSTITUTIONS OF SCIENCE AND
CLIMATE CHANGE
A Long History
The scientific discussion of climate change brought about by the emission of carbon
dioxide and other trace gases emitted by human activities can be traced back to the
nineteenth century. It reappeared in the 1930s, the late 1950s, the mid-1960s, the
late 1970s, and finally, successfully, in the mid-1980s (Weart, 1992). In 1965,
the US President's Science Advisory Council had claimed that supercomputers
would be able to make useful predictions down to the regional level within a few
years; thirty years later this task had still not been accomplished (McCracken,
1992). During the late 1970s, some scientifically interested diplomats studied the
subject and decided that it had the makings of a major task for global diplomacy.S
The Americans in particular began to invest large amounts of money in related
scientific research, much of it financed by the Departments of Defense, Energy, and
Commerce, and undertaken in large science research laboratories.6 In 1980, the
Climate Program of the International Federation of Institutes of Advanced Study
(IFIAS) and the Aspen Institute (in Germany and the United States) tried to attract
attention to the issue.
At the national level, therefore, early expressions of concern can be found - e.g.,
in the United States, UK and Germany - but these were not effectively com-
municated to the global policy system, surely not because the scientific community
did not have the "agreed" evidence that governments seemed to demand about the
sign of a possible climate change. The Aspen workshops raise the question of why
this early "warning" was not picked up. This was due to a lack of convergence with
global and major national energy policies. Hence the politics of global wanning
changed significantly when energy prices ceased rising, and the world began facing
not an energy "crisis," but an energy glut. The Reagan and Bush administration later
4There are welcoming signs that this is slowly being recognized by the experts on climate change.
especially those that are beginning to address political, cultural. and behavioral issues rather than science
and technology, e.g. G.!. Peannan (ed.), "Limiting Greenhouse Effects: Controlling Carbon Dioxide
Emissions," Dahlem Workshop Reports. Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 1992.
SHere Crispin Tickell proved to be a significant influence and link between the global and national
levels, as well as between science and world politics. He persuaded Margaret Thatcher in 1987 that the
issue was worthy of her attention, which in turn brought about major policy changes in the UK. See
Climatic Change and World Affairs. Center for International Affairs. Harvard University Press, 1977,
revised in 1986. were he tells how the first effort of science to have climate change research funded was
not very successful.
6NASA is a large beneficiary of this spending under its Earth Observation System.
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decided that the climate threat was being exaggerated for political purposes, and
hence stalled negotiations with "science."
The climate threat in support of nuclear power made its public appearance in the
UK in 1981, but even earlier in West Germany. By 1983 confidence that oil/energy
prices would continue to rise was declining, and energy demand growth was also
slowing. In February 1986, oil prices fell sharply.
By 1985, a group of American and European scientists therefore had another go,
this time from a more congenial European base (see Villach below). They did so
again on the basis of predictions derived from global climate modeling experiments.
The environmental research groups and eminent environmental scientists who
brought the climate threat to the attention of the world did so with the support of a
number of governments, but above all that of UNEP, WMO, and ICSU.7 The same
institutions had been involved in the Aspen workshops, but without the same level
of support from environmentalist organizations.
The diffusion of the climate threat perception from the scientific to the political
community followed, and was largely the achievement of the BrundtIand Report and
UNEP. The former was published in 1987, with the US government, not the
American environmental research lobby, but weakly represented. In 1988 Margaret
Thatcher made her "green" speech to the British Royal Society, and very shortly
afterwards the IPCC was formally set up by WMO and UNEP. Many international
conferences (e.g., Bergen, Toronto, Hamburg, Tokyo) were then organized by the
scientific community, together with a growing number of governmental and non-
governmental actors. By 1990, as an outcome of the Second World Climate Con-
ference, governments accepted the need for a climate treaty based on scientific
advice. The INC was set up, and the IPCC began preparing its "update" for
UNCED.
Villach 1985 - Looking for a Partnership between Thinkers and Doers
In 1985 a coalition of research and energy interests met in a small Austrian village at
the invitation of a handful of independent scientists who wanted to provide both the
"proof' of the threat and the solution. This group of Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian
scientists came from a range of institutions, several of them deeply involved in
environmental advocacy. They were largely self-selected, and uninhibited about tell-
ing governments what they ought to be doing. They had made up their mind that
"global warming" was an issue demanding immediate policy responses. The ViIlach
meeting was the first gathering to propose the idea of a climate convention.
From the institutional perspective, this meeting is of considerable interest. It was
called by the Committee on the Scientific Problems of the Environment (SCOPE), a
member of the ICSU, UNEP, (working on climate impacts since 1979) and WMO
(researching climate change since 1979). At this meeting the Advisory Group on
Greenhouse Gases (AGGG) was set up by some of the participants under the chair-
manship of the director of what is now known as the Stockholm Environment Insti-
tute (SEI). The AGGG met again, with less publicity and impact in 1987, but then
7 Important newcomers among the environmental research institutes were the Stockholm Environment
(formerly Beijer) Institute. which is strongly supported by the Swedish government. and the American
World Resources Defense Council (not popular with Washington because of its aggressive advocacy of
energy policy changes). The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Austria
remained a loyal supporter. but IFIAS ha~ fallen by the wayside
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dissolved itself. It can be considered to be the nongovernmental precursor of the
IPCe. The individuals involved came to be major participants in the global publicity
and conferencing effort (Toronto, Bergen, Second World Climate Conference)
(Paterson, 1992) that followed this meeting and continues until today.8
The widely cited SCOPE 29 Report (Bolin, Warrick, oo6s, and Jager, 1986) had
been commissioned by the organizers of this 1985 Villach meeting and was to become
"the bible" of IPCC's scientific assessment. Although the AGGG itself faded, SCOPE
29 is judged to be the highly influential product of a small number of people carefully
selected by a handful of individuals with strong environmental credentials and large
needs for research funds. The dominance of Anglo-Saxon environmental science is
revealed, a dominance that is carried over to the IPCC and can be traced not only to
the ability of government scientists (a purely Anglo-Saxon species) to draft scientific
and political documents (in the English language), but also to their close institutional
and personal links with government and academic research.
These AGGG scientists were familiar with climate modeling and the scientific
understanding of climate, as well as with the needs of UNEP, one of their funding
agencies. Very importantly, through ICSU/WMO, and the International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) with its modeling facilities and links to Eastern
Europe, this group was able to network with a broad peer group community of natural
scientists for support and peer review.9 There were strong personal links between
them, the recently established World Commission on Environment and Development
(WCED) and IIASA. 10 As primarily "soft money" organizations relying on govern-
mental and NGO/foundation support, these institutions are necessarily drawn toward
policy advocacy by their needs for clients.
The success of the AGGG was largely the result of the ability of nongovemmental
institutions to form a coalition with "new" interests, environmental and energy related,
that shared the presumption in favor of a serious climate threat and the conviction that
emissions from fossil fuel combustion should, and could, be reduced. Through per-
sonal commitments and institutional linkages, the nuclear power lobby had joined the
debate. Wolf Hafele and R.w. White, major figures in the climate story, were able to
link this threat to technology advocacy.
UNEP AND THE WeED
After Villach, between 1985 and 1987, the climate threat and the idea of a treaty was
disseminated through the activities and impact of both UNEP and the Brundtland
8A recent gathering of climate change experts included many of these activists or their proteges. Their
approaches. commitments. and research interests are documented in G.T. Pearman (ed.), "Limiting
Greenhouse Effects: Controlling Carbon Dioxide Emissions," Dahlem Workshop Reports,Wiley & Sons,
Chichester, 1992.
9 UNEP and WMO have major research programs related to climate change that they could bring to
the attention of politics, UNEP having used the climate threat since the mid-1970s to enhance its own role
and bring North and South together. WMO began developing its research agenda for climate change in
1979, with major inputs from several scientific unions belonging to ICSU. Its main practical concern,
however, was a better understanding of the predictability of climatic variability.
10 IIASA was very important as a meeting place for scientists from East and West who could "unite"
in "value-free" modeling experiments. It had well established global models for energy demand and
agricultural patterns that could be linked to climate change data. For IIASA's continuing interest in
energy, climate, and environment, see Annual Report, 1991.
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Report. The Brundtland Report was the product of fi ve years of consultation and
writing by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED, 1987).
When the WCED picked up the climate threat and advocated changes in energy pol-
icy, it did so as part of its proposed North-South negotiations for "sustainable devel-
opment," In this, UNEP was its major ally. Personal links existed not only between
the WCED and the environmental research community, but also with UNEP - for
example, Mostafa Tol ba was one of the directors of the Beijer Institute (now SEI).
The WCED was chaired by the Norwegian Prime Minister Mrs Brundtland, head
of a country very active in selling its natural gas, widely recommended as an
environment-friendly, carbon dioxide-reducing fuel. I I The WCED was attracted to
the global warming threat because it seemed to provide the moral issue around
which North and South could develop an agenda for sustainability and technology
transfer, and thus the energy policies of many countries could be reorganized in a
more rational way. The willingness of WCED to "use" the threat of global warming
in order to unite mankind against a common threat to its "security" had for some
time been given publicity by UNEP (Tolba, 1982).
In his speeches, Mostafa Tolba had mentioned energy and the need for better
climate forecasting in 1974 without any reference to global warming. By 1979, how-
ever, when addressing the First World Climate Conference, he referred to climate
change, the well-documented increase of carbon dioxide, and "the process of carrying
out uncontrolled experiments on the earth's atmosphere" (Tolba, 1982: 99). He
assured his audience that UNEP was ready to carry out its role in the important area of
assessing the environmental impacts of increased levels of carbon dioxide.
This concern was to provide the links with the World Meteorological Organization's
climate research program from which IPCC would emerge. ICSU had long collabo-
rated with WMO, and shared with it a concern for developing countries and their abil-
ity to contribute to data collection and monitoring. This meant that the research
network in which IPCC could embed itself was already taking shape.
A major convergence of environmental threat perceptions, science research
agendas, and commercial interest had taken place, and provided the political energy
for the climate negotiations. This proved irresistible to many world leaders during the
declining days of the Soviet Empire. Soviet scientists still played a major role, albeit a
diminishing one, during the next stage, the IPCC process.
THE IPCC AND THE GIVING OF SOUND ADVICE
Its Origin
Once taken up by the nongovernmental AGGG and the WCED, the idea of a climate
treaty would need testing and evaluating by more trusted experts. This demand was
particularly loudly voiced by developing countries who had no means of independ-
ent assessment, and rightly feared the political implications of any attempts to
control their economic activities. The world now needed an IPCC; fortunately, a
rudimentary body already existed.
II While Norway knew of its gas wealth during the 1970s, the need for secure markets became more
urgent in the mid-1980s along with the wish to develop expensive new fields.
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A Panel on Climate Change had been set up by WMO at its 1987 Congress: "to
provide the international assessment that would enable the Directors of National
Meteorological Services to advise their governments on the evidence for and nature
of, the climate threat and what they might do about it." It is virtually certain that
none of those involved in developing the concept of the IPCC foresaw the speed
with which it would take off or the depth of the international Pandora's box that it
would throw open. 12
WMO in particular was surprised by the attention paid to the IPCC after it was
formally established in 1988 as a joint UNEPIWMO body. WMO had become con-
cerned that UNEP would "run with" the idea of global warming without science. 13
It would bring with it good links with ICSU and governments, especially meteoro-
logical offices. ICSU could channel influence through national research bodies, such
as the Royal Society and NERC in the UK, the National Science Foundation in the
United States, and CSIRO in Australia. WMO's voice therefore proved to be a
powerful one, but it belonged primarily to that of the natural science community.
UNEP tried to balance this bias by closer links with nongovernmental organizations
and research institutes, such as SEI and IIASA (see below), although here too the
"number crunchers" and natural scientists dominated.
Tasks and Membership
IPCC is not a research organization, but one through which the institutions of
science can present their knowledge claims and agendas to governments. Its job was
to gather and evaluate "sound" knowledge and then draw advice from it, two very
different tasks. More precisely, IPCC was asked:
(1) to assess available scientific information on climate change (WMO/lCSU
expertise);
(2) assess environmental and socio-economic impacts of climate change (UNEP
expertise);
(3) formulate response strategies (UNEP/governments' expertise).
IPCC was not asked to inquire about the "socio-economic," or even political/
philosophical, causes of climate change, nor about the political obstacles that might
have to be overcome during implementation. The institutions behind IPCC could not
have handled such questions.
IPCC came to consist of scientists selected by WMO, ICSU, and UNEP in con-
sultation with governments, as well as appointed scientists and government officials,
who would meet in four working groups in the relatively open environment that is
typical of UN bodies (see Figure 12.1). While the selection of members of two of its
working groups was largely, but by no means always, left to the initially selected
experts themselves, the third working group became a forum mainly for government
people and lobbyists, and hence where politicization became sharpest. This was
intensified by the need for collaboration between Working Groups I and III, because
Working Group I had been instructed to accept emission data and scenarios
12A view from an unpublished paper by W.J. Teggart (Australia's principal delegate to (PCC and vice
chairman of Working Group II) and J.w. Zillman (director of the Commonwealth Bureau of
Meteorology, WMO delegate, and alternate IPCC delegate).
13(nterviews.
I
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Figure 12.1 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 1988)
from, de facto, government sources. This soon proved to be a major issue of irrita-
tion, as the needs and values of the two working groups differed considerably, with
the emission projections themselves becoming political tools. 14
14 From IPee files and intelViews. For a devastating assessment of the weakness of the Working
Group III report as a list of platitudes. which also accuses the whole IPee thinking of being affected by
"technological determinism." making socio-economic issues relevant only for impacts (not as causes).
and for responses. see Howard Newby (chairman of the UK ESRC). Robbin's lecture presented at the
University of Stirling, 4 November 199 I.
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From observation, the IPCC had to engage in four quite different activities:
(1) gathering (or even initiating) the "latest" and best science, by bringing together
scientists and their research results, using publications and global research
networks where they existed;
(2) translating and structuring this vast amount of often rather discrete and
itemized knowledge, into chapters of reports that were readable and spoke to
the educated non-expert;
(3) further condensing this summarized knowledge into something shorter and
more simple, i.e., preparing "summaries" for policy makers and the world's
media. 15
(4) having to observe the fate of summarized knowledge, defend, or adjust it in
extended plenary sessions before government representatives and diverse
lobbyists.
The products of these tasks were an overview, policy makers' summaries, and
three full reports, each of which was updated just prior to UNCED. All these tasks
were difficult and enormously valuable, requiring dedication and experience, as well
as national resources. This expertise could only come from the experienced
"government" scientists so typical of the Anglo-Saxon countries that came to
dominate, especially the third process. These countries therefore had a chance of
instilling the advice given to UNEP and the UN not only with their own concepts,
but also with their implicit environmental philosophy, a philosophy that strength-
ened the emphasis on research rather than action (Boehmer-Christiansen, 1992b).
Scientists and diplomats mingled to legitimate (or not) the "scientific consensus,"
previously agreed among the working group chairmen and their closest advisers.
This initially disturbed scientists, but proved a most valuable experience. IPCC had
to negotiate and become "diplomatic," if only to defend its own integrity.
Structure and Process
Most IPCC work was done in its many working groups and sub-groups assisted by
a small secretariat, based in Geneva under the chairmanship of a distinguished and
politically experienced climate scientist from Sweden, Professor Bert Bolin, who
had long experience in WMO/lCSU research management.
The group chairmen, appointed by governments at the suggestion of WMOI
UNEP, divided this enormous task according to scientific logic in a rather linear and
deterministic (or perhaps rational) way. From scientific theory and available
observational evidence to the prediction of the future (Working Group I under a
British chairman, Sir John Houghton), the advisory process would lead to pre-
dictions of impacts (Working Group II under a Soviet chairman, Yuri Izrael), and
hence to strategies or options from which governments could select the most
suitable ones (Working Group ill under a US chairman, F. Bernthal).
Draft reports written by lead-authors selected from the working groups would be
distributed to peers and governments, again discussed on the basis of comments
received, and adopted by consensus, if possible, at IPCC Plenary Sessions. The
working groups and sub-groups were to receive very different degrees of help from
national governments, reflecting not only government policy, but also the ability of
15See IPCC Reports of 1990, their executive summaries. and 1992 updates.
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the relevant national bodies, with NGO and UN assistance, to relate their expertise
to the interests of government departments.
Working Group III became the major forum for prenegotiations and conflicts, but
also proved to be of most interest and use to governments, especially those not
blessed with an independent domestic supply of "sound" science. Working Group
III was always in danger of falling foul of politicians, and hence found consensus
formation more difficult than Working Groups I and II. It did not get sufficient sup-
port from all governments. Preexisting research networks were often green think
tanks and only considered government-friendly if governments wanted their sup-
port. 16
Only Working Groups I and II (chaired by WMOIICSU scientists with many
years' experience both in research and government) could rely on existing interna-
tional research networks to sustain them and have their work "peer-reviewed" in a
way that resembles the methods of an academic community. The less fortunate
Working Group III could not rely on a similar network, and probably would have
been suspicious had such networks existed. Its primary value was therefore at the
national level, especially the extent to which it could bring the relevant govern-
mental bodies together for strategic thinking. One policy question arising from all
three working groups is why there was such a concentration on the reduction of
carbon dioxide emissions.
Too Much Uncertainty for Policy Making
The perception of the problem and how it would be solved by regulation and tech-
nology change thus directly determined the structure of the Panel. Yet the logic of
IPCe's tripartite structure was soon causing difficulties as a result of the uncertain-
ties facing scientists and emission experts. Working Group II could not really come
to firm conclusions until Working Group I had reported facts sufficiently robust for
governments to feel that they had to act, e.g. by reducing emissions, arranging trade-
offs between different greenhouse gases or responding by increasing sinks rather
than reducing sources. Working Group III in turn was dependent on the assessment
of conclusions reached by Working Group II, yet the links between them were weak.
Firm knowledge was not available by 1990, or 1992, although an embattled scien-
tific community held out promises of knowing enough in another decade or so.17 In
1990, model outputs remained too poor for regional breakdowns of climate change,
and by 1992 only slight improvements were reported.
The underlying assumption of UNEP when setting up Working Groups II and III
appears to have been the belief that sufficient knowledge was already available, but
this would have made the existence of Working Group I rather superfluous! UNEP
and WMO had got themselves into a muddle, but common institutional interests pre-
vailed over logic. Uncertainty was, however, built into the substance as well as the
structure, and increased as the IPCC process moved along the "straight line" from
science to response. It is not surprising, therefore, that a science-based policy
perception should produce a treaty that is largely a research agenda.
16UNEP probably overstepped its own capacities when it set this group up. or lacked political
awareness when it a~sumed that this group would remain in the hands of its environmental experts.
17The Chairman of Working Group I firmly believed that climate predictions would be sufficiently
developed to policy by 2005.
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With regard to the IPCC process having the capacity to stimulate further research
efforts, the potential was enormous and its effectiveness related to the ability of
IPCC scientists to link up with national institutions and encourage them. In the
countries studied in some detail, national research ministries soon became involved
in the IPCC process. 18 Examples are the German BMFT, the British Department of
the Environment, the US Department of Energy, and a large array of nationallabora-
tories with military connections and academic research organizations (competing
for "soft" money in the United States), as well as many ministries concerned with
environmental regulation as well as research (US EPA and the German Environment
Ministry). The different institutional commitments of these national bodies and their
individual philosophies then moved national climate change responses into different
directions.
Once the IPCC process was functioning well, scientists, diplomats, administrators
and their political masters were increasingly "in communication". The only
excluded actor was in fact industry, reduced to lobbying along the sidelines, but this
is another, very important, story that is changing. 19
By late 1991, structure had become a subject of considerable debate within IPCC
itself.20 Should IPCC continue to do its work through three permanent working
groups or should it form itself into two groups only, largely devoted to natural
science diagnostics, while ad hoc "task forces" were set up for specific, more
applied, problems, possibly those relating to implementation? There were still
informal, diametrically opposed views within IPCC itself and between governments
in autumn 1992.21 This internal debate extended to whether IPCC should be
formally integrated into the climate convention.22
In its proposal to the IPCC Plenary in early 1992, the leadership suggested a
reduction to two technical working groups, with more complex political issues
being "relegated" to ad hoc task forces. A desire to return to a less politicized, Le.,
value-free, environment was observed. While technocracy appeared triumphant, sci-
ence was in fact withdrawing somewhat, lending support to the argument that insti-
tutionalized science fares best at the global level if it appears to politics as a value-
free service (Proctor, 1991).
In Harare, at its eighth Plenary Session, a new structure was approved. This keeps
Working Group I essentially unchanged, while Working Groups TI and TIl are
18This happened via direct participation, which was very strong indeed for the UK and the United
States on the scientific assessment side, but much less so for Germany, where involvement with impacts
was stronger.The leadership of IPCC was very much in the hands of people from the natural sciences.
19Induslry is catching up by financing it own global research programs, e.g., MECCA (Model
Consortium for Climate Assessment) based at the US Electric Power Institute (EPRI), a collaborative
effort by utilities from France, Italy, Japan; and the United States, and already using some of the same
scientific institutions that have supported IPCC. e.g., NCAR in Boulder, and Maquarie University in
Australia. The carrot is a Cray y-MP/2D computer with 16 MW memory, two processors. 128 GB SSD
storage.
20 Interview, IPCC Plenary documents, February 1992.
21The IPCC leadership suggested the restructuring of its working groups, including the abolition of
Working Group III, and the setting up instead of task forces dealing with specific problems. Governments
did not find this an easy decision. with ministries taking different views, for example in Germany. The
UK and Australia wanted to keep three groups, but were outvoted in mid-I992.
22UNE appeared not to like this at all, while the "hard" science community seemed to be more
inclined to play ball, with Bert Bolin reporting in its favor. Governments did not want duplication, i.e.,
having to support IPCC as a "purer" body assessing science and impacts for UNEP and WMO and this
subsidiary group. ICSU wanted IPCC to become the scientific subsidiary body to the FCCC.
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merged, and subdivided into four groups (energy, industry, settlement issues; coastal
zones and oceans; unmanaged resources and ecosystems; managed ecosystems)
(Global Environmental Change Report, 1992). A new Working Group III will deal
with "cross-cutting" issues such as the socio-economic impacts of response strate-
gies. The IPCC Bureau has been enlarged. The IPCC may have tried to make itself
more attractive to the parties of the FCCC.
Being Diplomatic
Fortunately, the intergovernmental nature of the Panel and the leadership qualities
exhibited by most of its senior individuals ensured that "political" problems facing
scientists were anticipated and could be forestalled by careful diplomacy.
The problems included the appointment of unwanted people by governments,
insufficient resources made available for Third World participants (including ident-
ifying suitable persons), insufficient funding for meetings, heated debates in plen-
aries about carbon taxes and their impact on development, and strong lobbying by
the fossil fuel industries as well as by Greenpeace (one group was attacking the
"certainties" of science and the other attacking the lack of emphasis on these cer-
tainties and possible surprises).
The fossil fuel lobby was probably the most effective nuisance, as it was gener-
ally trying to challenge scientific findings in order to weaken the threat perception
that could be derived from the Summary. It demanded that the language of the
reports should be altered and that emphasis be put on those pollutants - e.g., aero-
sols - responsible for acid rain and CFCs, which "countered" global wanning and
for which the IPCC was not responsible.23
There were also intensive internal debates about language, i.e., the degree to
which it reflected (or did not reflect) the known uncertainties and disagreements
between different model predictions and measurements and different methodologies
of climate prediction.24 Trying to be fair to all parties and above all to science itself,
the drafters of politically important texts had to put much effort and thought into the
skillful use of words. 25
Scientific uncertainty and political confrontations are therefore reflected in IPCC
language as formally transmitted to governments. It is symbolic language, since the
precision of mathematics, and lack of data, cannot usually be translated into ordi-
nary language. Ambivalence is also an ancient diplomatic tool that allows various
interpretations, wisely pennitting the construction of quite different perceptions of
danger, especially if quoted out of context. For example, the word "prediction"
proved contentious and was therefore used less in 1992 than in 1990. "Scenario"
and "hypothesis" became more popular substitutes.
The Policy-makers' Summary of the 1990 Science Report demonstrates some
intentional ambiguity. For example, the report is said to state that from models "we
predict [that under a given emission scenario] ... a rate of increase of global mean
23Such lobbying took place at public conferences, in the media, by bombarding \PCC working groups
with faxes and attendance at plenaries/attempted attendance at drafting sessions.
24From observation of lPCC sessions <both Plenary and working groups), examination of IPCC Ii les
and many interviews.
25The drafting process was observed by the author thanks to the many copies made available to her by
Working Group I.
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temperature during the next century of about 0.3 °c per decade [with an uncertainty
range of 0.2 to 0.5 °c per decade] ... this will result in a likely increase in global
mean temperature of about 1 °c above the present value by 2025" (Houghton,
1990).
The IPCC had "calculated with confidence" that an immediate reduction of 60 per
cent of emissions would have to take place if the stabilization of concentrations
were to be ensured. This formulation tended to allow the misinterpretation, by envir-
onmentalists that included Maurice Strong, that IPCC had allegedly called for the
immediate reduction of emission by that amount to prevent global warming.
Climate change may well be in the pipeline; the difficulty for science was, and
remains, to predict how, where, and to what extent this complex set of physical
phenomena we call climate will alter with the changing composition of the atmo-
sphere. There is therefore much emphasis on "best available" knowledge, when
knowledge is admittedly in short supply. This then allows research proposals to
become part of policy advice. Both the Summary and the Full Report therefore pay
much attention to the research needs of the scientific community and the ways in
which they could improve their understanding and ability to predict changes. This
could be achieved, for example, through: improved understanding of clouds, oceans,
and carbon cycle; systematic observations of climate-related variables on a global
basis and of past climates; improved models of the climate system; increased
national and international support; and more international exchange of climate
data.26
Assessment
The IPCC process proved to be a powerful force in the integration of natural science
knowledge. It widened the range of actors in an environment that promotes internal
consensus agreement, if only for reasons of self-interest. The consensus reached
was, however, often little more than symbolic, with the language "papering over"
uncertainty and conflicts of interest. The desire to learn more remained the only true
commonality. Overall, therefore, global science has done well out of this IPCC pro-
cess that it carefully initiated and helped to structure. Governments did less well, for
science could not, and would not, relieve them of the responsibility of decision
making. This may not be entirely reassuring to all those non-scientists who worked
so hard to promote the issue, nor to those scientists who joined the debate with
strong environmental commitments.
Outside the IPCC, the process of forming a growing network of climate change
research continued. Governments and senior politicians, as well as a large array of
professional and commercial interests (ranging from international lawyers to profes-
sional economists and the managers of the energy industries), soon took up "global
warming" as a subject that presented either an opportunity for advancement of
growth, or a threat to it - or even survival. In either case, global warming would be a
stimulus for change - always provided that other issues would not replace the
"salience" of the threat and the opportunities it might offer.
26Emphasis was reduced somewhat during the drafting process. The full IPCC research agenda is
presented by major ICSU personalities (from a Canadian and a US university) in the Scientific
Assessment Report, 1990. ch. II; the other reports have similar sections.
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RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR CHANGING INTEREST
IN GLOBAL WARMING
Scientific research means finding out the physically knowable that is known to be
unknown. Since politicians like to worry about the future (so that they may promise
a better one or defend the existing one), future visions of mankind had to enter IPCC
predictions and hence advice (Parikh, 1992). For the natural scientists, this occurred
because climate models need "predictions" of how emissions will develop in the
future. This simple need brought natural science, societal, and applied sciences into
direct contact - at times confrontation - with one another. The social sciences and
humanities were poorly prepared for this challenge.
To explain the consequent dominance of the natural sciences in the IPCC, a closer
look at the institutions involved in the 1985 Villach appeal is necessary, for it allows
a more empirical assessment of the political role of science in furthering its own
values and interests.
Studying the role of the scientific institutions in the diffusion process of climate
change-related knowledge leads not only to the mentioned UN agencies, but also to
a variety of national and intergovernmental research bodies.27 Rather tangentially,
this also approaches the question of scientific interest in environmental policy
making at both the national and international level, and the linkages between the
two. In turn, the considerable power of the scientific, or epistemic, community in the
"creation/identification" of environmental threats, and in bringing these to the atten-
tion of the international political system, can be assessed, as can its limitation in this
process.
The main institutions were the aloof and elitist, but internationally well-
organized, ICSU, especially its Scientific Committee on the Problems of the Envi-
ronment (SCOPE), as well as several "Northern" environmental research institutes
and universities, the research sections of several UN agencies with strong environ-
mental commitments, and energy demand modelers. ICSU was later asked to
become the "principal scientific adviser" to UNCED (see Chapter 11) (ICSU, 1991).
Between 1985 and 1990, the period between the famous Villach Meeting and the
Second World Climate Conference, influential members of the scientific community,
together with responsive political bodies, became involved in the dissemination of a
powerful "scientific" threat perception. The latter in particular were able to give
wide publicity to the issue, using in particular the global network of environmental
pressure groups that had grown so vigorously during the 1970s and 1980s, initially
in Anglo-Saxon countries (McCormick, 1989; Boehmer-Christiansen, 1991).
After 1990, the strategic behavior of institutional science changed, as emphasis
on uncertainties in the predictions of danger came to dominate first the scientific
debate, and then also the policy debate. American scientists in particular felt frus-
trated about demands made upon them to give firm answers. As some "experts" split
along lines of political commitment, uncertainties became more fashionable among
the natural scientists, who could not but realize that the need for diagnostic know-
ledge declines as the threat becomes "real" enough to motivate action rather than
27The governments of the Netherlands, UK, Canada, and Australia became directly involved on the
scientific research side. Behind the scenes, science managers and environmental advocates, like Gordon
Goodman and Tom Malone, did valuable diffusion work. While interviews suggested that scientists were
becoming worried about the careless use of the climate threat, in some countries this threat was needed to
maintain the very funding of the relevant sciences.
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more research. Appeals for funding research into "scientific uncertainties" replaces
the funding of discovering threats. Research into uncertainties was justified with the
argument that it would reduce the costs of emission abatement, a clever tactical
response to the claim that emission abatement was too costly.28
Alongside the development of the climate change debate one can also document
the politics of fuel competition. This successfully challenged the early "scientific
consensus" of global warming with the idea of global greening, by collecting evi-
dence to show that more carbon dioxide is good for the planet. Those who saw
opportunities for the development of new knowledge (engineering, biotechnology,
carbon requestration, energy efficient machines and appliances), on the other hand,
continued on the assumption of a real threat to justify their own research and plan-
ning. As it needed industrial support, this effort took place primarily at the national
level, although even here collaboration was increasing. Soon the "science" of global
warming would no longer be needed! By this stage, science and technology policies
had already become a part of the environmental policy process and its outcomes.
When international politics, during the late 1980s, turned against the demand for
immediate action on economic and feasibility grounds, the scientific community
responded by reducing the intensity of the climate "threat" image, discovered scien-
tific explanations for lower observed values, and then turned to industry for further
support.
The origin and consequences of both the climate convention and of the IPCC pro-
cess can therefore be traced both backward and forward to discover linkages with
the internationally organized scientific community. The ultimate goal of this
community is the full understanding of the physical systems of Planet Earth. To
achieve this, the natural sciences are now prepared to enter into the first cautious
collaborations with social scientists on diagnostic issues (Price, 1992).
DISCUSSION: THE POWER OF SCIENCE
First, I would argue that the scientific diagnosis of the global environment has cre-
ated perceptions of both insecurity and opportunities for progress. The institutions
searching for new knowledge must protect their own relevance and their (always
fragile) global organization, growth, and status. They justify claims to resources by
searching for environmental threats, by weakening them, or by promising redress. It
is therefore difficult to base policy on science; science is a moving target with few
loyalties.
Science-based predictions of possible global warming beyond what is tolerable
were quickly taken up by political and commercial lobbies to promote their own
agendas using their own interests or values. The transformation of objective know-
ledge and scientific hypotheses into politically active threat images (or perceptions
of risk) is therefore undertaken less by science itself, but, for example, by energy
suppliers, environmentalists, and UN agencies, i.e., groups with global ambitions
and organizations. Perception of risk, dread, or opportunity attach themselves to
28T. Wigley and S. Raper, in a note to policy makers to accompany their review article "Implications
for Climate and Sea Level of Revised IPCC Emission Scenarios," Nature, vol. 357, 28 May 1992.
Scientists who have to fund research are as astute as any other lobbying group about tailoring their
arguments (but much less so the facts) to the "needs" of the funding body.
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multiple interests, the outcome of which will be decided through their battles with
one another. The outcome is unpredictable. Both insecurity and security are served
by research. The choice of which perception will prevail is not that of science, but of
politics. There is no need to fear science - it is a servant and not a master, and it is
the masters we need to watch the most.
Politically, this growth in knowledge may strengthen the dominance of the North
by drawing intellectual and material resources away from militarism and con-
sumerism. This societal transformation, if achieved, will require much more than the
diagnostic knowledge that the natural sciences can provide. But will this solve the
North-South problem?
Secondly, I doubt that "technoscience" will introduce new insecurity. Mankind
has lived with technological threats for a very long time and has had to adjust to the
consequences of unwise or ignorant actions. A bit more precaution and pre-testing is
certainly needed as the scale of impacts increases. Scientific notions that climate
change is dangerous for mankind are beginning to have impacts on policy develop-
ments in many areas, many of which could be called "technoscience," and would be
worthwhile even without climate change - i.e., an environmental threat is used to
encourage innovation and investment in the future. Here success depends, surely, on
whether individuals, firms, and governments have the foresight and means to do so.
This process, if successful, may further strengthen the Verwissenschaftlichung of
Western society, as well as the potential for technoscience to solve the problems it
has created.
Thirdly, I doubt that there will be a World Meteorological Order. Even if human-
kind were to reorganize itself fundamentally in response to meteorological threats,
this could be either democratic or authoritarian, depending on who implements
agreed responses. Since the impact of climate change is likely to be harshest on the
poorest, I cannot see it becoming a major incentive for a redistribution of power and
welfare.
This raises the question of whether it is risky to rely too much on science for
policy, a risk that may relate less to environmental damage than to the narrowness of
the knowledge base upon which policy responses are based. Technological and
political opportunities may be missed if no action is taken until "sufficient" evidence
has been collected. The advisory dominance of the natural sciences has become
apparent, and may well lead to misconceptions about the powers of this knowledge
to direct policy.
Yet the concern of environmentalists remains: before we do understand our planet
scientifically, the planet may have rid itself of mankind, or at least of society as we
know it. This concern rests on a question that science cannot answer, for it comes
from philosophy rather than science. The global science of climate prediction is
surely too weak and politically dependent to create an independent perception of
serious risk or global insecurity: this is done (or not) by the political actors who use
scientific debates for their own purposes.
My own question is which of the two is the greater threat today: that mankind is
destroyed by climate change, or that it destroys itself by not learning how to deal
with global poverty and violence springing from the lack of fairness in the dis-
tribution of resources and welfare. Efforts to make environmental security the basis
of global organization may therefore be a mistake. We can approach the environ-
mental threat more safely by ensuring that our societies do not fall apart for non-
environmental reasons, though it will not be in the interest of knowledge to say so.
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Science may be needed to reassure and calm (when too much fear or anxiety poses
threats to political instability), or to raise concern and dread of the future. It can
promise solutions as well as expose dangers. It cannot lose as long as it remains a
trusted source of legitimate authority. It must therefore remain flexible and respons-
ive to political needs - and even fashion.
The call for immediate action to reduce greenhouse gases will no longer come
from scientists. Having warned us in collusion with the environmentalists, they are
now busy for at least another decade. One risk I have identified in the global warm-
ing story, therefore, is that of excessive faith in knowledge as an incentive for action.
Even if there is no climate change, the increase in knowledge that we are likely to
gain will be enormous, but what wil1 we do with it? Who will benefit from it?
International environmental treaties in general face a major difficulty. Because of
their potentially major effects on virtually the whole of society (income distribution,
commercial competition, and lifestyles), governments will approach them extremely
cautiously. They cannot trust science to the extent of making policy fully dependent
on it. While strengthening scientific endeavor and enterprise, the dependence of
policy on science may make governments hostage to research lobbies and lead to
missed opportunities. As the current desire of IPCC to remain a purely "technical
body" shows, scientists prefer to be free from commitment and want to return to
value-free research, leaving the "use" of knowledge to others.
One of the characteristics of the climate convention, and many other international
environmental treaties, is their almost total reliance on scientific evidence and argu-
mentation for the justification of action. More specifically, this involves evidence of
harm or damage provided on the basis of knowledge claims made by the natural
sciences. Why should this be so? One reason is surely that diagnostic science has so
little to say about solutions. It protects the "sovereignty of states," which are then
left to draw their own conclusions. The other reason relates to the power of science
to protect itself and promote its own growth.
If there is a risk to society arising from the New Scientific Universalism (global
modeling), it is that it encourages policy to be based on far too narrow a conception
of mankind. If it were adopted as the foundation of policy, it would make precaution
and common sense difficult and allow politicians to hand responsibility to a "priest-
hood" of people primarily interested in finding out more. Too much environmental
globalism may become a justification for the powerful to dominate policy and
exploit resources for their own benefit. I am not against global science. but against
the interested use of science in global politics.
Having studied the climate threat, I have concluded that the main environmental
problem facing the world today is not potential environmental change, but the use of
such threats to further strengthen the North, and the institutions of science as clients
of power and wealth. The poor now have the power to destroy the planet faster than
climate change, beginning with our fragile political systems. Can technoscience
help here? Perhaps because it cannot help, political and scientific elites find environ-
mental threats so useful in instilling feelings of insecurity and, hopefully from this,
of common purpose, and the willingness to sacrifice. The interests of politics and
science do not always coincide.
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The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in
UNCED
Ann Doherty
Nongovernmental organization (NGO) is a sterile term for a vibrant entity, and
NGOs were involved in UNCED to an unprecedented degree. I Nearly 1500 organ-
izations were accredited to the UNCED process, and they represented a vast array of
sectoral and interest groups, including agriculture, environment, development,
health, human rights, indigenous peoples, peace, population, religion, trade, youth,
and women. In degrees that varied by country and stage of the negotiations, many of
these NGOs were permitted to assist in the preparation of their national report, sub-
mit written statements, and make oral interventions in Preparatory Committee
(prepCom) meetings, and in some cases were invited to join their national delega-
tions to UNCED. They were also instrumental in providing the secretariat and
national delegations with background documents and information used in the
drafting of Agenda 21.
However, despite this unusual access, many NGOs appeared frustrated by their
lack of substantive input into the UNCED negotiations. During the two-year prep-
aration process, NGOs attending PrepComs were disappointed by the increasing
number of informal negotiations to which they were barred access, as it was in these
closed sessions that many of the most important decisions were made. In the end, a
great number of NGOs seemed disillusioned and frustrated by the outcomes of
UNCED, since few of their goals for concrete change in the realms of environment
and development were achieved. Many attributed this perception of inefficacy to the
I At the conception of the UN system, the term "NGO" was used as an umbrella to describe all of the
independent actors that had some interest in international affairs. Traditionally, NGOs have been limited
to not-for-profit groups, thus excluding business and industry. An alternative term, "independent sector,"
was popularized during UNCED, due to the aversion of some NGOs to being lumped together in the
same category as business. For the purposes of this chapter, the term NGO will be used to describe
not-for-profit pressure groups that have expanded across national boundaries, and have to some degree
become involved with the operation of the UN system. To avoid confusion, business and industry will be
considered an independent sector, but not members of the traditional NGO community. This distinction is
necessary, as one of the many unique features of UNCED was that it assembled all of these disparate
actors in an often awkward embrace.
Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons Learned from the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (G. Sjostedt, el aJ., eds.; 1-85966-077-0; © IIASA; pub. Graham & Trotman, 1994;
printed in Great Britain), pp. 199-218.
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privileged role played by business and industry in the negotiations, as victories won
by this sector often meant defeat for NGOs seeking reform of the global system.
Taking into account the massive amounts of time, energy, and expense devoted to
the process by numerous NGOs, was their participation in UNCED a worthwhile
pursuit? Could more effective NGO participation have resulted in greater successes
(e.g., binding conventions) at UNCED? Or does the international negotiation system
by its very nature discourage the participation of outside groups? Can NGOs con-
tribute fruitfully to a negotiation process of the UNCED type or are they primarily
an impediment to progress? Are certain types of NGOs better suited to the UN fora
than others? Finally, did NGOs benefit from participating in UNCED in ways other
than influencing the official process? These questions are important, since the role of
NGOs in future negotiations will most likely continue to increase.
NGOs will be examined in two ways. First, it is instructive to directly juxtapose
NGOs with their opposites: governments. The characteristics of governments are
well defined. They are powerful, sovereign, economically motivated, experienced,
financially secure, well resourced, and often bureaucratically inflexible. Generally,
those governments with the strongest combination of these traits are most successful
in achieving their goals within the system. By extension, those NGOs with goals and
tactics most like those of governments will be most comfortable and effective work-
ing within the system. Nongovernmental actors that possess fewer governmental
traits are more likely to be frustrated, and may choose other means of attaining their
goals.
The tension created between NGOs that are more effective working within the
process and those that are more productive outside creates a second level for analy-
sis. To some extent, this tension is a reflection of the divisions between governments
throughout UNCED: between Northern and Southern objectives and principally
between environment and development. Differences of goals between the more
established environmental groups from Northern countries and the grassroots,
development-oriented NGOs from the South were partially resolved within the
NGO community, with many strong coalitions bridging the hemispheric and
environment/development gaps. What was more difficult to resolve were differ-
ences in tactics between "inside" and "outside" NGOs. This dynamic was an import-
ant factor during UNCED, and may be the force that will impel the NGO movement
into the next era of international cooperation.
In an attempt to illuminate some of the questions raised within the proposed
framework, the historical roles of NGOs both outside and within the UN system are
traced, focusing first upon the precursor to UNCED: the 1972 Stockholm Confer-
ence on the Human Environment. Next, UNCED itself is explored: the process, the
problems, the products, and the tensions between actors. Many of the observations
and analyses are based upon primary data collected from NGOs accredited to
UNCED via a detailed questionnaire (see Appendix 13.1 on p. 215 for the basic
results). Finally, some conclusions about the impact of NGOs on the negotiations,
on their movement, and on future post-UNCED regime governance are discussed.
ROLES OF NGOs AT THE UN
The UN officially sanctions nongovernmental partiCipation for the following
purposes: mobilization of popular support for and publicizing of UN activities, pro-
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viding expertise to the secretariat and member states, and monitoring the imple-
mentation of UN conventions (ECOSOC Resolution 1296, 1968). However, two
essential functions of NGOs - educating public opinion and offering alternative
perspectives and solutions to governments - are far more controversial within the
UN and its member states.
It is not uncommon for NGOs to possess greater scientific, technical, and statis-
tical expertise than governments and the secretariat. NGOs often have a more inter-
connected and holistic view of the issues that are tackled within the UN and they can
be helpful in illuminating these linkages to delegates. For example, NGOs have
been instrumental in emphasizing the interactive nature of the global economic sys-
tem, environmental degradation, development strategies, poverty, and the military.
In addition, NGOs may be particularly helpful to delegates from small or less
wealthy nations, who are often responsible for handling several issue areas con-
currently and may need concrete comprehensive information. (Such assistance, of
course, is not without benefit to the NGO, who has the chance to convince the open-
minded delegate that the negotiating strategies offered are superior to all others.)
One of the most valuable roles played by NGOs within the UN system is that of
enforcing compliance with treaties and conventions. Accredited NGOs have an
advantage over the media and the rest of the public in that they can be present in
consultative meetings, where they can acquire intimate knowledge about the activ-
ities of states in areas such as human rights, environment, and disarmament. Some
delegates refer to the process of careful note-taking and conferring by the NGOs
present at meetings as "silent lobbying" - a powerful mechanism in encouraging the
accountability of governments to the public. And in addition to pressuring trans-
gressive governments, many NGOs are also active in the field - monitoring the
implementation of and compliance with agreements, assessing environmental,
health, and other impacts, and publicizing violations, a politically sensitive task that
governments may be reluctant to perform.
In the past decade, many NGOs have enhanced their reputations as providers of
credible scientific information, accurate facts and statistics, and sound policy
options. Some choose to utilize this information within the UN, but the majority
focus their educational capacities upon the rest of the nongovernmental community.
NGOs are practiced in disseminating critical information to the public through pub-
lications and the media, and thereby forcing issues on to the political agendas of
decision makers. Through these activities, NGOs can build a large domestic consti-
tuency that makes it difficult for a government to deviate from a position in the
interest of expediency or under pressure from commercial lobbies (Burke, in
Willetts, 1982: 114). This role of public educator, which often involves working
outside the UN system and taking critical perspectives on UN programs and poli-
cies, is not overly popular among governments and secretariat officials.
Yet, NGOs within the UN offer what governments and the secretariat cannot or
choose not to provide - innovation, flexibility, objectivity, and independence. They
are not constrained in the same way as governments to satisfy constituencies or pre-
serve sovereignty. Unlike governments, they often enjoy broad grassroots support
that instills legitimacy to their work. Moreover, NGOs are often not pressured to
reach an internal consensus as in large governmental bureaucracies, which can sup-
press differing ideas, criticism, and dissent (Chiang, 1981: 6). As instruments of
democratic representation, NGOs can be considered as the "main social counter-
vailing power to the state" (Lador-Lederer, 1963: 60).
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However, NGOs that have the ability to glide smoothly between their grassroots
supporters and international politicians are rare entities. Many NGOs are either
unfamiliar or impatient with the stately paced, nitpicking and politicking lobbying
process. They often become frustrated and experiment with other methods of influenc-
ing the proceedings with varying degrees of success. As these alternative mechanisms
tend to further complicate an already complex procedure, these NGOs become
unpopular within the secretariat, with delegates, and with their more professional
lobbying counterparts. As a result, few NGOs have mastered the art of transferring a
grassroots sense of urgency and responsibility into the formal arena of the UN.
THE 1972 STOCKHOLM UN CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN
ENVIRONMENT
The environment became an item on the global agenda for the first time in 1972, at
the UN Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) held in Stockholm.
When the Swedish government first proposed the idea of holding an environmental
conference, it met with lukewarm endorsements by both governments and NGOs,
neither of which were particularly anxious about the state of the environment.
Developing countries, in particular, were frankly disinterested in conservation
efforts, preferring to concentrate their efforts on the quickest possible rate of devel-
opment. However, once the preparatory process for the conference was initiated,
over 100 nations and in excess of 400 NGOs became intimately involved in the
formulation of a Declaration with 26 Principles, and an Action Plan with five
resolutions and 109 recommendations.
It is believed that there were more NGOs present in Stockholm than at any previ-
ous UN conference. They undertook a panoply of tasks during the preparatory
period, which included assisting government delegations in the preparation of their
national reports, providing information to governments and the secretariat, lobbying
on specific issues, and publishing a daily newspaper for both NGOs and govern-
ments. However, during the actual two-week conference period, NGOs were rele-
gated to a separate "MiljOforum" (environmental forum), which was physically
distant and emotionally removed from official proceedings. In the parallel confer-
ence, NGOs had daily briefings on the progress of the official meeting, heard visit-
ing speakers, and organized demonstrations.
The efficacy and equitableness of having a separate forum for NGOs was dis-
puted during Stockholm and continues to be a matter of controversy among NGOs.
As the number of organizations seeking to participate increases with every global
conference, universal accommodation of every interested NGO in the official event
has become logistically impossible. Yet many NGOs feel alienated from the actual
decision-making process when confined to a separate area, particularly for those
who were not involved in the preparatory process. In Stockholm, it was clear to
most in the government delegations that the NGO activities had little discernible
effect on "the real action." There has since been real disillusionment on the part of
many NGOs as they have come to realize how little a role they actually played
(McCormick, 1989: 101). However, many nongovernmental actors support the par-
allel meeting structure as an opportunity to criticize the official process unhindered,
and to offer alternative views, capture the attention of the media, and thus the
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general public, and to communicate with NGOs from different areas of the world on
issues of common concern.
In the two decades between Stockholm and Rio, NGOs zealously exchanged
information and coordinated campaigns in what has become a powerful movement
and a major force in international politics. In the early 1980s, there were an esti-
mated 13 000 environmental NGOs in the industrialized nations and close to 2500 in
developing countries. The growth rate was, and continues to be, phenomenal, par-
ticularly in developing countries over the past decade. Cooperation between these
Northern and Southern NGOs has been impressive for the most part, and in many
ways has surpassed that between governments from the different hemispheres.
As communications between citizens' groups in different parts of the world grew
in scope and complexity, so did the nature of environmental problems during the 20
years between UNCHE and UNCED. First, they became more explicitly intercon-
nected, as environmental problems including climate change, biodiversity destruc-
tion, and deforestation began to elicit global concern. Second, the connections
between the environment and other areas - including development, demilitarization,
trade, debt, and women's issues - became more prominent. NGOs were paramount
in the process of bringing these interconnections to the attention of governments and
the public, and have become progressively more integral in this capacity. Thus,
when the UN General Assembly called for a world conference on environment and
development in Resolution 441228 in 1989, the global NGO community rallied to
the cause.
THE RIO CONFERENCE
Participation and Accreditation
UNCED was groundbreaking for the NGO community in several respects. It was
the first time that environmental issues were examined formally in conjunction with
developmental problems in international negotiations. Moreover, it involved a mas-
sive mobilization of the NGO community, which allowed practically universal
access, at least in principle, to official negotiations.
There were several prominent NGO networks that coordinated and facilitated
NGO access to UNCED. The most influential of these were the International
Facilitating Committee (IFC), which was created specifically to assist NGO
work within UNCED, and was a co-coordinator of the NGO Global Forum in
Rio; the Environmental Liaison Centre International, created after Stockholm to
facilitate communication between NGOs; and the Forum of Brazilian NGOs for
UNCED, the other coordinator of the Global Forum. There were also several
active national networks that were created specifically for UNCED, including
the US Citizen's Network and the Canadian Participatory Committee for
UNCED. It is important to keep in mind that although these official networks
were the most visible, NGO participation was also catalyzed in nonofficial and
less observable ways. Thousands of communities, grassroots groups, and
schoolchildren from all over the globe were involved in UNCED for a different
purpose: their goal was not to lobby governments nor to directly influence nego-
tiations, but rather to vocalize their concerns on environment, development,
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poverty, and other related issues. Even after UNCED, these international,
national, and subnational groups continue to unite in what is becoming an
increasingly dynamic and powerful movement.
At the outset, the UNCED secretariat supported NGO participation in all aspects
of the conference. General Assembly Resolution 44/228 specified that NGOs with
consultative status to ECOSOC be permitted to participate in UNCED and the sec-
retariat interpreted this to include their participation in the PrepCom meetings. The
negative emotional reaction by some national delegates to this expansion of eligibil-
ity was not anticipated, nor was the prolonged battle between the secretariat,
governments, and NGOs that was launched at the first PrepCom. But most of all, no
one was prepared for the voluminous infl ux of NGOs seeking accreditation over the
two-year preparatory process.
Although there were no more than one dozen NGOs in Nairobi at the inception of
the UNCED process in August 1990, their role, as well as the future role of NGOs in
UNCED, immediately became a matter of heated debate that obstructed all substan-
tive discussions for nearly the entire first week of negotiations. The majority of gov-
ernments present openly and vociferously encouraged NGO participation for
various reasons: the Brazilian Ambassador, for example, cited their creativity and
imagination; the head of the Canadian delegation spoke of the need to ensure that
"NGO networks ... be regarded as systems that, because of their effective function-
ing, ensure a wide involvement of concerned citizens in many countries" (Goree,
1990: posted on en.unced.general); and Secretary General Maurice Strong lauded
the abilities of NGOs to provide substantial contributions to the process, including
papers, reports, and statistics. A few delegations, however, were reluctant to so
readily sanction the participation of NGOs. Mauritania and Tunisia, in particular,
preferred to avoid the entire question of nongovernmental participation until the
next meeting of the General Assembly: as a result of previous experience, they may
have been suspicious of the pro-environmental protection and anti-development
postures of many Northern NGOs. After much debate and pressure from the anti-
NGO delegations, the question of general NGO participation at UNCED was
deferred to the December 1990 General Assembly session. The Plenary voted to
allow NGO participation for the remaining two weeks of the first PrepCom meeting,
but a poor precedent had already been set in the realm of cooperation between
NGOs and governments.
Nonetheless, recommendations for NGO participation were drafted by the pro-
NGO coalition, with the basic proposals that NGOs accredited to the UNCED pro-
cess be permitted to submit papers and presentations to the PrepCom, and to make
oral statements on matters within their special competence at meetings when
approved by the PrepCom chairman. The recommendations further specified that all
participation by NGOs manifest equitable regional distribution, a balance between
environment and development organizations, and include grassroots as well as more
established groups. Secretariat assistance for NGO participation was also stressed -
in particular, the need for support of NGOs in their information dissemination and
communication efforts in preparation for the conference.
The official participation process was further complicated by discord within the
NGO community. The perennial problem of the definition of an NGO was resur-
rected: many were disturbed that, for UNCED purposes, the International Chamber
of Commerce and other business coalitions were grouped together with the predom-
inantly not-for-profit NGO community. Furthermore, the Environmental Liaison
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Centre International (ELCI) publicly withdrew its membership in the International
Facilitating Committee (lFC) due to concerns about the IFC's representativeness
and mandate. The rifts in the nongovernmental community were deemed by many as
poorly timed, since the struggle for opportunities to participate would be aided by a
unified NGO front. However, crisis was avoided, and consensus was eventually,
although temporarily, achieved.
The General Assembly approved NGO participation at its meeting in December
1990 and NGOs arrived in Geneva in March 1991 for the second PrepCom under
the impression that their troubles were over. However, the delegate from Tunisia
immediately resuscitated the qualifications issue, claiming that his recollection of
the resolution was that only coalitions of organizations would be allowed to speak.
PrepCom Chainnan Tommy Koh clarified the meaning of the resolution, which pro-
vided for NGOs speaking individually unless their numbers became unmanageable.
Furthennore, problems with accreditation began almost instantaneously. The pro-
cess was designed to work as follows: prior to the beginning of any PrepCom, an
NGO interested in participating in PrepCom meetings could present to the secretar-
iat its credentials and a written statement of its relevance and competence within the
UNCED framework. The secretariat would consider these applications, and submit
both positive and negative accreditation recommendations to the PrepCom. The
PrepCom then had a 24-hour period in which to accept or reject these advised appli-
cations; if unable to meet during this period, these NGOs under consideration would
be temporarily accredited during the interim. Finally, any accredited NGO would
remain eligible for all succeeding PrepComs and the official event in Rio de Janeiro.
Notwithstanding the clarification of the accreditation process, however, the secretar-
iat was unable to process the influx of NGO applications received at the start, pre-
venting the recommendations from being passed on to the PrepCom, and during the
first few days of the negotiations, NGOs were forced to remain silent in the Plenary
and working groups. Many of the NGOs in Geneva were disillusioned by this in-
voluntary exile from the proceedings:
Despite official "lip-service" by many countries to NGO involvement, there are several
countries who are openly hostile and many more we suspect that are using front countries
to delay and block NGO participation. There is a growing sense of frustration from many
NGOs who believe that the process wants our nominal participation but that a commitment
to real involvement has not materialized in time to allow input during critical periods. To
date, everything regarding NGO involvement has happened too late in the process to allow
anyone to claim that NGOs have been involved throughout the PrepCom process (Goree.
1991. posted on en.unced.general).
However, once the hitches were finally worked out in the accreditation process
and the number of secretariat staff devoted to this task was increased, nearly all of
the NGOs that applied for accreditation were accepted by both the secretariat and
the PrepCom. Further positive developments in Geneva were the appearance of
many of the provisions promised to NGOs at the first PrepCom, including an NGO
lounge and offices with copy and fax machines. Briefing sessions for new NGOs
were provided by the International Facilitating Committee (IFC), and more
information became available for distribution. NGO concerns regarding the need
to facilitate developing country participation through funding mechanisms were
partially alleviated by the establishment of a Southern participation fund by the
Canadians.
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The extent to which NODs were allowed to participate in official proceedings
depended upon the designation of a negotiation session as fonnal, infonnal, or
infonnal-infonnaI. NODs could present oral interventions only in fonnal sessions.
In infonnal sessions, they were pennitted to observe only with the pennission of the
chairperson. And in infonnal-infonnal sessions, where most of the real nuts and
bolts negotiations took place, NOOs were entirely prohibited. During the first three
PrepCom meetings, NODs had virtually unlimited access to sessions, which were
for the most part fonnal and infonnal. However, as time pressures increased and
patience decreased, more sessions were infonnal-infonnal, and only accessible by
NODs on official delegations. At the final PrepCom in New York, there were very
few fonnal sessions. This, unfortunately, coincided with a major increase in the
number of accredited and participating NODs, as well as the gradually enhanced
ability of some NODs to contribute more effectively as they learned how to work
within the UN system.
During the third PrepCom, NODs had several struggles with the secretariat and
governments over access to informal working group sessions. The official regula-
tions were that the chairperson's pennission was needed in order for NODs to
observe. However, decisions about the level of fonnality in meetings seemed to be
made on a capricious basis, and the degree of openness varied not only from work-
ing group to working group, but also from day to day within the different groups.
NOD frustrations gradually built up, and came to a climax on the final evening of
PrepCom ill, during a fonnal discussion concerning many aspects of the next Prep-
Com in New York. The chainnan of Working Oroup I made a unilateral decision,
based on the lateness of the meeting and the general fatigued condition of delegates,
to close this session to NODs, many of whom were already seated in the room.
Many of them were reluctant to leave and had to be escorted from the room by con-
ference security guards. Among all of the governments generally supportive of NOD
participation, the US government was alone in openly objecting to this forced
removal, but only briefly, as the general mood among delegates was one of
impatience to end this phase of the negotiations. At several points during the third
PrepCom, various NODs considered completely discontinuing their participation in
UNCED, due to the inability of the secretariat and delegates to decide what role
would be played by NODs, and the lack of accountability and transparency shown at
these closed sessions.
Although the accreditation mechanics were operating more smoothly at the
final PrepCom in New York, problems with NOD access to negotiations con-
tinued. The proportion of informal meetings had increased since Oeneva and NOD
access to most meetings was still decided on a case-by-case basis. During the first
week of the fourth PrepCom, NODs were allowed to sit only in the gallery above
the conference room, making it nearly impossible to make contact with delegates
or the chairperson, or to obtain official documents. By the second week, the secre-
tariat had implemented a ticketing system, which would allow 35 NODs on the
floor at any given time during formal and informal sessions that were open to
NODs. The tickets were distributed to the earliest arrivals. which was rarely a
problem except at occasional meetings of strong interest to all NODs. Another
frustration for NODs was the insistence by the PrepCom chainnan that NODs
focus on sectoral rather than individual interventions in the interests of time and
simplicity. An editorial from Crosscurrents, an independent NOD publication,
observed that:
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NGOs have spent a lot of money and time in following the UNCED process only to find
that the U.N. is not ready to incorporate them in its workings and accept them as part-
ners. The U.N. seems to feel that by allowing the NGOs into the corridors, it has created
a Frankenstein, and that the monster is out of control As the U.N. has already found,
NGOs do not form into neat little groups behind a single spokesperson with a simple
message that can be read out in two minutes (Crosscurrents editorial, 6-9 March 1992).
In Rio, the issue of sectoral interventions resurfaced. The secretariat had taken the
initiative to allocate separate periods of speaking time to 12 sectors, which angered
many NGOs. Some disliked the artificiality of the division in a community with an
inherent ability to work holistically and seek common goals, whereas others were
frustrated that certain "elite" NGOs were chosen to represent their entire sector. A
coalition of NGOs accredited to the UN drafted a letter to the Secretary General:
In our view, it is not meaningful to call for "monolithic" positions to be established by
any "sector". It can even be an asset if divergent views and different approaches are
heard. Nobody can claim to single-handedly represent one particular constituency, for
example "youth" or "women". It is our hope that your affirmation and its active follow
up by the secretariat will help to dispel the impression that some initiatives are actively
promoted at the expense and exclusion of others (Crosscurrents, NGO Plenary Protest,
II June 1992).
In Rio, the final number of NGOs accredited to UNCED rose to 1420. The secre-
tariat estimated that ad hoc UNCED NGOs were organized in 90 percent of the
involved nations, and 70 percent of governments cited "full and close participation
from the nongovernmental citizens' affinity groups" (Earth Summit Times, June
1992). The majority of accredited NGOs were from Northern industrialized coun-
tries, but the number of Southern country NGOs was increased by nearly 100
through the Developing Country NGO Participation Fund and numerous initiatives
by wealthier NGOs to sponsor the participation of poorer groups. Another important
trend in UNCED participation was the unprecedented number of NGOs on official
delegations. During PrepCom IV, approximately 15 delegations included NGOs
either as full participants or as official observers. This number rose to approximately
150 NGOs on official delegations by the Earth Summit.
How did NGOs view their overall access to UNCED? Our questionnaire endeav-
ored to ascertain the level of satisfaction among accredited NGOs concerning
various aspects of access to official negotiations. Concerning access to negotiating
sessions, the great majority (76 percent) were dissatisfied, and a few pointed out that
this access became progressively worse from PrepCom to PrepCom and was dismal
by Rio. (Predictably, those NGOs that were members of delegations were signifi-
cantly more likely to be pleased than those not on delegations.) Regarding the
amount of speaking time allotted to NGOs, the proportion of NGOs dissatisfied was
even stronger: a mere 12 percent found this amount of time to be adequate.
Although the immediate implication of these figures is that the process was
inadequate in providing for NGO access and speaking needs, one should also take
into account the possibility that NGOs did not make full use of the opportunities
given to them due to their unfamiliarity with the process. However, a third measure
of access, which asked NGOs to estimate the number of written statements that they
submitted to delegates, indicated that NGOs were indeed well organized and func-
tioning knowledgeably within the system. The average number of written inter-
ventions per NGO hovered between 5 and 6 in a broad range from 0 to 50. Of
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course, the quality of these interventions is undetermined, but given the fact that
many of them were laboriously discussed and drafted by coalitions of NODs, it can
be assumed that this level of input is fairly reliable. A final measure was the level of
access that should be allowed for NODs at future negotiations - universal, the same
as at UNCED, or restricted. The majority (62 percent) were in favor of universal
access, 38 percent preferred the same level, and not a single NOD responded that
access should be restricted. This is in contrast to the opinions of some governments,
who have stated that NODs could be more "effective" if they were more carefully
screened and were present in reduced numbers.
An analysis of when NODs became involved in the UNCED negotiations yields
further insight into perceived access and efficacy of NODs. Dnly the most extreme
cases were included - those NODs involved as early as the first PrepCom in
Nairobi, and those who became involved only at Rio. The resulting statistics con-
firmed the hypothesis that the later the involvement in the process, the higher the
level of frustration and feelings of inefficacy among NODs. Whereas the earliest
involved NODs met with both their own and with other delegates several times per
week, the NODs that were not accredited until Rio met with other delegates as
seldom as bi-weekly, and with their own delegates less than once a week. These
latecomers were also less satisfied with the frequency with which their concerns and
ideas were incorporated into official documents.
Structures and Processes
NODs created their own organization structures and implemented unique processes
throughout the two-year preparation period for UNCED. They formed a sub-system
that mimicked the structures and processes of governments and the UN and facili-
tated NOD participation within the official system. The NOD system sponsored
various daily meetings and briefings, sectoral conferences, and national, regional,
and international conferences, forums, and networks. There were also a number of
NOD publications, including several newspapers (Earth Summit Times, Crosscur-
rents, Terraviva), and a detailed daily summary of official negotiations (Earth Sum-
mit Bulletin). Communications between NODs were essential in spurring the mass
mobilization of pressure groups that occurred around UNCED; this was facilitated
by several NOD electronic networking systems. In contrast to governments, which
generally prefer official arenas for communication, NODs used these alternative
communications networks to exchange information and formulate strategies. In fact,
it was observed that "the planning for this Earth Summit has involved the most
massive communications exercise ever undertaken in the name of sustainable
development" (Hanson and Regallet, 1992: 36).
For many NODs accredited to UNCED, lobbying was their primary activity.
Lobbying at UNCED was manifested in many forms, including education of dele-
gates, dissemination of information, and advocacy of particular causes. Some NODs
were very issue-focused, and came prepared to work within their area of expertise to
have specific changes made in documents. These NODs met daily with other like-
minded lobbyists, prepared interventions, and tracked delegates. Many of these
specific-issue lobby groups were either regional or sectoral in character: for exam-
ple, the NODs most involved in the desertification negotiations were predominantly
African, and many indigenous peoples became active in the forest, oceans, and
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biodiversity debates. Other NGOs concentrated on issues that were only superfi-
cially covered on the agenda. These issues - e.g., trade, militarism, debt - were
broader and less open for discussion, thus making concrete victories practically
nonexistent.
Contact with delegates took place at various times and in different manners. Some
NGOs preferred to pass notes to delegates during official sessions; others attempted
to corner governmental representatives in the hallways or at coffee breaks; and still
others found that the best lobbying was conducted away from the negotiations. In
addition, those NGOs chosen to participate on official delegations had unusually
prolonged and intimate relations with delegates from many countries, and were able
to become fully enmeshed in the process. An important part of their work involved
transferring their privileged knowledge to the general NGO community.
Lobbying, when performed well, is a complex procedure. NGOs must judge not
only where and when their input is most appropriate, but must ensure that their
interventions are clear, well documented, and relevant to the phase of negotiations.
Those who devoted the majority of their time and energy to effecting change in offi-
cial documents were occasionally rewarded, and there are numerous examples in
Agenda 21 of text that was suggested by NGOs. Nonetheless, a common NGO com-
plaint was that governments adopted their text solely for the sake of appeasement,
and after much struggle. Some NGOs regarded these scattered rewards with frustra-
tion, as "fragments of the text without the spirit of the whole recommendation are
meaningless" (Crosscurrents editorial, 30 March 1991).
When asked how often governments incorporated NGO decisions, our question-
naire provoked a broad range of answers. Those who said that their views were
"often" incorporated into documents were few, and tended to have been on delega-
tions or had some other special status in relation to the official process. The most
common response was "sometimes," and the remaining answers were evenly
divided between "seldom" and "never." A representative comment from this ques-
tion was "They took some formulations, but never the intentions." Another section
of the questionnaire asked NGOs to "describe the most effective way to lobby dele-
gations." The answers were quite simple: maintaining direct, personal contact in
order to create a good working relationship as early in the process as possible, pref-
erably beginning in the home country; providing specific deletions and alternatives
in the language and documents that delegates are familiar with rather than general
statements of principle; being diplomatic, not falling asleep in meetings, and thank-
ing delegates when they do something right.
Another question that provided illuminating responses was which sectors or inter-
est groups were the most effective lobbyists during the UNCED process. Whereas
coalitions between different types of groups were common, there were several sec-
tors and interest groups that were particularly visible. Women were deemed the most
effective, with business coming a close second, and environmental groups third.
Youth, indigenous, and development groups each got honorable mentions.
The Women's Caucus, which was active at PrepComs and further strengthened
during the 1990 World Women's Congress for a Healthy Planet, was generally con-
sidered the most organized group at PrepComs, and their success was evident by an
impressive number of significant interventions and textual changes. For example,
when the Group of 77 moved to strike out all references to family planning and
population in response to the US threat to delete any mention of over-consumption
in Agenda 21, women effectively channeled their outrage and managed to have the
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original language restored. The success of women in having their concerns reflected
in official documents was attributed in questionnaire responses to the coordination
by a strong leader in Bella Abzug of the Women's Environment and Development
Organization (WEDO); the development of coherent lobbying strategies at the
Miami conference; the success of the group in learning how the process worked; and
the establishment of good coalitions with government delegates and the secretariat.
As previously mentioned, business has not traditionally been considered an NGO,
but the UNCED accreditation process was set up so that not-for-profit business
coalitions were allowed to participate in the same capacity as other nonprofit
groups. Thus, the International Chamber of Commerce was accredited, as was the
Association for Chemical Manufacturers. The Business Council for Sustainable
Development (BCSD), a coalition of 50 corporate leaders including Chevron, Dow
Chemical, Dupont and Royal Dutch Shell, was created specifically for UNCED, and
was chaired by Stephen Schmidheiny, a personal friend and the "chief adviser on
industry and business" to Secretary General Maurice Strong. Furthermore, business
leaders involved in these so-called NGOs participated on some delegations as gov-
ernmental advisers. Such preferential treatment for business allowed this sector to
have overwhelming influence upon the process, including a paragraph in Agenda 21
about the importance of the free market economy. Questionnaire respondees had
much to say about the success of business as an NGO: Business "has been favored
by the UNCED secretariat," "succeeded in escaping all regulations," and "reduced
the scope of the Conference." Furthermore, "Corporate interests ruled the agenda
and entrenched themselves further as economic dictators," "Business has money
and their point of view is often the same as the leaders." Few NGOs seemed to have
used this unusual contact with business as an opportunity to forge new coalitions.
The success of the environmental sector at UNCED is self-explanatory. This sec-
tor primarily encompasses large, well-established and well-funded organizations
such as the World Wildlife Fund, the International Union for the Conservation of
Nature (IUCN), and the Sierra Club, as well as some smaller grassroots groups.
These organizations are generally from industrialized countries and are often
focused on conservation issues such as forests, biodiversity and oceans. They are
generally well financed, well prepared, and experienced in lobbying. The envir-
onmental NGOs appeared to have reaped the most rewards from UNCED: not only
were their contributions incorporated into official documents, but they profited from
the opportunity to build coalitions with development groups and other NGOs.
Youth had a unique role in the UNCED process. Many did not have the experi-
ence or issue-specific backgrounds necessary for in-depth lobbying of delegations.
Moreover, most of them were disillusioned with the efficacy of lobbying alone to
effect change and felt that the exclusion of several vital issues from the agenda was
a crucial omission. Thus, they focused a good portion of their time publicizing the
fact that they considered UNCED a failure: planning actions and demonstrations,
issuing critical press releases, and making occasional disparaging statements to the
Plenary concerning the sluggish progress of negotiations and the lack of political
will on the part of many governments. They were praised by questionnaire respond-
ees for their "refusal to compromise" and for "succeeding in stretching the envelope
of the range of debate." On the other hand, those committed to working inside the
process were quite critical of the role of youth - for example, pointing out that "they
lost patience and developed an outside strategy that undermined the work of those
who were working hard to change from within."
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The role of indigenous peoples in UNCED is difficult to categorize, as most of the
indigenous peoples participating in UNCED considered themselves sovereign
nations rather than NODs. As Dren Lyons, chief of the Dnondaga nation, explained:
"UNCED accredits organizations and NODs. But we will certainly not subject our
nations to an NOD status. That disenfranchises us from the discussion because there
is not a specific place for us. We are requesting special accreditation for indigenous
nations and peoples" (Lerner, 1992). In fact, many of the indigenous peoples did not
consider themselves part of the NOD community present at PrepCorns and in Rio,
and often conducted their business independently without forming cross-sectoral
coalitions. This was reflected in the section of the questionnaire that asked NODs to
identify sectors or organizations with which they felt they had inadequate contact:
indigenous peoples groups were the most frequent response.
A significant number of accredited NODs avoided lobbying altogether during
UNCED preparations or supplemented their lobbying with other tactics, including
alternative conferences, workshops, and demonstrations. These groups were gener-
ally cynical about official participation, and felt that their strengths and skills could
be better used working outside the process in some form. Youth were common out-
siders, as well as more radical NODs from the Northern countries and many devel-
oping country NODs. Those working inside the process and those on the outside
frequently regarded each other with suspicion and distrust. Insiders feared that their
hard-won positions within the official process would be jeopardized by the more
independent and critical tactics of a subset of NODs; and those NODs who
eschewed lobbying in favor of direct action, or other outside events, were critical of
inside NODs, many of whom they considered as being coopted by the UNCED
process. The authors of EcoCurrents were critical of this trend:
The UNCED process has divided, coopted and weakened the green movement.... On the
one hand UNCED brought every possible NGO into the system of lobbying
governments, while on the other hand it quietly promoted business to take over the solu-
tions. NGOs are now trapped in a farce by which they have lent support to governments
in return for some small concessions on language and thus legitimized the process of
increased industrial development.... After decades of battle the UN discovered the truth
of the old adage, if you can't beat someone, join them...by making them believe they
[NGOs] were winning ground inch by inch, they failed to notice that they were now
becoming part of the system (Finger and Chatterjee, 1992: 4).
North versus South
Environment and development issues define the North-South separation perhaps
more precisely than any other set of problems. From the outset, differences of
perspectives and goals between the Oroup of 77 developing nations and the industri-
alized countries colored the UNCED negotiations. These differences were also vis-
ible within the NOD community, although many barriers were overcome by the end
of the two-year process, and new coalitions between Northern and Southern coun-
tries will probably sustain this partnership. As Vandana Shiva from the Third World
Network pointed out: "Those of us deeply involved have found our partners are
crossing the North-South divide much more effectively than governments" (NOLS,
E&D File No. 25).
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One section of our questionnaire asked NGOs to comment on whether or not they
observed a difference in the goals and/or tactics of Northern and Southern NGOs.
Some 80 percent of those polled answered in the affirmative and provided brief
descriptions of these differences. According to their responses, Northern NGOs
focused much more on "cosmetic" environmental conservation problems, whereas
Southerners were more inclined to work on debt, poverty, development, or economic
systems. This coincided with their respective tactics, with Northern NGOs working
more incrementally on sectoral issues, and Southerners focusing on broader, more
cross-sectoral goals and more fundamental systemic change. Terms that were fre-
quently mentioned in reference to Northern strategies were "experienced," "special-
ized," "pragmatic," "technical," "domineering," and "aggressive." Southerners were
categorized as "radical," "analytical," "practical," "ideological," "theoretical," and
"subtle." Northern NGOs had superior resources and information and were more
organized lobbyists. However, some NGOs pointed out that Southern NGOs had a
great deal ofpatience and lobbied hard for more interconnection between issues. Some
felt that Northern NGOs compromised too much in the process, whereas Southern
groups held fast to their hard-line positions. As one respondent put it, "Northerners
lobbied governments, while Southerners built an international NGO movement."
Further analysis of the responses revealed some interesting results. First, when
Northern and Southern groups were compared, there was a significant difference
(p <.007) in the level of negotiations at which each became involved. The average
Northern NGO became involved in the UNCED process during PrepCom III,
whereas the average Southern NGO did not participate fully until the final PrepCom
seven months later. This delayed involvement in the process, in large part due to
lack of information and funding, greatly reduced the chance of Southern NGOs
becoming integrated into the complex negotiating process. Indeed, Southern NGOs
met less frequently with either their own national or other government delegates on
average than did Northern NGOs (every second week rather than every week), and
found this level of access to governmental representatives less useful (p<.043).
Another interesting difference between Northern and Southern NGOs was their
rating of the effectiveness of gathering information on issues discussed at UNCED
(p <.008). It can be hypothesized that the frustration with information collection on
the part of Southern NGOs stems at least in part from the availability of most
information being in English only.
Outcomes: NGO Global Forum, Agenda 21, and Alternative Treaties
The Global Forum has been described as a circus, as Woodstock II, and as a colossal
mess. The estimated number of nongovernmental participants was 30 000 and they
traveled from 166 countries. The extent of the activities was vast: from intense sec-
toral negotiating sessions that resulted in 30 "alternative treaties" to a protest against
the World Bank; from theater and dance to celebrity appearances; and from work-
shops on a panoply of issues to a backward march to Rio Centro to symbolize NGO
opinion of the progress made at UNCED. The excitement was heightened by the
near-bankruptcy of the event: with a debt totaling US $2 million, the electricity,
translation, and meeting areas were saved at the last minute only by an emotional
fund-raising drive. Many NGOs were enthusiastic about the opportunities to meet
other like - minded people; others were disgusted by the "non - serious" tone of the
event.
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The Forum was completely separate from the official UNCED conference. The
events were held 45 kilometers apart and travel between them was difficult and
expensive. Attempts to minimize the physical distance (regarded by some as an
intentional tactic to distract meddlesome NGOs) were made with tele-conferences
and visits by some delegates to the Forum. However, many were not assuaged,
including Forum organizer Chip Lindner: "You got the feeling, if you were an NGO,
that there was a sense of tokenism, you were somehow a lesser citizen, a lesser
human being. What was lost was this great facility for human interaction with Heads
[of State]" (E&D File No. 25).
Many of the NGOs who had been lobbying at the PrepComs over the previous
two years focused their energies on the official process at Rio Centro; each accred-
ited NGO was permitted two observers in the official negotiations. However, due to
the fact that there was little left to lobby by the Earth Summit, and the problem that
Rio Centro was as full of delegates, secretariat staff, security, and media as the
Global Forum was packed with NGOs, led many to comment that they felt even less
influential than they had during the PrepComs.
One substantial product of NGO participation in UNCED was a chapter in
Agenda 21 called "Strengthening the Role of Major Groups." The chapter discusses
the creation of a "real social partnership" between governments and NGOs, and dis-
cusses the need to provide "mechanisms for the substantive involvement of NGOs at
all levels from policy and decision-making to implementation" (AlConf.151IPC/
100/Add.13). A large percentage of this chapter was drafted by coalitions of NGOs,
and discussed at length in official sessions. Indeed, its very existence is rather
impressive, when one considers that NGOs were such a source of controversy at the
first PrepCom.
An alternative treaties process was first proposed during the third PrepCom as a
way to supplement and react to the official negotiating process. In Rio, over 3000
NGOs collaborated on the drafting of more than 30 alternative treaties at the Global
Forum, and an elaborate structure was created for follow-up and implementation.
Each treaty had both a Southern and a Northern coordinator, and regional meetings
to discuss treaty implementation were scheduled for the next year. The alternative
treaties process was in many respects a reaction to the general failure of govern-
ments to produce strong commitments to action at UNCED, and a desire to produce
results that were more democratic than those coming from the official side. The
NGO treaties cover a broader range of issues than does Agenda 21 and are more
detailed and strongly phrased. They are an attempt to be proactive rather than criti-
cal of governments, and to achieve solutions that can be implemented independently
of governments. On the other hand, some NGOs found the alternative process
overly bureaucratic and analogous to the official process in its procedural hang-ups
and squabbles over phrasing. Some NGOs called the alternate treaty process "dog-
matic," as "stifling creativity," "lopsided," and failing in crucial linkages (UNCED
NGO Press Release no. 253, posted on en.unced.general).
Post-Rio NGO Activities
Post-UNCED work among NGOs began almost immediately after the Summit
ended. The treaties are still being reviewed and signed, and UNCED evaluation
meetings have taken place in many countries. Most of the UNCED-related monitoring
and implementation of Agenda 21 work will take place on local and national levels,
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but future global collaboration is also in the works, with an international UNCED
follow-up and future planning meeting slated for 1993 in the United Kingdom. In
Rio, NGO networks discussed future participation in a number of different UN con-
ferences, including the 1992 General Assembly meeting, the 1993 Conference on
Human Rights, the 1994 Population Conference, the 50th Anniversary of the United
Nations, and the 1995 Conference on Women. In the questionnaire, virtually all (99
percent) of the responding NGOs planned to continue networking on a regional or
international level, and the majority (93 percent) planned to be involved in UNCED
follow-up, e.g., implementing Agenda 21.
One issue that will doubtless be debated in the post-Rio period is the idea of
"institutionalizing" NGO input with some sort of advisory mechanism from a select
number of NGOs. The benefits of such a mechanism are simplicity and the assur-
ance that NGO input would be considered. The drawbacks are that the selection
process for such a body could be highly controversial and it would be difficult to
ensure that the voices of all sectors of society were being taken into account.
Response to the issue of institutionalization for NGOs in the questionnaire produced
an even split between those in favor of such a device and those opposed. Those sup-
porting institutionalization cited the UNCED proposal for a Sustainable Develop-
ment Commission, which would incorporate NGO input as a suitable mechanism.
Many qualified their support with the requirement that such a body be open and
accountable and not dominated by larger, more established NGOs. Interestingly, the
reactions of those opposed to institutionalization were among the most vehement
responses in the entire questionnaire. These anti-institutionalists feared the "bureau-
cratization," "sterilization," "homogeneity," "cooptation," "power struggles," the
transformation of NGOs into "a rubber stamp," and adoption of general govern-
ment-like behavior. Fears surfaced that "the voices of small and poor NGOs would
be lost among big, rich, and powerful NGOs," that "the global relationship of NGOs
is in formation and must evolve unconstrained by artificial and premature bureau-
cracy," and "the NGO community does not sympathize with the idea of creating a
UN-style NGO bureaucracy to 'represent' such a vast and diverse movement."
CONCLUSIONS
As it is premature to make final declarations about the implications of UNCED, it is
difficult to assess whether NGO participation was worthwhile. Ifonly the NGO per-
spective is considered, participation was at least valuable in terms of developing
new networks, acquisition of information, and heightened public awareness. As far
as the success of the conference itself, although few expectations were met in terms
of binding agreements, those that were hammered out can only be implemented
through the active intervention and monitoring by NGOs. When asked to evaluate
their participation in UNCED in retrospect, and whether the time, money, and
energy devoted to the process was worthwhile, a surprising majority of NGOs
replied in the affirmative. Most qualified their answers though, as the majority of
NGOs did not feel that they had a real impact on the official UNCED process. How-
ever, NGOs generally appreciated the value of the process in other ways. For exam-
ple, Patricia Carney, a US NGO, commented: "While we may not have gotten
exactly what we wanted or needed from the Earth Summit, an enormous amount of
positive action has begun. We left with the strong message that - even if govern-
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ments won't take leadership - individual citizens, organizations and businesses will
take significant actions, and that the mechanisms are in place for this to happen"
(Hussain, 1992: 5).
One of the major impediments affecting the outcome of UNCED was that the
agenda was set without NGO input, thus excluding some issues deemed crucial by
the NGO community. Furthermore, the earlier that connections were made between
governments and NGOs, the more influence NGOs had on national positions, which
otherwise tended to become inflexible early in the negotiations. Providing education
and orientation for NGOs about working within the UN system and with govern-
ment delegations could also reduce frustration levels for both parties.
How could NGO participation have been more effective in attaining their goals
for UNCED? Much revolved around the concept of support: more financial and
human resources for NGOs, prior distribution of draft treaties, better meeting facili-
ties and translation services, an information clearinghouse for NGOs, greater access
to governments, more support for groups working outside the process, and more
support from NGO movements in home countries would have likely yielded
improved effectiveness. One of the most important lessons learned in the UNCED
process was that in order to have any effect whatsoever on the official "inside" nego-
tiations, NGOs must become fully involved and at the earliest phase of the process.
It would be a mistake to conclude that only "inside" NGOs have any chance of
being effective in negotiations of the UNCED genre, or that "outside" groups should
completely abandon all official activities. On the contrary, lobbying is most effective
when complemented by the generally more creative proposals and statements gen-
erated outside the process. NGOs should capitalize on the fact that they are not
governments and do not have to work within the narrow confines of bureaucracy.
Whereas governments were unable to bridge the gaps effectively between envir-
onment-development and North-South in UNCED, NGOs proved that diverse sec-
tors and hemispheres can cooperate productively and overcome traditional
divisions. Through the UNCED experience, NGOs have been transformed into a
diverse but cohesive and communicating movement: one that has learned from its
unchartered path through the UNCED negotiations, and can playa major role in the
future governance of international environmental regimes.
APPENDIX 13.1 QUESTIONNAIRE FOR UNCED NGOS
The total number of completed questionnaires received and tabulated was 79. Out of a pool of
1420 accredited NGOs, this is a response rate of over 5%. The North/South balance was
roughly equivalent to the ratio of accredited NGOs from these hemispheres: 59 from Northern
countries responded, and 20 from the South. All sectors were well represented, except busi-
ness. The questionnaire was sent only to NGOs that were accredited to the official process;
thus, it is important to keep in mind that this grouping represents only a small (less than 5%)
percentage of the total number of NGOs that participated in the Global Forum and other
UNCED-related events.
I - Please circle the negotiations that you or another representative of your organization have
attended:
PrepCom I PrepCom 2 PrepCom 3 PrepCom 4 Rio Conference
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On average, the NGOs who responded became involved in the UNCED process during the
fourth PrepCom.
2 - Were you or your organization part of an official delegation? Yes 33% No 66%
3 - Please circle the level that you (or your organization) work on:
Local National Regional International
Most organizations worked on most or all of these levels; only 4 worked only on the local
level.
4 - If you associate yourself (or your organization) with any particular sector(s) and/or
issues(s), please circle:
Youth Women Indigenous Religious Labor Agriculture Business Development
Environment Health Trade Human Rights PeacelMilitary Other
There were representatives of all of the above sectors; most considered themselves
members of two or more of the categories.
5 - How often did you meet with other NGOs on issues of common interest during PrepComsi
at Rio?
every day several times per week once weekly bi-weekly never
50% of the respondees met with other NGOs every day, and most of the rest several times per
week.
6 - How often did you attend the following NGO events?
NGO Strategy Meetings:
every day 25% several times per week 47% once weekly 8% bi-weekly 8% never 12%
NGO-Government Dialogues:
every day 10% several times per week 39% once weekly 15% bi-weekly 18% never 13%
NGO Plenaries:
every day 20% several times per week 49% once weekly 9.5% bi-weekly 12% never 9.5%
Sectoral Meetings (e.g. Women):
every day 25% several times per week 44% once weekly 10% bi-weekly 4% never 17%
Interest Group Meetings (e.g. Trade):
every day 18% several times per week 44% once weekly 17% bi-weekly 7% never 14%
7 - Did you observe a difference in the goals and/or tactics of "Northern" and "Southern"
NGOs?
Yes 80% No 20%
8 - Did you network/build coalitions with organizations from countries besides your own?
Yes 91% No 9%
If so, were these networks/coalitions on a regional basis?
Yes51% N049%
9 - Were there NGO sectors/organizations that you felt you did not make enough contact
with?
Yes79% N021%
Lack of time was the main reason for not having enough contact
10 - Please circle the sector(s) and/or interest group(s) that have, in your opinion, been the
most effective lobbyists during the UNCED process:
Youth 17 Women 44 Indigenous 18 Religious 5 Labor 0 Agriculture Business 37
Development 16 Environment 27 Health 0 Trade 6 Human Rights I PeacelMilitary 2
* numbers are out of a total pool of 79 questionnaires
II - How often did you met with delegates from other governments?
every day 21 % several times per week 23% once weekly 12% bi-weekly 17% never 27%
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12 - How often did you meet with delegates from your own government?
every day 28% several times per week 17% once weekly 14% bi-weekly 24% never 17%
Was this sufficient? Yes 42% No 58%
13 - Was the level of access you had to official negotiations (PrepComs and Rio) adequate?
Yes 76% No 24%
14 - Was the amount of speaking time you had in official negotiations adequate?
Yes 12% No 88%
15 - Please approximate the number of written statements you submitted to delegates;
The average number of written interventions per NGO hovered between 5 and 6 in a broad
range from 0 to 50.
16 - How often did delegations incorporate your ideas and concerns into their decisions?
Often 12% Sometimes 44% Seldom 22% Never 22%
SECTION II - GOALS
Not at all 3%
Not at all 4%
Not at all 1%
Not at all 4%
Not at all 10%
Not at all 20%
Not at all 35%
Not at all 46%
NGOs had various goals that they hoped to achieve during the UNCED process. By circling
the provided responses, please rate HOW IMPORTANT the following goals were to yourself
and/or your organization and measure HOW EFFECTIVE you think you were in attaining
these goals.
I - Lobbying on specific issues on the UNCED agenda (Le. biodiversity, climate)
How important? Very 62% Somewhat 31 % Not at all 7%
How effective? Very 58% Somewhat 26% Not at all 16%
2 - Lobbying on specific issues NOT on the UNCED agenda (Le. trade, militarism)
How important? Very 58% Somewhat 26% Not at all 16%
How effective? Very 5% Somewhat 39% Not at all 56%
3 - Coalition building/networking with other NGOs
How important? Very 85% Somewhat 12%
How effective? Very 33% Somewhat 63%
*ranked Ist in importance, 2nd in effectiveness
4 - Coalition building/networking with government delegations
How important? Very 42% Somewhat 48% Not at all 10%
How effective? Very 8% Somewhat 58% Not at all 34%
-ranked 9th in importance, 9th in effectiveness
5 - Facilitating dialogue between governments
How important? Very 28% Somewhat 37%
How effective? Very 2% Somewhat 52%
*ranked 11th in importance, 12th in effectiveness
6 - Obtaining information on issues discussed at UNCED
How important? Very 76% Somewhat 23%
How effective? Very 44% Somewhat 52%
*ranked 3rd in importance, Ist in effectiveness
7 - Providing information to delegates on particular issues
How important? Very 62% Somewhat 28%
How effective? Very 12% Somewhat 68%
*ranked 6th in importance, 8th in effectiveness
8 - Education of public about issues through media (e.g. press conferences and releases)
How important? Very 83% Somewhat 16% Not at all 1%
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Not at all 13%
Not at all 13%
Not at all 25%
How effective? Very 28% Somewhat 59%
*ranked 2nd in importance. 3rd in effectiveness
9 - Supporting projects of your organization
How important? Very 47% Somewhat 40%
How effective? Very 17% Somewhat 58%
*ranked 8th in importance. 7th in effectiveness
10 - Working "outside" the process (e.g. demonstrations and protests)
How important? Very 36% Somewhat 38% Not at all 26%
How effective? Very 19% Somewhat 53% Not at all 28%
*ranked 10th in importance. 6th in effecti veness
11 - Facilitating future NGO access to international negotiations
How important? Very 66% Somewhat 24% Not at all 10%
How effective? Very 20% Somewhat 63% Not at all 17%
*ranked 5th in importance. 5th in effectiveness
12 - Monitoring implementation of UNCED commitments in your country post-Rio
How important? Very 73% Somewhat 21 % Not at all 6%
How effective? Very 22% Somewhat 56% Not at all 22%
*ranked 4th in importance. 4th in effectiveness
13 - What degree of future access should NGOs be allowed in international negotiations like
UNCED?
Universal access 62% Same level of access 38% Restricted access 0%
14 - Should NGO input be institutionalized? (e.g. with an intergovernmental advisory
mechanism)
Yes 52% No 48%
15 - Do you plan to be involved in UNCED follow-up? (implementation of Agenda 21/
conventions)
Yes93% N07%
16 - Do you plan to continue networking on a regionallinternationallevel?
Yes 99% No 1%
17 - In retrospect, was the time/money/energy devoted to the UNCED process worthwhile?
Yes 81% No 19%
Part IV
The Outcome and Lessons Learned for
Future Regime-building Negotiations

14
What Will It Take to Ensure Effective Global
Environmental Management?
A Reassessment of Regime-building
Accomplishments
Lawrence E. Susskind
UNCED, or the Earth Summit as it was more popularly known, fell short of
the goals that the UN General Assembly had set for it, I only two of the seven
projected treaties were signed. Worse still, the most important cross-cutting
questions of how best to strengthen the UN-sponsored global environmental
management system to ensure sustainable development were not addressed. Two
non-specific agreements -the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, spelling out general
principles and a comprehensive list of problems requiring attention - were signed,
though, along with conventions calling for further monitoring of climate change and
technology sharing to protect biodiversity. However, neither of these two treaties set
deadlines nor did they require signatory countries to adopt less environmentally
destructive resource management practices.
Much has been made of the fact that more heads of state met at UNCED to dis-
cuss global environmental issues than had ever gathered previously. However,
neither rules, regulations, nor relationships were altered in any significant way.
While consciousness was raised, expectations were heightened, and environmental
issues were raised to a higher level on the world policy agenda, at least for several
months, these do not constitute success. The most important measure of regime-
building success in the environmental field is the extent to which institutional
capacity to ensure sustainability (both domestic and international) is enhanced. By
this measure, UNCED was only modestly successful.
There were, though, two important institution-building accomplishments at
UNCED: the decision to continue (and increase funding for) the Global Environ-
I In the fall of 1989. when the UN General Assembly called for the Conference on Environment and
Development, there was some hope that treaties dealing with climate change, transboundary air pollution,
deforestation, soil loss, desert expansion and drought, conservation of biological diversity, protection of
the oceans and seas, protection of freshwater resources, and strategies for financing all these
improvements, could all be signed in Rio.
Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons Learned from the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (G. Sjiistedt, et al., eds.; 1-85966-077-0; © IIASA; pub. Graham & Trotman, 1994;
printed in Great Britain), pp. 221 -232.
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ment Facility (GEF) and the decision to create a new UN Commission on Sustain-
able Development (CSD). Each of these efforts has proceeded haltingly, and neither
is supported by the kind of broad-based North-South coalition needed to ensure
long-term success. Without unified support, the GEF will not be able to generate
sufficient funds to support implementation of existing treaties (let alone more mean-
ingful accords aimed at reaching specific goals by pre-set dates); nor will the CSD
be able to fulfill the coordination role that is so sorely lacking within the UN system.
Four obstacles to more effective global environmental management blocked the
path at Rio. Effective management of common pool resources requires all states to
accept certain constraints on the ways in which they pursue economic development;
yet, most nations continue to resist collective efforts to ensure wise management of
shared resources - claiming infringement of their sovereignty. Second, the nations
of the South (Le., G-77) do not have the resources necessary to reverse the destruc-
tive forces of overpopulation and poverty that have decimated many of their most
valuable natural assets; yet the nations of the North are not inclined to provide the
technical and financial aid needed to help the South implement more sustainable
development practices. Third, the nations of the North refuse to alter the historic
consumption patterns that have generated enormous amounts of global pollution and
depleted vast stocks of natural resources - far in excess of the North's "fair share" of
the world's resources. Fourth, most elected leaders are unwilling to incur political
and economic costs now so that future generations may benefit; yet, this is what is
required to reverse the ecological destruction that current development patterns are
causing.
In the face of such obstacles, it is not surprising that the results of most global
environmental negotiations, and Rio was no exception, have been "lowest common
denominator" agreements that only apply to some countries and contain weak or
nonexistent enforcement mechanisms (Susskind, 1994). Indeed, the UN-sponsored
treaty-making system that has emerged in recent years accommodates the political
needs of both developed and developing nations, but yields global agreements that
fall far short of what is needed to ensure global sustainability. The current system
permits heads of state, such as those who gathered at the Earth Summit, to sign
vague agreements while avoiding the risk of political reprisals (at home and
abroad). Our political leaders have been able to claim symbolic victories regarding
their attempts to protect the environment while avoiding almost any constraints on
investment and development practices. They do this by signing conventions that
require nothing more than a willingness to submit reports and meet again (although,
even the submittal of reports is sometimes controversial). Moreover, they are not
obliged to adopt subsequent protocols that emerge from future meetings of treaty
signatories.
To go beyond the treaties that have been adopted thus far, and to achieve real
regime building success in the environmental management field, at least four
changes in the U.N.-sponsored treaty-making system will be required:
1. Non-governmental interests will have to be guaranteed a more formal con-
tinuing role (independent of national governments) at all stages of international
treaty negotiation. This will enhance their capacity to influence domestic decision-
making and, ultimately, to fight for global convergence of environmental regulations
as well as more effective enforcement.
2. A much tighter link will have to be made between the harmonization of global
environmental protection and resource management efforts and the economic well-
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being of nations. Even though such linkages will make negotiations more compli-
cated, tougher environmental treaties will be resisted until they are coupled with
sufficient development assistance to ensure that political and economic benefits are
generated in the short run. To accomplish this, environmental treaty-making will
need to be linked directly to global trade and debt management policies.
3. There must be a dramatic increase in the level of financial support for
collaborative scientific research to pinpoint the ways in which various regional
ecosystems respond to global insults. Unless global policies can be targeted
in ways that are sensitive to variations in ecosystem carrying capacity and
institutional management capabilities, we will not be able to craft cost-
effective treaties. Until it is possible to make the case that the costs imposed
on participating nations and regions are fair and appropriate, environmental diplo-
macy will fail.
4. There will need to be a dramatic increase in financial and political support for
global environmental monitoring. Unless and until independent and reliable moni-
toring reports are regularly available to groups within every country, it will not be
possible to force compliance with global environmental protection and resource
management standards, even if they are spelled out in detailed treaty protocols. Such
standards cannot be effectively enforced by a centralized "command-and-control"
system; rather, grassroots community efforts - along the lines of the human rights
monitoring process that has evolved over the past few decades - will be required
(Susskind,1994).
THE OUTCOMES AT RIO CONFIRM THE WEAKNESSES OF THE
EXISTING CONVENTION - PROTOCOL APPROACH TO
TREATY-MAKING
Most of the attention at the Earth Summit was focused on the Climate Change and
Biodiversity Treaty negotiations. Yet, neither of these negotiations produced par-
ticularly noteworthy treaties. Indeed, the rush to meet the artificially imposed June
1992 deadline may well have produced inferior agreements than would otherwise
have evolved. Historically, it has taken anywhere from eight to ten years to generate
sufficient scientific and political consensus to trigger collective action: that is, to
ensure ratification of accords on complex global environmental issues (Spector and
Korula, 1993 ). The imposition of the June 1992 negotiating deadline did nothing to
remove the obstacles that have caused environmental treaty-making to move so
slowly or have produced weak treaties that, at best, slow the rate of environmental
deterioration, but never repair the damage that has already been done.
The Climate Change Treaty
The parties to the Climate Change Convention promised to:
(1) develop national inventories of anthropogenic emissions;
(2) implement and publish national programs aimed at mitigating climate change;
(4) promote sustainable management of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases;
(5) cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change;
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(6) take climate change into account in developing social, economic, and environ-
mental policies;
(7) promote scientific cooperation and data collection;
(8) share information related to climate change;
(9) promote and cooperate in public education related to climate change.
No emission targets were specified; no deadlines were set. No attempt was made
to set out the kinds of activities that each country should undertake to reduce the
risks associated with climate change.
The treaty also states that the extent to which developing countries are expected
to implement their obligations depends on the developed countries fulfilling their
commitments, particularly the promise to provide financial resources and transfer
technology. The treaty points out that economic development and poverty eradica-
tion remain the overriding priorities of developing countries, implying that environ-
mental protection must take a "back seat." The section of the Climate Change Treaty
outlining financial obligation says only that "provision should be made for the
appropriation of financial resources on a grant or concessional basis under the guid-
ance of all the parties." No specific funding requirements were specified.
The treaty assigns the usual responsibilities to the Conference of the Parties and a
secretariat. It calls for a "subsidiary body for scientific and technological advice" to
be created along with a subsidiary body for implementation (open to all parties) to
be comprised of government representatives "expert on matters related to climate
change." No specific performance milestones are listed. No enforcement powers are
granted to any institution.
In the end, the Climate Change Convention achieved the absolute lowest common
denominator outcome - a statement of concern about the possible dangers of climate
change and a promise to work together to collect additional information. The parties
have agreed to meet again to review the reports that each may provide. This rather
inconsequential outcome was clearly a function of the South's unwillingness to
accept any responsibility for mitigating adverse effects of the build-up of green-
house gases caused by development in the North, unless the North is willing to
increase substantially the development assistance given to the South. The North,
however, unwilling to admit responsibility for the build-up of greenhouse gases, not
only refused to promise additional aid, but was adamant in its view that it would not
be necessary to alter its development patterns in response to the dangers of climate
change. The stated goal of environmental advocates, which was ultimately rejected,
was that all nations of the world should agree to cut back their emission of green-
house gases to 1990 levels by the year 2000. Note, though, that 1990 levels were the
initial trigger that raised international concern in the first place! Nevertheless, the
developed nations, particularly the United States, were unwilling to endorse even
this non-remedial goal (although the Clinton administration seems to have reversed
the Bush administration on this point).
Gareth Porter and Janet Brown, in their excellent book Global Environmental
Politics, suggest that global environmental negotiations involve four political pro-
cesses - issue definition, factfinding, bargaining, and regime strengthening. Issue
definition brings problems to the attention of the international community and sug-
gests the type of international action required. Once issues are identified, factfinding
brings parties together in an attempt to establish agreement and to clarify the scope
of differences in the understanding of the problem and of possible policy options.
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Bargaining, they suggest, hinges on the leverage and cohesion of veto coalitions -
groups of states that can block international cooperation (Porter and Brown, 1991).
Regime strengthening presumably occurs after a first round agreement has been
reached and improved understanding of the environmental problem(s) is achieved.
Thus, scientific evidence, especially the product of joint monitoring or collaborative
research, is meant to be given increasing weight over time. In the case of the
Climate Change Convention, however, it is far from certain that this will happen;
not only because there will always be a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the
sources and impacts of greenhouse gases, but also because the South has decided
that it will not "give" on environmental issues until the North agrees to a massive
reallocation of resources.2
Perhaps the Climate Change Convention will lead to some regime strengthening
over time, but this will not be because scientific results dictate the next steps in
international bargaining. Regime strengthening could occur if independent envir-
onmental interests in a sufficient number of countries gain enough strength to push
their national governments to take unilateral steps to reduce the emission of green-
house gases. At that point, countries that have been forced to take action will band
together to argue for harmonization of international efforts so that none is dis-
advantaged economically. In short, there is no inevitability about the process of
regime strengthening, especially if it depends on the building of scientific consensus
and the dominance of scientific evidence over national self-interest.
If we look closely at the institutional arrangements and assignment of responsibil-
ities specified by the Climate Change Treaty, we can see why they are not likely to
lead to regime strengthening. Signatory states face no penalty if they fail to file com-
plete or accurate reports. In fact, there is no mechanism to determine whether
national reports are at all accurate. Under the circumstances, there are sure to be
gaps in the information provided. Protocols to standardize national reporting have
yet to be written and, when they are, there is a good chance that the South will resist
any effort to impose Northern data-gathering requirements or a centralized authority
with the power to review or revise what nations submit. Thus, even if independent
groups of scientists reach agreement on why and how greenhouse gases cause
climate change, it will not be easy to estimate what remedial actions will work or
what their regional implications are likely to be, since we are unlikely to acquire
adequate information to permit that level of detailed modeling. My hunch is that we
are not likely to know much more about the dynamics of climate change after the
next round of national reports is received than we do now. As long as a significant
number of countries see monitoring as a threat rather than as an opportunity for
global learning, it is not obvious how or why regime strengthening will occur.
The Biodiversity Treaty
The signatories to the Convention on Biological Diversity pledged to cooperate in
efforts to conserve and promote the sustainable use of biological diversity. They
promised to:
2Adil Najam, "A Strategy for the South," in Lawrence Susskind, William Moomaw, and Adil Najam,
International Environmental Negotiation, vol. 3. (Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School,
Cambridge, Massachusetts), 1993.
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(I) develop national and cross-sectoral plans for the conservation and sustainable
use of biological diversity;
(2) monitor, through sampling and other techniques, the components of biological
diversity;
(3) establish a system of protected areas where special measures will be taken to
conserve biological diversity;
(4) regulate or manage biological resources important to the conservation of
biological diversity whether within or outside protected areas;
(5) rehabilitate and restore degraded ecosystems and promote the recovery of
threatened species;
(6) establish means to control the risks associated with the use and release of living
modified organisms resulting from biotechnology;
(7 adopt measures for the ex-situ conservation of components of biological
diversity, preferably in their place of origin;
(8) facilitate access to genetic resources for environmentally sound uses by other
countries and not impose restrictions that run counter to the objectives of the
Convention;
(9) facilitate access and transfer to the other states of technologies that are relevant
to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, on concessional
and preferential terms where mutually agreed.
The developed countries are supposed to provide new and additional financial
resources to enable developing countries to meet the incremental costs of imple-
menting the Biodiversity Treaty. However, it is left to subsequent meetings to decide
how much this will cost, where the money will come from, and how responsibility
for meeting these financial obligations will be assured.
Even after signing the Biodiversity Treaty, states still retain the option of saying
when and how (or even whether) they will provide access to biological resources
within their borders. There are no penalties for failing to achieve the goals of the
treaty. There are no deadlines by which targets must be met. There is no grant of
authority to supersede national sovereignty; indeed, efforts to ensure that national
sovereignty is in no way compromised (which remains paradoxical given that
almost all global resource management measures require participating countries to
accept some limitations on the exploitation of resources in exchange for the co-
operation of other nations) explain why so few requirements are actually included in
the treaty. As was the case with the Climate Change Treaty, and indeed with almost
all international environmental negotiations, the North was not willing to promise
the South the resources it needs to implement more sustainable development prac-
tices. Moreover, the North is unwilling to alter its historic consumption patterns in
exchange for concessions by the South. And, finally, most elected leaders in both
developed and developing countries are unwilling to incur political and economic
costs so that future generations might retain the same choices that we now have. The
result is weak treaties and a hope that irrefutable scientific evidence will emerge,
leading to regime strengthening. The leaders who signed the most recent treaties are
congratulating themselves for having taken important first steps, even though no
results are guaranteed. And, why should they do any more than that? There will
always be experts, assigned by their national governments, to point out that scien-
tific uncertainty surrounding the current state of affairs should lead to caution, that
the weaknesses of the theoretical basis for forecasting future impacts call for modest
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proposals, and the relative merits of taking no action while more data are gathered
should be carefully considered. This provides cover for leaders who prefer to take
no action.
The GEF and the CSD
In spite of these difficulties, the UNCED negotiators did make two important insti-
tutional commitments. First, they agreed to retain the GEF; and second, they created
the CSD. The UNCED representatives agreed that developed countries should
reaffirm a commitment to reaching the longstanding UN target of 0.7 percent of
GNP for Official Development Assistance (aDA). Those who signed Agenda 21
urged that developed nations augment their aid programs until the 0.7 percent goal is
met. The UNCED secretariat initially estimated that the full cost of implementing
Agenda 21 would be $600 billion per year, of which about $125 billion annually
would come from the North and the balance from developing country resources. By
any stretch of the imagination, this was an untenable goal. At most, UNCED
generated additional aid commitments of less than $10 billion.
Faced with these financial constraints, the Earth Summit negotiators sought ways
of financing the implementation of Agenda 21. They decided to build on the GEF,
although the South demanded certain changes in its organization and operation
before it would agree. The GEF is administered by the World Bank, along with
UNDP and UNEP. The GEF was created in 1990 as a three-year pilot program and
given a mandate to allocate $1.3 billion for projects related to global warming,
biodiversity, international waters, and ozone depletion. The South's distrust of the
World Bank (which it perceives as intrusive in domestic policy making and dom-
inated by developed countries) led to the adoption of a new GEF voting system for
allocating aid funds that does not mimic the World Bank's reliance on a system
weighted according to the size of each country's contribution. Instead of scraping
the GEF (which the parties could have demanded), UNCED reaffirmed an earlier
April agreement on restructuring it.
GEF decision-making procedures will now be more transparent to member coun-
tries and aid recipients. The reforms further called for involvement of NGOs in GEF
project development and administration. So, in exchange for the North's willingness
to modify the GEF's administrative structure, the South accepted (at least tem-
porarily) a North-dominated system for allocating aid. While the GEF will still
receive funds pursuant to the terms of each individual treaty for which it has finan-
cial responsibility, the overall "pot" of money will continue to grow and, from the
standpoint of the South, it may be possible to argue later on that "fair shares" of the
total GEF budget should be allocated to specific countries or regions, regardless of
the project proposals they have been able to generate.
While the money provided through the GEF will still be project specific, it can
now be construed as something more closely akin to compensation. While grants are
supposed to cover the costs that developing countries will face in meeting their
obligations under the Montreal Protocol, Climate Change Convention, and other
treaties - and take account of the scientific merit of each project proposal - by
putting all the funds under one auspice, it will be much easier for developing nations
to keep track of the overall allocation of treaty-related monies. The South is likely to
look askance at an overall pattern of allocations that favors one continent or one
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country over others. In the final analysis, GEF allocations may be judged less on
their technical merit, and more in terms of the extent to which basic needs in
different parts of the world are being met.
At PrepCom III in Geneva in August 1991, Bangladesh, supported by Norway
and France, proposed the creation of an Earth Commission or a Commission on Sus-
tainable Development (CSD) as an intergovernmental body, elected from ECOSOC,
but open to all member states and agencies of the UN. This body would receive
reports and recommendations from a committee of experts, which would, in tum,
receive national reports from each member state describing its success in meeting
treaty commitments. The committee would then make recommendations to the
CSD, which could investigate them and report to the General Assembly. The Com-
mission would be open to the participation of NGOs accredited by ECOSOC. It
would have a small secretariat based in Geneva (Roddick, 1993). This version ofthe
CSD was based on the UN Commission on Human Rights.
Some countries, like the United States, initially argued against creating any new
institutions, or allocating any additional aid for sustainable development. Rather,
they advocated strengthening UNEP (Roddick, 1993). Sweden proposed a Com-
mission on Global Governance, aimed at streamlining the role of the UN's special-
ized agencies and strengthening the position of the Secretary General. While other
delegates to the PrepCom saw no need for anything more than an annual session of a
revitalized ECOSOC, which ostensibly coordinates all UN institutions; this was not,
in the eyes of most countries, sufficient to ensure the integration of desperate
environmental protection and economic development activities.
At PrepCom IV in New York, Venezuela once again proposed the Commission.
Backed by Mexico and Colombia, Venezuela called for a commission of ECOSOC,
on a par with the Commission on Human Rights (Roddick, 1993). The CSD as it
finally emerged from Rio and the subsequent General Assembly session is a "high
level" functional Commission of ECOSOC, consisting of 53 government repre-
sentatives, reporting through ECOSOC to the General Assembly. Its primary role is
to review progress in implementing Agenda 21, as well as the overall integration of
environment and development within the UN system. Initially, it will meet annually
for two to three weeks, before the regular ECOSOC session. It will review progress
on finance, transfer of technology, and government successes and failures in
integrating environment and development. In spite of the refusal of Brazil, India,
and China to allow the CSD to review national reports formally, the Commission
can receive information sent to it by any nation or organization.
The General Assembly formally gave the CSD the following assignments:
(l) monitor UN progress in implementing Agenda 21;
(2) consider information on the implementation of environmental treaties which
the signatories agree to provide;
(3) consider information from governments such as "periodic communications or
national reports" on the activities they undertake to implement Agenda 21, the
problems they face, and the issues they consider important;
(4) review progress on technology transfer and on governments' financial
commitments under Agenda 21;
(5) receive and analyze input from NGOs.
There were, as I have hinted, numerous points of contention regarding the design
and operation of the CSD. At the General Assembly session and at subsequent
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meetings of the CSD, the mandate of the commission, its membership and the fre-
quency of its meetings, the location of its meetings and its secretariat, its position
within the UN bureaucracy, the endowment of its secretariat, the procedures by
which it would operate, and its relationship to and the role of NGOs in its operation,
were all debated (Wolz, 1992; Sessions, 1992). While most of these have been tem-
porarily resolved, the structure of the CSD is sure to evolve. The same North-South
conflicts that plagued the GEF simmer just below the surface of the current CSD
agreement. Those who want the CSD to play an aggressive watchdog role are coun-
tered by those who view any second-guessing of national reports as an abridgement
of sovereignty. Those who feel that the internal operations of disparate UN agencies
can be coordinated from within or on high (even with the strong support of the Sec-
retary General) are sure to be disappointed.
FURTHER INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS ARE REQUIRED
Most recent international environmental negotiations have followed a two-step
approach. An initial series of meetings is held to review scientific evidence and draft
a framework convention. Then, subsequent meetings of the signatories focus on the
preparation of detailed protocols. The convention-protocol approach has produced a
number of first-step agreements - the Climate Change Convention and the Bio-
diversity Treaty being the most recent examples. The Montreal Protocol is the best-
known example of what the second step in the two-step process is supposed to
generate. It is inevitable, however, that the two-step convention-protocol approach
to treaty negotiation will take a long time and reinforce the tendency to seek lowest
common denominator agreements. Unless the treaty-making system is substantially
reformed, international environmental treaties will continue to take decades to adopt
and impose the same requirements on all signatories, often neglecting available
scientific and technical information that argues for regional or even sub-regional
variations in standards and timetables for implementation.3
The convention-protocol approach has, for the most part, been dominated by the
most powerful states. They have taken the initiative on issues of environmental pro-
tection. Now, however, the South is demanding a greater role and insisting on the
transfer of financial resources before further treaties are considered. The ad hoc
nature of the convention-protocol approach is partly to blame for the current grid-
lock. In the absence of a formal negotiating system spelling out the rights of each
country to help set the agenda and the obligations of secretariats to ensure that cer-
tain minimum thresholds of support from UN members will be met, the North and
the South feel compelled to hold out for "everything" they want, each time a new
treaty is up for negotiation. Most global environmental treaties signed thus far (and
there are dozens of them dating back to the tum of the century) have not been rati-
fied by most nations. The environmental problems to which the treaties were
addressed have not been resolved (Susskind, 1994). Further improvement will
require at least four kinds of institutional reforms.
3For a list of these reforms. see The Salzburg Initiative. prepared by the International Environmental
Negotiation Network.
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STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL
INTERESTS
Unofficial actors can play several important roles in the process of global envir-
onmental treaty-making, but they have not been given a clear mandate to do so.
They can serve as scientific advisers or information gatherers at the point at which
risks are being defined or problems are being diagnosed. They can play the role of
advocates, mobilizing public opinion within each country as well as on a world-
wide basis, pressing heads of state to advance an issue higher up the political
agenda. They can also make negotiations more democratic - ensuring that the
concerns of segments of the population that may not be important to certain
national leaders are nevertheless addressed by international assemblies. They may
assume the role of change agents - promoting new and different policy
approaches that have not yet won support in international bureaucratic ranks.
Unofficials, in addition, can serve as monitors, providing a key independent check
on the information provided by official sources or gathering data when countries
fail to meet their reporting requirements. Finally, unofficials can serve as inter-
mediaries or facilitators, suggesting and helping to implement action on stop-gap
measures when countries are too slow to act or there is no time to move collec-
tively when formal treaties have clearly failed.
Given this multiplicity of roles and functions, it is not surprising that unofficials
want a guarantee that their involvement will not be blocked by the UN and its mem-
ber institutions. Nongovernmental interests want the UN to acknowledge formally
their right to participate. At present, at the outset of each treaty-making effort,
unofficials must invest substantial organizational resources to plead for the right to
be at the negotiation table. Often, as was the case at the Rio Earth Summit, they are
forced to settle for parallel conferences or restricted observer status. They are,
though, seeking something closer to a fully fledged partnership with the
governmental members of the UN.
The exact form this partnership should take is not clear, but several principles
that might guide its design are: first, the various segments of the unofficial com-
munity should be recognized as separate and distinct. Second, nongovernmental
interests need to be "at the table" at all stages of the treaty-making process.
While some nongovernmental interests will serve as members of national dele-
gations, others should be present as independent actors, even if somewhat simi-
lar interests are represented on both national delegations and at-large. Since
only countries vote, there need be no fear that nongovernmental interests will be
given undue advantage if they are represented in several ways. The final prin-
ciple should be an emphasis on informality. Too much of the dialogue at the UN-
sponsored conferences has become stilted, leading to half-hearted initiatives
that value caution far more than imagination. While the language of diplomacy
and the rules of official etiquette will undoubtedly be preserved, more informal
give-and-take during working sessions and other portions of official conferences
should be encouraged.
Retaining the status quo regarding the role of unofficials is unacceptable. They
have too much to offer, and they have the potential to fill the gaps in what gov-
ernments have alone been unable to do. One such area is in representing the interests
of future generations.
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Issue linkage can facilitate international environmental negotiations in three ways.
First, by adding an issue, one party can offer others additional advantages, and thus
a reason to agree. Second, adding an issue, and thereby bringing other parties to the
bargaining table, makes it possible to counteract the power of a blocking coalition
(by increasing the size of the coalition that favors agreement). Finally, adding an
issue makes it possible to shift the institutional locus of a negotiation to a new venue
in which implementation may be easier. Each of these linkages involves building or
modifying coalitions.
A crucial element in the success of multilateral negotiation is the ability to add -
very judiciously - issues and parties for purposes of expanding the zone of agree-
ment. The appropriate scale and scope of a negotiation, and thus the use of issue
linkage, depend on the size of the coalition required to respond to efforts to block
consensus. Changes in the agenda must be made with the consent of all interested
stakeholders. When there is unanimity, any linkage is acceptable. When doubts are
raised, linkages must be argued on their merits - that is, proponents must show
either a functional or a causal connection between issues or a past precedent legit-
imizing such a connection. Failing this, linkage is likely to be rejected. The key test
of the acceptability of a proposed linkage is the impact it has on the long-term
relationships among the parties.
I have described elsewhere a new approach to environmental treaty-making that
could systematize environmental treaty negotiations and synchronize global expec-
tations (Susskind, 1994). More specifically, all countries would be able to rely on
the fact that certain global environmental treaties would move through a predictable
multi-state process with explicit time limits and voting requirements. This would
permit linkage between and among multiple treaty negotiations.
PINPOINTING REGIONAL SOLUTIONS WITHIN A GLOBAL
MANAGEMENT CONTEXT
There will always be uncertainty hovering over global environmental treaty nego-
tiations. One way of handling uncertainty is to invest more money in basic envir-
onmental research that might produce the scientific equivalent of a "smoking gun."
As a result of ongoing British efforts to monitor meteorological change at the South
Pole, for example, the hole in the ozone layer was confirmed, and directly linked to
CFCs. That "smoking gun" certainly spurred action on the Montreal Protocol. There
is no guarantee, though, that expanding basic environmental research will yield the
evidence that will reduce uncertainty on other global issues in a timely way.
An alternative strategy would be to organize critical experiments (on a small
scale) and work to ensure that the results are shared regionally and globally. Such
small-scale demonstrations might establish beyond doubt that environmental threats
exist, that they are caused in a certain way, or that a particular response to such
threats is likely to be effective. In the absence of a central environmental planning
authority, regional experimentation, networking among adjacent nations, and
regional capacity building would be most helpful.
I am particularly convinced that groups of countries organized on a bio-regional
basis can and should seek to take collective action in the face of environmental
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threats even before there is sufficient agreement to justify or propel a global
response. New regional capacity building centers could well be the locus of the
small-scale experiments that lead to global action.
PUSIDNG FOR COMPLIANCE THROUGH LOCAL MONITORING
Oran Young argues that the prospect of "shaming" - exposing treaty violations to
the public - may be a source of even greater fear among national leaders than the
application of sanctions. "Policy-makers," he writes, "like private individuals are
sensitive to the social opprobrium that accompanies violations of widely accepted
behavioral prescriptions" (Young, 1992). These feelings, Chayes and Chayes (1991)
point out, are intensified by having to confront colleagues demanding explanations
for violations. This, of course explains the resistance that countries sometimes
display toward reporting requirements, independent reviews of national reports, or
other mechanisms designed to inform the public of their behavior. Monitoring is
effective, then, because it increases "transparency," although because anything other
than pure self-reporting typically runs afoul of claims of sovereignty, this is not easy
to achieve.
While countries insist that no one outside their borders ought to be empowered to
second-guess them, the sovereignty argument does not apply to people and organ-
izations within their own borders. Thus, one way around the sovereignty problem is
to create groups within each country to take responsibility for monitoring compli-
ance with global environmental treaties. These groups, especially when they join
forces on a worldwide basis, may be able to shame noncomplying nations into
changing their behavior. By working together, highly motivated local activists can
achieve the competence and credibility they need to bring the full weight of inter-
national opinion to bear on noncompliers. This is the approach that Amnesty Inter-
national has used in pursuing noncompliers with the UN's human rights provisions.
It may well be appropriate to build a parallel local monitoring and enforcement
system in the environmental field (Susskind, 1994).
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The essence of regime strengthening is institutional reform. Unfortunately, the Earth
Summit hardly dealt at all with questions of institutional redesign - save for the dis-
cussions of the GEF and the CSD. While these represent moves in the right direc-
tion, they do not address the inherent weaknesses in the convention-protocol
approach to treaty-making or the flaws in a UN system that has for decades accorded
only minor emphasis to environmental issues. We need to bring the nations of the
world together to focus on the broader problem of redesigning our multilateral insti-
tutions to deal with the problems of sustainability that were not apparent when the
UN was created almost 50 years ago. Regime strengthening on a treaty-by-treaty
basis without overall reform of the multilateral institutions arrangements that cur-
rently exist will never lead to global action of the sort needed to remedy the envir-
onmental damage we already face or to respond to the future environmental threats
that are sure to arise.
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Looking Ahead
Gunnar Sjostedt, Bertram I. Spector, and I. William Zartman
LESSONS FOR NEGOTIATING FUTURE REGIMES
There is general agreement that concrete results of the UNCED process in the areas
of environment and development were relatively meager. Susskind elaborated on
this theme in Chapter 14, and pointed out that the commitments made in the two
treaties signed in Rio (on climate change and biodiversity) were conspicuously
weak. The institution that was set up with some difficulty to deal with the imple-
mentation of the UNCED outcome (the Commission for Sustainable Development)
was endowed with an organizational structure and position within the UN system
such that it is not likely to survive very long as a meaningful mechanism for real
coordination and supervision.
These rather harsh judgments of the value of the UNCED process and its accom-
plishments are seemingly founded on the view that international regimes have an
impact on the performance of states and other international actors only through their
rule component, which is typically defined in terms of an international treaty. For
instance, in the case of environmental treaties preceding the UNCED process, say, in
the case of acid rain or ozone depletion, the rules of the new regime stipulate what
industrial emissions of pollutants should be restricted and by how much in each par-
ticular signatory country. This outlook presupposes a strong link between regime
operation, pertaining to the systemic level of analysis, and compliance, representing
state responsibilities and action necessary to secure the implementation of an inter-
national regime at the national level.
According to this view, the function and significance of other regime elements
cannot be fully understood and fairly evaluated except in terms of their supportive
relationship to the rule component of the regime. For instance, procedures typically
relate to organizational structures or collective working methods that have been
created with the specific purpose of assisting rule compliance in a very practical
way. In contrast, norms and principles are background factors that, in interaction
with one another, give legitimacy and authority to the rule component of the regime.
Norms define the general or long-term objectives motivating the regime and the way
its rules are constructed. Principles represent the basic epistemic component of the
regime. For instance, in the European regime on acidification, the epistemic
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component explains how the phenomenon of acid rain is produced by long-range
transboundary air pollution. The norm that "the polluter pays" influences how cost-
sharing is undertaken between signatory powers. According to the traditional way of
thinking, the nations that are parties to the regime feel the impact of norms and prin-
ciples through the medium of the rules of the regime; specific articles of the agree-
ment manifest the regime by laying out the obligations of signatories. State action is
not directly linked to the dynamics of norms and principles as such.
However, a broad regime building process like UNCED may have an impact
beyond compliance with a few concrete rules. Presumably, norms, as well as prin-
ciples, may under certain conditions have a direct impact on state interaction or
societal economic processes within nations. In fact, several chapters have indicated
the significance of norm-building processes during the work of the PrepCom and the
Rio Conference. The complex problems of environment and development were
highlighted to an unprecedented degree through the media around the world. Thou-
sands of journalists covered the Rio Conference as well as a multitude of NGOs; in
fact, Doherty reports that hundreds of NGOs were active in the process (Chapter
13). As a result, decision makers, as well as the general public, in many countries
were updated about the many environmental and development issues on the
UNCED agenda. Even if this impact on opinion-building is assumed to have been a
temporary phenomenon, it has left traces in the collective memory of at least some
nations.
UNCED also strengthened particular norms in the area of environmental politics.
It may be claimed that one of the main functions of UNCED was to make the norm-
loaded notion of sustainable development more acceptable and credible as an opera-
tional concept in regime-building processes. You will recall that several of the so-
called cross-sectoral issues on the UNCED agenda expressed, or referred to, the
notion of sustainable development. Other norms, unfolding in the environmental
area, notably the "polluter-pays-principle," moved somewhat further toward the
status of formal international law by inclusion in the Rio Declaration.
Several of the chapters highlight the importance of information-gathering and
collective learning in the UNCED process. The work of the PrepCom included a
massive general build-up of knowledge and scientific information concerning envir-
onment, development, and the couplings between these two vast problem areas;
recall, for example, the large-scale network of study groups organized by the
UNCED secretariat to support issue clarification in the PrepCom (Chapter 4). The
two case studies of how individual countries, Argentina and Austria, worked out
their policy and strategy for UNCED give further testimony about the importance of
collective learning in the process (Chapters 7 and 8). These two cases also illustrate
how collective learning affected policy planning at the national level. First, organ-
ized information-gathering in UNCED produced a pool of knowledge that actors in
the process could draw from. Secondly, UNCED catalyzed domestic activities lead-
ing to a reinforced cumulation of knowledge/information about the environment as
well as development issues. At the international level, the working groups organized
by the UNCED secretariat not only cumulated information in the UNCED context
itself, but also redistributed knowledge between the many international agencies that
were involved.
Collective learning in UNCED did not pertain exclusively to the substance of
issues; it related to organizational structures and working methods employed for
policy making and negotiation as well. Interestingly, the authorities in Argentina as
I
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well as in Austria had similar experiences when they became seriously engaged in
the UNCED process in early spring 1990. In both countries, existing institutions and
practices were insufficient to cope with the requirements of the UNCED agenda,
especially the cross-sectoral issues and the general relationship between the envir-
onment and development. New routines had to be established. The procedures for
policy coordination were especially cumbersome and provoked inter-agency rivalry,
all the way up to the ministerial level.
At the international level, the preparatory work for UNCED evoked problems of
coordination and leadership. Chapter 4 argued that Agenda 21 represented an effect-
ive instrument to deal with these challenges during the UNCED process. The inten-
tion was that Agenda 21 should have the same function in the post-UNCED world as
well. However, in Chapter 14, Susskind expressed well-founded doubts that the
body set up to monitor and direct the implementation of Agenda 21 - the Com-
mission for Sustainable Development - is likely to become a rather toothless
mechanism or may disappear altogether. Without the support of a competent and
effective Commission, Agenda 21 will not be able to serve as the same guiding
frame of reference in future regime-building processes as it did in UNCED.
Concrete agreements concerning future undertakings and new institutions pro-
duced in the UNCED process represent building blocks for continued regime-
building related to environment and development. For instance, a framework agree-
ment may become more fully developed and specified, and institutions may be
employed either to monitor the implementation of earlier deals among states or to
catalyze new initiatives. Thus, lessons for the future represent another type of result
from the UNCED process. Lessons typically pertain to "how things should be done"
- how negotiations and other forms of state interaction that are part of the regime-
building process should best be conducted. Sometimes, the lessons drawn represent
favorable experiences at the present time that may be replicated in the future. How-
ever, on other occasions, negative lessons may be equally or even more important to
register - for instance, to understand what procedures and process rules should be
avoided in the future.
As in most multilateral negotiations with global participation, the large number of
participants represented a problem in its own right. This predicament was further
enhanced by the extraordinarily large number of NGOs that took part in the prep-
aratory process or were present in Rio de Janeiro during UNCED (Chapter 13).
Many interesting lessons can be categorized into two dimensions of regime-
building: actor strategies and process.
Lessons Concerning Actor Strategies
The interaction of competing actor strategies constitutes the engine of regime-
building processes. The correlation of actor interests determines the contents and
form of the agenda and provides leadership for probing into possible negotiation
solutions, including the search for formulas and the accommodation of detailed
objectives. However, there are several indications that leadership at UNCED was
performed in a distinct way as compared to other multilateral negotiations. In Chap-
ter 4, Sjostedt argues that the UNCED secretariat performed more of an assertive
and constructive leadership role than seems to have been common in other multi-
lateral negotiations, at least until PrepCom IV in March 1992. In Chapter 9, Antrim
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credits the Bureau leadership for the successful unfolding of the process, and par-
ticularly singles out the decisive chainnanship of Ambassador Koh of Singapore.
From Koh's own account (Chapter 10), it seems clear that his leadership role was
particularly important toward the end of the UNCED process when the essence of
the col1ective decision process was choice rather than search. Hence, the mounting
importance of the chainnanship temporarily coincided with a rapidly waning leader-
ship role of the UNCED secretariat. One explanation for this development is that the
leadership functions of the secretariat pertained especially to issue clarification and
interconnected activities, whereas that of the Bureau and the chainnan of the Prep-
Com was particularly related to the exchange of concessions and the end game. This
distribution of work can be expected to emerge in any multi-party negotiation deal-
ing with a multitude of complex issues, but was unusual1y pronounced in the case of
UNCED. The analysis conducted in Chapter 4 indicates that one major cause for this
state of affairs was the self-constrained role of some of the actors - specifical1y
nations and coalitions - that had a potential, but unrealized, capacity to lead.
The perfonnance of the Great Powers in UNCED can largely be explained in
tenns of interests. Although most industrialized countries certainly wanted to bring
the UNCED process to a successful end, no leading nation belonging to this group
wanted to make far-reaching commitments with regard to specific issues such as
climate change, biodiversity, or additional financial or technological assistance to
developing countries (Chapter 5). It seems clear that particularly during the later
stages of the UNCED process, the leading OECD members, particularly the coali-
tion of EC nations and the United States, made an effort to control the UNCED pro-
cess to pave the way for a Meeting of Heads of State or Government, as wel1 as a
decent final declaration. Their strategy was to hold back "extremist" demands with
regard to both environmental and development issues. Thus, the leading industrial-
ized nations did not combine their efforts to attain process control with assertive and
promotive tactics linked to particular issues. They were satisfied instead to muddle
through the PrepCom process and the Rio Meeting without having to underwrite
excessively costly commitments.
In some respects, developing more than industrialized countries were the most
assertive actors in the UNCED process, particularly with regard to the so-cal1ed
cross-sectoral issues, such as additional financial resources and the transfer of envir-
onmentally sound technology. With regard to these issues, negotiations developed
along familiar lines where offers and claims tabled by some nations were met with
defensive as wel1 as offensive countennoves by other countries. The main problem
was that the countries making the principal requests, and hence playing the offense
in the negotiation game, were considerably weaker than the nations to which these
claims were directed. Developing countries could not claim concessions from indus-
trialized countries; they could only ask for them with reference made to general1y
accepted nonns of fairness and justice. Otherwise, the power base of the Southern
nations was general1y very weak. Most developing countries had little to trade,
except for their own acceptance of agreements worked out in the negotiation. More-
over, these governments were infonnation-poor as wel1, and were strongly depend-
ent for infonnation and assessments from UN agencies or other countries.
The lack of important knowledge and infonnation severely constrained many
countries, not only in the Third World, to work out independent national strategies
that could be pursued in UNCED. The infonnation constraints were especial1y
strong with regard to the environmental problems on the UNCED agenda. The
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reason is that development issues, like financial assistance and technology transfer,
were leftovers from many years of debate and negotiation in most UN agencies
about a New Economic Order and related topics. Furthennore, it was relatively easy
to take a position on development issues as they are typical "more-or-less" ques-
tions. The knowledge problems confronting actors involved in UNCED are illus-
trated in the case study about Argentina, one of the advanced developing countries
(Chapter 8). It is clearly stated that the Argentines were in no position to deal with
all the issues on the UNCED agenda. A narrow selection of a few issues was chosen
for policy making and direct continuous monitoring of the work of PrepCom. The
two basic criteria for this selection are noteworthy. First, an issue solidly on the
UNCED agenda, like the depletion of the ozone layer, was singled out. The reason
was that Argentina is one of the few countries that are directly victimized by the
growing ozone hole in the stratosphere. Second, the government of Argentina gave
priority to an issue that was not fonnally on the UNCED agenda, namely the elim-
ination of trade barriers for agricultural products. Argentine negotiators were
instructed to link the agricultural issue to any other issue on the agenda, so that an
opportunity would be generated to argue for trade liberalization. In this particular
case, the UNCED process functioned as a "garbage can" decision model. In other
words, UNCED represented a negotiation context in which all sorts of issues could
be inserted to promote important national objectives. It seems reasonable to suspect
that Argentina was not the only nation that used UNCED as a garbage can. Another
example was the intervention of a group of Arab oil producers during the Rio
Conference with the purpose of blocking the final framework agreement on climate
change. In this case, the Arab interests were quite obvious: to delay a regime-
building process that would ultimately contribute to a scaled-down demand for
petroleum products.
If many countries throw a variety of issues into the garbage can, a complex
hidden agenda will emerge. If this happens, as seems to have been the case with
UNCED, actor strategies will be partly targeted against the garbage can rather than
the official agenda. Consequently, comprehensive national strategies in a large
conference context like that of UNCED will become very difficult to detect and
understand unless the garbage can - the hidden agenda - is taken into consideration.
Lessons Concerning Process
As in other multilateral negotiations, a major task related to process management in
UNCED was to find ways to cope with the great number of actors and the multitude
of issues. The methods employed in UNCED need to be carefully assessed as they
represent positive as well as negative lessons. There are two topics especially that
should be considered in this connection: the role of NGOs and developing countries
in the process.
According to the account given by Doherty in Chapter 13, NGOs have rarely had
such free access to an interstate bargaining process as they had in the case of
UNCED. However, this open-door policy was far from uncontroversial. The deci-
sion taken by the Plenary Committee of the PrepCom to pennit NGO repre-
sentatives to take part in all fonnal, as well as some infonnal, sessions of PrepCom
bodies was preceded by an intensive and protracted debate during the meeting in
Nairobi. The experiences from UNCED indicate that in a regime-building process of
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this type, extensive participation of NGOs may produce noteworthy benefits, for
example, related to implementation effectiveness. The other side of the coin is, how-
ever, that a large NGO participation in a regime-building process also entails con-
siderable costs. During the meetings of the PrepCom where NGOs had the right to
participate actively in the deliberations, the list of speakers became unreasonably
long. Often the prepared speeches of NGO representatives introduced new or differ-
ent ideas that were largely irrelevant within the context of the current dialogue
between national governments. As a consequence, the time left for constructive
debate between nations with differing interests often became seriously curtailed.
One lesson for the future is that although a greater participation of NGOs in
regime-building processes in the areas of environment and development should be
welcomed and encouraged, the terms of access for NGOs need to be carefully
assessed. It is necessary to consider that the character of a multilateral negotiation
usually changes drastically from its initiation to the conclusion of a final agreement
that terminates the process. For example, the demand for new knowledge and
information is much more limited at the end of the negotiation, when concessions
are exchanged and deals are made, than when the agenda is set and issues are clari-
fied in the earlier stages of the process. Some NGOs may be capable of performing a
constructive role from the beginning to the end of the process. However, it may be
more reasonable to constrain or circumscribe the activities of certain NGOs in the
regime-building process or negotiation. For instance, some scientific organizations
that are in a position to supply significant information during the process stage of
issue clarification may have little to contribute when hard bargaining and the
exchange of concessions prevail. In contrast, other NGOs may have but a layman's
knowledge about the technical issues, but can be in a position to communicate the
agreements reached in the negotiation to the general public or to certain social
strata. Maybe distinctions such as these should be taken into consideration when
access rules are formulated for NGOs. Selection is obviously very sensitive for
political reasons. However, it is, no doubt, an important mission to elaborate such
selection criteria to facilitate future negotiations. A reasonable tradeoff has to be
found between two basic considerations. One is that if hundreds of NGOs are given
free access to the negotiations, there is a risk that the process may become over-
loaded. The other is that increased participation of competent private organizations
in international regime-building processes is not only desirable, but necessary, due
to the continually reinforced relationships of complex interdependence in the global
system.
One of the basic objectives of UNCED was to persuade Third World nations to
undertake more far-reaching commitments in the environmental area. A major con-
cern, therefore, was to secure the participation of developing countries to the highest
degree possible. Procedural rules were established to attain that objective. One such
rule was to use texts prepared by the Group of 77 as a point of departure for dis-
cussions and negotiations in the PrepCom. Another example was the rule that only
two meetings could be held simultaneously to give nations with small delegations a
chance to follow the proceedings properly. Chapter 8 demonstrates that for a rela-
tively developed Third World nation like Argentina, the Group of 77 was of
immense importance. This coalition helped Argentina to monitor general develop-
ments in the UNCED process so that it could concentrate its own analytical and
diplomatic resources on a few issues that were of primary importance. These and
other measures facilitated the access of developing countries to UNCED, as well as
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their active participation in the negotiations. They were, hence, beneficial for the
process.
The benefits accrued were, however, not free of charge. They impeded process
effectiveness in different ways. One negative effect was that the pace of the process
was slowed down. Another major repercussion was that the overall problem-solving
capacity of the UNCED process was hampered. In spite of its gigantic agenda, the
work of the PrepCom was only distributed formally between four different nego-
tiation bodies, including the Plenary Meeting. Each working group therefore had to
cope with an agenda much too broad to permit in-depth analysis and discussion. For
some time, this problem could be managed with the help of Agenda 21, which
represented an administrative framework, rather than truly analytical or conceptual
framework. However, in the end (during PrepCom IV in New York) a different and
much more differentiated distribution of work was established. In future nego-
tiations on the environment and development, a facilitating strategy on the basis of
something akin to Agenda 21 is unlikely to represent a viable solution; a much more
penetrating problem analysis is likely to become necessary. Then, quite new for-
mulas will have to be elaborated, accommodating a constructive tradeoff between
the two important requirements of easy process access for developing countries and
effective process dynamics.
In several respects, issue linkages represented a characteristic feature of the
UNCED process with regard to goal structure as well as to the development of its
agenda. First, a highly visible manifestation of interlinked issues was the presence
of the evident cobweb of physical interdependence between many of the topics on
the agenda - for instance, between climate change, the ozone layer, deforestation,
and desertification. Secondly, one of the main political objectives of UNCED was to
highlight the couplings between environment and development and design long-term
operational strategies to cope with them. Thirdly, another overarching aim of the
UNCED process was to develop a holistic intemationallong-term plan of action for
sustainable development, and for the whole range of issues subordinated to this con-
cept. This approach required that topics be sufficiently focused - narrow and
clearcut - to permit the actors to come to an agreement on concrete programs of
action. On the other hand, the holistic ambition also required that the interdepend-
ence - the structure of linkages - between these specified themes be noted when
UNCED's long-term plan of action was designed and carried out.
As one of the leading objectives of UNCED was to consider and cope with issue
linkages, it is reasonable to ask if this ambition was, in fact, realized. Evoking this
question, it has first to be acknowledged that the question of issue linkages was far
from ignored; it was manifestly at the forefront throughout the process. This may be
cited as an accomplishment in its own right, as it was part of UNCED's mission to
point out and stress the need for a holistic approach to the treatment of envir-
onmental and development questions at the global level. It is quite clear that
UNCED succeeded in further consolidating the notion of sustainable development,
which had become a solid international catchword as a result of the Brundtland
Report. UNCED transformed this normative, indeed ideological, notion into a set of
operational concepts.
In the UNCED process, issue linkages were handled most effectively at the
administrative level. The concrete measures proposed and decided upon in the
UNCED process that were related to issue linkages mostly concerned the dis-
tribution of work and cooperation between many UN institutions with
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responsibilities in the areas of environment and development. Thus, from one point
of view, Agenda 21 may be regarded as a design for a coordinated long-term plan of
action. This was one of the most important and tangible results of the whole
UNCED process. The leadership of the various UN agencies concerned became
better informed about, first, the work programs of other institutions and, secondly, of
the prospects and problems of interagency coordination. The high-level Com-
mission on Sustainable Development was created under the auspices of the UN
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) with the objective of supervising,
guiding, and coordinating this work.
The administrative approach to issue linkages had obvious advantages. Notably, it
was a feasible and controllable approach. At some stages in the process, it was
widely doubted that UNCED could be brought to an end with even a minimum
degree of success. However, all things considered, the UNCED process was man-
aged remarkably smoothly, especially with regard to the established time schedule.
The difference is striking in comparison to the developments of the Uruguay Round
of GATT negotiations, the end stage of which took place at about the same time as
the UNCED process was launched. Their closing ministerial session in Brussels
scheduled for late 1990 ended in complete failure in spite of at least fi ve years of
intensive negotiation.
Thus, the management of issue linkages and other forms of complexity seem to
have been easier and more effective in the UNCED process than in the GATT
Round. This observation is somewhat intriguing as there were evidently numerous
issues on the UNCED agenda that were more technically difficult and complex than
the average item within the Uruguay Round. One explanation is that the UNCED
process was characterized to a considerable degree by complexity and uncertainty
avoidance. Notably, neither negotiating parties nor the UNCED secretariat had the
motivation to penetrate and analyze the truly complex environmental issues on the
agenda. They left the tough issues for subsequent negotiations within the sustainable
development regime they had created.
CONSENSUS BUILDING AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION
Large multilateral negotiations, such as UNCED, are inherently unwieldy events.
Zartman (1994) has characterized the process of multilateral negotiations as a series
of valiant maneuvers to manage complexity within a diverse supraorganizational
setting. For mutually beneficial outcomes to be achieved, the process of negotiation
among over 150 sovereign national entities must somehow be organized and
managed effectively; muddling through with no real plan to manage complexity,
and achieving success, can be an accidental occurrence.
Various mechanisms to manage complexity were used with some degree of suc-
cess in the UNCED negotiations. In Chapter 4, Sj6stedt describes the steps taken to
reach consensual knowledge on particular issues under negotiation. Spector, in
Chapter 5, analyzes the process by which countries with differing national interests
adjusted their preferences over the course of the negotiation to reach mutually com-
patible compromises on the sensitive issue of financial resources. Schally (Chapter
7) and Avalle (Chapter 8) both describe approaches to intragovernmental
coordination by which the internal stakeholders bargain among themselves to arrive
at a single national position and bargaining posture. Discussing the multifaceted
roles of leadership at UNCED, Antrim (Chapter 9) points to different types of
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leaders using specific procedures to help parties reach consensus. NGOs also helped
in defusing the complexity of negotiation. Some in the scientific community
nurtured transnational epistemic groupings and conducted meetings to influence
and coalesce diverging policy directions (see Marton-Lerevre and Boehmer-
Christiansen in Chapters 11 and 12). Others served as objective third parties,
facilitating the process of finding common ground among competing coalitions.
Unfortunately, the problems of managing complexity do not end when multi-
lateral negotiations are concluded. The prospect of building an international regime
to administer the agreed solutions requires the design and activation of additional
creative mechanisms to manage a new set of complex relationships and situations.
The post-negotiation period involves not only implementation of provisions agreed
at the bargaining table, but a continual process of management, monitoring, adjust-
ment, and continued negotiation as the effects of the negotiated provisions are fed
back to enhance policy learning. Spector and KOTUla (1993) have called this a post-
agreement negotiation process: agreements must be implemented and enforced, but
often this occurs within the context of an international regime that employs sus-
tained negotiation as its main vehicle of operation. This continued negotiation
serves to resolve disputes that may arise, fill in details, augment partial agreements,
and adjust regimes that must be modernized to reflect new scientific infonnation.
Post-agreement negotiation provides a stable mechanism to implement and expand
regimes peacefully, thus reducing complexity.
If regime management is conducted as a negotiation process, one important ele-
ment of managing this process is consensus building. Fonnalized voting procedures
to govern decision making by all of the signatory members within a regime can have
a polarizing effect. It can easily cause parties to become inflexible in their approach
to sensitive issues. Forcing issues to a vote causes parties to commit themselves to
particular positions rather than submit it to further discussion and debate; activity
takes the fonn of a rigid pledge rather than an adaptable tradeoff. It cuts off the road
to further discussion and possibly the finding of some common ground. Thus, it is
preferable to build consensus within a regime than to resort to voting.
Rule by consensus is certainly accepted as a valuable mechanism of decision
making in multilateral negotiations and of governance within international regimes.
However, much is left to chance. If consensus emerges from a debate, it helps to
move things forward; if it does not, maneuvering toward building consensus can
assume an ad hoc process. Then, leadership style, personality, and organizational
culture are often the driving forces motivating consensus fonnation. For example,
Dr. Mustafa Tolba of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) actively pursued a
consensus-building role during the ozone depletion negotiations by conducting
infonnal consultations (Szell, 1993). Secretary General Maurice Strong played a
similar role in the prenegotiations leading up to the 1972 Stockholm Conference on
marine pollution, helping to motivate the delegations and identify areas of agree-
ment and gaps in understanding. Ambassador Tommy Koh served a consensus-
building role in the Law of the Sea negotiations and stimulated the fonnation of
helpful coalitions (Herter, 1991; Antrim and Sebenius, 1992). At an organizational
level, the secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency played a major con-
sensus-building role in the nuclear pollution talks in 1986 by drafting the agenda
and a proposed text (Sjostedt, 1993). UNEP served a similar function in drafting the
1974 Mediterranean Action Plan. Finally, the scientific community was called upon
to mediate in the Mediterranean pollution talks by providing independent fact-
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finding, diagnosing the problem, and recommending the range of scientifically
viable solutions (Thacher, 1993).
Mediation and Consensus-building Mechanisms
Rather than leaving this critical function of consensus building to chance, inter-
national regimes would be wise, in their formative stages, to institutionalize pro-
cedures that facilitate the development of consensus among large numbers of
signatory parties. As in many of the examples cited above, a third party mediator, in
the form of a secretariat, a chairperson, or some such function, can be assigned the
catalytic task of developing consensus among diverging positions. Mediation can be
used to help settle disputes, uncover common interests, and cobble together agree-
ments. However, to be effective, mediators must be sensitive to variations - for
instance, in the situation and context, the types of actors, the divergence in their
positions, and the intensity of dispute, and adjust and temper their strategic and
interpersonal tools and approaches appropriately. Spector and Korula (1992) have
gathered a propositional inventory drawn from substantiated experimental findings
that suggests the likely effectiveness of mediational approaches under differing cir-
cumstances. Practitioners can be guided by the inventory to a proposed repertoire of
tactics and strategies.
Specifically, the Spector and Korula study targeted the literature on facilitative
mediation. Mediational strategies that are particularly relevant to consensus-
building tasks typically involve the opening and supporting of communication chan-
nels and the facilitation of interaction between parties. The role of communicator/
facilitator is at the most passive end of the mediational continuum (Touval and Zart-
man, 1985) and is typified in the international context by the provision of "good
offices." Table 15.1 summarizes the study's results in a series of prescriptive "homi-
lies" for the practical mediator. While these findings may appear to be very simple
and obvious, they are supported by empirical evidence from a large number of lab-
oratory experiments and field studies. Based upon the more fully elaborated pro-
positional inventory, four facilitative mediation roles were deduced. While the roles
are distinct, they can be, and often are, implemented simultaneously in practice.
The Go-between
Go-betweens serve as the conduit for information between disputing parties. They
take on the responsibility of making contacts and keeping channels of com-
munication open. They serve as delivery mechanisms for proposals, demands, and
concessions.
The Fact-finder
Fact-finding is among the most common roles assumed by facilitative mediators.
Fact-Finders serve as objective information collectors about the dispute; they gather
the facts on an impartial basis and investigate allegations put forth by the parties.
Their goal is to readjust misperceptions that result from inaccurate information or a
misreading of the facts.
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Table 15.1 Research Findings on Effective Mechanisms for Facilitative
Mediators!
The go-between
Associate communication with authoritativeness
Encourage "staying in touch"
Educate parties in constructive communications
Encourage "complete" messages
The fact-jinder
Gather information
Provide objective data
Quote law and legal precedent
Provide accurate information on each party's position
Provide information on each party
The counselor
Have each party state their own point of view
State other's point of view
Be non-evaluative
Recommend role playing
Cite dependencies
Cite superordinate goals faced by disputing parties
Indicate costs to third party
Call for empathy
Praise parties
Maintain momentum
Encourage friendly attitudes
Limit the scope of issues
Seek early agreement on easier issues
Reduce public position-taking and posturing
Encourage "fair" proposals
Educate on cultural differences
Educate parties on bargaining dynamics
Encourage retlective statements
Suggest cooling-off period
Avert and convert intangible issues
Promise gains for cooperation
Fractionate issues
The sponsor
Establish mediator's presence
Establish and control agenda
Avoid audiences
Select neutral sites
Maintain secrecy
Encourage face-to-face talks
Create deadlines
I The experimental social psychological research literature on negotiation and contlict resolution was
reviewed to identify implementation mechanisms that have been shown to be effective in achieving
successful outcomes - improved communication or agreement - among disputing parties. The
mechanisms identified in this literature have been substantiated as being effective in systematic research
findings - either in field or laboratory tests. Together, the results represent a propositional inventory that
describes a set of authoritative prescriptions for mediators that have been verified through controlled
experimental channels. This assessment benefited greatly from several major reviews of the experimental
research literature on negotiation and mediation: Druckman (1973); Rubin and Brown (1975); Wall
(1981); Pruitt (1981); Carnevale and Pruitt (1992); and Kressel and Pruitt (1989).
Source: Spector and Korula (1992).
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The Counselor
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The counselor serves the role of educator and adviser to the disputing parties. Such
supportive activities can range from very passive assistance - just providing a pres-
ence - to consultations with the parties, but stops short of offering proposals for
solution. Counselors also function as sounding boards for the disputants, and
sometimes as confidants, as they assume more of a trusted role.
The Sponsor
The Sponsor organizes and/or hosts fora in which the disputants can talk directly or
through the mediator. Again, playing a facilitative role, the sponsor can provide the
venue, send out invitations, arrange for or exclude media coverage, and chair
sessions.
Within the regime context, facilitative mediators that follow these prescribed
roles and paths can serve the important function of promoting consensus among the
parties. Fonnalizing such a mediational function institutionalizes a vital feature of
regime governance, while making it more efficient by reducing its inherent
complexity.
Developing Consensus-building Procedures at the Global Environment
Facility - An Example
Several of the prescriptive mediational approaches mentioned in Table 15.1 were
recommended and incorporated into the governing principles of an important
regime element emerging from UNCED - the Global Environment Facility (GEF).
A common demand of countries represented at UNCED was that negotiated agree-
ments be implemented by existing institutions. The GEF, an agency jointly admin-
istered by the UN Development and Environment Programs and the World Bank
was selected at UNCED to be the interim funding mechanism for the climate change
and biodiversity conventions. An important condition guiding this choice was that
the GEF make serious adjustments to the decision-making rules by which it is
governed - how it develops policy, how it selects projects for funding, and how it
administers funds. Governed largely by World Bank procedures, the GEF was
viewed suspiciously by developing nations as a vehicle for donor countries, and par-
ticularly the United States, to exercise influence over the developing world through
granting projects that placed extensive economic conditions and restrictions on the
grantee. UNCED instructed the GEF to refonn its governance procedures to provide
a more equitable framework that would be acceptable to all countries - both donors
and grantees.
Proposals were prepared by the GEF Administrator for its first post-UNCED
meeting of participants in December 1992 in Abidjan (GEF, 1992). These proposals
largely addressed the GEF's legal status, as well as refonned decision-making pro-
cedures, attempting to balance the interests of all parties in a restructured GEF. One
of the stated goals in these proposals was to avert deadlock in the Participants'
Assembly, its decision-making body, by encouraging consensus among the parties,
thereby bypassing the need for voting. In line with this objective, some mediation
mechanisms that were identified in the previous section were offered as proposals to
the Assembly to be included as explicit consensus-building activities in the GEF's
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decision-making procedures. These functions would be carried out by the GEF
secretariat not as ad hoc activities, but as prescribed tasks. These proposals are pre-
sented below as examples of how the facilitation of consensus building can be incor-
porated formally into the management of international regimes to reduce
complexity.
The GEF secretariat was called upon to conduct early preparatory activities to
ensure that consensus is forthcoming at the Assembly meetings. In the event that
consensus is not easily achieved, alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods
could be used during the Assembly meetings, again aided by the GEF secretariat, to
actively seek consensus. Only as a last resort were voting methods to be invoked to
deal with deadlocked issues. The following ADR mechanisms were recommended:
For Early Facilitation Prior to Meetings:
(I) The GEF secretariat, as the source of background papers and proposals, can
integrate the various party points of view to design specific proposals that
account for different constituency positions. The secretariat can do this by poll-
ing the constituencies and conducting role-playing exercises, for example.
(2) The secretariat can play an important role in early consensus building by
actively supporting constructive communications among the parties. Such con-
structive communications seek to transmit accurate accounts of the positions of
each party and the principles of fairness held by the various constituencies,
rather than emphasizing differences. This is likely to yield greater under-
standing and trust among parties.
For Dispute Resolution Methods During Meetings:
(I) The chairman of the Participants' Assembly can be empowered to form a small
ad hoc problem-solving committee comprised of three to five constituencies to
address deadlocked issues, seeking to identify novel ideas that will overcome
the impasse. Creative tradeoffs or solutions would be reported back to the full
Assembly for final decision.
(2) Such an ad hoc problem-solving committee can sometimes operate more effect-
ively with the help of trainedfacilitators who either know the substance of the
deadlocked issue very well or are skilled in special problem-solving tech-
niques, such as creativity methods. These facilitators can be supplied by the
GEF secretariat. .
(3) The secretariat and the chairman of the Participants' Assembly can encourage
consensus by fractionating contentious issues into more manageable pieces. If
certain elements of the problem area can be solved quickly as a result, it will
increase trust among the parties and improve the chances for finding agreement
on the more difficult issues.
(4) If the differences among constituencies are extreme, active mediation
supported by the secretariat or the chairman can be useful in seeking a con-
vergence of interests and agreement.
The redesign of the GEF's decision-making structure in response to the
North-South debates at UNCED was just a small step toward institutionalizing
mediation-based consensus-building mechanisms into the operation of an important
international environmental regime. It can be seen as a natural outgrowth of the
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desire to manage complexity and generate a more effective regime, one capable of
achieving agreement despite extensive interest divergence.
Such approaches are central features of regime governance. The agreement
among parties to formalize these mechanisms as standard operating procedures to
achieve their objectives in the regime is a negotiating achievement in itself. This
achievement indicates a degree of maturity and stability in the regime based on a
common political will to avoid impasse and realize the overarching objectives for
which the regime was established. The facilitative mediational techniques described
in this chapter offer straightforward post-agreement support toward these goals.
REGIME EVOLUTION AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
The sets of rules, principles, expectations, and routines established in the mUltiple
practices and agreements emanating from more than two years of UNCED experi-
ence are not fixed, nor are its final commandments writ in stone. To stay alive, they
need to evolve to meet changing situations and unfolding knowledge. Innately, they
are also bound to evolve under the internal dynamics of their own successes and
failures, as they face consequences of their measures and reactions to their regula-
tions. Thus, external and internal challenges shape the course of the regime as it
navigates through time and - unlike the image - these challenges shape the very
nature of the regime itself.
Although much of this evolution is unforeseeable, the nature, even if not the spe-
cifics, of the challenges can be anticipated, even in the area of external surprises.
Anticipation, in turn, provides the basis for action and the lessening of surprises, and
therefore of some further policy-relevant analysis. It should not be forgotten, how-
ever, that challenges are not merely the product of neutral events, natural winds that
knock down any object in their path; they also come from the intentional effects of
policy makers seeking to deflect or accelerate the evolution of the regime and there-
fore looking for policy-relevant analysis for their own purposes.
UNCED is at least a triple regime, as Chasek's chapter has graphically illustrated.
Northern countries have a clear focus on its efforts to set up new norms, principles,
expectations, and (more loosely) regulations in the area of environment. However, it
also was the latest attempt to create a similar context for thinking and action in the
area of development. Southern countries, in turn, have looked on it as the beginning
of a new regime that links the two, focusing on the environmental impact on devel-
opment as well as the developmental impact on environment. Not all these three
overlapping regimes can be expected to evolve through time at the same speed or in
the same form, and part of the policy dynamic will involve conscious efforts to
foster one in relation to the other two.
In all three areas, the basic movement of the regime is like a sea wave, not in its
common image of an inexorable surface movement, but in its kinetic reality, where
movement on the top is propelled by energy at the base. In its public, diplomatic
phase, UNCED registered the formal progress analyzed in the previous chapters of
this book. That phase completed, its work now returns to the individual states'
domestic arenas, at both the governmental and the nongovernmental (NGO) level.
The meeting at Rio was designed to create institutions and momentum in both are-
nas. As the Schally and Avalle chapters indicate (Chapters 7 and 8), the need to pre-
pare for Rio brought about the creation of new environmental ministries in some
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countries and the coordination of environmental activities among established minis-
tries in the rest. These ministries now live under the organizational imperative to
defend their existence, by hiring staff, making budgetary claims, and showing jus-
tifying activity. This does not mean that they thereby will win the day in policy
debates, but it does mean that they are an element among others in determining new
national policy directions. Even a basically unfriendly government, such as the Bush
administration in Washington, was able only to deflect, not deter, the pressures that
resulted in the Rio preparations and documents, and the US Environmental
Protection Agency was a body with a mind of its own, often difficult to control.
On the other side, UNCED was the largest fair for NGOs that the world has ever
seen, and, as Chapter 13 records, they came home from Rio invigorated and frus-
trated. The combination makes for a very active array of pressure groups, some of
them operating for the very first time in Third World country politics, and others
well established in a competitive context in developed democracies, as emphasized
in Chapter 14. Momentum on the environmental, development, and joint fronts
depends on the dynamism of the NGOs, defined in the UNCED sense as not just
public interest groups, but also business. Only the alliance of scientists, public advo-
cates, and business will provide the discourse, finance, and electoral clout to keep
governments focused on fulfilling the UNCED goals (Zartman, 1993).
None of these three groups, nor their cooperation together, guarantees the imple-
mentation and expansion of the UNCED norms, principles, expectations, and regu-
lations. However, they do practically guarantee an equal and opposite reaction, the
mobilization of efforts by opponents to regain in domestic application what was lost
in diplomatic negotiation. Business and labor groups and various competing inter-
ests join efforts with ministries devoted to conflicting concerns to limit the effects of
the plan of action and associated agreements. Many of these groups might not be
specifically "anti-UNCED," but simply efforts competing for scarce resources or
conflicting in their own orientations. Nothing can indicate what the outcome of
these domestic confrontations will be, since it depends on many external variables,
but repeated reactions as well as actions are to be expected.
These confrontations bear on the course of the regime at two pressure points, in
conflicts over agenda and conflicts over action (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). Con-
tending forces vie over the place of UNCED-related issues on various agendas, from
that of public attention to that of legislative consideration; once they reach the point
where action is required, the contention among forces renews over two aspects of
action-specific measures and their financing. While these confrontations are self-
supporting, given the contending forces involved, they also benefit from one major
source of external pressure, the foreseen accident. Indeed, most environmental
negotiations have been triggered by a catastrophe that scientists and interest groups
have warned against, falling in the midst of a debate on a plausible solution like a
piece of dust into a supersaturated solution (Zartman, 1993). Such catastrophes can
literally be accidents or they can be further startling and confirming scientific evidence,
demanding public attention and official action. Inland seas, deserts, atmosphere, and
wastes, as well as population growth, health, and nourishment, all contain catastro-
phes waiting to happen. They will trigger attempts to lock the stable door after the
horse has bolted and debates affecting the course of the UNCED regime.
Despite the return to the base as the arena of regime dynamics, there are con-
tinuing manifestations of the regime dynamic at the level of public diplomacy. As
Chapter 14 details, Agenda 21 is replete with calls for further action on the global
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aild regional levels, as well as national ones, to contribute to the development of fur-
ther norms, principles, expectations and regulations. These actions take three forms:
extension, implementation, and consolidation. The global debate passed to the UN
General Assembly at the 47th session in 1992, where, despite widely dissipated
attentions and implementation efforts that have to compete for a place on the world
agenda crowded with noisier security issues, plans were made and institutions
created to move the regime forward (III ENBl-3).
The first result was the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee to elaborate a
convention on Desertification (INC-D), which met throughout 1993 and 1994 to
extend UNCED concerns into a new area. Prepcom meetings for an International
Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) began before UNCED, in May
1991, and continued thereafter two years later, in preparation for the actual con-
ference in September 1994 to extend and consolidate the UNCED regime into a
large area of activity. Two other diplomatic activities linked the UNCED regime to
the regime on the seas as revised by the Law of the Sea Conference that ended a
decade earlier; the UN Conference on Fish Stocks met in July 1993 and projected
further sessions for 1994 to resolve strong differences over the appropriate degree of
international controls, and a conference on national guidelines for the integrated
management of coastal zones was to be held in 1994 to set standards for national
implementation. A conference on the sustainable development of small island states
was also scheduled for 1994, after preparatory committee work in 1993. All of these
activities planned at Rio keep parts of the momentum alive, extending coverage into
new areas by elaborated new norms and regulations and consolidating established
efforts by closing loopholes. The accent on tightening specific aspects of the regime
has shifted the role of driver or conductor from the global to the specific level. As
chairs, Swedish Ambassador Bo Kjellen and Fijian diplomat Satya Nandan have
been the conductors of the Desertification and Fish Stocks Conferences, for
example.
The most important institutionalized effort to monitor the implementation of the
UNCED regime is the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) of
ECOSOC, which met in its first annual session in June 1993 in Rio. Its contribution
to the furtherance of the regime depends on its ability to give policy direction and
monitor and generate information on the implementation of Agenda 21, which in
tum requires both solid capabilities and innovative artifices to insure cooperation
and transparency. Typical of the latter were such plans from the first session as the
scheduling of country-hosted intersessional meetings on focused topics (nine were
volunteered for 1994), the arrangement of ministerial sessions about a round table to
encourage dialogue, and the inclusion of other than environmental ministers in CSD
work (V ENB.12; 12)
Efforts to extend, implement, and consolidate the UNCED regime have also been
pitched at the regional level, between global and national activities. Agenda 21
specifically targets regions in regard to transportation and environment, trans-
boundary air pollution, and movement of hazardous wastes, marine environment,
and sustainable development of small islands, among others. Regional activities
have the obvious strengths and weaknesses, allowing for ready regions to move
ahead and slower regions to lag behind, but the result is a pressure that moves with
the direction of the momentum and thus generally favors regime progress.
All of these activities and actions tend to focus on the extension, implementation,
and consolidation of the regulatory aspect of regimes, whether in their binding or
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nonbinding fonn. Behind this lies a softer area of nonns, principles, and expecta-
tions, general notions on which specific provisions lie. It is not clear how finn a nor-
mative foundation UNCED had laid for itself. Like the UN Conference on the Law
of the Sea a decade earlier, UNCED was built on a basic tradeoff between environ-
mental concerns for the North and developmental concerns for the South. However,
there is no evidence or assurance that either the equality or the tradeoff itself has
taken root in the popular mind or in policy makers' calculations.

Appendix A
Resolution Adopted by the UN General
Assembly: Resolution No. 44/228
New York, 22 December 1989
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
RECALLING its resolution 43/196 of 20 December 1988 on a United Nations
conference on environment and development,
TAKING NOTE of decision 15/3 of 25 May 1989 of the Governing Council of
the United Nations Environment Programme l on a United Nations conference on
environment and development,
TAKING NOTE also of Economic and Social Council resolution 1989/87 of 26
July 1989 on the convening of a United Nations conference on environment and
development,
TAKING NOTE further of Economic and Social Council resolution 1989/101 of
27 July 1989 on strengthening international co-operation on environment through
the provision of additional financial resources to developing countries,
RECALLING its resolutions 42/186 of 11 December 1987 on the Environmental
Perspective to the Year 2000 and Beyond and resolution 42/187 of 11 December
1987 on the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development,2
TAKING NOTE of the report of the Secretary-General on the question of the
convening of a United Nations conference on environment and development,3
MINDFUL of the views expressed by Governments in the debate held at its forty-
fourth session on the convening of a United Nations conference on environment and
development,
RECALLING the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment,4
I See Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 25 (AJ44125),
annex I.
2See AJ42/427, annex.
3AJ441256-E/1989/66 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2.
4Report of the UN Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 5...{j June 1972, and
corrigendum (UN publication, Sales No. E.73.II.A.14), chapter I.
Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons Learned from the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (G. Sjostedt, et aI., eds.; 1-85966-077-0; © IIASA; pub. Graham & Trotman, 1994;
printed in Great Britain), pp. 251-258.
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Deeply CONCERNED by the continuing deterioration of the state of the envir-
onment and the serious degradation of the global life-support systems, as well as by
trends that, if allowed to continue, could disrupt the global ecological balance,
jeopardize the life-sustaining qualities of the Earth and lead to an ecological catas-
trophe, and recognizing that decisive, urgent and global action is vital to protecting
the ecological balance of the Earth,
RECOGNIZING the importance for all countries of the protection and enhance-
ment of the environment,
RECOGNIZING also that the global character of environmental problems,
including climate change, depletion of the ozone layer, transboundary air and water
pollution, the contamination of the oceans and seas and degradation of land
resources, including drought and desertification, necessitates action at all levels,
including the global, regional and national levels, and the commitment and partici-
pation of all countries,
Gravely CONCERNED that the major cause of the continuing deterioration of the
global environment is the unsustainable pattern of production and consumption,
particularly in industrialized countries,
STRESSING that poverty and environmental degradation are closely interrelated
and that environmental protection in developing countries must, in this context, be
viewed as an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in
isolation from it,
RECOGNIZING that measures to be undertaken at the international level for the
protection and enhancement of the environment must take fully into account the
current imbalances in global patterns of production and consumption,
AFFIRMING that the responsibility for containing, reducing and eliminating
global environmental damage must be borne by the countries causing such damage,
must be in relation to the damage caused and must be in accordance with their
respective capabilities and responsibilities,
RECOGNIZING the environmental impact of material remnants of war and the
need for further international co-operation for their removal,
STRESSING the importance for all countries of taking effective measures for the
protection, restoration and enhancement of the environment in accordance, inter
alia, with their respective capabilities, while at the same time acknowledging the
efforts being made in all countries in this regard, including international co-
operation between developed and developing countries,
STRESSES the need for effective international co-operation in the areas of
research, development and application of environmentally sound technologies,
CONSCIOUS of the crucial role of science and technology in the field of envir-
onmental protection and of the need of developing countries, in particular, for
favourable access to environmentally sound technologies, processes, equipment and
related research and expertise through international co-operation designed to further
global efforts for environmental protection, including the use of innovative and
effective means,
RECOGNIZING that new and additional financial resources will have to be chan-
nelled to developing countries in order to ensure their full participation in global
efforts for environmental protection,
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PART I
1. DECIDES to convene the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, which shall be of two weeks' duration and shall have the highest
possible level of participation, to coincide with World Environment Day, on 5 June
1992;
2. ACCEPTS with deep appreciation the generous offer of the Government of
Brazil to act as host to the Conference;
3. AFFIRMS that the Conference should elaborate strategies and measures to hall
and reverse the effects of environmental degradation in the context of increased
national and international efforts to promote sustainable and environmentally sound
development in all countries;
4. AFFIRMS also that the protection and enhancement of the environment are
major issues that affect the well-being of peoples and economic development
throughout the world;
5. AFFIRMS further that the promotion of economic growth in developing
countries is essential to address problems of environmental degradation;
6. AFFIRMS the importance of a supportive international economic climate con-
ducive to sustained economic growth and development in all countries for the
protection and sound management of the environment;
7. REAFFIRMS that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and
the applicable principles of international law, States have the sovereign right to
exploit their own resources pursuant to their environmental policies, and also
reaffirms their responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or con-
trol do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction and to play their due role in preserving and protecting
the global and regional environment in accordance with their capacities and specific
responsibilities;
8. AFFIRMS the responsibility of States, in accordance with national legislation
and applicable international law, for the damage to the environment and natural
resources caused by activities within their jurisdiction or control through trans-
boundary interference;
9. NOTES that the largest part of the current emission of pollutants into the envir-
onment, including toxic and hazardous wastes, originates in developed countries,
and therefore recognizes that those countries have the main responsibility for
combating such pollution;
10. STRESSES that large industrial enterprises, including transnational cor-
porations, are frequently the repositories of scarce technical skills for the pre-
servation and enhancement of the environment, that they conduct activities in
sectors that have an impact on the environment and, to that extent, have specific
responsibilities and that, in this context, efforts need to be encouraged and
mobilized to protect and enhance the environment in all countries;
11. REAFFIRMS that the serious external indebtedness of developing countries
and other countries with serious debt-servicing problems has to be addressed in an
efficient and urgent manner in order to enable those countries to contribute fully and
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in accordance with their capacities and responsibilities to global efforts to protect
and enhance the environment;
12. AFFIRMS that, in the light of the foregoing, the following environmental
issues, which are not listed in any particular order of priority, are among those of
major concern in maintaining the quality of the Earth's environment and especially
in achieving environmentally sound and sustainable development in all countries:
(a) Protection of the atmosphere by combating climate change, depletion of the
ozone layer and transboundary air pollution;
(b) Protection of the quality and supply of freshwater resources;
(c) Protection of the oceans and all kinds of seas, including enclosed and semi-
enclosed seas, and coastal areas and the protection, rational use and develop-
ment of their living resources;
(d) Protection and management of land resources by, inter alia, combating defores-
tation, desertification and drought;
(e) Conservation of biological diversity;
(f) Environmentally sound management of biotechnology;
(g) Environmentally sound management of wastes, particularly hazardous wastes,
and of toxic chemicals, as well as prevention of illegal international traffic in
toxic and dangerous products and wastes;
(h) Improvement of the living and working environment of the poor in urban slums
and rural areas, through the eradication of poverty by, inter alia, implementing
integrated rural and urban development programmes, as well as taking other
appropriate measures at all levels necessary to stem the degradation of the
environment;
(i) Protection of human health conditions and improvement of the quality of life;
13. EMPHASIZES the need to strengthen international co-operation for the man-
agement of the environment to ensure its protection and enhancement and the need
to explore the issue of benefits derived from activities, including research and devel-
opment, related to the protection and development of biological diversity;
14. REAFFIRMS the need to strengthen international co-operation, particularly
between developed and developing countries, in research and development and the
utilization of environmentally sound technologies;
15. DECIDES that the Conference, in addressing environmental issues in the
developmental context, should have the following objectives:
(a) To examine the state of the environment and changes that have occurred since
the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held in 1972, and
since the adoption of such international agreements as the Plan of Action to
Combat Desertification, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer, adopted on 22 March 1985, and the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, adopted on 16 September 1987, taking into
account the actions taken by all countries and intergovernmental organizations
to protect and enhance the environment;
(b) To identify strategies to be co-ordinated regionally and globally, as appropriate,
for concerted action to deal with major environmental issues in the socio-
economic development processes of all countries within a particular time-frame;
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(c) To recommend measures to be taken at the national and international levels to
protect and enhance the environment, taking into account the specific needs of
developing countries, through the development and implementation of policies
for sustainable and environmentally sound development with special emphasis
on incorporating environmental concerns in the economic and social develop-
ment process and of various sectoral policies and through, inter alia, preventive
action at the sources of environmental degradation, clearly identifying the
sources of such degradation and appropriate remedial measures, in all
countries;
(d) To promote the further development of international environmental law, taking
into account the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment,S as well as the special needs and concerns of the developing
countries, and to examine in this context the feasibility of elaborating general
rights and obligations of States, as appropriate, in the field of the environment,
and taking into account relevant existing international legal instruments;
(e) To examine ways and means further to improve co-operation in the field of pro-
tection and enhancement of the environment between neighbouring countries,
with a view to eliminating adverse environmental effects;
(0 To examine strategies for national and international action with a view to arriv-
ing at specific agreements and commitments by Governments for defined activ-
ities to deal with major environmental issues in order to restore the global
ecological balance and to prevent further deterioration of the environment,
taking into account the fact that the largest part of the current emission of pol-
lutants into the environment, including toxic and hazardous wastes, originates
in developed countries, and therefore recognizing that those countries have the
main responsibility for combating such pollution;
(g) To accord high priority to drought and desertification control and to consider
all means necessary, including financial, scientific and technological resources,
to halt and reverse the process of desertification with a view to preserving the
ecological balance of the planet;
(h) To examine the relationship between environmental degradation and the inter-
national economic environment, with a view to ensuring a more integrated
approach to problems of environment and development in relevant inter-
national forums without introducing new forms of conditionality;
(i) To examine strategies for national and international action with a view to arriv-
ing at specific agreements and commitments by Governments and by inter-
governmental organizations for defined activities to promote a supportive
international economic climate conducive to sustained and environmentally
sound development in all countries, with a view to combating poverty and
improving the quality of life, and bearing in mind that the incorporation of
environmental concerns and considerations in development planning and poli-
cies should not be used to introduce new forms of conditionality in aid or in
development financing and should not serve as a pretext for creating unjustified
barriers to trade;
(j) To identify ways and means of providing new and additional financial
resources, particularly to developing countries, for environmentally sound
5 Report of the UN Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972. and
corrigendum (UN publication, Sales No. E.73.II.A.l4), chapter I.
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development programmes and projects in accordance with national develop-
ment objectives, priorities and plans and to consider ways of effectively moni-
toring the provision of such new and additional financial resources, particularly
to developing countries, so as to enable the international community to take
further appropriate action on the basis of accurate and reliable data;
(k) To identify ways and means of providing additional financial resources for
measures directed towards solving major environmental problems of global
concern and especially of supporting those countries, in particular developing
countries, for which the implementation of such measures would entail a
special or abnormal burden, owing, in particular, to their lack of financial
resources, expertise or technical capacity;
(I) To consider various funding mechanisms, including voluntary ones, and to
examine the possibility of a special international fund and other innovative
approaches, with a view to ensuring, on a favourable basis, the most effective
and expeditious transfer of environmentally sound technologies to developing
countries;
(m) To examine, with a view to making recommendations on effective modalities
for favourable access to, and transfer of, environmentally sound technologies,
in particular to the developing countries, including on concessional and pre-
ferential terms, and on modalities for supporting all countries in their efforts to
create and develop their endogenous technological capacities in the field of
scientific research and development, as well as in the acquisition of relevant
information, and, in this context, to explore the concept of assured access for
developing countries to environmentally sound technologies, in its relation to
proprietary rights, with a view to developing effective responses to the needs of
developing countries in this area;
(n) To promote the development of human resources, particularly in developing
countries, for the protection and enhancement of the environment;
(0) To recommend measures to Governments and the relevant bodies of the United
Nations system, with a view to strengthening technical co-operation with the
developing countries to enable them to develop and strengthen their capacity
for identifying, analysing, monitoring, managing or preventing environmental
problems in accordance with their national development plans, objectives and
priorities;
(P) To promote open and timely exchange of information on national envir-
onmental policies, situations and accidents;
(q) To review and examine the role of the United Nations system in dealing with
the environment and possible ways of improving it;
(r) To promote the development or strengthening of appropriate institutions at the
national, regional and global levels to deal with environmental matters in the
context of the socio-economic development processes of all countries;
(s) To promote environmental education, especially of the younger generation, as
well as other measures to increase awareness of the value of the environment;
(t) To promote international co-operation within the United Nations system in
monitoring, assessing and anticipating environmental threats and in rendering
assistance in cases of environmental emergency;
(u) To specify the respective responsibilities of and support to be given by the
organs, organizations and programmes of the United Nations system for the
implementation of the recommendations of the Conference;
I
I
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(v) To quantify the financial requirements for the successful implementation of
Conference decisions and recommendations and to identify possible sources,
including innovative ones, of additional resources;
(w) To assess the capacity of the United Nations system to assist in the prevention
and settlement of disputes in the environmental sphere and to recommend
measures in this field, while respecting existing bilateral and international
agreements that provide for the settlement of such disputes;
PART II
1. DECIDES to establish the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Con-
ference on Environment and Development, which shall be open to all States Mem-
bers of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies, with the
participation of observers, in accordance with the established practice of the General
Assembly;
2. DECIDES that the Preparatory Committee shall hold an organizational session
of two weeks' duration in March 1990 and a final session, both at United Nations
Headquarters, as well as three additional substantive sessions, the first at Nairobi
and the following two at Geneva, the timing and duration of which shall be
detennined by the Preparatory Committee at its organizational session;
3. DECIDES that the Preparatory Committee, at its organizational session, shall
elect, with due regard to equitable geographic representation, a chainnan and other
members of its Bureau, comprising a substantial number of vice-chainnen and a
rapporteur;
4. DECIDES that the host country of the Conference, Brazil, shall be ex officio a
member of the Bureau;
5. REQUESTS the Secretary-General, following the organizational session of the
Preparatory Committee, to establish an appropriate ad hoc secretariat at the United
Nations Office at Geneva, with a unit in New York and another unit in Nairobi, tak-
ing into account the decisions to be made by the Preparatory Committee regarding
the preparatory process for the Conference and based on the principle of equitable
geographic distribution;
6. DECIDES that the ad hoc secretariat will be headed by the Secretary-General
of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, who will be
appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations;
7. REQUESTS the Secretary-General of the United Nations to prepare a report
for the organizational session of the Preparatory Committee containing recom-
mendations on an adequate preparatory process, taking into account the provisions
of the present resolution and the views expressed by Governments in the debate at
the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly;
8. DECIDES that the Preparatory Committee shall:
(a) Draft the provisional agenda of the Conference, in accordance with the
provisions of the present resolution;
(b) Adopt guidelines to enable States to take a harmonized approach in their
preparations and reporting;
258 NEGOTIATING INTERNATIONAL REGIMES
(c) Prepare draft decisions for the Conference and submit them to the Conference
for consideration and adoption;
9. REQUESTS the United Nations Environment Programme, as the main organ
dealing with environmental issues, and other organs, organizations and programmes
of the United Nations system, as well as other relevant intergovernmental organiza-
tions, to contribute fully to the preparations for the Conference on the basis of
guidelines and requirements to be established by the Preparatory Committee;
10. REQUESTS the Secretary-General to ensure the co-ordination of contribu-
tions from the United Nations system through the Administrative Committee on
Co-ordination;
11. INVITES all States to take an active part in the preparations for the Confer-
ence, to prepare national reports, as appropriate, to be submitted to the Preparatory
Committee in a timely manner, and to promote international co-operation and
broad-based national preparatory processes involving the scientific community,
industry, trade unions and concerned non-governmental organizations;
12. REQUESTS relevant non-governmental organizations in consultative status
with the Economic and Social Council to contribute to the Conference, as appropri-
ate;
13. STRESSES the importance of holding regional conferences on environment
and development with the full co-operation of the regional commissions, and rec-
ommends that the results of such regional conferences be introduced into the prepa-
ratory process for the Conference, bearing in mind that regional conferences should
make important substantive contributions to the Conference;
14. DECIDES that the preparatory process and the Conference itself should be
funded through the regular budget of the United Nations without adversely affecting
other ongoing activities and without prejudice to the provision of sources of
extrabudgetary resources;
15. DECIDES to establish a voluntary fund for the purpose of assisting develop-
ing countries, in particular the least developed among them, to participate fully and
effectively in the Conference and in its preparatory process, and invites Govern-
ments to contribute to the fund;
16. REQUESTS the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee to report to the
General Assembly at its forty-fifth and forty-sixth sessions on the progress of work
of the Committee;
17. DECIDES to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth and forty-
sixth sessions an item entitled "United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development".
85th Plenary Meeting
United Nations General Assembly
New York
22 December 1989
Appendix B
The Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development
Preamble
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
Having met at Rio de Janeiro from 3 to 14 June 1992,
Reaffirming the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, adopted at Stockholm on 16 June 1972, and seeking to build upon it,
With the goal of establishing a new and equitable global partnership through the
creation of new levels of cooperation among States, key sectors of societies and
people,
Working towards international agreements which respect the interests of all and
protect the integrity of the global environmental and developmental system,
Recognizing the integral and interdependent nature of the Earth, our home,
Proclaims that:
Principle 1
Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are
entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.
Principle 2
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the prin-
ciples of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources p'lr-
suant to their own environmental and developmental policies, and the responsihiHty
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to
the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Principle 3
The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental
and environmental needs of present and future generations.
Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons Learned from the United Nations Conference on Environment
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Principle 4
In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall
constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in
isolation from it.
Principle 5
All States and all people shall cooperate in the essential task of eradicating
poverty as an indispensable requirement for sustainable development, in order to
decrease the disparities in standards of living and better meet the needs of the
majority of the people of the world.
Principle 6
The special situation and needs of developing countries, particularly the least
developed and those most environmentally vulnerable, shall be given special
priority. International actions in the field of environment and development should
also address the interests and needs of all countries.
Principle 7
States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and
restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem. In view of the different
contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility
that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the
pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and
financial resources they command.
Principle 8
To achieve sustainable development and a higher quality of life for all people,
States should reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and
consumption and promote appropriate demographic policies.
Principle 9
States should cooperate to strengthen endogenous capacity-building for sus-
tainable development by improving scientific understanding through exchanges of
scientific and technological knowledge, and by enhancing the development, adapta-
tion, diffusion and transfer of technologies, including new and innovative
technologies.
Principle 10
Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned
citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appro-
priate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public
authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in their
communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes.
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States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making
information widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative
proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.
Principle 11
States shall enact effective environmental legislation. Environmental standards,
management objectives and priorities should reflect the environmental and develop-
mental context to which they apply. Standards applied by some countries may be
inappropriate and of unwarranted economic and social cost to other countries, in
particular developing countries.
Principle 12
States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic
system that would lead to economic growth and sustainable development in all
countries, to better address the problems of environmental degradation. Trade policy
measures for environmental purposes should not constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. Uni-
lateral actions to deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the
importing country should be avoided. Environmental measures addressing trans-
boundary or global environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based on
an international consensus.
Principle 13
States shall develop national law regarding liability and compensation for the
victims of pollution and other environmental damage. States shall also cooperate in
an expeditious and more determined manner to develop further international law
regarding liability and compensation for adverse effects of environmental damage
caused by activities within their jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their
jurisdiction.
Principle 14
States should effectively cooperate to discourage or prevent the relocation and
transfer to other States of any activities and substances that cause severe envir-
onmental degradation or are found to be harmful to human health.
Principle 15
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely
applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason
for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
Principle 16
National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of envir-
onmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the
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approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard
to the public interest and without distorting international trade and investment.
Principle 17
Environmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall be undertaken
for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the
environment and are subject to a decision of a competent national authority.
Principle 18
States shall immediately notify other States of any natural disasters or other emer-
gencies that are likely to produce sudden harmful effects on the environment of
those States. Every effort shall be made by the international community to help
States so afflicted.
Principle 19
States shall provide prior and timely notification and relevant information to
potentially affected States on activities that may have a significant adverse trans-
boundary environmental effect and shall consult with those States at an early stage
and in good faith.
Principle 20
Women have a vital role in environmental management and development. Their
full participation is therefore essential to achieve sustainable development.
Principle 21
The creativity, ideals and courage of the youth of the world should be mobilized
to forge a global partnership in order to achieve sustainable development and ensure
a better future for all.
Principle 22
Indigenous people and their communities, and other local communities, have a
vital role in environmental management and development because of their know-
ledge and traditional practices. States should recognize and duly support their ident-
ity, culture and interests and enable their effective participation in the achievement
of sustainable development.
Principle 23
The environment and natural resources of people under oppression, domination
and occupation shall be protected.
Principle 24
Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall there-
fore respect international law providing protection for the environment in times of
armed conflict and cooperate in its further development, as necessary.
APPENDIX B: RIO DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 263
Principle 25
Peace, development and environmental protection are interdependent and
indivisible.
Principle 26
States shall resolve all their environmental disputes peacefully and by appropriate
means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
Principle 27
States and people shall cooperate in good faith and in a spirit of partnership in the
fulfillment of the principles embodied in this Deciaration and in the further
development of international law in the field of sustainable development.
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Agenda 21: Programme ofAction for Sustainable
Development - Table of Contents
I. Preamble
SECTION 1: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS
2. International cooperation to accelerate sustainable development in developing
countries and related domestic policies
3. Combating poverty
4. Changing consumption patterns
5. Demographic dynamics and sustainability
6. Protecting and promoting human health
7. Promoting sustainable human settlement development
8. Integrating environment and development in decision-making
SECTION 2: CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF
RESOURCES FOR DEVELOPMENT
9. Protection of the atmosphere
10. Integrated approach to the planning and management of land resources
II. Combating deforestation
12. Managing fragile ecosystems:
Combating desertification and drought
13. Managing fragile ecosystems:
Sustainable mountain development
14. Promoting sustainable agriculture and rural development
15. Conservation of biological diversity
16. Environmentally sound management of biotechnology
17. Protection of the oceans, all kinds of seas, including enclosed and semi-
enclosed seas, and coastal areas and the protection, rational use and develop-
ment of their living resources
18. Protection of the quality and supply of freshwater resources:
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Application of integrated approaches to the development, management and use
of water resources
19. Environmentally sound management of toxic chemicals, including prevention
of illegal international traffic in toxic and dangerous products
20. Environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes, including pre-
vention of illegal international traffic in hazardous wastes
21. Environmentally sound management of solid wastes and sewage-related issues
22. Safe and environmentally sound management of radioactive wastes
SECTION 3: STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF MAJOR GROUPS
23. Preamble
24. Global action for women towards sustainable and equitable development
25. Children and youth in sustainable development
26. Recognizing and strengthening the role of indigenous people and their com-
munities
27. Strengthening the role of non-governmental organizations:
Partners for sustainable development
28. Local authorities' initiatives in support of Agenda 21
29. Strengthening the role of workers and their trade unions
30. Strengthening the role of business and industry
31. Scientific and technological community
32. Strengthening the role of farmers
SECTION 4: MEANS OF IMPLEMENTATION
33. Financial resources and mechanisms
34. Transfer of environmentally sound technology, cooperation and capacity-
building
35. Science for sustainable development
36. Promoting education, public awareness and training
37. National mechanisms and international cooperation for capacity-building in
developing countries
38. International institutional arrangements
39. International legal instruments and mechanisms
40. Information for decision-making
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